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EDITED BY DEXTER HOYOS



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A COMPANION TO THE PUNIC WARS

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Abbreviations



<i>Acta Tr.:</i>	<i>Fasti Triumphales</i>
<i>AHB:</i>	<i>Ancient History Bulletin</i>
<i>AJA:</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJP:</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Anc. Hist. Bull.:</i>	see <i>AHB</i>
<i>Anc. Soc.:</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i>
<i>Ann.:</i>	<i>Annales</i>
<i>AntAfr:</i>	<i>Antiquités Africaines</i>
<i>ANRW:</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt</i>
<i>Apol.:</i>	see <i>Apuleius</i>
<i>Appian, BC:</i>	<i>Bella Civilia</i>
<i>Hann.:</i>	<i>Hannibalica</i>
<i>Iber.:</i>	<i>Iberica</i>
<i>Ill.:</i>	<i>Illyrica</i>
<i>Lib.:</i>	<i>Libyca</i>
<i>Mac.:</i>	<i>Macedonica</i>
<i>Mith.:</i>	<i>Mithridatica</i>
<i>Samn.:</i>	<i>Samnitica</i>
<i>Sic.:</i>	<i>Sicelica</i>
<i>Syr.:</i>	<i>Syriaca</i>
<i>Aristotle, Pol.:</i>	<i>Politics</i>
<i>BAfr.:</i>	<i>Bellum Africum</i>
<i>BAlex.:</i>	<i>Bellum Alexandrinum</i>
<i>BIDR:</i>	<i>Bullettino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano</i>
<i>ca.:</i>	<i>circa</i>
<i>Caesar, BCiv.:</i>	<i>Bellum Civile</i>
<i>BGall.:</i>	<i>Bellum Gallicum</i>
<i>CAH:</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> (1st edn.)
<i>CAH²:</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> (2nd edn.)
<i>cf.:</i>	(= <i>confer</i>) compare

Cic.:	Cicero
2 Verr.:	<i>Second Verrines</i>
Amic.:	<i>de Amicitia</i>
Att.:	<i>ad Atticum</i>
Balb.:	<i>pro Balbo</i>
Cato Maior	= <i>de Senectute</i>
Div.:	<i>de Divinationes</i>
Fin.:	<i>de Finibus</i>
Leg. Man.:	<i>pro Lege Manilia</i> (= <i>de Imperio Cn. Pompei</i>)
Nat. D.:	<i>de Natura Deorum</i>
Off.:	<i>de Officiis</i>
Rep.:	<i>de Republica</i>
Senect.:	<i>de Senectute</i>
CIG:	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
CIL:	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
CISA:	<i>Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica</i>
Class. Philol.:	<i>Classical Philology</i>
cos.:	consul (with year of office)
CP:	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ:	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR:	<i>Classical Review</i>
CUF:	<i>Collections des Universités de France</i>
D.H.:	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
DCPP:	<i>Dictionnaire des Civilisations Phénicienne et Punique</i>
de Vir. Ill.:	<i>de Viris Illustribus</i>
Diod.:	Diodorus
Dion. Hal.:	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
ed.:	editor, edited (by)
edn.:	edition
eds.:	editors
Ennius V ³ :	Ennius, ed. Vahlen (3rd edn.)
Epist.:	<i>Epistulae</i>
Epit.:	<i>Epitome</i>
Eutr.:	Eutropius
F. Cap.:	<i>Fasti Capitolini</i>
FGrH:	<i>Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i>
Flor.:	Florus
fr., frg., frgs.:	fragment(s)
FRH:	<i>Die Frühen Römischen Historiker</i> (ed. Beck & Walter)
Front. Strat.:	<i>Strategemata</i>
FTr:	<i>Fasti Triumphales</i>
G&R:	<i>Greece & Rome</i>


Gell.:	Gellius
GRBS:	<i>Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies</i>
HAAN:	see Gsell (Bibliography)
Hdt.:	Herodotus
HN:	see Pliny
Hor. <i>Od.</i> :	Horace, <i>Odes</i>
HRR:	Peter, <i>Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae</i>
HSCP:	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
HZ:	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>I Congr. di Studi Fen. e Pun.</i> :	<i>I Congresso di Studi Fenici e Punici</i>
IG:	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
IGRR:	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas pertinentes</i>
ILLRP:	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i>
ILS:	Dessau, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i>
<i>Inscr. It.</i> :	Degrassi, <i>Inscriptiones Italicae</i>
JRS:	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
Just.:	Justin
KAI:	H. Donner & W. Röllig (eds.), <i>Kanaanäische und Aramäische Inschriften</i> , 3rd edn., 3 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964
LCM:	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
Livy, <i>Per.</i> :	<i>Periochae</i>
LTUR:	<i>Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae</i>
MDAI (R):	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Römische Abteilung)</i>
MEFRA:	<i>Mélanges de l'École française à Rome (Antiquité)</i>
<i>Mél.</i> :	<i>Mélanges</i>
<i>Mél. École Fr. de Rome (Ant.)</i> :	see MEFRA
<i>Mitteil. d. Deutsch Arch. Instituts (Röm. Abt.)</i> :	see MDAI (R)
MRR:	Broughton, <i>Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i>
<i>Mus. Afr.</i> :	<i>Museum Africum</i>
n., nn.:	note(s)
Naevius, <i>fr. com.</i> :	<i>fragmenta comica</i>
NC:	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
Nep. <i>Hamil.</i> :	Nepos, <i>Hamilcar</i>
Nep. <i>Hann.</i> :	Nepos, <i>Hannibal</i>
ORF:	Malcovati, <i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i>

<i>Orig.:</i>	<i>Origines</i>
Oros.:	Orosius
P, P ² (citations of Roman historians):	HRR ed. Peter
Paul. Diac., <i>Hist. Lang.</i> :	Paul the Deacon, <i>Historia Langobardorum</i>
PCPS:	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>Per.</i> :	see Livy, <i>Per.</i>
<i>PHamb.</i> :	<i>Hamburg Papyri</i>
<i>PRyl.</i> :	<i>Rylands Papyri</i>
Pliny, <i>HN</i> & <i>NH</i> :	<i>Historia Naturalis</i>
Plut.:	Plutarch
<i>Fab.</i> :	<i>Fabius</i>
<i>Flam.</i> :	<i>Flaminius</i>
<i>Lys.</i> :	<i>Lysander</i>
<i>Marc.</i> :	<i>Marcellus</i>
<i>Mor.</i> :	<i>Moralia</i>
<i>Pyrrh.</i> :	<i>Pyrrhus</i>
<i>Ti. Gr.</i> :	<i>Tiberius Gracchus</i>
Pol.:	Polybius
<i>praef.</i> :	<i>praefatio</i>
Roman Praenomina:	A. (Aulus), Ap. (Appius), C. (Gaius), Cn. (Gnaeus), D. (Decimus), L. (Lucius), M. (Marcus), M'. (Manius), N. (Numerius), P. (Publius), Q. (Quintus), Ser. (Servius), T. (Titus), Ti. (Tiberius)
<i>R&C:</i>	<i>Religioni e Civiltà</i>
<i>RE:</i>	Pauly-Wissowa, <i>Realencyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>REA:</i>	<i>Revue des Études Anciennes</i>
<i>Rep.</i> :	see Cicero
<i>Rev. Afr.</i> :	<i>Revue Africaine</i>
<i>Rev. Ét. Anc.</i> :	see <i>REA</i>
<i>Rev. Hist.</i> :	<i>Revue Historique</i>
<i>RFC:</i>	<i>Rivista di Filologia Classica</i>
<i>RhM:</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
<i>RIDA:</i>	<i>Revue internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité</i>
<i>RIN:</i>	<i>Rivista italiana di numismatica e scienze affini</i>
<i>ROL:</i>	Warmington, <i>Remains of Old Latin</i>
<i>RSA:</i>	<i>Rivista Storica dell'Antichità</i>
Sall. <i>BJ</i> :	Sallust, <i>Bellum Iugurthinum</i>
Schol. Bob.:	Scholia Bobiensia


Sen. <i>Ep(ist)</i> ..:	Seneca, <i>Epistula(e)</i>
Serv. <i>ad Georg.</i> , <i>ad Aen.</i> :	Servius on <i>Georgics</i> , <i>Aeneid</i>
Sil., <i>Pun.</i> :	Silius Italicus, <i>Punica</i>
SNG:	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum</i> , numerous vols.
Stob. <i>Flor.</i> :	Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>
Suet. <i>Rhet.</i> , <i>Gramm.</i> , <i>Div. Iul.</i> , <i>Tib.</i> :	Suetonius, <i>de Rhetoribus</i> , <i>de Grammaticis</i> , <i>Divus Iulius</i> , <i>Tiberius</i>
SVA:	(Bengtson, Schmitt) <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> , vols. 2 and 3
<i>Syll.</i> :	<i>Sylloge</i>
Tac.:	Tacitus
TAPA: <i>Association</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Thuc.:	Thucydides
TLE:	(Pallotino) <i>Testimonia Lingua Etruscae</i>
tr.:	translator, translated by
Val. Max.:	Valerius Maximus
Varro, <i>Rust.</i> :	<i>de Re Rustica</i> (= <i>de Agricultura</i>)
<i>LL</i> :	<i>de Lingua Latina</i>
Vell. Pat.:	Velleius Paterculus
Zon.:	Zonaras
Zos.:	Zosimus
ZPE:	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>




Map 1 Carthage



Map 2 Rome, third and second centuries BC



Map 3 The Mediterranean, third century BC



Map 4 Punic North Africa



Map 5 Italy and islands

Introduction: The Punic Wars

It was a welcome opportunity to be invited to edit the Blackwell *Companion to the Punic Wars* and so to gather a body of specialist contributors who would illuminate not only the military aspects of these famous conflicts but also many other linked themes. The *Companion* aims to fit the warfare into its complex environment to illuminate the culture, background, demography and postwar fortunes of the two states that fought each other to the death over a hundred and twenty years.

The Punic Wars marked the beginning of Rome's imperial expansion and ended Carthage's. The issue was not a foregone conclusion until 201 BC: more than once, especially during the Second War, it could have turned the other way. Together with a range of Roman leaders celebrated in literature and tradition — Regulus, Fabius the Delayer, Marcellus the captor of Syracuse, Scipio Africanus, his adoptive grandson Scipio Aemilianus, and Cato the Censor — the conflicts made famous the only Carthaginian with as notable a name today, not always for accurate reasons, as in the ancient world, and two other great North African leaders who by contrast are undeservedly forgotten, Hannibal's father Hamilcar and Masinissa of Numidia.

The historical record of these figures and their world is variedly askew. Apart from a few quotations and papyrus fragments, the written accounts that survive are all by Greek and Roman authors, from Polybius who watched Carthage burn in 146 BC to sometimes uncomprehending summary-compilers of late Roman times. Roman tradition, and increasingly Greek, viewed the Carthaginians as quintessential fraudsters and warmongers, memorably summed up by the philosopher-biographer Plutarch around AD 100:

bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to decisions, disagreeable and hard in their attitude towards playfulness and urbanity. (*Moralia* 799D)

By contrast, Rome and the Romans of this era of conflict were largely held to be solidly virtuous and heroic, not to mention much put upon by their cunning adversaries: who, it followed logically, were entirely to blame for the wars. This bias forms one of the modern scholar's constant preoccupations when assessing any aspect of the Punic Wars, as this *Companion* illustrates in every chapter.

The ancient accounts are askew in other ways too. They survive unevenly, another scholarly cross to bear, for most detailed Greek and Roman historical works did not make it unscathed out of the Middle Ages. Those that treat of the three Punic Wars are in a particularly unfortunate state. Only Polybius' first five books (out of 40) are complete, although we do have sizeable extracts from the rest; Livy's account of only the Second War has come through, though with short epitomes of his books on the others; Diodorus' world history is down to excerpts for the centuries after 300 BC; and Dio's monumental history of Rome is represented solely in excerpts and in a Byzantine epitome for all the centuries before Cicero's and Caesar's. As a result our knowledge of the First Punic War and the Third is lopsided and almost monochrome: the only detailed information on the First comes in Polybius' condensed version and, on the Third, in Appian's fairly short narrative which, in agreeable contrast to his treatment of the previous two, draws partly on Polybius' lost account — but also devotes plenty of space to rather less admirable, Appian-composed speeches.

That Appian is the major source for a war fought three centuries before his own day illustrates another problem. Polybius alone was a contemporary of any war; Livy and Diodorus lived and wrote 100 to 150 years after him, and the rest still later. How all of them utilized earlier sources, including documents like the texts of treaties, what sources each chose to utilize, and how they organized the information they drew from these are among the most debated issues in Punic Wars studies. Livy, for example, used Polybius extensively and thus could read his verbatim quotation of Hannibal's treaty with Macedon, as we still can: why did he choose to offer without comment an improbably biased version, presumably found in an earlier Roman author?

A fourth source problem is compounded by the other three. Most Greek and Roman authors were inexpert or uninterested in technical matters, from military realities to topography and chronology, and their decided preference was for dramatic and psychological retellings. Polybius does offer some discussion, almost too compressed, of why the First Punic War broke out, whereas

what we have of Diodorus and Dio on the outbreak of the First Punic War shows them interested mainly in the personal confrontations between Mamertines, Carthaginians, and Romans around the straits of Messina in summer 264 (Dio's efforts at explaining the background are merely a series of generalizations about mutual fear and territorial covetousness). Reporting how Scipio Africanus' first peace treaty with Carthage, in 203, was received by the Senate at Rome, Livy supplies participants with plenty of oratory while insisting that the treaty was rejected, a striking contrast to Polybius' evidence of ratification — which Livy himself soon afterwards assumes to have happened. His account of the climactic battle of Zama, in turn, is bizarrely at odds with Polybius' which he seems not to understand fully (a Livian hazard also found elsewhere in his work); though it is not as bizarre as that of Appian, who like the epic poet Silius was determined to insert a hand-to-hand joust between the two great generals. Polybius himself, with all his disdain for careless armchair historiography, can be vague or simply wrong at times: as in his narrative, almost place-name-free, of Hannibal's passage over the Alps and his implausible account of Scipio's early political career.

The virtues of our ancient sources deserve acknowledgment, all the same. They provide names, details of places, and a huge range of military, political, diplomatic, administrative, social, and even (especially in Livy) economic and religious information. Predictably, there are enough discrepancies and sometimes contradictions between accounts to make the task of establishing a reasonably true picture of any topic a contentious one. Yet no study of Punic War themes, this *Companion* included, would be possible without the materials, expansive, concise, or fragmentary, in the varied writings that survive.

Archaeological evidence and numismatics are in turn valuable in illuminating the societies, cultures, and religions involved in the wars, although they cannot to any great extent clarify the “action history” — politics, diplomacy, warfare, and individuals. The rather small number of inscriptions from those centuries is invaluable, from the epitaphs of some of the Scipio family, and a (possibly) third-century milestone on a road in western Sicily, to the broken text of Rome's treaty with the Aetolians in 212 and second-century BC memorials to royal Numidians, inscribed in the Punic language, in territories previously Carthaginian. Of all the epigraphic materials that once existed, the one that probably most historians wish had survived would surely be Hannibal's personal record, in Punic and Greek, of his campaigns in Italy down to 206 in the temple of Hera (Juno) on Cape Lacinium, today Capo Colonna, in southern Italy.

The Punic Wars created a “national” Roman story of almost Trojan War resonance, with its cast of heroic characters, figures flawed or tragic (such as Regulus and Flaminius), and the larger-than-life enemy — hateful yet also admired — personified by Hannibal. The dimensions of warfare were vast for

the ancient Mediterranean world: Polybius describes the First as the greatest known to history until the Second surpassed it, while in the Second the proportions of Rome's and her loyal allies' manpower that were called on for military and naval service approached those of twentieth-century Europe. Hannibal's tactical genius and the dramatic glamour of his crossing of the Alps have gripped the imagination of all eras, and have been esteemed as lessons valuable even to campaign-planners of recent times (notably Graf von Schlieffen and General Norman Schwarzkopf) — though the further lesson, that a sweeping victory does not invariably end one's problems, has always been less welcome. The ruthlessly imposed horrors of the Third war illuminated the realities of great-power hegemony that again could offer lessons to later eras.

Rome's victory in the Second established her domination of the western Mediterranean lands, and freed her to intervene in the east. This was done with a speed and success that stunned observers. Thirteen years after the peace of 201 with Carthage, she had struck down the great-power pretensions of both Alexander the Great's homeland Macedon and the greatest of his successor states, the Seleucid empire, and reduced the entire eastern Mediterranean potentially to satellite status. By 167 Macedon itself had ceased to exist and Rome had reinforced her eastern hegemony. It prompted Polybius' famous introductory question:

Who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what political system the Romans in less than fifty-three years [to 167 BC] have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole rule [*arche*] — something not to be found in all previous history? (Pol. 1.1.5)

The ultimate result, after his time, was the Roman empire bounded by the Atlantic, the Sahara, and the great rivers of central Europe and Mesopotamia, remembered and sometimes envied down the ages. Polybius was more prescient than even he knew.

One might wonder what the result would have been had Hannibal and Carthage been victorious instead of Scipio and Rome. With Rome, Italy, and the western lands under Carthage's *arche*, subjection of the east would not have been long in coming (especially if Hannibal continued in control; in 201 he was only 46). An empire speaking Punic and Greek, or Punic, Greek, and also Latin, might ultimately have stretched from the Atlantic to the Euphrates — if not beyond.

Our *Companion to the Punic Wars* does not attempt para-factual history, but explores as wide a range of topics and questions as possible that arise from the perennially challenging subject of the three wars. An internationally collaborative volume, it does not aim at uniform viewpoints or follow any

ideology. It does not impose artificially strict bounds on each chapter's topic either, for one strength of a broad spectrum of scholarly contributors is that differing interpretations of the same or a similar issue will be presented, appropriate to the healthy diversity of views in current historiography: as a notable instance, the variety of modern scholarly views about the reasons why the wars occurred at all.

The chapters contributed by scholars writing in other languages have been translated by language specialists whose work the Editor takes much pleasure in acknowledging: Dr Tomas Drevikovsky (German), Dr Diana Modesto (Italian), and Mrs Robyn Rihani (French). Dr Naco del Hoyo's chapter was translated by the Editor. Throughout the long gestation of the *Companion* the support of Wiley-Blackwell's editorial team, especially Galen Smith and Haze Humbert, has been constant and is deeply appreciated. The learned collaboration, and the patience, of the Editor's fellow contributors are also deeply appreciated: he hopes that the *Companion* will satisfy them as fully as, he also hopes, it will our readers.

DEXTER HOYOS

Sydney: June 2010

PART I

**BACKGROUND
AND SOURCES**

CHAPTER ONE

The Rise of Rome to 264 BC

John Serrati

Now I will set forth the glory that awaits the Trojan race, the illustrious souls of the Italian heirs to our name. I will teach you your destiny... Under [Romulus'] auspices, my son, Rome's empire will encompass the Earth, its glory will rival Olympus... This will be your destiny, Roman, to rule the world with your power. These will be your arts: to establish peace, to spare the humbled, and to conquer the proud.

By the time Vergil put these words into the mouth of Anchises as he showed his son Aeneas the glories that awaited his lineage, Rome controlled the entire Mediterranean and had already established itself as one of history's leading imperial states. In the last decades of the first century, though in all likelihood going back to Cicero, there was a belief among some Romans that it was their destiny to rule an empire, that they had not become so powerful simply by happenstance but because conquest was somehow part of their psyche, and that early on in their history they were marked out as different, even gifted, when it came to the art of war. It has recently been argued that at no point in its history was the Roman Republic ever markedly more aggressive or imperialistic than contemporary states, yet it is unlikely that Rome owed the empire of Cicero or Vergil's times merely to the might of its legions.¹

By the fourth century Rome was almost certainly militarized to a far greater extent than any of its neighbors, and within a short time a hypercompetitive, aggressive, and warlike nobility would emerge as leaders of the state, while the classes that made up the common soldiery themselves favored war due to the plunder which it provided. These elements fused with Latin manpower in 338 in a settlement that gave the Romans unmatched resources of human capital. It should therefore be seen as no coincidence that serious conquest and warfare began in the fourth century; this was the era that laid the foundations of

the large-scale conquests that were to come post-264. In fact, it would not be an overstatement to say that by the dawn of the third century, warfare must be seen as a binding force in Roman society, and Rome itself had become a state socialized to make war.

Yet what is equally clear is that it was not always this way. The city that existed prior to the fourth century appears in no way extraordinary in comparison to many of its peers on the peninsula. It likely began around the *forum Boarium* area as an *emporion* for salt from the mouth of the Tiber. Several hill-top villages developed in the area (tenth to ninth centuries) and in the eighth century began to coalesce into one settlement that centered on the Palatine, Capitoline, and the new common area of the Forum. At some point the region fell under the dominance of a series of warlords or tyrants, whom the later Romans called kings, but these fell eventually to an aristocracy that had been gaining power for some time and established an oligarchy in the late sixth century. Even at this stage, there appears to have been nothing atypical about Rome, beyond the fact that it was by now the largest urban centre in Latium. Nevertheless within a little more than a hundred years Rome did emerge as a highly aggressive military state. The process by which the city went from village to the brink of empire forms the central theme of this chapter.

Pre-Republican Rome

The belief that Rome was predestined to rule an empire perhaps goes back even further than Cicero to Marcus Terentius Varro in the first century, who more than anyone else is responsible for the canonization of early Roman history. But he was not the first to look into Rome's distant past: the earliest writers to mention the city are, perhaps unsurprisingly, Greek. Hellanicus in the fifth century first seized upon the lines from the *Iliad* (20.302–305) that predicted the survival of Aeneas; he then had the Trojan hero go west and eventually found Rome. Other Greek writers, such as Damastes, repeated the story, while Alcimus in the fourth century first connected it with Romulus, the native eponymous founder of Rome, whom he made Aeneas' son. Timaeus, Antigonus, and finally the Roman historian Fabius Pictor expanded greatly on these themes in the third century; by the second century, Roman antiquarians were at pains to establish a legitimate connection between the Trojan Aeneas and the Roman Romulus. The former became the distant ancestor of the latter, who went on to found Rome—according to Varro, whose date became the most accepted—in 753.²

Remus does not seem to have been part of the early narrative — indeed, amongst ancient cities Rome is quite unique in having two founders — and only makes an appearance in the late fourth or early third century when the

Greek chronicler Diocles incorporated the twins into his work on the foundation of Rome, and when, in 296 specifically, the brothers Ogulnii as curule aediles set up the very first statue in Rome of Romulus and Remus being suckled by the she-wolf.³ Various reasons have been speculated for his late arrival. For example, the philological: “Rumlnas” and “Remne” as the names of two Etruscan *gentes* who once dominated the area that was to become Rome and ruled over the Latins there. Their names were rendered into Latin as Romilius and Remmii (a fifth-century *gens* Romilia Vaticana does appear to have existed). The Romilii either defeated or absorbed the Remmii, hence Romulus killing Remus, and therefore gave their name to the entire area. The political: Romulus’ murder of Remus illustrates the early Roman dominance of the Sabines. Or the imperial: Romulus and Remus symbolize Rome and Capua in their joint rule of Italy in the fourth and third centuries.⁴

However, it is far likelier that the twins represent either patricians and plebeians or the joint consulship perhaps created in 367 (see below), or indeed both, for from 342 onwards plebeians began to hold at least one consulship regularly. Much evidence supports this: first, a tradition in some sources that Remus was a self-sacrificing hero whose blood, albeit spilt by his brother or on Romulus’ order, purified the city walls to make Rome hallowed ground. Furthermore, fourth-century and early third-century objects depicting both being suckled by a she-wolf confirm that in some versions Remus survived and ruled with Romulus; some literary sources also imply this.⁵

By Varro’s time, the mid first century, the myth of Romulus and Remus and the latter’s murder was believed to have happened in 753. It is unsurprising that Varro arrived at this date; as with the Olympic Games beginning in 776, oral history and memory only appear to have gone back to the mid eighth century by the time the first histories were being written. The Varronian date, however, is not borne out by archaeology, which has revealed activity from the fifteenth century and permanent occupation from the tenth. On a natural bend in the Tiber, the area featured well-irrigated agricultural lands and nearby salt flats, probably the main reason that people permanently settled the place at the outset. The easily fordable Tiber made the location also a way-station for trade between the Etruscan north and the Campanian south. Thus, at an early date the settlement came into contact with a host of foreign peoples and influences, from Phoenicians to Etruscans, Campanians, Greeks, and Carthaginians.⁶

The site was supposedly chosen by Romulus because it featured seven hills, although the local topography has to be quite generously manipulated – and undoubtedly was by antiquarians – in order to arrive at this number. Nonetheless, earliest Rome perhaps did encompass seven villages, as remembered via the *Septimontium* (Festival of the seven mounts) that took place annually on 11 December in historical times when ceremonies were held not

on each of the canonical seven hills, but at the sites of the seven prehistoric villages that existed on just three: Germalus and Palatium on the Palatine; Velia at the foot of the Palatine, near one entrance to the future *forum Romanum*; Querquetulanus on the Caelian; and Oppius, Fagutal, and Cispius on the Esquiline. This festival as a whole, and its recognition of the Palatine's two villages, likely originated in and represents a proto-urban phase in the development of Rome; a time before the eighth century. The existence of a wall between Germalus and Palatium may indicate that these places at times even fought one another.⁷

As with the number seven, later Romans may also have been onto something with the date 753. While it certainly does not represent the city's foundation, in the eighth century the first hints of a synoecism are found and the villages apparently coalesce gradually into a single urban settlement. This period sees a greater amount of luxury goods, many of them Greek, coming into the area. Rome's first aristocracy are now displaying their wealth and beginning to utilize chamber tombs. In the decades to come, the first permanent houses, undoubtedly belonging to this same upper class, would be built. By the third quarter of the eighth century the settlement was probably united by the construction of an earthen wall, making it likely that the villages first came together for collective defence.

The existence of such a defensive work, however, has yet to be proven. The first site that we know with certainty to have been communal is the Forum, lying between the Velia, the Palatine and the Capitoline. Votive deposits on the latter indicate that it too came into communal religious use within a few decades of the Forum area being cleared in the mid seventh century, and within the same period was perhaps home to a wooden temple. The Forum itself probably first served as a central meeting place and market. Within a few decades it was expanded to create the first *comitium*, most likely for the *comitia calata* (called assembly) which, as the name suggests, was a gathering of all citizens to hear proclamations from the government as well as the announcement of the *kalendae* and the coming festival days.⁸

Though it is impossible to say with certainty, early Roman society appears to have been organized on the basis of clans or *gentes* (singular *gens*); units comprising multiple families who were not necessarily related to the wealthier families in control at the top. All Romans seem to have belonged to this structure and, like Scottish clans, each *gens* member, whether related or not, took the name of the top family. Thus by the eighth century each Roman had two names, his own and that of his *gens*, and within a couple of hundred years, as the *gentes* grew in size, larger units began to break away forming new clans, until by the sixth century most aristocrats had three names. Moreover, high-ranking members of a *gens* would have large groups of retainers (*sodales*; singular *sodalis*; archaic *suodalis*, *suodales*); not only is this almost certainly the

origin of the later patron-client system in Rome, but is also likely to have been that of several, if not all, of Rome's kings as many of these groups acted as war-bands. While some of these formed Rome's earliest armies, others appear to have aggressively engaged in raiding and at times even conquest. The phenomenon of war-bands was frequently found in Etruscan society as well. Therefore, the "monarchical" period, which later Romans believed lasted from the mid eighth until the late sixth century, in all likelihood represents a time of rule by a series of local and foreign leaders heading *gens*-based war-bands who had either taken the city by force or reached a concordat with the population where their rule was exchanged for protection.⁹

This theory is buttressed by several points. Firstly, the kingship in Rome was not in any way hereditary, and, even if we are generous and add the other leaders of whom we know from this period — Titus Tatius, the brothers Vibenna, Mastarna, and Lars Porsenna — to the canonical list of seven Roman kings, 250 years is far too long a period for 12 men to have ruled in unbroken succession, and thus large gaps are likely to have existed between reigns. Moreover, Mastarna is not an actual name but an Etruscan title meaning *magister* or leader, in all likelihood in a military context: perhaps merely the title of either Caeles or Aulus Vibenna, brothers who certainly headed war-bands and probably conquered and ruled Rome at some point in the sixth century, or of the Roman king Servius Tullius, who one tradition claims was a *suodalis* of Caeles. Finally, these roving war-bands continued to exist well into the fifth century, fighting private wars and attempting to conquer small settlements, including Rome.

Therefore, while later Romans pictured their early kings more along the lines of Hellenistic rulers, and while the deeds of certain monarchs are doubtless mythological, there does appear to have been a significant period in Rome's early history where the city was under the rule of a succession of individuals at the head of powerful war-bands. Some of these certainly, as the legends state, did build up the settlement to the point where it might be described as a city, and were probably responsible for many of Rome's earliest permanent structures. This situation would last until the local aristocracy, following a well-established pattern that had long ago played itself out in Greece and other parts of Italy, felt strong enough to seize power and found what came to be called the *Res Publica*.

The Sixth Century and the Fall of the Monarchy

War-bands are also likely to have been responsible for the early Romans' reputation as raiders and cattle rustlers, reflected both in the legend of Romulus and Remus and in stories of how the former populated early Rome with

criminals and brigands. The raiding and pillaging of neighbors is ubiquitous in Livy's and Dionysius' accounts of early Roman warfare. The rape of the Sabine women fits this context: as in many Indo-European traditions cattle and women are both seen as movable property. Indeed, the oldest version, from Fabius Pictor (fr. 9 (Beck and Walter)) and repeated by Cicero (*Rep.* 2.12–14), sees the women as wholly passive; only Livy (1.9.6–10.1, 11.5–13.5), Ovid (*Fasti* 3.167–258), and Dionysius (2.30–47) later inject them with a personality. Dionysius, in fact, has the Romans carry off women from several different Italian peoples, as they had been doing for some time with neighbors' livestock. The incident may equally reflect early *conubium* between the Romans and the Sabines of the nearby Quirinal hill, which may have ushered in a period of Sabine dominance as our next three kings, Titus Tatius, Numa Pompilius, and Ancus Marcius, are all Sabine. This time also saw the Sabine god Quirinus amalgamated into a divine triad with the Roman Jupiter and Mars, and from pre-literate times all Roman citizens were equally referred to as *Romani* or *Quirites*. Therefore it would appear as though some form of synoecism did take place in the eighth century between the Romans and their Sabine neighbors, perhaps brought about via the conquest of Rome by a series of Sabine warlords and their *suodales*.

Although on the surface the early leaders of Rome might have been clan warriors, some of them nevertheless must have come to act as kings in some way, embodying military, civil, judiciary, and religious authority, for the city did move beyond its belligerent *gens*-based roots. The archaic Latin inscription found under the *Lapis Niger* in the Forum, and to a lesser extent the fourth-century Etruscan tomb at Vulci (often known as the François Tomb), illustrate that Rome was indeed ruled by individuals exercising some sort of legitimate authority. While the tomb features a painting of Mastarna and the brothers Vibenna, proving only that people in the early Republican period believed the kings to have existed, the *Lapis Niger* inscription is more conclusive as it is possibly as early as 600 and clearly mentions a *reks*, archaic for *rex* (king). This is highly significant: the *Lapis Niger* is a small sacred area in the Forum that at one point served as a shrine for a king. It contained an altar and the columnar inscription — much of which is lost — and very likely a statue. Votive objects found in and around the site date from 575–550, confirming a slightly earlier construction date. This coincides with the building of the *Regia* as the king's residence just east of the Forum (a cup from 625–600, inscribed with the word *rex*, has been found nearby). In the Republican period, this building served as the home of the *pontifex maximus*.¹⁰

Rome by the sixth century had emerged as a state with some form of organized government that went far beyond a simple rule of the sword. What caused, and accompanied, this shift was the growing power of the upper class in Rome to influence, and eventually to oppose, the monarch. The Roman

people too reorganized in the same period. It is likely that these were simultaneous responses from both monarch and subjects to each other's growing power. What little organization the very early Roman state had was probably based on *pagi*, small districts or communities. As the villages gradually merged, political activity came to be based on the *curia* and the tribe, both of which, supposedly instituted by Romulus himself, served as the basis for the city's earliest military levies. There eventually came to be three tribes each subdivided into ten *curiae*. The latter, however, were heavily tied to the *gentes* — indeed, they almost certainly evolved out of the clan-based warrior bands described above — as membership was hereditary and each tended to be dominated by one particular family, whose head served as the leader of the *curia*. By the sixth century, just as the king was starting to operate out of the *Regia*, so too did the aristocracy begin to move away from the gentilician system and to reorder themselves.

In what clearly appears to be an early power-sharing agreement, the heads of the *curiae* organized themselves into a single body with the right to advise the reigning monarch. Membership was confined to men over 50; it was clearly envisioned as a council of elders, as is apparent from its name: *senatus* or senate, derived from *senex* (elderly man). That the *curiae* formed the basis of the earliest senate is plain from the fact that their chamber was called the *Curia*. Later Romans believed that it was built by the king Tullus Hostilius, and hence this building was often referred to as the *Curia Hostilia*, but his reign (672–641) is too early, as the foundations of the building go back only to around 600: a chronological symmetry exists between the new epicenter of aristocratic power, the *Curia*, and the seat of royal power in the *Regia*, constructed roughly at the same time.¹¹

In between the *Regia* and the *Curia* stood the *Comitium* and within it the *Lapis Niger*. In this area the earliest voting assembly, the *comitia curiata* — with citizens divided, as the name suggests, by *curiae* — was by now meeting on a regular basis and had begun to vote upon issues that affected the entire community: war, peace, law, and, so we are told, the granting of formal power to a new king. The *curiae* probably evolved out of older clan-based war-bands, and this perhaps explains the Roman propensity for voting in blocks when in an organized assembly. That monarchs by the sixth century had to be formally confirmed in power by at least some citizens speaks volumes about the upper classes' new potency.

In fact the *Lapis Niger* itself may be the greatest symbol of this potency: it defined the *Comitium* as public as opposed to royal space. And the king in its inscription may well have been Servius Tullius, who reorganized Rome's political and military structures midway through the sixth century. By this time the city certainly had a large enough population to make reforms necessary. And while some later constitutional changes are falsely ascribed to him

(see below), it has been postulated that during his reign the *comitia curiata* was either created or reformed to introduce the hoplite phalanx. Other innovations involved new tribes still based on the *gentes* but tied increasingly to location rather than family.

The city was also now asserting its pre-eminence in Latium, and this necessitated using its army more frequently. Thus the new system should probably be seen as primarily military. This entire process, from institutionalizing the monarchy to strengthening aristocratic wealth and political power and organizing the citizenry for military levies, illustrates that Rome was now a fully-fledged state well beyond its roots as clan-based settlements ruled by warlords. These developments culminated with the fall of the monarchy sometime in the late sixth century. While this event was remembered by Romans through the mythological rape of Lucretia, in reality it repeated a phenomenon that had already played itself out around the Mediterranean. With the absence or death of a king around 509, the aristocracy at last felt powerful enough to take full control of the government. Although Lars Porsenna probably forced monarchy on the city one more time, until 504, the process had by then become unstoppable. Expelling Porsenna may have required military action, but really a revolution along the lines of the one led by Lucius Iunius Brutus is not necessary to understand the disappearance of the kingship. The sixth century thus marks a watershed in the history of early Rome.¹²

The Beginnings of the Republic and Rome's Early Wars

Unquestionably, whether the Republic was founded in 509, 508, or 504, the period was accompanied by a degree of strife and chaos. Despite the advances towards organized government, *gens*-based bands of warriors were still common in central Italy and the Romans found themselves frequently at war. More than one warlord attempted to take the city and install himself as its leader (n. 8). This new warfare had several effects: firstly famine, forcing the senate to seek a treaty with Carthage in order to allow grain be imported. This treaty, which Polybius (3.22.3–13) claims to have seen himself and is certainly historical, also gave the Republic a degree of legitimacy in that its government had been recognized by Carthage, the leading power in the western Mediterranean at the time. The concordat itself, furthermore, illustrates that outsiders were not always on the defensive at the end of the sixth century, as it makes clear that Rome, as well as Carthage, had territorial ambitions in central Italy, making this our first concrete evidence for both Roman and Carthaginian imperialism.

The second effect of this period of endemic warfare was civil strife, as we are told that as early as the mid-490s the citizens of Rome clamored for more political representation in return for their increased military responsibilities. This was the beginning of the so-called Struggle of the Orders, a conflict that supposedly continued down to 287. While some have dismissed the earliest accounts of *stasis* as unhistorical, and while two centuries of unabated political turmoil are unlikely, it is nonetheless possible that the “Struggle” was actually a series of independent political standoffs that were conflated into one by later Roman historians. The episodes by and large center on relations between the plebeians and the patricians. The latter, the *patres* of the state, evolved out of those wealthy families who had the right to send one of their members to the earliest form of the senate during the monarchical period. By the late sixth century this had become a closed caste, and in the early Republic they exercised a lock on political and religious offices.

Plebeians, regardless of how much wealth they amassed, could never move up in status. Many theories have been postulated concerning the origins of the plebeians, but it seems that the simplest is also the most likely: they were Romans who were not patricians. Moreover, it is important to note that the Struggle of the Orders, whether one or a series of conflicts, was no democratic revolution; Roman society did emerge in the third century with a “mixed constitution” where the people had some power, but the political battles of the preceding two centuries were fought by and for well-off plebeians who believed that their wealth, which now often rivalled that of individual patricians, entitled them to a share of the opportunities and the prestige that accompanied political office at Rome.¹³

Warfare appears to have increased dramatically in scale and in ferocity after around 500, and our sources speak of conflicts happening on an almost annual basis. Famine in central Italy added to the chaos as via the *ver sacrum* various settlements evicted groups of young men, who often turned to a life of raiding and looting. Throughout the period the cities on Italy’s western coast came under frequent attack, and the Romans themselves fought many battles at their very walls and, at least once, within the city itself. Unsurprisingly, Rome experienced a decline in wealth and prosperity. Far fewer imported goods entered the city and there was a marked decrease in permanent architecture. Nevertheless, Rome remained the leading city in Latium, becoming its hegemon and leading a common defence.¹⁴

Rome now required greater amounts of men to serve in the army. Moreover, by this time the city had adopted the hoplite phalanx, and the larger this formation was, the better it functioned. There is no doubt of the military nature that was at the heart of these internal conflicts at Rome, and it has been argued that the early phase of the Struggle of the Orders in fact constituted an Italian hoplite revolution. As there is no reason for the *comitia centuriata* to have

been initiated by Servius Tullius, as several of our sources claim, it was probably created during the early part of this period, as one of the first concessions from the patricians in return for the plebeians' military service. The martial nature of this assembly is obvious from its organization as well as the fact that it had to meet outside of the *pomerium* on the *Campus Martius*, where the legions were chosen. Furthermore, in 357 the Romans banned political assemblies that took place far from the city, and thus we can infer that, from its inception until this point, the *comitia centuriata* was still viewed in some way as a type of warriors' assembly, and could be convened by a consul while on campaign. All the same, the creation of this political body in itself provides a clear example of how Rome was gradually leaving clan-based groups of warriors behind in favor of a military organized and commanded by the state.

The *comitia centuriata* took over the main functions of the *comitia curiata*, which gradually sank in importance. The centuriate assembly dealt with issues that affected the entire citizen body, in particular the election of magistrates, who would often serve as generals in the army, and it voted on declarations of war and on peace treaties. Thus its primary function was to ensure that the state only went to war with the approval of the people and that these had some say in whom they had as leaders. All of this strongly bolsters the argument that the *comitia centuriata* was an early-fifth-century creation, born out of military necessity brought on by a dramatic increase in the number of wars the Romans had to fight. All the same, it was dominated by the wealthy and thus it is not long before we hear of renewed strife at Rome. In 494 the patricians acceded to the creation of a new assembly, one just for plebeians, the *concilium plebis*. And to run this assembly, as well as to protect plebeians from increasing threats of debt-bondage from the patricians, a body of ten tribunes was created, each one armed with a new weapon, the veto, which gave these magistrates the ability to call a halt to political proceedings that they determined acted against plebeian interests. As a foil to this, around 471, when the *concilium plebis* began to organize itself by tribe, the patricians possibly created the final Roman assembly, the *comitia tributa*, which, as it was organized by tribe, was more efficient than the *comitia centuriata* and was able to pass laws much faster and with shorter notice.¹⁵

The Struggle appears to have cooled by the mid fifth century, but the military situation from which it was born remained. Thus, as the role of the people at Rome evolved, so too did the way in which the city was governed. Although the Romans believed that the dual consulship went as far back as the late sixth century, our sources indicate that the years down to 367 were characterized by experiments with various forms of government, no doubt brought on by the volatile nature of the times. In the very early fifth century the chief magistrate appears to have been the *praetor maximus*; the term *praetor*, "one who goes before", implies leadership, and the fact that the office always came with a

grant of *imperium* strongly presupposes that at some point it was the highest magistracy in Rome. From the mid fifth century onwards things fell deeper into flux. From 451 to 449 the state was ruled by a board of ten magistrates, the *decemviri*, then in 440–439 by three *praefecti*. Government even seems to have been suspended altogether in 444. Finally, from 426 to 367 Rome settled on a board of annually elected military tribunes with supreme authority. Thus by the late fifth century, as reflected in the purely martial nature of its leadership, Rome had emerged as a militarized state from the period of anarchy that engulfed much of Italy. While later Romans liked to believe that they always had militaristic tendencies and that they were somehow destined to conquer, in reality the Rome that conquered the Mediterranean only emerged in the early fourth Century, forged by decades of fighting for its very survival.¹⁶

The Fourth Century and Roman Hegemony

There is no doubt that Rome was aggressive before the fourth century, and always harbored aspirations to be the power in central Italy. But the same can be said for any of the other states in the region, had they had the population and resources necessary for the establishment of a hegemony. However, Rome by 400 was markedly different from its neighbors: it was now a militarized state where every man, regardless of status, was expected to serve in the military. This service was indelibly linked both with manhood as well as citizenship.

The shifting attitude towards war in Rome can be viewed through religion. An obscure and largely amorphous goddess named Duellona (classical Bellona) represented war to the Romans of the fifth century. Likened to the Greek Ares, she symbolized the chaos of conflict; she personified disorder and was the antithesis of civic life. Temples to her were thus forbidden inside the *pomerium*. She appears to have gradually sunk in importance during the fourth century and the last known vow to her took place in 296. Mars, on the other hand, while always a deity associated with battle, was by the early fourth century the main Roman war god; he received his first major temple in 388 and by 350 this shrine was used as a muster point before an army set out on campaign. Dedications to him would increase significantly over the following 200 years. His other major attributes from earlier times, as a protector of fields, livestock, and borders, were now forgotten and he became associated only with warfare. Unlike Duellona, however, Mars not only represented strength and courage on the battlefield, but war as an ideal undertaking for male citizens. Thus war and, by extension, conquest were now seen as a normal state of being for the Romans, who by the fourth century were mobilizing their adult male population on a far greater scale than perhaps any other state in the Mediterranean.¹⁷

Roman warfare, however, was probably still confined to raiding and border disputes for much of the late fifth century. While the period of anarchy may have militarized the Romans, what turned Rome into an aggressive imperialist state was the introduction of profit into war. This turning point perhaps occurred with the conquest and destruction of Veii, just 24 km north of Rome, in 396. Our sources ascribe a great deal of relevance to the victory over Veii, and so it is clear that this was more than just a minor triumph over a local rival. The Romans had battled on and off with Veii for economic supremacy for over 80 years. But in 396, the Romans, after managing to tunnel under the walls, sacked and destroyed Veii rather than simply taking it, selling its inhabitants into slavery. The territory was then made *ager Romanus*, public land, and distributed in small plots to Roman citizens. The war brought in a great deal of plunder and represented a massive increase in the territory controlled by Rome. Moreover, it also exemplified a shift in both Roman tactics and Roman imperialism. For the first time large-scale profit had been taken from a war. This, combined with the increasing prestige attached to military victory, created a climate of competition among the aristocracy for field commands, and began the process by which the Romans went from unorganized raiders to systematic conquerors.

Rome was seriously shaken in 390 when Gallic warriors conquered and sacked the city. The Capitoline served as a citadel for the survivors and the invaders were expelled only with great difficulty and large bribes. This led to the construction of a new wall around the city (using stone taken from quarries that once belonged to Veii, it should be added), and it also derailed Roman expansion for a significant period. The debacle against the Gauls may, furthermore, have prompted the Romans to bring the military under the full command of the state. Such a move would fit well with the transitional nature of Roman warfare at this time, moving from small-scale local conflicts to increasingly larger wars. This would also be an ideal time to begin the abandonment of the hoplite phalanx and move gradually to the manipular formation for which the mid-Republican legions would become so famous.¹⁸

Certainly, the intensity of warfare increased in the decades after 390, when wars of conquest, fueled by aristocratic competition, resumed. Such competition, however, came with a price as the upper economic stratum of the plebeians, who could now be counted as wealthier than some patricians, renewed the conflict between the orders and clamored for access to the offices with military commands attached to them. A small number of plebeians had managed to become military tribunes with supreme authority, but by and large generalships were confined to the patriciate. What also drove the issue forward was that from about 375 the plunder coming into Rome from warfare was regularly increasing. This freed the wealthy from the need to run their estates for profit and allowed them to concentrate more on public and political life.

The demand of the plebeians for access to the highest offices came to a head in the early 360s, as the senate and the *concilium plebis* frequently clashed, at times even violently. In 367 the plebeian tribunes threatened to lead their followers out of the city in a *secessio* or strike. At this point the patricians appear to have realized that yearly profit-driven warfare could not continue without the cooperation of the soldiery, and the affair produced the *lex Licinia Sextia*: from 366 military tribunes with supreme authority would cease to exist and military commands would henceforth be given annually to two consuls elected by the *comitia centuriata*, one of whom had to be a plebeian.

The establishment of military magistrates with equal rank had several consequences. In the immediate sense, to symbolize the peace that had been established between Rome's two orders, a temple to the goddess Concordia was erected in the Forum, and for the first time plebeians felt that this area was no longer the preserve of the patricians. We should furthermore see the popularization of the myth of the city's dual foundation by Romulus and Remus as coming from this time, with the two representing the patricians and the plebeians as well as the dual consulship. But, most importantly, the *lex Licinia Sextia* significantly increased the intensity of Roman warfare and imperialism as a series of plebeian generals attempted to establish themselves. Lacking the traditional legitimacy of the patricians, plebeian consuls sought to prove themselves worthy of their new-found equality by excelling on the battlefield and winning ever larger triumphs.¹⁹

This harmony, however, did not last long. The initial success of the plebeian consuls significantly increased competition for the office and within a decade a backlog of patrician candidates produced another clash; the traditional nobility withdrew their concessions of 367 and from 355 to 342 few plebeians held the consulship. The latter year turned out to be the breaking point for the plebeians, who used the ultimate weapon available to them. While the tribunes protested in the city, the army in the field mutinied, and took the unprecedented step of marching upon Rome. Armed rebellion against one's superiors tends to be anathema in military cultures. It is therefore a testament to how serious the situation was. Moreover, militaristic societies usually punish acts of insubordination with extreme severity, but on this occasion not even the leaders of the mutineers faced sanction when the dust settled. In the end, a dictator was appointed to restore order, and the patricians once again acquiesced without bloodshed. The upper-class plebeians reasserted their right to the consulship, and furthermore won for themselves the concession that in any given year both consuls could be plebeian. In order to ease the pressure coming from the backlog of those waiting to hold the consulship, a law was passed that forbade an individual from holding the office more than once in a ten-year period.²⁰

Although the Struggle of the Orders had a few more rounds left — in 300 major priesthoods became open to the plebeians, while the *lex Hortensia* of

287 made *plebiscita* binding on the entire population — the dramatic and pivotal events of 342 appear to have at last made serious conflict between the patricians and plebeians a thing of the past. And from this point forward we can speak of a united Roman upper class. Several conclusions can be drawn from the events of 367–342. Firstly, the mid fourth century confirmed a clear link between warfare and social harmony at Rome. All classes within Roman society were willing to compromise and give up freedoms and monopolies rather than risk losing the benefits, material and honorific, that external conquest brought to them. While war in other cities might cause internal strife, it can be argued that the ubiquity of military action in Rome was responsible for the fact that the state would be almost completely free from *stasis* for the next two centuries. In addition, this harmony extended to the lower classes, as is witnessed by one of the principal demands of the mutineers in 342: that their names not be struck from the rolls of those eligible for military service. Campaigning allowed the common soldiery chances to rise socially, while plunder provided a significant source of additional income. Finally, competition amongst the new, united nobility for the consulship and for greater military victories, and subsequent memorializations, remained, and this too in part drove conquest forward. But this rivalry was tempered by a collective spirit, where the group indirectly worked together to prevent individual competition from becoming damaging to the whole.

The settlement reached with the Latins in 338 gave Rome the ability to win long wars. The second treaty with Carthage in 348, as recorded by Polybius (3.24), illustrates that the Romans did not have control over all of Latium, but nonetheless continued to harbor clear ambitions there. Thus the First Samnite War (343–341) was cut short when the Latins, together with the Campanians, began a struggle to break the Roman hegemony in central Italy. The conflict lasted three years and Rome emerged as the victor only with difficulty. As a result, in 338 the Romans dismantled the previous system that tied all Latin settlements, including Rome, to each other, and replaced it with a series of treaties binding these peoples individually to the Republic. Some Latins were even incorporated wholly into the Roman state. Even the few remaining Latin centers which stood outside this settlement were prevented from exercising any independent foreign policy. Most of all, Rome was now in full control of each state's military, and these were absorbed into the legions under the status of *socii* (allies; singular *socius*). The settlement would gradually be extended to all of Italy, and it, along with the colonies that had been set up over the last century, gave the Romans unmatched resources of human capital. This, in combination with Roman militarism, shaped the history of the Mediterranean for the next 200 years.²¹

Rome's first taste of large-scale warfare came once again against the Samnites (327–304). In the years before Rome had nearly hemmed in Samnite territory

via a series of colonies. A further colonial foundation at Fregellae and an internal dispute in Neapolis eventually led to war. The first five years saw a few Roman successes, but the Samnites forced a ceasefire when they trapped an entire consular army in 321 at the Caudine Forks. The peace, at least to the Romans, was only temporary, and fighting resumed in 316. Our sources, mostly Livy and Diodorus, record a seesaw struggle for the next several years as both sides scored victories and penetrated deeply into each other's territory. Finally, in 305 the Romans scored crushing victories in the Ager Falernus in Campania and at Bovianum in Samnium. The following year the legions marched into Samnite territory almost unopposed and, after causing much destruction, forced a peace. Both sides were exhausted; thus the treaty was not overly harsh and the Samnites retained some power. In the end the Samnites, although possibly as militaristic as the Romans, were wholly out-matched when it came to resources.

The years 298–290 would come to be known as the Third Samnite War, but this was by and large a rebellion of Rome's subjects in Etruria and Umbria, who were joined by the Gauls and Samnites. Rome used its manpower advantage to field several armies at once and eventually to defeat each power individually. Only the Samnites and the Gauls seemed to be able to coordinate, but these suffered a large defeat in 295 at Sentinum in Umbria. The conflict ended in a complete Roman victory five years later, with defeated states forced to become allies. Only a few peoples in Italy remained outside Roman dominance.

One of these was the Greek colony of Tarentum in the southeast, and this place would unknowingly provide the greatest example of just why Rome would emerge as a major power, if it had done so not already, in the coming century. A dispute between Rome and Tarentum led the latter to appeal to King Pyrrhus of Epirus (306–302, 297–272), cousin of Alexander the Great and leader of a large mercenary army which included 20 elephants. Since the third treaty between Carthage and Rome in 306, all of Italy had been defined as Rome's sphere of influence, and thus, although Pyrrhus was fighting on behalf of an independent city, the Romans were not about to let a foreign power establish itself on the peninsula. The legions for the first time faced a professional fighting force from the east, armed with the *sarissa* and organized in the Macedonian phalanx. The battle at Heraclea with Pyrrhus was a close affair, with the Romans acquitting themselves well, but in the end the Greeks emerged victorious. Despite the invaders being joined by the Samnites and several other Italian peoples, Rome steadfastly refused peace overtures. A second victory by Pyrrhus in 279 at Asculum cost him a good portion of his army, and he soon fled to Sicily. Returning in 275, he was fought to a stand-still at Beneventum. This proved to be the last straw, and he was forced to quit the peninsula for good. Tarentum would fall in 272. Rome had managed to win a war without being victorious in a single battle. Militarism allowed the

Romans to see this difficult conflict through to its conclusion, while manpower resources, both Roman and allied, permitted victory, and within less than a decade the Roman army was taking on enemies outside Italy.

A multitude of factors are responsible for placing the Romans on the brink of a Mediterranean empire. Not the least of which is compromise. Despite strong authoritarian tendencies, compromise was ever-present in Rome. Only once, in 342 (above), do we ever hear of Romans turning against their own state and never in their early history did a dissatisfied group make common cause with an enemy. The ability and willingness to compromise meant that the Romans themselves did not have to face the same *stasis* as other peoples. Compromise can be seen as one of the central themes of early Roman history, and was furthermore a principal reason behind the Republic's military success.

There is nothing in the early history of Rome that shows the city to be predestined to become an imperial capital. Even so, by the fourth century Rome had emerged as a power that was markedly atypical: an aggressively imperialist state where an aristocracy consistently pushed for war and a huge percentage of the citizenry were under arms. The process by which Rome achieved this degree of bellicosity rests on four pillars. First, there was the endemic warfare and fights for survival of the fifth century that militarized society. Second, the introduction of serious plunder as a part of warfare in the early fourth century. This turned the Romans from raiders into conquerors. The major concessions won by the plebeians in the period 367–342 should be seen as the third pillar. As more people had access to generalships, this substantially multiplied aristocratic competition and created a culture of regular warmaking in which successive leaders tried to outdo their immediate predecessors. Finally, the Latin settlement of 338 permitted Rome to bring vast resources of manpower to the battlefield, allowing the Republic to recover from losses and to endure long wars of attrition. In the wars against Carthage that were to come, the militaristic nature of Roman society combined hyper-competitiveness on the part of its aristocracy and desire for plunder amongst its common soldiery to give Rome the desire and the drive to see through lengthy conflicts.

NOTES

1. Vergil, *Aeneid* 6.756–759, 781–783, 851–853; see Bettini 2006; Rehak 2006, 136–138. Cicero on empire: *Off.* 1.38; *Rep.* 3.35; see Richardson 2008, 63–79, 89–91. Roman imperialism not atypical: Eckstein 2006, *passim*; esp. 181–216; Eckstein 2008.
2. Hellanicus, *FGrH* 4 F84; Damastes, *FGrH* 241 F45; Alcimus *FGrH* 560 F4; Pearson 1987, 33; Vanotti 2006; Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 T 7, 9b-c; Brown 1958;

- Momigliano 1977, 37–66; Pearson 1987, 47, 85–86; Antigonus, *FGrH* 816 F1; Fabius Pictor, *Histories* F7a–c (Beck and Walter). For the foundation date of Varro see Plut. *Romulus* 12.3–6; Solinus 1.18.
3. Diocles: *FGrH* 820 F1; Ogulnii: Livy 10.23.11–2. The mysterious Promathion’s version (*FGrH* 817 F1) is probably much older than the late fourth century; however, the fragment quoted by Plutarch (*Romulus* 2.3–6) is clearly corrupted as it starts out with Romulus alone being prophesied as Rome’s founder and ends with the twins. The primacy of the hearth and of Hestia (Vesta) strongly suggests later Roman interpolation; cf. Wiseman 1995, 57–61.
4. Romulus and Remus as the Etruscan *gentes* Rumlnas and Remne: Schulze 1904, 219, 368, 579–581; Wiseman 1995, 92–94, 197 nn. 19–22. As Romans and Sabines: Momigliano 1989, 58–59. As Rome and Capua: Carcopino 1925.
5. The murder of Remus as a blood sacrifice: Ennius, *Ann.* 1.74 (with Skutsch 1985, 224); Flor. 1.1.8; Propertius 3.9.50. The greater role of Remus: Antigonus, *FGrH* 816 F1; Dionysius of Chalcis, *FGrH* 840 F12, 14, 21–22; Cassius Hemina, 2 F14 (Beck and Walter); D.H. 1.73.3; Egnatius *apud* OGR 23.6; Kallis, *FGrH* 564 F5. In general cf. Adam and Briquel 1982; Cornell 1995, 57–63; Wiseman 1995, 63–76, 117–128, 138–144.
6. Oral history and memory: Raaflaub 2006, 126–30. Rome’s earliest centuries: Cornell 1995, 48–57; Forsythe 2005, 82–4; Holloway 1994, 14–55.
7. *Septimontium*: Antistius Labeo *apud* Festus 474–6L; Paulus Festus 458–9L; Plut. *Mor.* 4.20.69; cf. Pliny, *NH* 3.69; Carandini 1997, 267–285, 360–380; Cornell 1995, 74–75. Early Roman villages: Carandini 1997, 280–359; Cornell 1995, 53–57, 80, 92–94, 102–103.
8. Note that for the calendar announcements the *comitia calata* at least sometimes met in the *Curia Calabra* chamber on the Capitoline (cf. Festus 49L; Macrobius 1.15.10, 19; Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.654; Varro, *LL* 6.27). That it also met in the *comitium* is suggested by the term “*kalator*” in the *Lapis Niger* inscription (below): Ammerman 1990; 1996; Carandini 1986; 1990; Forsythe 2005, 83–86 who, 84 n. 4, correctly points out that the construction of Rome’s first wall does coincide with Cincius Alimentus’ foundation date of 729 (fr. 6 (Beck and Walter); Rich 2007, 10–11; Torelli 1989, 36–38.
9. Archaic *sodales/suodales*: Stibbe *et al.* (1980) on the *Lapis Satricanus* (*CIL* 1.2.2832a). Mastarna, the brothers Vibenna, and Servius Tullius: *CIL* 13.1668; D.H. 2.36.2; Festus 486.12–16L; Tac. *Ann.* 4.65.1–2; Varro *LL* 5.46; Alföldi 1965, 212–231; Buranelli 1987, 234–235. Fifth-Century *gens*-based war-bands: Diod. 11.53.6; D.H. 7.19.2–4, 21.3, 64.3–4, 9.15–22, 10.14–17.1; Livy 2.16.4–6, 48–50, 3.15.5–18.11; Ovid, *Fasti* 2.195–242; Plut. *Coriolanus* 13; Rawlings 1999. In general, see Cornell 1988; 1995, 84–85, 133–141, 143–146; Forsythe 2005, 102–105, 192–200, 205–206.
10. Romulus recruiting criminals: Livy 1.8.5–7; early Romans as raiders and cattle rustlers: Livy 1.4.8–9, 5.3–4; rape of the Sabines: Cornell 1995, 75–80; Dumézil 1970, 67–73; *contra* Raaflaub 2006, 130, seeing the myth as reflective of Greek colonization. François Tomb: Alföldi 1963, 212–231; Buranelli 1987, 234–235; Momigliano 1989, 94–96; Raaflaub 2006, 131. *Lapis Niger*: *CIL* 1.2.1; Festus

- 184L; Coarelli 1983–5, 1.166–199; Forsythe 2005, 73–74, 87; Holloway 1994, 83–90; Smith 1996, 166–71. *Regia*: *LTUR* s.v. “*Regia*”; Carandini 1997, 512; Coarelli 1983–5, 1.56–78; Cornell 1995, 239–241; Forsythe 2005, 87–88; Smith 1996, 172–178.
11. *Curiae*: D.H. 2.7.3, 12.14, 21.3; Festus 180L; Laelius Felix *apud* Gell. 15.27; Livy 1.13.6; Plut. *Romulus* 14; Tac. *Ann.* 12.24; Cornell 1995, 114–117. Senate: *LTUR* s.v. “*Curia*”; Dio fr. 5.11; D.H. 2.12.1; Festus 288L, 290L; Livy 1.8.7, 17.9, 49.7; 2.23.1; 45.24.12; Ovid, *Fasti* 3.127; Varro, *LL* 5.155; Coarelli 1983–5, 1.122, 127–130; Cornell 1995, 116; Forsythe 2007, 25–26; Gjerstad 1953–73, 3.217–259.
 12. *Comitium*: D.H. 2.12.14; Festus 42L; Livy 1.17.7–11, 32.1, 49.7; Botsford 1909, 152–153, 168–173; Cornell 1995, 115–117; Forsythe 2005, 109–110; 2007, 25; Meyer 1983, 124–125; Raaflaub 2006, 136. Servian reforms: Cic. *Rep.* 2.22.39–40; D.H. 4.14–19.4; Livy 1.42.5–43.13; Ogilvie 1965, 166–176; Cornell 1995, 190–197; Forsythe 2005, 111–115; 2007, 26–28. Fall of the monarchy: D.H. 4.64.4–67.4; Livy 1.57–60; Ovid, *Fasti* 2.721–852; Val. Max. 6.1.1; Cornell 1989, 257–264; 1995, 215–226; Forsythe 2005, 147–149; Zevi 1995. Porsenna: D.H. 5.21–35.1; Pliny *NH* 34.39.139; Tacitus, *Histories* 3.72; Cornell 1995, 216–218; Momigliano 1989, 93–94; Raaflaub 2006, 130–131; Vliet 1990, 247.
 13. Famine: Livy 2.9.6, 34.2–5. Treaty: Serrati 2006, 114–118. Struggle of the Orders: in general, Cornell 1995, 242–271; Forsythe 2005, 157–177, 327–344; Raaflaub 2005; 2006, 138–141; Vliet 1990, 247–257.
 14. Ampolo 1990; Cornell 1989, 264–275, 281–308; Raaflaub 1993, 137–141; 2006, 138; Scott 2005. *Contra* Rich 2007, 11–13, who disputes the frequency and defensive nature of Rome’s wars in this period.
 15. *Comitia centuriata*: Cornell 1995, 195–197; Forsythe 2005, 109–115; 2007, 26–33; Momigliano 2005, 168–175. Ban of 357: Livy 7.16.7–8. *Concilium plebis* and plebeian tribunes: Diod. 12.25.2; D.H. 6.89–90.2, 10.30.6; Festus 422L; Livy 2.32.2–33.2, 58.1, 3.30.5; Eder 1993; Wittman 1995. *Comitia tributa*: Diod. 11.68.7; D.H. 9.43.4; Livy 2.56.2–3, 60.4–5. Forsythe 2005, 177–183, argues, correctly I believe, that the organization of the *concilium plebis* into tribes in 471 is actually a doublet of the creation of that assembly from 494. What was actually inaugurated in 471 was the *comitia tributa*. In general see Cornell 1995, 256–262; A. Drummond in *CAH* 7.2, 212–225; Nicolet 1980, 224–226; Staveley 1972, 129–131; Taylor 1966, 59–64, 74–76.
 16. *Praetor maximus*: Twelve Tables *apud* Festus 518L; Cinc. fr. 9 (Beck and Walter), *apud* Festus 276L; Livy 3.55.12, 7.3.5–8; Brennan 2000, 20–23; Cornell 1995, 227–230. *Decemviri*: Cic. *Rep.* 2.61.3; Livy 3.33.1; Cornell 1995, 272–6. *Praefecti*: Livy 4.13.7, 20.8. Military tribunes with supreme authority: Diod. 12.32.1; D.H. 11.62.1; Livy 4.7.1; *MRR* 52–3, 66–114. In general see Stewart 1998, 52–111.
 17. Duellona: *CIL* 1.2.441; Livy 8.9.6, 10.19.17; Varro, *LL* 5.73. Mars: *CIL* 1.2.2832a; D.H. 2.70.2, 4.22.1, 6.13.4; Livy 6.5.8, 7.23.3; 10.28.1, 22.10.9; Plautus, *Miles* 11–12.

18. Victory over Veii: Diod. 14.93.2; D.H. 12.11.2–12.2, 15, 13.3; Flor. 1.6; Livy 5.19–22, 30.8; Plut. *Camillus* 5–6.1; Val. Max. 4.2. See Harris 1990. Gallic sack: D.H. 13.6–9; Livy 5.39.5–49; Plut. *Cam.* 22–30.1; Pol. 2.18.2–3, 22.4–5. Wall: Livy 6.32.1; Cornell 1995, 198–202; Holloway 1994, 91–101.
19. *Lex Licinia Sextia*: D.H. 14.12; Fabius Pictor, *Hist.* F23 (Beck and Walter); Livy 6.42.9–15, 7.18.5, 21.1; Plut. *Camillus* 42; Cornell 1995, 327–40; Develin 2005, 298–307; Forsythe 2005, 362–7; Stewart 1998, 95–136. Temple of Concordia: Ovid, *Fasti* 1.641–4; Plut. *Cam.* 42.4; Coarelli 1983–5, 2.67–74, 87–88. Romulus and Remus: above n. 4.
20. Livy 7.38.8–42.2; Develin 2005; Hölkeskamp 1993.
21. Livy 8.13.10–14; Cornell 1995, 347–352; Forsythe 2005, 289–292; Oakley 1997–8, 2.538–559; Salmon 1982, 40–56; Serrati 2007, 485–488.

CHAPTER TWO

Early Relations between Rome and Carthage

Barbara Scardigli

The chronological end of this study should be the so-called Philinus Treaty of 306 BC (with a glance at the Pyrrhus Treaty of 278 BC, which still envisages Carthaginian co-operation with Rome but is restricted to military matters). From the initial contacts down to this time, relations between the two powers had been largely non-military and included various areas of mutual exchange. With the increased strength of Rome and the beginning of its expansion, there was increased suspicion in Carthage: the third century brought the turning-point, as is evident from the causes, the course, and the outcome of the First Punic War. The war had a negative effect on the Roman sources on Carthage as great as was previously the case with the Greek authors who reported on the relationship of the two powers in Sicily (see below). The earliest relations between Rome and Carthage were actually between Etruscan Rome and Carthage, which is the reason that we must here regard the Etruscan ruling class as partners of the Carthaginians.

Of seafaring and trade relations among the various powers in the western Mediterranean in the eighth and seventh centuries (Western Greeks, Etruscans, Phoenicians, Carthaginians, peoples of the Italian peninsula, the islands, etc.) it is possible to gain a vague picture from the sparse accounts in the sources (Herodotus, Diodorus, Livy), a very few inscriptions, and various pieces of archaeological evidence, mainly from graves.¹

Aristotle (*Pol.* 3.5.10, 1280a38ff.) tells of trade treaties (σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους) between Etruscans and Carthaginians, by means of which they became somewhat like “citizens of one single city” and on the basis of συνθήκαι (agreements) made mutual promises of morally correct behaviour in their trade relations (σύμβολα). Such treaties, concluded under economic, legal,

and political aspects, were made between various powers in the Mediterranean and individual Etruscan cities, Greeks in the west (Massilia; Magna Graecia), Carthaginians, and so on. The first treaty between Carthage and Rome stands entirely within this tradition.²

From the seventh century at the latest, in Phoenician and then Carthaginian graves as also at Motya, Cadiz, and in Sardinia, there is evidence of Etruscan pottery; in addition there is a Carthaginian *cippus* from Caere, and in the sixth century a so-called *tessera hospitalis* with an Etruscan inscription. Conversely, objects from Carthage have been found in Etruscan cities. All this points to very extensive trade relations.³

From about 600, Phocaean refugees fleeing from the Persians descended on the western Mediterranean, founded Massilia, settled in Corsica around 565 and were a disruptive element for the trade of others (Hdt. 1.166.1). A united fleet from Carthage and Etruria was defeated by the Phocaeans at Alalia around 540–535 (a “Cadmeian [i.e. Pyrrhic] victory”). Thereafter the Carthaginians began to establish themselves as successors of the Phoenicians with colonies in Sardinia, while the Etruscans did the same in Corsica.⁴

There seems to have been particularly close contact between Carthage and the Etruscan town of Caere (Cerveteri) as one of the harbours there appears on the Peutinger Table as Punicum (Santa Marinella): probably this was a Carthaginian colony founded for trade purposes and perhaps even for demographic reasons. In 1964 a bilingual inscription dating from around 500 was found in a sanctuary (Temple B) in another harbour of Caere, Pyrgi. It was dedicated by Thefarie Velianas, ruler of Caere, to the Carthaginian goddess Astarte.

Conversely, Greeks and people from the Italic peninsula probably settled in Carthage at the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries. For instance, in the so-called cemetery of Ste Monique in Carthage an ivory plaque was found, bearing in Etruscan writing the text, probably originating in Vulci: “I am a *Puniel* from Carthage”, which a Carthaginian trader perhaps brought with him from Etruria; Etruscan bucchero pottery from as early as the seventh century was found in the graves of Carthage as well as in Sardinia and Sicily.⁵

Carthage was the last colony founded by Tyre in the west. It gained hegemony over the other cities at about the same time as the first contacts were probably made with Rome, that is, in the second half of the sixth century. Perhaps Carthage was already beginning to subjugate Libyan peoples in North Africa; in any case it established itself in western Sicily by taking over the Phoenician cities of Panormus (Palermo), Soloeis (Solunto), and Motya (Mozia; then Lilybaeum), which at that time lived in peaceful cooperation with western Greek colonists and were given protection by Carthage in the Carthaginian treaties. The proof that Carthage was considered not to be merely a trading but also a military power is provided by its early relations with Rome, as

Eckstein has recently again pointed out (see below), and also by the existence of fortresses and naval bases for which there is archaeological evidence. Trade and the military strength that protected it went hand in hand; the fleet and the army were in the service of a well-developed system of control (see below).⁶

It is well known that Rome in the early days of the Republic made an alliance with Carthage. This had been desired and prepared by the last Tarquins and implied that there had been contact for some time. The text of this agreement dated by the dedication of the temple of Jupiter in Rome (508/507) — the mention of the first pair of consuls probably comes from a later period — is transmitted by Polybius (3.23ff.). He may have added it to his work when it was already in an advanced state, in connection with his discussion of Carthage's final fate; it was probably intended to introduce the account of the Second Punic War. Polybius declares (3.22.3–4) that he had seen it personally on bronze tablets in the temple of Jupiter and had translated it into Greek from a language previously incomprehensible to him with the help of Romans expert in the field. He himself gives a commentary on the text. It is a treaty of friendship, applying also to allies, which reflects the current situation of each of the two powers, while it also looks to the future in several clauses (e.g. regarding Carthage's possession of Sardinia, its claim to Sicily, the not quite clear role of Massilia or the cities of Latium, claimed by Rome but still outside its sphere of influence, etc.).⁷

Even if the introductory formula customary in Carthaginian pacts, known to us, for example, from the alliance concluded between Philip V of Macedonia and Hannibal in 215,⁸ is missing, this agreement seems unmistakably to have been drafted by Carthage. This appears particularly clearly from the first half of Polybius' text, which contains the conditions imposed on Rome regarding the limits of navigation along the coast (see particularly the much-discussed *Kalon Aktoterion*,⁹ perhaps not its first mention in this role), measures to be taken in the case of an involuntary breach of the limits, and restricted access and permission to trade in Carthage itself as well as North Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily, which Carthage indubitably considered its own possession. The contract of sale was to be signed in the presence of Carthaginian supervisory officials (κῆρυξ and γραμματεὺς) who were responsible for the control of prices and judicial guarantees.

The conditions imposed on the Carthaginians by Rome did not include limits of navigation and were mainly concerned with attacks on cities in Latium, whether subject to Rome or not, where plunder (of cattle and people) was permitted by day but where it was forbidden to remain during the night. The limits of navigation include not only the extent of trade activities, but also military operations in certain waters, as appears from Polybius's commentary (3.23.2: prohibition against Romans μακραῖς ναυσί, i.e. sailing out with their warships towards the south beyond the Beautiful Cape). In fact

these military operations refer to looting by pirates whose activity was a common source of income at that time.¹⁰

The treaty reveals a great difference between the two powers. Carthage was a recognized enterprising trade power which was securing a large area for itself vis-à-vis Rome and Latium. Rome's interest was to resist permanent foreign influence in Latium by Carthage. The latter offered its small, ambitious partner legal security and organizational experience.

The second treaty with Carthage was probably made in 348 (see below). In the one and a half centuries between the first agreement and it, both sides were occupied with their own affairs. They had to deal with foreign and domestic policy reversals, but also enjoyed successes. Carthage continued to conquer its fertile North African hinterland and to extend its maritime trade (see below) and the family relationships of its governing class with foreign countries. Possibly as a result of its efforts to extend its territory in Sicily, it was defeated in 480 by Gelon of Syracuse in the battle of Himera. Thereafter it reduced its presence on the island in favour of extending its dominance in Africa.¹¹

On the other hand the concept of *epikrateia* over the three cities in the west of the island is connected with the period after the end of the fifth century. In the changing fortunes of wars with Dionysius I of Syracuse, a ruler filled with Panhellenic ambitions, the Carthaginians at times won domination over almost the entire island. Yet after 396 the tide began to turn: the Carthaginians' traditional enmity towards the Greeks brought the expulsion of all Carthaginian traders and the destruction of Motya. After several peace treaties with Dionysius, seldom adhered to, Carthage suffered a final defeat in 382, and relations reverted to their earlier state.¹²

After it had attained dominance over Latium in 493 (*foedus Cassianum*), Rome fought against the Etruscans, the Volsci, and the Aequi with mixed success in the following century and a half. In the end it was victorious. When the city was conquered by the Celts in 390, the Volsci, Etruscans, Latins, and Hernici defected from Rome (Livy 4.2.1ff), which is why Camillus in 389 triumphed *de Volscis, Aequis et Etruscis* (*Elogium*, CIL 1², 1, p. 191; Livy 6.7.4; Plut., *Camillus* 36). Rome however got help from its allies Massalia and Caere, which Dionysius I plundered in 384 (mainly Pyrgi). In 378/377 Rome tried in vain to found a colony in Sardinia (Diod. 15.27.4), and a few decades later in Corsica (Theophrastus, *Historia Plantarum* 5.8.2).

After renewed battles with the Volsci (Livy 6.11.1) the Volscian town of Antium submitted in 377 (Livy 6.23.2), yet only after a new conflict did it become a colony in 338 and lose its fleet (Livy 8.14.1ff.). In 358/357 the momentous war with the Etruscans broke out (Caere, Tarquinii, Falerii) with whom treaties were made in 353–351. The Latins met in 349 in the grove of Feretrium to refuse to supply *auxilia* to repel new threats by hordes of Celts.

Other events, too, point to a poor relationship between Rome and its Latin and Campanian allies — the war against the Latins, followed by the war against the Samnites, cast an advance shadow.¹³

The date given by Diodorus, 348 (16.69.1; cf. Livy 7.27.2; Oros. 3.7.1), for the second treaty with Carthage (which for him was the first), the text of which (without indication of date) was transmitted in turn by Polybius, can easily be reconciled with the reported events. Despite many similarities, the second treaty differs in a far-reaching way from the first. Apart from Carthage, two allies are mentioned by name (Pol. 3.24.2): the inhabitants of the older city of Utica and probably the mother-city Tyre itself, whose leading role had long been taken over by Carthage.

Booty, trade, and the founding of colonies were forbidden to the Romans not only beyond the Beautiful Cape but also beyond Mastia Tarseion on the south coast of Spain (Pol. 3.24.3–4), which Carthage had reached perhaps around 450. A breach would not be penalized by individuals but by the State. There is more detail than in the first treaty about the steps to be taken in an emergency (repairs to a damaged ship, procuring supplies). In military operations or piracy on the coast of Latium, the Carthaginians are given virtual *carte blanche* (conquering towns and taking the movable chattels outside the walls of the towns themselves); this is also applied to cities with a peace treaty with Rome, apart from a special provision for Roman prisoners who were not allowed to be taken into Roman harbours — this would make them subject to a liberating intervention by the Romans, the *vindicatio in libertatem*. Sardinia and Libya remained closed to the Romans (Pol. 3.24.11); in other words, their trade was restricted to the western part of Sicily and Carthage itself (3.24.12).¹⁴

The Carthaginians appear even more assertive than in the first treaty; the mutual suspicion of the two parties had grown. The Carthaginians wanted to keep foreign activity of all kinds, but particularly trade, away from their territories, which now included Sardinia and the south coast of Spain. The tense relations with the Latins, who were clinging to their independence, are reflected in the clause concerning relinquishing movable chattels and people to the invaders. Rome took advantage of these tensions to expose the Latins to damage from Carthage. Shortly after concluding the treaty (in 343) a Carthaginian embassy arrived in Rome (Livy 7.38) in order to congratulate the Romans on the result of the First Samnite War and to hand over to them a heavy gold *crater* (bowl).

The end of the Second Samnite War, when Rome's victory was in sight, coincides with the date of the third treaty (306: Philinus) whose existence is hotly denied by Polybius. This war opened the way for Rome to Southern Italy, though this could easily lead to conflict with Tarentum or Agathocles of Sicily (see below). Before and during the war with the Samnites, Rome had

founded various colonies in Latium, built a fleet in 311 (Livy 9.30.4; cf. *Per.* 12; Appian, *Samn.* 7.1) and was in conflict with the Etruscans.¹⁵ Sicily was ruled by Agathocles (317–289), who with the help of Etruscan, Samnite, Celtic, and Libyan mercenaries even undertook a campaign in Africa (310–307) and defeated the Carthaginians several times (Diod. 20.9–12, 33–34). Subsequently he assumed the title of king (Diod. 20.54.1) and, after he had made a vain attempt to get a foothold in Southern Italy and on the Adriatic (Diod. 20.101.1ff.; 21.2.2–3; Strabo 6.3.4, C280), there was peace.¹⁶ The impulse for the Philinus Treaty of 306 was probably given by Carthage, though the situation of both parties had changed considerably: the position of Rome had grown stronger and expansion towards the south was a possibility. Even if Carthage's position in Sicily after the conflicts with Dionysius I remained essentially unchanged (see below), it could still calculate that Rome would not interfere in these matters.

According to Philinus, cited by Polybius (3.26.1–3), the Romans had agreed in this treaty with Carthage to keep their hands off Sicily, which would surely have affected more than trading relationships. Polybius disputes its existence because he could not find the text in the *aerarium* of the aediles, which certainly is true, yet does not exclude that the text was deliberately removed and/or destroyed. The agreement seems to have been transmitted by the annalistic tradition (see Livy 9.43.26) and dated to 306.¹⁷ The following arguments have been adduced in favour of its existence.

A passage in Servius (*ad Aen.* 4.628–9), independent of the annalistic tradition (see above), is an undated piece of evidence of an alliance between Rome and Carthage, according to which the Romans were not to have access to the shores of the Carthaginians, “litora Carthaginiensium” (including all of Sicily, or at least the Carthaginian sphere of influence), nor were the Carthaginians to have access “ad litora Romanorum: aut potest propter bella navalia accipi inter Romanos et Afros gesta” (to the shores of the Romans: or it could refer to the naval wars fought between the Romans and Africans). Corsica was to remain neutral and accessible to both powers.

The fourth treaty, from the time of Pyrrhus' sojourn (278) in Italy, presupposes an alliance of this kind, if perhaps not in the form that Polybius hints at. It emerges from the barely comprehensible text of the Pyrrhus treaty that the Romans and Carthaginians might under certain circumstances come to the others' aid on the others' territory, but this relates only to a wartime emergency, and it is assumed that normally such help would not be possible.

At the end of the war with Tarentum in 272, after the return of Pyrrhus to Greece, the abandoned Tarentines had called on the Carthaginians for help and the latter had sent them a fleet (Livy, *Per.* 14; 21.10.8; Dio, frg. 43.1; Oros. 4.5.2; Zon. 8.8.3); there is no mention of this in Polybius or in Plutarch, for which reason the report is deemed by various scholars to be unhistorical or

a confusion with a later event. Yet in the Livian *Periocha* 14 we read: “Carthaginiensium classis auxilio Tarentinis venit — quo facto ab his foedus violatus est”, that is, by sending this fleet to Tarentum an agreement was breached. Livy himself has Hanno say à propos of the siege of Saguntum (21.10.8): “sed Tarento, id est Italia, non abstinueramus ex foedere...”, that is, we (Carthaginians) had not kept away from Tarentum, i.e. from Italy, as was agreed in the treaty.¹⁸

The main argument in favour of the existence of the Philinus treaty is Philinus’s indirect protest against the Romans’ intervention in Sicily in favour of the Mamertines, which gave rise to the First Punic War in 264.¹⁹ Polybius favours the Romans in his assessment of the cause of the war: the Roman landing in Sicily οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους εὐρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, “we find did not occur against their oaths” (3.28.1), yet he could have said this with the intention of defending the Romans against accusations from their opponents. A passage in Cassius Dio (frg. 43.1) is less biased, as it blames both powers equally: the Carthaginians because they had come to aid the Tarentines, and the Romans because they had entered an alliance with Hiero II. Cassius Dio adds that both powers viewed each other with suspicion — Carthage, which had been a great power for a long time, and the upstart Romans — since both were striving to extend their possessions and both broke treaties that were in force.

The legally unclear situation before the First Punic War is just what might have caused the document on the demarcation of the spheres of interest to disappear from the *aerarium*, at the time when Polybius was writing about the treaties and M. Porcius Cato, the most ardent defender of the need to annihilate Carthage, wanted no suspicion of illegality to attach to the Romans.

In conclusion, one must note that it would be wrong to describe the early relations between Rome and Carthage only as peaceful, not merely because acts of violence were envisaged, even permitted (yet were controlled and limited), but also because those relations were based rather on the principle of avoiding an unbounded, dangerous use of force. Prohibitions and limiting controls predominated over concessions and liberality, and in the second treaty the latter are specified still more clearly than in the first.

As far as we are able to judge on the basis of the scarce information we possess, we must remember that Carthage possessed not only a juridically sophisticated system of control in which a graded hierarchy of functionaries performed their duties, but also revenues, trading products, and markets that needed to be protected from illegitimate access by exclusion zones. The purpose of the treaties was less to trade products and buy others in return, but rather to maintain control of the major trade; and this was enforced too against a still minor power like Rome. Carthage was no more peace-loving or belligerent than any other power, but it strove to foresee and assess difficulties, and it had

the means of doing this. It had the advantage over the other western powers thanks to this system of control and bureaucracy, probably inherited from its Asian antecedents.²⁰

NOTES

1. Carthage's suspicion: Mitchell 1971, 634–635; see below. On negative Roman sources on Carthage: e.g. Barceló 1989b, 33: "Carthage shares the fate of all those losers who not only lost militarily, but were also later stamped as potential disturbers of the peace..." ; on the various authors, 34–35. Beginning of relations: see e.g. Weber 1998, 230–231. Navigation and trade relations: a good overview e.g. in Vallet 1958, 164; Pallottino 1985, 135ff.; Lancel 1995a, 78ff.; Ridgway 1997; Serrati 2006, 114ff.
2. σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους: cf. e.g. Gandolfi 1960, 340; Aubonnet 1971, 241–244; Burn 1984, 159; Asheri 1988, 750. On correct behaviour in trade relations: e.g. Ferron 1966, 693ff.; Cataldi 1974, 1238ff.; Weeber 1979, 60–61; Bringmann 2001b, 112. Treaties with Etruscan cities: cf. Cataldi 1974, 1237ff. With western Greek and Punic cities: e.g. Gandolfi 1960, 340; Pallottino 1985, 157ff., Cataldi 1974, 1246; also the first treaty with Rome, e.g. Lancel 1995a, 78ff.; Whittaker 1982, 87 n. 47; Oakley 1998, 2.256. First treaty with Rome: Walbank 1957, 1.343; Aubonnet 1971, 240–241; Weeber 1979, 63ff.; von Hase 2004, 71.
3. Etruscan pottery in Phoenician and Carthaginian graves: Pallottino 1964, 113ff.; MacIntosh 1974, 184; Thuillier 1985, 155ff.; Gras 1985, 239; 1989, 227; Lancel 1995a, 86. Cippus from Caere: Pallottino 1964, 113. Etruscan *tessera*: Sordi 1960, 114; Pallottino 1963, 26; Ferron 1966, 689ff.; MacIntosh 1974, 167; Gras 1985, 528; Thuillier 1985, 115ff. Carthaginian objects in Etruria: MacIntosh 1974, 164ff.
4. On relations between Massilia and Carthage, see especially Barceló 1988, 98ff. The Phocaeans as a disturbing element: cf. Cataldi 1974, 1242ff.; Weeber 1979, 57ff.; Cristofani 1983, 62; Burn 1984, 154; Heurgon 1986a, 153; Barceló 1988, 99; 1989, 36; von Hase 2004, 71–2. On the Etruscan-Punic alliance: Bengtson 1975, *SVI* 2, no. 116; Pallottino 1985, 161; Flach 1994, 33. Battle of Alalia: Colozier 1953 86ff.; Tširkin 1983, 209; Krings 1998, 118–19; Lancel 1995a, 84. Carthaginians in Sardinia: Hoffmann 1972, 345; Moscati 1966, 138; Pallottino 1985, 162; Heurgon 1986a, 155; Hans 1985, 67ff.; Barceló 1988, 31ff.; Scardigli 1991, 20; Huss 1985, 64. Etruscans in Corsica: e.g. Pallottino 1985, 162; Colonna 1984, 366ff.
5. Pyrgi inscription: e.g. Sordi 1960, 76; Ferron 1972, 189ff.; Werner 1973, 241ff.; MacIntosh 1974, 164, 174; Whittaker 1982, 83; Cristofani 1983, 121ff.; Lancel 1995a, 85. Italians and Greeks at Carthage: Eckstein 2006, 159. Etruscan inscription from Ste Monique: Ferron 1966, 699, 704ff.; MacIntosh 1974, 163; Cristofani 1983, 66f.; Gras, Rouillard, and Teixidor 1989, 227; von Hase 2004,

- 72 with illustrations and further evidence of long-distance trade in the Mediterranean. *Bucchero ceramics in Carthage*: Colozier 1953, 65ff.; von Hase 2004, 73–74.
6. Carthage and Tyre: MacIntosh 1974, 164ff. Carthage and Libya: Whittaker 1978, 59; Lancel 1995a, chap. 3; Eckstein 2006, 159. On its presumed influence in eastern Africa, see Fariselli 2002, 9ff. Carthage and the Phoenicians in Sicily: Meier-Welcker 1979, 4; Hans 1983, 33ff. Carthaginian protection of the western Greeks: Thuc. 6.2.6; details in e.g. Hans 1983, 7ff.; Barceló 1989, 20ff.; Ameling 2004, 88. Carthage as a military power: Meier-Welcker 1979, 12: “From early times armies fought on remote battlefields where a high degree of independence was required of the military leadership”; Eckstein 2006, 159ff. On the Carthaginian army, e.g. Fantar 1993, 2.80ff.; Ameling 1993b, 116ff. Carthage’s system of control: cf. Diod. 13.43.3–4—Segesta put itself in the hands of Carthage in 410 (ἐγγειρίζοντες), in order to gain protection.
 7. Mention of the first pair of consuls: Walbank 1957, 1.339; Petzold 1972, 370; Oakley 1998, 2.256; Bringmann 2001b, 115ff.; Serrati 2006, 116. Polybius and Carthage’s fate: Scardigli 1991, 25. First Carthaginian treaty, which may have caused misunderstandings and inaccuracies in its Greek translation: e.g. Gandolfi 1960, 336; Serrati 1991, 122f.; for a free rendering of the text e.g. Bringmann 2001b, 113. The treaty also applied to allies: Whittaker 1982, 87. In the case of Rome, one may think of Massilia: e.g. Nenci 1958, especially 76ff.; Pena 1976–78, 522–523; on Carthage see Fariselli, 11ff. For the role of Massilia cf. Nenci 1958, 77; Pena 1976–8, 522–523. Rome and Latium: e.g. Oakley 1998, 2.256.
 8. Hannibal’s pact with Philip V: Pol. 7.9.5; cf. Livy 23.34.7; Appian, *Mac.* 1.2 with Schmitt 1969, *SVF* 3, no. 528; Wollner 1987, 121ff.
 9. *Kalon Aktoterion*: Asheri 1988, 750; Lancel 1995a, 87. In contrast to earlier scholars (above all Meltzer, Gsell, Colozier, but also Walbank, Werner, Capogrossi, Pena etc.), where it was mainly identified with Cape Farina (Râs-el-Mekki) north-west of Carthage, today one tends to exclude (or think of excluding) the west coast from foreign navigation, i.e. identifying the promontory with Cape Bon (Ras-el-Drek) northeast of Carthage: e.g. Hands, Heurgon, Petzold, Hans, Whittaker, Burn, Prachner, Scardigli, Lancel, Marek, Bringmann, Foulon, Serrati.
 10. Access to Sicily: Ameling 1993a, 151ff. Price control: cf. David 1946, 35ff.; Gandolfi 1960, 338, Ferenczy 1969, 272ff.; Ameling 1993a, 148ff. Guarantees: cf. Frezza 1949, 263ff., Gandolfi 1960, 323ff., 337, 340ff.; Capogrossi 1971, 179; Hans 1983, 106, 115; Burn 1984, 166, Bringmann 2001b, 113. Latium: Toynbee 1965, 1.521. Sailing ban on Romans: Hans, 114; Ameling 1993a, 142–3. Prohibition of plundering (Thuc. 1.5) found even in Homer: Cristofani 1985, 221ff.; Ameling 1993a, 120; Serrati 2006, 118.
 11. Carthaginian conquest of the hinterland: Günther 1993, 78ff., Barceló 1989b, 24; de Vido 2005, 353ff. On changes in waging war and running the state by Carthage: Ameling 1993a, 15ff.; 2004, 90ff. Himera 480: Hdt. 7.153–167; Ephorus, *FGrH* 70, F 186C; Diod. 11.24ff; cf. Ehrenberg 1927, 17; Hands

- 1969, 84f.; Hoffmann 1972, 348; Whittaker 1982), 65; Asheri 1988, 766; Lancel 1995a, 106–107. Relations of the governing class with foreign countries: cf. Günther 1993, 81–82, on the hero-cult of Hamilcar the Magonid, the defeated leader of Himera, and the comparison with Greek aristocratic society; Wollner 1987, 23–24. Carthage's rule in Africa after 480; little is known about the attacks by Carthage on the Libyans in the hinterland and their resistance (Diod. 15.24.2–3); cf. Lancel 1995a, 266; Eckstein 2006, 161.
12. Concept of *epikrateia*: Meltzer 1879–96, 1.256; Hans 1983, 119ff., and Günther 2004, 85; Huss 1985, 59, 127. Expulsion of Carthaginian traders: Diod. 14.46.1. Cf. Garbini 1966, 128; Whittaker 1982, 78; Günther 2004, 85. Destruction of Motya: Huss 1985, 129. Peace treaties with Dionysius: Bengtson 1975, *SVF* 2, nod. 210, 233, 261; Toynbee 1965, 1.530–531; Huss 1985, 135, 139; Zahrnt 1988, 209ff.
 13. Rome after 439: e.g. Gandolfi 1960, 329; Radke 1961, *RE* 20.810ff.; Toynbee 1965, 1.533. Victories in the *Fasti Triumphales*, e.g. for 459 and 423, *de Aequis et Volsceis*. Alliances between Rome and Massilia 390: Justin 43.5.8; cf. Sordi 1960, 111. Between Rome and Caere: Sordi 1960, 25ff. Antium a Roman colony: Livy 7.27.5ff., etc.; e.g. Oakley 1998, 2.565–6; Bringmann 2001b, 115. Treaties with Caere, etc.: Bengtson 1975, *SVF* 2, no. 316; Toynbee 1965, 1.522ff.; Oakley 1998, 2.196, 208. Latins at Feretrium 349: Livy 7.25.5–7; Toynbee 1965, 524; Oakley 1998, 2.233–234. Poor relations of Rome with its allies: Hoffmann 1934, 118; see also Eckstein 2006, 138ff.
 14. Date of the second treaty: Toynbee 1965, 1.522, 528; Oakley 1998, 2.257. Tyre in the treaty: Walbank 1957, 1.347; on Tyre and the Tyrians, e.g. Molin 2004, 188 n. 105; G. Maass-Lindemann in Peters 2004, n. 136. Spain in the treaty: Wickert 1938, 354ff., Toynbee 1965, 1.528ff.; Walbank 1957, 1.347; Burn 1984, 166; Barceló 1988, 26ff.; Oakley 1998, 2.256–257. Carthage's freedom to trade on the coast of Latium: e.g. D. Timpe in Eder 1988, 382; Flach 1994, 37; Ameling 1993, 132ff. *Vindicatio in libertatem*: D. Timpe in Eder 1988, 381; Flach 1994, 37; Bringmann 2001b, 118. On Sardinia: Hans 1985, 73ff.; Barceló 1989b, 33; Serrati 2006, 119.
 15. Annexation of Spain and Sardinia: Cary 1919, 70–71; Hans 1985, 67ff.; Wagner 1989, 148ff.; Bringmann 2001b, 118. Surrender: Ferenczy 1969, 266, 270; Hans 1985, 109. Carthaginian embassy 343: Toynbee 1965, 1.541; Ameling 1993a, 119. Third treaty: Toynbee 1965, 1.545. Roman fleet 311: Livy 9.30.4, cf. (e.g.) Thiel 1954, 420ff.; Mitchell 1971, 639; Oakley 2005, 3.395ff.; Serrati 2006, 120ff. Conflict with the Etruscans: e.g. Cary 1919, 76.
 16. Agathocles: cf. MacIntosh 1974, 145–154. His mercenaries: Diod. 20.61.6; Thiel 1954, 5, 17; Mazzarino, 5, 62; Hans 1983, 220 n. 63; Ameling 1993a, 192–193, 214. Campaign in Africa: Meister 1967, 145ff.; Meier-Welcker 1979, 22–23. Attempts to intervene in Southern Italy and in the Adriatic area: Hoffmann 1934, 57ff.; Willeumier 1987, 86–87; Meister 1970, 405ff.; Mitchell, 643.
 17. Rome's position strengthened in 306: Mitchell 1971, 637. On Polybius's denial: Hans 1983, 110. *Aerarium* of the aediles: Palmer 1997, 17ff. On dating it in

- 306: e.g. Mitchell 1971, 635; Oakley 1998, 2.259; Serrati 2006, 123 f. However, see below.
18. Independent and undated evidence in Servius: so a few scholars (e.g. Hoyos 1998, 98–99; Albert 1978, 206–207; Oakley 1998, 2.259; Serrati 2006, 126f.) hold. Condition of the agreement in the treaty with Pyrrhus in 278: Cary 1919, 69ff.; Toynbee 1965, 1.543ff.; Schmitt 1969, 54; Meister 1970, 408–409; Torelli 1978, 178; Oakley 1998, 2.258; Serrati 2006, 125, 129ff. Intervention by Carthage in favour of Tarentum in 272: e.g. Wuilleumier 1987, 138; Walbank 1967, 2.354; Walsh 1985, 140; Händl-Sagawe 1995, 79; Serrati 2006, 125ff.
 19. Roman intervention in Sicily in 264: cf. e.g. Thiel 1954, 13ff.; Toynbee 1965, 1.553, Mitchell 1971, 635; Hans 1983, 110, 112–113; Hoyos 1998, 107, and Chapter 9 below; Brizzi 2005, 31ff.
 20. Carthaginian system of control and protection of markets (oil, wine, metals, and other goods): Gandolfi 1960, 339ff.; Meier-Welcker 1979, 9. Its Asian predecessors: Liverani 1990, 113; Weinfeld 1990, 176ff.

CHAPTER THREE

The Rise of Carthage to 264 BC

Walter Ameling

Before the First Punic War, when the Romans were discussing whether to come to the aid of the Mamertines in Messina, part of the argument supposedly ran thus:

they ... saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbors, hemming them [i.e. the Romans] in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge for crossing over to Italy, debated the matter for long. (Pol. 1.10.5-10, tr. Paton)

The position of Carthage in the Mediterranean world is seen here as an immediate threat to Rome, forcing Rome into action the rationale of which is reminiscent of a theory of defensive imperialism. Today we mostly assume that the cited passage is based on the account of the beginning of the war in Fabius Pictor, that is, a Roman source, which at least raises the question whether Rome's assessment of the position reported here actually reflected the political situation in the western Mediterranean, and whether there was a real foundation for the resulting fear of an encirclement by Carthage. Naturally, the Roman and Carthaginian elites had known each other for centuries, and the old contacts had grown closer once more when the Romans, in the course of their expansion in Italy advanced further and further southward — and in

Pyrrhus they had even had a common enemy. It is precisely because Rome knew the policies and behavior of Carthage, and, by the way, the resources that the Carthaginians had available for war, that it is so important in the assessment of the First Punic War and its beginnings to gain an idea of the Carthaginian state and its history. In this way we may perhaps reach a reliable conclusion about the assessment transmitted by Polybius.

We must therefore address four topics of particular interest, whose individual strands will not always be easy to keep apart: the history of Carthage till about 400; the structure of the Carthaginian state; the Carthaginian “empire”; and Carthage’s engagement in Sicily, where the historical account can be taken as far as the beginning of the First Punic War.

Carthage’s History

Timaeus put the foundation of Carthage by settlers from Phoenician Tyre in 814 BC (*FGrH* 566 F60). We now have C14 dating which puts it in the last third of the ninth century BC: literary and archaeological traditions confirm each other.¹

The foundation of Carthage was part of Phoenician expansion to the west and the associated colonization that aimed not only at establishing trading-posts and securing sea-routes, but also at founding self-sufficient and autonomous cities: Carthage was one of the places that were founded with an eye to their extensive and fertile hinterland, ease of defence, and good harbors. The Phoenicians knew the area well, for the somewhat older city of Utica was not too far away. Carthage, along with Gades/Cadiz, is the only Phoenician city for which a foundation myth is known: Timaeus already knew the story of Queen Dido/Elissa, and the purpose of this story was to explain the rather reserved relations between Carthage and Tyre and the relations of the Carthaginians with the Libyans.

Carthage was in practice autonomous, at any rate was not directed and ruled by its mother city Tyre. The first element of the city’s name, *qrt* (city, *polis*), implies this — quite apart from the practical question of how the distant metropolis Tyre was to control a city the size of Carthage. Naturally, there were relations between the cities: the Carthaginians honored Melqart, the great god of Tyre, and sent annual tribute to him, and, even if this custom sometimes lapsed, it was always remembered in times of distress. Tyre sought help from its mighty daughter-city, but one cannot deduce dependence from this — just as it is no proof of dependence that foreign conquerors of Tyre repeatedly laid nominal claim to rule over Carthage. Numerous other connections existed, but they were not unique: Tyrian traders in Carthage are hardly unusual.

Neither trade with Greeks, nor the support of the Phoenicians coming from Spain, nor trade with the hinterland — hardly imaginable anyway — explain

adequately the rapid growth of Carthage and its astonishing size as early as the eighth century. The size of the city is a further sign of the intentions of the founders to establish an autonomous city with all the advantages of agrarian self-sufficiency. If the early Carthaginians paid *vectigalia* to the tribes in the hinterland, then this is evidence of their concern for the territory: they wanted to protect it from wandering hordes and their frequent incursions. Many ancient cities whose territory bordered on regions inhabited by semi-nomads did just this.

The Phoenician city-states of the first millennium BC must have been models for the way the early Carthaginian state took shape — yet, unfortunately, we know little more about them than about Carthage. The traditional form of rule in these cities was monarchy, and the Phoenician rulers had comparable duties to other Middle Eastern rulers: they exercised political, economic, and religious functions, though it is easily possible that these spheres overlapped in quite particular ways in each case. Alongside the king there was an upper class which depended either on land ownership or perhaps also on income from trade. How the relationship of the upper class to the king developed over time is not really clear. As early as in the ninth century there were various officials and a council of elders — but how did these institutions relate to king and aristocracy?

We must also assume comparable institutions at Carthage. Initially they governed the city, and then developed to suit local conditions — so that the analogy to the Phoenician cities becomes a little more difficult. In view of the frequent threats to the Carthaginian territory by Libyan tribes, the power of the local aristocracy may have increased, as they could give rapid and effective help on the spot. In any case, towards the end of the sixth century there was a military aristocracy, a council of elders, a king who acted as leader of the army, citizen-soldiers who had a specially close relationship with their noble leader — and the model just sketched would be one way of explaining this development.

Written sources offer little material for the time after the foundation of Carthage — only when the Carthaginians entered the sights of the Greeks and Romans did they become the object of ancient historiography. Our sources therefore mostly omit Carthaginian history in Africa, and we have almost nothing else to refer to. Nevertheless, the excavations of the last decades have shown that archaic Carthage, laid out as a large city from the beginning, grew rapidly, and this growth was not uncontrolled growth but occurred in a well-ordered way.² In other words, there must have been efficient administrative structures from the beginning, which fixed the layout of the city, enforced compliance with regulations, and were responsible for the various communal buildings from the city walls to the temples.

Such growth reveals self-contained residential buildings even in the early seventh century and these kinds of structures must have had consequences for the environs and for Carthage's relationship with its hinterland. Just the huge

growth of the population needing to be fed must have led to the extension of its territory, or at least the extension of the region whence the Carthaginian leadership obtained food supplies.

Various kinds of ceramics reveal early contacts reaching far into Africa, and archaeological finds prove there was direct interest by the Carthaginians in their hinterland around 600 at the latest, and shortly afterward stone was quarried on Cape Bon. Kerkouane was founded around this time, and a number of smaller fortresses were built to protect the Carthaginian territory from attacks by pirates. Carthage, as has been clear for some time, did not live in isolation, did not concentrate on Africa alone, but played its part in the turbulent archaic world which was still seeking order, where the Etruscans, Greeks, Phoenicians, Italians, and many others were looking for their place. Collaboration and conflict were common and ethnic divisions were of no particular account: Phoenicians against Phoenicians, Etruscans against Etruscans — these constellations were just as possible as Etruscans against Greeks or Greeks against Phoenicians. For reasons not always clear, prevailing interests could oppose each other, though we must not forget that at this time there were still military conflicts that did not concern the whole state but were waged only by individual groups within the state, even sometimes only by individual persons and their followers.

A few examples show the geographical extent reached by Carthaginian interests in the sixth century, and the problems with which the city was confronted. It is a characteristic of our sources that confrontation with the Greeks is central to them:

When Pentathlos tried to found a settlement near Lilybaeum in 580/576, he was repulsed by the Phoenicians there without the Carthaginians' involvement. The developments at roughly this time concerning the foundation or extension of Himera, Selinus, and Acragas seem likewise to have been solely a matter between the Phoenicians living in Sicily and the Greeks.

In the middle of the sixth century the Phocaeans in the Tyrrhenian Sea attracted more settlers and thus achieved new impetus; they disturbed their neighborhood to such an extent through piracy that Carthaginians and Etruscans together took action against them. This led to the battle of Alalia (Aleria) in 540, where the Carthaginians and Etruscans each supplied 60 ships — and defeated the Phocaeans.

The Spartan Dorieus tried to found a colony on the Kinyps River in Libya, but was driven off by the natives acting in concert with the Carthaginians: a few years later (524/3? 510?) he attempted a new foundation on Eryx in Sicily, but was driven out by the Phoenicians and Segestans. It is unclear whether Carthaginians were also involved in this repulse of Dorieus.

In the sixth century there was a conflict with Massalia over Carthaginian pirates attacking Greek fishing boats.

Taking all this into account, we gain an impression of what actions were open to the Carthaginians: private ventures like the one against Massalia stood alongside massive state interventions like the case of Alalia.

These unstructured forms of foreign relations, typical everywhere in the archaic world, necessarily led to the search for the first forms of international law. Treaties with various states (in Greek, *symbola*: SVA 2.116) were intended to reduce friction that arose from the lack of international law and the coexistence of public and private power.

Carthage is thus present in wide reaches of the western Mediterranean, has interests in Africa where it cooperates with indigenous tribes, and in the sixth century at the latest begins to establish dominance beyond the territory of the city.

In Sicily the Phoenicians had for the most part lived alongside the Greeks without problems. Both Selinus and Himera had been founded near Phoenician settlements, and later these settlements were integrated into the territories of the *poleis* without any indication of violent incorporation. If, therefore, Carthaginian armies waged war in Sicily and Sardinia in the second half of the sixth century, the Phoenician cities will hardly have called for their aid against indigenous enemies: these cities in Sicily, for example, Panormus, Motya, and Solus, had little in common, so there is no question of a common threat requiring a request to Carthage for aid. Very likely Carthage was conducting a conscious policy of expansion in the Phoenician area: in any case, at the end of this development Carthage controlled the Phoenician cities in Sicily and Sardinia, and thus begins the transformation of western Phoenician culture into Punic culture.

There is still little to say about the extent of a Carthaginian dominion around 500: possibly only a handful of cities with their territories counted as part of that dominion. This applies to the North African coast too, where the Carthaginians were likewise expanding (here there may be a link to the Phoenician journeys to the west, which however is difficult to envisage in detail). Any conception of a coherent territory, as many maps suggest, is false.

Both the foundation of Ebusus by Carthage (in 654/3 according to Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F164, 16) and overall an early presence of the Carthaginian state in Spain, are heavily disputed (Pol. 2.1.6? The only certainty is the lack of Carthaginian rule in Spain in the middle of the third century and the loss of such rule is nowhere mentioned; presumably there was no territorial dominance in Iberia and thus no direct mining of minerals; still, settlements may have existed which the Carthaginians regarded for a time as dependent on themselves.) Blocking the Straits of Gibraltar to foreigners is a constantly reappearing myth, which has no basis in the sources or in the form of Carthaginian presence and Carthaginian interest in these areas.

The journey by Hanno, which — presumably in the early fifth century — took him along the west coast of Africa to the area of the mouth of the Niger, aimed at founding colonies beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. This points to a possible reason for Carthaginian expansion in different regions: colonization suggests overpopulation, or at least rapid population growth, which is confirmed by the archaeologically demonstrable growth of the city. This is not to say that the search for raw materials, above all metals, played no part at all in Carthaginian foreign relations; the intervention in Sardinia took them to an area whose mineral resources the Phoenicians had long been exploiting.

We gain a somewhat better picture of Carthage's early relations with Rome — if the dating of the first Roman-Carthaginian treaty (*SVA* 2.121) around 500 is correct. The Carthaginians had already cooperated with the Etruscans at this period (*Alalia*), and Rome like the other Latin cities was probably well known to them from their piracy — just as there were always Romans who tried their luck on the African coast. Roman voyages of this kind to Africa were completely prohibited in the treaty, while certain rights were granted to Carthage in Latium. At the time of the treaty Carthage is present in Libya, Sardinia and Sicily in differing forms — in Sicily there are, for instance, no Carthaginian officials: the island is still an agglomeration of cities, tribes, and other groups. Nevertheless, the Carthaginian presence there is so strong that treaty provisos about conduct on the island can be made. Carthage does not yet know international law, but already attempts to find substitute forms (cf. *SVA* 2.116).

Carthage had ambivalent relations with the Italic, Etruscan, and Greek cities of the western Mediterranean, though this ambivalence cannot be attributed anywhere to ethnic conflicts. Private power certainly existed, and Carthage was strong enough — as the example of Rome shows — to provide its own people with advantages in this area. Alongside this, however, there are also normal trade relations — and from Rome there are numerous indications of the presence of Punic traders and Punic gods introduced by them (cf. also the gold tablets from Pyrgi [*KAI* 277; *TLE* 874f.]). The intensity of such contacts probably depended on the importance of each partner.

Carthage is therefore present in many places around 500, can assert its will — alone or with the help of others — and with Syracuse is one of the centers of the western Mediterranean. Social links exist with the members of other states — King Hamilcar, who died in 480 in the battle of Himera, was the son of a Syracusan woman and guest-friend of the tyrant of Himera. Relations like this show the compatibility of the Carthaginian and Greek aristocracies (cf. also Plut. *Dion* 25), but also prove that in Carthage the social world of the aristocracy is even more important than the abstract state with its various rights. Private and treaty relations stood side by side, and both could influence the actions of the state.

We see in the example of Hamilcar that the Carthaginians in Sicily became involved in the disputes between the two Greek blocs: the tyrants of Himera and Messana were opposed by the tyrants of Syracuse and Acragas. In view of this uneven distribution of power, the tyrant of Himera believed he could regain his lost position only with the help of his guest-friend Hamilcar. Hamilcar's decision may not have been influenced only by the laws of hospitality, but also by the interests of his state: the aggressive policy of expansion espoused by Hippocrates of Gela, then Gelon of Syracuse, must have represented a threat to every state interested in Sicily, and one mysterious passage tells of a war between Gelon and Carthage, possibly in the 480s (Hdt. 7.158).

The help that Hamilcar wanted to give the tyrant of Himera was of a private nature — but Gelon, after his great victory in the battle of Himera (480) which he successfully represented to the Greeks as defence against barbarian peril, demanded state reparations from Carthage, which were given (SVA 2.131). State reparations for privately caused damage were customary at the time, yet the huge encroachment on the state by the action of one of its citizens is probably the main reason why such private action was rapidly proscribed by the state. On land, the battle of Himera is the last example of this in the history of Carthage: Hamilcar's defeat actually contributed to the consolidation of the state and its monopoly on the use of force.

The battle had no territorial consequences for direct Carthaginian rule in Sicily: the Phoenician cities in the west remained under Carthaginian control. There were no observable consequences, either, from the Carthaginian–Etruscan defeat in the sea battle of Cyme (474).

Overall one may say that the extension of Carthage's power, which brought numerous contacts of a political, military and economic kind, was responsible for the development of the state and its institutions. The independence of the aristocracy was curtailed by this development, and its functions (and competencies) were transferred in greater measure to a state still of course aristocratic. These developments must have occurred largely during the fifth century, which is a relatively obscure period in Carthaginian history. After the battle of Cyme we hear nothing more for a considerable time about Carthaginian–Greek conflicts, which probably indicates the establishment of a certain *status quo* between the two groups.

Despite this, Carthage did not disappear from the sight of the Sicilian (and other) Greeks: it remained present in Sicily and was felt to be a significant power, not only economically. “Seditiones Siculorum” (Livy 4.29.8) brought the Carthaginians perhaps in 431 to think about renewed activity in Sicily. Even in Athens people knew Carthage's reputation, and the city was regarded simultaneously as possible plunder and as a possible ally against the Sicilian Greeks. Although Athenian fancy dreamed of conquering Carthage during the first expedition to Sicily (Aristophanes, *Knights* 172–174, 1303–1304)

the Carthaginians remained quiet at that time. During the great Athenian expedition in 415–413 Alcibiades wanted to capture Carthage (Thuc. 6.15.2, cf. 90.2), the Carthaginians had long feared an Athenian attack, so that the Syracusan Hermocrates considered an alliance with them (6.34), and finally the Athenians even sent an embassy to Carthage which was to make a treaty (against Syracuse: 6.88.6). All these various possibilities were based on conditions in Sicily which had changed in favor of Carthage: consolidation, probably also extension of its power in the west of the island, occurred during the obscure decades of the fifth century. In any case, for the year 405 the sources imply a territorially defined Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, which was generally designated *epikrateia* (the expression also occurs in the Carthaginian-Syracusan treaty of 339/8: Diod. 16.82.3 [SVA 2.344]).

Towards the end of the fifth century we thus observe a twofold process: Carthage stabilized its own position in western Sicily (and elsewhere?), and Athens, through its intervention, altered the balance of power and the political dynamics so enduringly that Carthage from now on could not avoid intervening in Sicily and establishing its own military presence there. The successes of the Sicilian Greeks were seen as a threat that needed to be met with a more active policy: a call for help from Segesta was probably the trigger, but hardly the reason, for increased military activity by the Carthaginians in the island. The Carthaginians were concerned only with Sicily: the Aegean was neither politically, militarily, nor economically of particular significance to Carthage. Nevertheless, they did take into account developments there in their policy on Sicily and in occasional diplomatic contacts. Carthage's Sicilian policy was dominated in the following period by the wars with Syracuse in which luck and success oscillated back and forth (see below).

The Structure of the Carthaginian State

Carthage was an aristocratic state and a city-state, in other words, its structures did not really evolve with the changing conditions and the growth of the Carthaginian empire. The importance of the city officials, institutions, and assemblies, and the lack of integration of subject people, all derive from this fact. And although the Greeks in the fourth century thought that Carthage had an almost ideal mixed constitution, some of the state's problems have their origin in this structure. In a treaty, the so-called "oath of Hannibal," the individual elements of the Carthaginian state are designated as follows (Pol. 7.9.5 [SVA 3.528]; cf. also 3.24.3 [SVA 2.326]): "the Carthaginians, the supreme lords... and all under the dominion of Carthage who live under the same laws; likewise the people of Utica and all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage" (tr. Paton).

The “Carthaginian empire” was thus not a homogeneous entity, but consisted of differing groups of differing legal status. Next to the Carthaginian citizens stood the subject peoples who used the same laws as the Carthaginians³ — which necessarily resulted in equal status in civil law. Mostly these subject peoples are called “Libyphoenicians”: they lived in cities, often but not exclusively on the coast. Their special status in law probably originated in the fact that their cities must have been old Phoenician foundations or colonies of Carthage. Alongside these legally privileged descendants of the *Poeni* were numerous other subjects. According to their individual legal status — city, village, tribe — and the history of their relationship with the Punic metropolis, the relations of these groups with Carthage were most likely differently regulated.

All these groups are groups of persons: the Carthaginian state was not an abstract concept, but consisted of different groups of people who had different rights and duties according to their legal status. The Carthaginian citizens, for instance, will have known the same private and criminal law — but it is uncertain whether they had to pay taxes regularly. On the other hand it was part of the duties of a citizen to serve in the army and the fleet, and the citizens could be called to arms by the *strategoï*.

Duties of this kind should actually lead to rights for the people, and there was indeed a popular assembly that elected the various officials. The Carthaginian people were not simply forced to react — with approval or disapproval — to the proposals put by the chief official (*sufete*) as leader of the assembly: any citizen could put a proposal on any subject brought before the popular assembly (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1273a6 ff.).⁴ Nevertheless, the people had very limited power to shape policy: if the *sufetes* and a majority of the council agreed not to put a matter before the people, then they were not obliged to do so: unity of the upper class could block political initiative from below.

The gradual end of the monarchy in Carthage put the aristocracy in the foreground, and generally they supplied the officials who, as Aristotle says, were elected for one year by the people, according to their merits and fortune (*Pol.* 1273a23f.). Officials were not paid for their services, which was enough to exclude large groups of the population. We do not know if iteration was prohibited. Accumulation of offices was permitted, though there were clear hierarchical differences between the individual offices. The highest official was the *sufete* (from the Phoenician word for “judge”; cf. the Biblical book) and not the people but officials functioned generally as judges in Carthage. We know the titles of many other officials, either in Greek or in Latin, or — from inscriptions — in their Punic form. We know of the rough division of their competencies, but nothing more. Altogether the number of annually elected officials was not particularly great.

As a rule, two or more officials held the same office, that is, collegiality was preserved, which is to be seen above all as limitation of the power of one

individual official. This is particularly clear in the example of the *strategoi*: even here the principle of collegiality was introduced towards the end of the fifth century, even for a military campaign. It also fitted the principle of shared powers that there were no officials simultaneously holding civil and military competencies: thus, just as the *sufetes* had nothing to do with conducting warfare, the *strategoi* had no civil competencies of any kind.

As neither the people's assembly nor the officials were particularly strong, the actual power in the state resided with the various councils⁵ — and thus with the councillors who were recruited from amongst former officials. In the council decisions were made about war and peace, military levies and their financing. Members of the council accompanied the *strategoi* to war, so control could be ensured over the military.

If one now asks why the Carthaginian people was prepared to leave the rule in the hands of the nobility, then one must point out that the people profited from their rule — though at the expense of its subjects (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1273b18–20; 1320b5–9; cf. 1316b5). Dominance in Africa helped to stabilize aristocratic dominance within Carthage. Like all great cities in the ancient world, Carthage lived on its dominance over others, not on the services it performed for others. For these reasons, the Carthaginians could not afford to integrate the Libyans into their state, with resulting legal equality. The African territory, the taxes gathered there, its agricultural production and the possibilities it offered for recruitment were the basis of all Carthaginian rule.

The Carthaginian Empire

Carthaginian territory in Africa reached its greatest extent in the fourth century, even though there were repeated attempts till the First Punic War to extend it (Hecatompylos). These were the peoples, in sum, who inhabited the Carthaginians' African territory; if we can say that the Carthaginians had divided their African possessions into a number of administrative districts, it involves the land of these subjects. Neighboring this territory were free Numidian tribes who, however, no longer represented any real threat to Carthage. In many cases the aristocracy of these tribes had personal connections with the Carthaginian elite (cf. Naravas see Chapter 12): in relations with these groups the archaic form of personal ties still applied.

The relationship of the Carthaginians to their subjects must have varied according to the subjects' differing legal positions, but one point must have been common to all: subjects had to pay tribute and taxes, and had to provide soldiers for Carthage's wars. Alongside Carthaginian citizens, Libyans formed the greatest part of the city's armies. In many cases the respective numbers will have been fixed in treaties, yet we know that at least the tax paid by the

Libyans on produce could be fixed by the Carthaginians according to choice (or necessity). We may add, incidentally, that the Carthaginian aristocracy gained its wealth from land ownership in Africa (Diod. 20.8.3f.).

The African territory was administered by a civil official (with the title of *strategos*) who was virtually without armed personnel. Just as no military force was necessary in dealing with the Libyphoenicians who were their equals in civil law, it was also mostly unnecessary for the Libyans, if for different reasons. They were not so organized as to make ruling them by force necessary. We do hear of some uprisings, but the only serious Libyan uprising was in the years 241–237 and had at its military core the mutinous mercenary army, which acted as catalyst and organizer for Libyan discontent (cf. Chapter 12).

For Sardinia, archaeological evidence after the Carthaginian conquest shows extensive Punicization of the former Phoenician cities, which were mostly in the south of the island. Besides the exploitation of metal ores, the aim in Sardinia was an expansion of agricultural production, part of which was certainly required for export to Africa (in times of military emergency Carthage was supplied from Sardinia). The cities thus intensified their presence in the hinterland, but were also forced to set up a number of military outposts against the indigenous population. This required a permanent Carthaginian military presence on the island, and brought about a subjugation (partly at least) of the Sardinians, who were perhaps no better organized than the Libyans but had topography on their side. In the third century garrisons and cities were protected by mercenaries commanded by a Carthaginian *boetharchos* — and in a crisis situation Carthaginian rule could be endangered.

Corsica and — for different reasons — even Malta were not central to Punic power in the western Mediterranean. In the Balearic Islands archaeological finds begin in the sixth century; they are of the same kind as Punic find-groups and are closely related to them. The flourishing society of this time, too, was based on intensive cultivation of the islands, which made a connection with Carthage possible as destination for the produce. Carthaginian wealth probably came into the country through the — indigenous — slingers who served as specialists in the armies of the metropolis. All this does not really take us any further in the question of the introduction and possible form of Carthaginian rule in the Balearic Islands. While Carthage's presence is felt from the fifth century, and a stronger Punic penetration in the fourth, initially this is more a cultural contact than confirmation of a political presence. If we are not certain about this, how much weaker must be our concepts of Carthaginian presence in Spain?

The Phoenician presence in Spain goes back to the ninth century or even earlier times. Connections with Carthage unquestionably existed, yet it is unclear to what extent such connections contributed to the growth of the Carthaginian state or determined its political or military action. A (possible)

indication of Carthaginian rule in Spain comes only with the middle of the fourth century: in the so-called second Roman-Carthaginian treaty (Pol. 3.24.2; *SVA* 2.326) a place called “Mastia Tarseion” is mentioned as the limit of Roman navigation: the first part of the name is connected with Hecataeus’ Mastianoi, who lived near the Pillars of Hercules, the second part (or the second place-name?) is mostly understood as a reference to Tartessos, or Tarshish in the Bible, to be located in the south of Spain — even if Polybius evidently assumed that this place lay in Africa. The usual interpretation of the treaty presupposes huge Carthaginian interests in Spain without being able to adduce further evidence or indications of these interests.⁶ Certainly, however, the Carthaginians lost their potential bridgehead in Spain before the end of the First Punic War, as Hamilcar needed to “reconquer” the land (Pol. 2.1.6).⁷

There was special significance in the Carthaginian rule in Sicily, the so-called *epikrateia*. Even if in this expression the aspect of territorial domination is already included, the *epikrateia* did not involve a firmly fixed, unified territory: its changing borders are known to us through the peace treaties between Carthage and Syracuse. Its structure lacked unity too: we find no threats from the indigenous peoples that needed warding off, no intervention in agriculture, no ethnic unity, and definitely no unified administration. Till well into the fourth century the Punic cities continued minting their own coins: only around 305/300 did they cease — though we still have no convincing explanation for it. Perhaps this was the time when Carthage adopted stricter control, for at the same time the production of Carthaginian military coins increases.

The tribes and cities of the *epikrateia* were of course obliged to pay tribute and to support Carthaginian foreign policy, primarily by accommodating garrisons against the Greeks and building and extending their own fortifications. At the beginning of the *epikrateia* these garrisons were not much in evidence: practical and financial grounds hindered the Carthaginians from stationing major contingents permanently in Sicily. In the first wars with Syracuse the Carthaginian armies first had to be recruited and shipped to Sicily before a military response to foreign aggression could begin — even though the locally available forces were numerically not negligible. In the *epikrateia* early on, defence, conscription, auxiliary contingents that could be called up, and troops in individual garrisons existed side by side, and were poorly coordinated. It is clear that the coordination, supplying, and provisioning of these various groups made it necessary to establish certain facilities. For pay, supply, and provisioning, it was possible locally to mint coins whose legend clearly shows the army and its soldiers as recipients. We must assume that the mintmasters of these coins, which were not destined for circulation in Africa, were the *strategoi*, other military commanders, or paymasters.

It looks as if in the last quarter of the fourth century a specific change was occurring in the *epikrateia*: more soldiers seem to have been stationed

permanently in Sicily, some of them perhaps even given land by the Carthaginians to settle on in the Sicilian manner, and the Carthaginian *strategoï* seem to have intervened more forcefully in the internal affairs of the cities in the *epikrateia* and seem to have concluded generals' treaties (*berit*) more frequently. Though the last point may perhaps be ascribed to a stronger interest by our sources in the events of the fourth century, there can be no doubt at all that the Carthaginians saw reason to intensify their presence in Sicily. We may attribute this to a general trend towards stronger state rule, yet we must not forget that still no civil administration had been set up, there was still no "provincial governor," and the various political units did not disappear, but kept the greater part of their internal autonomy. Thus, if we seek a reason for the changes in Carthage's rule in Sicily, we must consider the disputes with Syracuse: Carthage wanted troops, not to be an instrument to dominate the *epikrateia*, but rather to improve the possibility of defence against Syracuse under its various rulers.

Carthage's Engagement in Sicily

The rise of Carthage as a prelude to the First Punic War is, of course, particularly closely linked with Carthage's presence in Sicily and its disputes with the Sicilian Greeks (we had left this theme towards the end of the fifth Century: see Carthage's History above). The dominance of Carthage outside Sicily served mainly to support warfare in Sicily or to make it possible: this is in any case the way our sources see it. They report the Sicilian wars of the end of the fifth Century and in the fourth with greater thoroughness, in relation to Carthaginian history.

Among the western Greeks, mainly those in Sicily, historiography flourished.⁸ For these authors the Greeks' disputes with Carthage had special significance, so they recounted them at length. Even if most western Greek historians are lost, the reflection of their work is preserved in Diodorus who — coming from Sicily himself — gave extensive space to Sicilian history. This may be useful for our purposes, but it causes a weighting of Carthaginian history that certainly was not shared by the Carthaginians: at least till 264, and possibly even longer, the opinion in Carthage would have been that its own fate would be determined in Africa.

If the Sicilian historians thought that the Greeks' wars with Carthage were important, they were not wrong — as is clear from a first glance at Syracuse. The Syracusan victory over the great Athenian expedition of 415–413 did not bring the peace that the city desired, but rather marked the beginning of lengthy conflicts within Sicily and within Syracuse.

The failures by Syracuse in the war with Carthage led to the tyrant Dionysius taking power: his harsh criticism of the current war-leadership gave him this

opportunity. Syracusan politicians are repeatedly measured by their ability to defeat Carthage, and Dionysius was not the last to have gained internal political power by promising a victory over the *Poeni*. However, Dionysius had no more success than his opponents, and the peace of 405 (*SVA* 2.210) marks the greatest extent of Carthaginian influence in Sicily up to that time: besides Carthage's pre-existing possessions (i.e. besides the Punic cities in the west of the island and the territories of the Elymians and the Sicans) a number of important Greek cities were to become dependent on her: Himera, Selinus, Acragas, Gela, and Camarina. In addition, it was agreed that a number of places near Syracuse, notably Messana and Leontinoi, were to be autonomous—that is, not subject to the Syracusans; the same was to apply to the Siculi. Autonomy meant freedom from the influence of Syracuse, and thus was to Carthage's advantage.

Such a peace treaty put Dionysius under pressure, and as early as 404 he began systematic preparations for a new war which broke out in 397. Nevertheless, one cannot be content with an explanation in terms of internal policy or simply assume that Dionysius was striving for more power. Anti-Carthaginian feeling seems to have been strong among the Syracusan population, as Hermocrates had already announced pan-Sicilian ideas, in other words, wished to bring about a Sicily without Carthaginians. Since the days of Gelon, the Carthaginians had been considered barbarians who played the same role as the Persians for the Sicilian Greeks: Dionysius was able to use this attitude to spread the idea that Sicily must be protected from the Carthaginians. This situation was hardly to change in the following period: the barbarian image could constantly be dragged out and activated for political purposes till well into the third century. It was not hard for Timoleon, in the middle of the fourth century, to use the freedom slogan, well known from his Greek homeland, against the Carthaginians.

More difficult to explain than Dionysius' aggressiveness is Carthage's inactivity during these years. Modern hypotheses point to the consequences of a plague and to internal policy differences (not really attested), which stopped Carthage pursuing further expansion. Probably another factor is more important: after the great success of 405, confirmed by treaty, Carthage had hardly anything to gain, for dominance over all of Sicily had never been the aim of Carthaginian policy, which did not seek expansion for expansion's sake. We may recognize even in these early years the first features of Carthage's Sicilian policy.

The first effects of the war and the necessary preparations may be observed in the production by Carthage of tetradrachms to the Attic standard, which applied universally in Sicily at that time. The war began in 406 at the latest, but presumably started as early as 410/9, and ended around 390. The independent minting of coins by the Punic cities was no longer sufficient

for war preparations, and the “trading empire” of Carthage had not till then minted its own coins.⁹ These coins were intended for the war against Dionysius, as their date, their quantity, and their legends confirm. The coins were also a symbol of the sovereignty of a state which now for the first time held the view that it wanted to be present in Sicily with a symbol of this kind.

There is little interest in the details of the four or more wars that Carthage had to wage against Dionysius I, yet a few general points must be noted as they may be observed repeatedly till the time of Pyrrhus:

Even if Greek cities had been put under Carthaginian rule or Punic protection in a treaty¹⁰, they were often willing to cross to the Syracusan side. Under military pressure the west of the island was similarly ready to act against Carthage, though, conversely, even the immediate environs of Syracuse took Carthage’s side under pressure.

We observe a division of the island into spheres of influence in the frequent drawing of borders along the Halykos and Himeras Rivers. As a rule the Carthaginians were satisfied with such arrangements if they were not provoked.

Both sides had varying degrees of military success: both sides advanced more than once deep into enemy territory. The destruction of Motya by Dionysius in the year 397 was important in the continuing development of Punic Sicily. The Carthaginians did not refortify this city anew even after regaining their positions; instead, they founded Lilybaeum, which was to become the new bulwark of Carthaginian power in Sicily: as long as this city and fortress could be supplied by ship, i.e. as long as Carthage controlled the sea, the *Poeni* could not be driven out of Sicily.

It also became clear that such a bulwark was necessary, for Carthage’s military presence in Sicily was not lastingly high. Usually the Carthaginian armies needed to be raised in Africa and mercenaries had to be recruited before Carthage could respond to an attack. Often a whole year passed before the Carthaginian military machine could intervene, which gave clear advantages to their opponents on the spot. In other words: like all city-states, Carthage could not afford to maintain a standing army, and the distance made any response difficult.

And one final point: it is often said that Dionysius tried to take advantage of an epidemic in Africa and an uprising by the Libyans which occurred at the same time, in order to act against Carthage in Sicily. This is based on the sure recognition that Carthage’s power was not to be found in the Sicilian *epikrateia* or in Sardinia, but in Africa.

Dionysius and his successors did not conduct a policy that was restricted to Sicily: as is well known, they tried, with varying success, to gain control of parts of southern Italy. Comparable attempts were never undertaken by Carthage, but it is clear nonetheless that the Carthaginians were well acquainted with Italian conditions. This is shown above all by the second

Roman-Carthaginian treaty (SVA 2.326), which dates to the middle of the fourth century. Rome is, as before, a middle-ranking power at best, whose affairs were certainly not the most important topic of conversation in the harbors of the Mediterranean, but the Carthaginians were plainly aware of Rome's awkward situation and knew too how to exploit it. Carthage was given an almost completely free hand for activities on the coast of Italy — which was perhaps seen by Rome as helpful: Rome's enemies could thus be weakened. If the same treaty concentrates trade with Rome at Carthage, that is, keeps it out of the Punic cities of Africa, the probable aim is to concentrate the revenue from harbor dues in Carthage, even if the old trend from the first treaty must not be wholly forgotten: foreigners' legal security is thus easier to guarantee.

Tendencies are recognizable in this treaty, but it is not easy to generalize: the involvement in the political situation in Latium on the one hand, and on the other the continuing validity, which must be assumed, of older treaties with other partners, show that the political aims of Carthage may not be reconstructed only from this treaty. As the treaty grew out of a certain situation, the end of this situation, the establishment of Roman hegemony in Latium and Italy, restricted Carthage's opportunities. A further limitation arose from the huge military problems that the Carthaginians had in the second half of the fourth century in Sicily: private or public warfare on the coasts of Italy was not possible on a large scale in the era of a Timoleon or Agathocles.

These two just-mentioned names represent completely different directions in Syracusan internal policy, but in both cases we observe that war against Carthage was not waged for its own sake but rather to secure their own position internally — just as the Carthaginians, too, repeatedly tried to use internal events in Sicily for their purposes. Both conflicts began with severe Carthaginian defeats, but ended with a strengthened *status quo ante*, favorable to Carthage. Although in 342 Timoleon won an impressive victory on the Krimisos River, which meant for the Carthaginians the end of the aristocratic elite troops (the "Sacred Band") and the end of the war-chariot as an instrument of warfare, the Syracusans in the peace of 339 (SVA 2.344) were able to claim only the territories that had already been ceded to them in 362. Whether and how far the war years — and the serious defeat — influenced conditions in Africa the sources do not say.

A few years later things looked different, when the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles based his war plans against Carthage precisely on the insecurity of African conditions. The rise of Agathocles was linked from the beginning with Carthaginian-Syracusan enmity, which the Sicilian Greeks wanted to use against Carthage and which Agathocles used to secure his position. Carthage for its part was not unwilling to strengthen the *epikrateia* or at least defend it.

The great war broke out in the spring of 310, and in view of Carthaginian successes, Agathocles developed a bold plan: he was the first enemy general to cross to Africa with an army — an idea which was to be taken up later by Regulus and Scipio Africanus. Agathocles' thinking was: Africa had agricultural and material wealth, so an army could be fed (and paid) from the land; he also expected support from the Carthaginians' Libyan subjects. He had seen correctly how important Africa was to Carthage's war in Sicily; he had also seen that the military defence of Africa was not very strong and that the subjects were discontented with their masters. His army was to promote a more general uprising and thus break the back of Carthaginian domination. The Libyan hinterland indeed offered little resistance to Agathocles, not only because he was an enemy of Carthage, but also because the Libyan villages and "cities" had little possibility of opposing an active army — and the Carthaginians did not manage to defeat Agathocles in a pitched battle.

Agathocles's intelligent and ruthless actions won larger African cities over, and by 307 at latest he had control of a large territory. However, as the war in Sicily continued, and as Agathocles was not able to act with equal success in both theaters, he finally abandoned his army and left Africa. Through clever offers to integrate his mercenaries, Carthage was able to end the war in Africa quickly, and in 306 peace was made in Sicily on the territorial basis of the *status quo ante* (SVA 3.437).

To the same year belongs a treaty with Rome, the so-called "Philius treaty" (FGrH 174 F 1; Pol. 3.26.1ff.; SVA 3.438) mentioned by the Sicilian historian Philinus but deemed unhistoric by Polybius. This treaty is mentioned only for the sake of one article, which does not mean, however, that it contained only the one article: the Carthaginians were to keep out of Italy and the Romans out of Sicily. Roman expansion, even before the end of the Samnite wars, had led to a limitation of Carthaginian piracy on the coasts of Italy; at the same time the Carthaginians seem to have recognized that the presence of Rome in Campania and further south could provide a potential ally for Syracuse — which was to be prevented by this treaty. External meddling in Sicilian affairs was thus to be made impossible. Even if this treaty was only signed after the peace with Agathocles, it shows that the Carthaginians were still not sure about their old enemy, but believed that they had to protect themselves in a different way from possible future aggression.

The death of Agathocles in 289 gave rise to general disorder in the Greek part of Sicily (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 14.8ff.) — and here, too, Rome neither should nor ought to intervene. This supported Carthage's ability to strengthen its side of the island, and even offered a chance to engage in Sicily's east, a move that must, however, be seen more as preventive than as expansionist.

Syracuse called Pyrrhus to Sicily to achieve its freedom. Carthage reacted with several alliances, for instance with an Italian mercenary body, the

Mamertines, but also again with Rome: in 279/8 the last treaty between Carthage and Rome before the outbreak of the First Punic War was signed (SVA 3.466). Rome, likewise at war with Pyrrhus, was a natural ally. In this treaty both parties granted — as an exception to the Philinus treaty — the possibility of intervention in each other's territory, though only on request. They should conclude an alliance with Pyrrhus only in unison, whereby the Carthaginians secured themselves against a possibly envisaged agreement between Pyrrhus and Rome. The Carthaginians are thus still mainly interested in keeping Rome out of Sicily — they still see in Rome, a newly rising power, a possible competitor.

The treaty was never used — even though Carthage had been in sore need of support against Pyrrhus. In late summer 278 the king crossed to Sicily — and within two years took the whole of the Carthaginian *epikrateia*: the Carthaginians retained only Lilybaeum as a stronghold, which could not be taken without a large fleet. Pyrrhus' war thus gave the Romans an important lesson in dealing with Carthaginian power in Sicily. Pyrrhus now sought to imitate Agathocles and cross to Africa, but he lacked the support of the Siceliots. When Pyrrhus left the island in 275, he uttered the famous dictum: "My friends, what a wrestling-ground for Carthaginians and Romans we are now leaving behind us" (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 23.8, Loeb tr.). The *epikrateia* at any rate was soon restored within its old borders — which was the basis of the clash with the Romans. It was Carthage, the only great power besides Syracuse, from which the Mamertines requested help after their defeat in the battle at the Longanus (269): Carthage placed a garrison in the city, which protected Messina for a few years from Syracuse's forceful claim.

Let us return to the beginning. Did the history of Carthage in Sicily and in the western Mediterranean justify the anxieties which — according to Polybius — vindicated war in Roman eyes? Quite certainly the presentation of Carthaginian power in Polybius (1.10.5-8) is exaggerated, consisting of details which partly concern the period after the First Punic War. It is likewise clear that Carthage was always intent on a strong position in Sicily, but had never fought for dominance over the whole island. Carthage plainly wanted to reach a kind of equilibrium with Syracuse — but was nevertheless not prepared to allow a third power to disturb this equilibrium on the island.

For centuries no enterprise was undertaken by the Carthaginian state that could have indicated an expansion towards Italy. The argument presented in Polybius does not stand up to criticism and, furthermore, leaves out of account the fact that Africa and not Sicily had to be at the center of Carthaginian endeavors. Finally, there is the matter of the last treaties of Rome with Carthage: in them the Carthaginians had attempted to protect Sicily from Roman intervention.¹¹ The last treaties remained in force as long as they

matched the political will of the signatories. The call for help by the Mamertines to Rome changed the situation in this respect fundamentally.

NOTES

1. Docter *et al.* 2005.
2. Cf. H.G. Niemeyer, in Niemeyer *et al.* 2007, 178: the settlement layout that the Hamburg excavation uncovered was the “result of planning in the foundation-phase or the phase of settlement on the eastern Byrsa slope” (still eighth century).
3. Utica, older than Carthage, is probably named *honoris causa*.
4. Huxley 2003.
5. We hear of the council, the *iudicum ordo*, the Hundred and the Thirty, though the connections between these bodies (some of which may be identical) could not be definitively established.
6. Pace Koch 2000.
7. But note that Paton translates this important passage only as: “applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians.”
8. Timpe 2007.
9. There are no numerically significant finds of coins from archaic and classical Carthage or in Punic territory which could show that the Carthaginians had operated with foreign coins before they began to mint their own shekels. The coins minted for Africa and domestic use had a different standard than these first coinages: according to the system of standards in Carthage these were shekels.
10. Zahrnt 1988.
11. The fact that Sardinia and other islands are not mentioned in these treaties may be attributable to Carthaginian interests, assumed Roman intentions — or the transmission of the texts.

CHAPTER FOUR

Manpower and Food Supply in the First and Second Punic Wars

Paul Erdkamp

Hardly having conquered the Italian peninsula, Roman armies crossed the sea to fight new opponents. The first war between Rome and Carthage is seen as the beginning of a new era, but one may wonder whether in 264 BC Roman senators and voters saw sending an army to Messana as an epoch-making decision. Rome had fought against and allied itself with the Greek cities of southern Italy before, and Messana was part of that same world. The involvement in Magna Graecia had also drawn Rome into its first struggle with a Hellenistic warlord and his mercenary army in the person of Pyrrhus. Nevertheless, the small step across the straits of Messana eventually engaged Rome in a war of novel proportions. Polybius (1.13.11) writes that one could not “name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations.” True, Rome had fought wars on a very large scale in the Italian peninsula too, in particular at the start of the third century, when Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls combined their forces against Rome. Nonetheless, Polybius is right: from 264 onwards Rome for the first time fought a large Hellenistic state and major naval power. But if the First Punic War engaged Rome in a war of a novel scale, the same is even more true of the Second.

The demands made on manpower and resources caused the Roman state to change, as means had to be developed not only to mobilize many thousands of soldiers, but also to maintain them for years on end — and that in overseas war zones, far from the communities that had mustered them. In 264 Italy’s manpower and resources vastly surpassed those of the lands over which Carthage held direct sway, but the means had yet to be developed to make full

use of this advantage. Carthage may be said to have evolved too as a result of the struggle with Rome, as Hamilcar Barca's policy in Spain shows, but the catastrophe of the Hannibalic War cut this development short.

Manpower

In his account of the Gallic invasion of 225 Polybius (2.24) gives figures of the various forces stationed in Italy, and of the "men able to bear arms" of Rome and its allies. Rome's recruitment base consisted of 700,000 foot soldiers and 70,000 horsemen, which figure Polybius contrasts with the small army that Hannibal brought to Italy. Polybius got his figures from Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator of the late third century BC and the first Roman historian. He wrote in Greek, undoubtedly with a readership of Greeks (and others able to read Greek) in mind. We will have reason to discuss this passage later in more detail. The main point to be noted at the moment is that Fabius Pictor included these figures with the purpose of impressing his readership with the enormous manpower that Rome could muster in Italy. The same view we find in a letter written by no lesser person than King Philip of Macedon, who told the councillors of Larisa that Rome could mobilize large armies and found 70 colonies only because it was generous with its citizenship (*Syll.* 3.543). Philip clearly aimed to follow the Roman example when he urged the councillors to be similarly openhanded. Two centuries later the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus (1.14.1) also related the rise of Rome to the generosity with which it handed out its citizenship. We may add the famous story about Pyrrhus, who after a victory that cost him dearly is said to have remarked that one more such victory would cost him the war (Plutarch, *Mor.* 184c; Diod. 22.6.2). The implication of the story clearly is that Rome could bear losses better than its opponents.

Mobilization

Carthage relied on mercenaries and on conscripts from its subjected peoples in northern Africa. For instance, increasing its military effort in Sicily in 263, Carthage "enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Gauls, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily." Carthage also hired well-trained veterans from the wars in the Greek East (*Pol.* 1.17.4).

In Rome service in the army was a basic duty of its citizens. The citizenry was divided into property classes, the wealthiest citizens being designated as the *equites* (horsemen), while the poor were considered to be *infra classem*,

“those below the classes.” The latter group, also known as the *proletarii*, was not liable for service in the legions, but often served as rowers in the fleet or as muleteers and servants. Those citizens who owned property above the minimum requirement for service in the legions were called *assidui*. The lowest property class among the *assidui* served as light-armed legionaries, which underlines that service in the heavy infantry was the prerogative of the propertied citizens. Adult male citizens were divided into two age groups: the *iuniores* of 17–46 years, and the *seniores* of above 46 years. During crises *seniores* might be employed for minor duties such as guarding the walls, but regular service was limited to the *iuniores*. In fact, most of the men serving in the legions seem to have been well under 30. On estimate, soldiers older than their late twenties numbered less than 15% of the total in the late third century.¹ Recruits served for a number of years (the norm for foot soldiers was probably six²), after which they were dismissed. Livy (24.18.7) informs us that in 214 the censors “extracted from the registers of military aged men the names of all those who had not served in four years but had no official exemption from service or plea of ill-health.” The passage shows that lists were maintained not only of all citizens liable for service, but also of the years they actually served, and whether they were exempted. In short, military service pervaded the life of most young adult Roman men.

There were two kinds of mobilization. Troops were mobilized almost annually to form fresh armies for new wars or to replace casualties and discharges. Normally, the Senate or consuls would determine the number of troops to be levied. The selection of recruits among those liable for service was undertaken locally. Subsequently the recruits assembled in Rome in order to be allocated to the various legions and subunits.³ The allies too were selected in their own communities, but assigned to units by the Roman authorities. In times of crisis, the Roman authorities declared a *tumultus*. During a *tumultus* the Romans did not care much about registration and dividing the mobilization among available recruits. All regulations concerning liability for service, number, and qualification were suspended and the responsible magistrates simply brought under arms all the available men they could find.

From Polybius’ and Livy’s account of the Second Punic War a picture emerges in which half of the troops on the Roman side consisted of allies.⁴ Allied troops either belonged to so-called Latin states, most of which were strategic strongpoints founded by Rome and manned with Roman and allied citizens, or to cities and tribes that had made treaties with Rome (*socii*). The *formula togatorum*, which prescribed the proportion of recruits each community had to contribute, regulated the mobilization of these troops. However, that cannot have been the picture from the start.

After Rome had subdued its direct neighbors during the Latin War (340–338), it reorganized its political and military relations with its former

allies and foes. The essence of the organization was that most communities remained independent states, but that several tiers of administrative, political, social, and military integration were created within the area that Rome now dominated. During the wars of the following decades all communities of Roman and Latin citizens contributed troops that fought under Roman command, although we have no idea of how the military forces were organized. The sources provide no date for the *formula togatorum*. It has been suggested that from 338 onwards at least 50% of Roman troops consisted of allies.⁵ However, such a situation may only have been reached much later. The regulation of the number of Latins and allies may have been as late as the Gallic invasion of 225, when, as Polybius tells us, Rome mobilized troops from all over Italy against the common foe. He adds that the allies eagerly joined the Romans, because now they felt they were waging war for their own benefit, not for Rome's purposes (Pol. 2.23.12). As far as this remark allows any conclusions, it does indicate that the allies had fought as part of the Roman army before. Unfortunately, in his condensed narrative of the First Punic War Polybius is rather vague about the composition of the Roman armies, while the details presented by other sources concerning early third-century wars may be unreliable. Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that at the battle of Ausculum against Pyrrhus (279) units of Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volsci, and Frentani were posted between the legions (Dionysius 20.1.5; cf. Dionysius 19.12; Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 16.8–10). However, this evidence is rather weak, since we may be dealing with the fiction of a later writer imagining how it could have been in earlier times.⁶ The best we can say is that the involvement of the *socii* in Roman wars gradually evolved and probably only reached the situation as described by Polybius and Livy late in the third century.

Manpower and demography

It is imperative to realize that war was not an exogenous factor and to see the impact of military service against the background of ancient demographics.⁷ A basic demographic characteristic was the low life expectancy at birth. No statistical evidence is available for Republican Italy, but comparative evidence points to a life expectancy at birth in the range of the low or mid twenties. Mortality among adults was higher than in modern societies, but the biggest factor in the low life expectancy at birth was the extremely high number of infants dying. Nearly half of the children born died before they reached a reproductive age. However, that does not mean that ancient populations were hardly able to maintain their size. Comparative evidence indicates that, if most women started to give birth to children below the age of 20, they were quite capable of giving birth to more children than required to maintain population

levels. The available sources do indicate a young age of first marriage of women (between 16 and 22) and a higher age of first marriage of men (between 25 and 35), but the evidence mainly pertains to an imperial and urban setting.

In mid-Republican Italy many young men died on the battlefield and in minor skirmishes, or in camp because of infectious diseases.⁸ Some might want to argue that this inevitably caused the population to decline. However, individual considerations concerning marriage and child-rearing are culturally determined and therefore adaptable. In other words, in a society in which military service is a normal part of life, people will adapt to the fact that many young men will die because of war. On average women might have given birth to more children than they would have done without military service. The fact that in the third century many adult men received a piece of land was another stimulus to raise many sons, since one did not need to worry about dividing up one's land. What about girls? The high mortality among young men may have been balanced out by female infanticide, as little value was attached to female offspring. In addition, we cannot exclude the possibility that rural Republican men married earlier than their urban imperial counterparts, or that widowers generally remarried while widows generally did not. Moreover, a large influx of slaves and a relatively high rate of manumission among male slaves meant that many men of reproductive age stepped in to take the place of the casualties. In short, high rates of adult male mortality do not exclude population growth.

Most families probably welcomed the opportunity to send out their young men to wage war, since for most of them this was the most profitable source of employment that was available. Comparative evidence shows that in rural societies, in particular when this created advantages in the face of external forces, many households consisted of more than one conjugal unit, in other words combined the conjugal units of close relatives. In that case the withdrawal of one or even two adult men would not have been detrimental. Moreover, most soldiers were probably unmarried (even if in Republican times their age of marriage was lower than in the cities of the empire), thus leaving no families behind. In addition, many smallholders had too many mouths to feed and too little land to employ their labor usefully.⁹ It is sometimes argued that the high rates of mobilization must have been detrimental to society, and comparisons with European nations of the 17th or 18th centuries are cited as evidence.¹⁰ However, ancient societies were far less complex than modern Europe and contained more people whose labor was hardly employed. Second-century Italy was economically more developed and socially more complex than third-century Italy. Hence, war may have been more welcome to the sons of the propertied classes of the third than of the second century, as there were fewer alternatives to make money.¹¹ In that sense Roman soldiers were not completely unlike the mercenaries in the Carthaginian armies.

Table 4.1 Census figures for Rome in the third century BC

<i>Year</i>	<i>Census figure</i>	<i>Source</i>
294/3	262,321	Livy 10.47
289/8	272,000	Livy <i>Per.</i> 11
280/79	287,222	Livy <i>Per.</i> 13
276/5	271,224	Livy <i>Per.</i> 14
265/4	292,234	Eutropius 2.18
252/1	297,797	Livy <i>Per.</i> 18
247/6	241,712	Livy <i>Per.</i> 19
241/0	260,000	Jerome, <i>Ol.</i> 134.1
234/3	270,713	Livy <i>Per.</i> 20
209/8	137,108	Livy 27.36
204/3	214,000	Livy 29.37

The incredibly high level of mobilization during the Hannibalic War, however, is a different story.

Ancient statistics

The authorities of Republican Rome had recourse to various lists of their subjects, providing the details they needed for the purposes of voting, tax paying, and military service. Unfortunately, of all this wealth of data the literary sources only preserved the total number of male citizens. While the earliest figures are generally rejected as fictitious, there is no reason to doubt those from the third and second century BC, although there is debate about dates and about possible copying mistakes (Roman numerals being notoriously prone to scribal errors).¹²

What do these figures represent? About every five years the censors required adult men to come forward and to declare their household and property. The main purpose of the census was to assign citizens to a certain property class, *tribus*, and *centuria* for the purpose of taxation, mobilization, and vote.¹³ Undoubtedly, not all men came forward to register. The poorest citizens did not serve in the legions, did not pay many taxes, and hardly counted at the vote, and so the degree of underregistration among proletarians was probably large. At the same time, Roman society in the third century would not have supported a large class of landless citizens. Moreover, it would not have made much sense to set the property requirement at a level that would exclude a large proportion of the population from service in the army.¹⁴ One may guess

therefore that in the third century the degree of underregistration was above 10%, but below 30%.

In part the fluctuations of the figures reflect changes in population size, in part changes in legal status. In the first half of the third century, Rome founded many Latin colonies, which were manned by Roman citizens, Latins, and probably other allies. Roman settlers became Latins. Although they still served in the Roman armies, they now did so as Latins. Moreover, soldiers fighting overseas were not always counted, so the low figure for 247/6 (56,000 lower than five years before) may not only reflect casualties, but also the possibility that overseas troops were not counted that year. During the Second Punic War the figures reached a low point, which may reflect the disorder in Italy and the mobilization of huge numbers of soldiers. Nevertheless, at the end of the war the number of men was undoubtedly at the lowest point for many decades. On the other hand, in the third century movement of Latins and allies towards Roman territory may have added to the Roman citizenry, as it did in the second century. Philip V made much of the fact that former slaves became citizens, and it is not impossible that a thousand freedmen or more received citizen status each year.

The census figures can be used to give an estimate of the Roman population. For instance, the 270,713 men registered in 234/3 may represent a total of at least 900,000 and at most 1,400,000 Roman citizens, including proletarians, women, and children. For our purpose it may be more important that they offer evidence on the number of men that manned the legions.

The only figures available for the allies are included in Polybius' survey of troops and manpower in the year 225, when, so the Greek historian tells us, a threatening invasion of Gauls from across the Alps caused fear not only in Rome but in the entire peninsula. Rome, wanting to know how many troops it could muster, requested lists of "men able to bear arms" from the Latins and other allies. Polybius not only includes in his account the size of the forces stationed in Italy, but also a list of figures representing the available manpower of the Roman allies:

The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows: Latins 80,000 foot and 5,000 horse; Samnites 70,000 foot and 7,000 horse; Iapygians and Messapians 50,000 foot and 16,000 horse in all; Lucanians 30,000 foot and 3,000 horse; Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse. ... Of the Romans and Campanians there were on the roll 250,000 and 23,000 horse, so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse. (Pol. 2.24.10-16)

Much ink has been spilled on the problems of interpretation. For example, the total of 700,000 foot and 70,000 horsemen is approximated when adding

the men on the lists to Polybius' figures for the number of troops in the field. Some scholars concluded that the men in the field were not included on the lists, but in practical terms this makes no sense. The figures have been employed to estimate the population of the Italic peoples, but we can never be sure that the infantry of, let's say, the Messapians and Iapygians represents the same share of the general population as among the Romans or Latins. But the problems are even more basic. For one, there are too many well-rounded ratios to be coincidental. The manpower figure for infantry with citizen status exactly equals that of the total of allies listed above: 250,000 foot soldiers on both sides. Moreover, in several instances the proportion of foot soldiers and horse-men equals the classic ideal of 10:1 (or 5:1). Apparently the figures present the actual proportions within the army and not so much the available manpower. Moreover, Fabius Pictor (Polybius' source in this case) presented Rome in the light of propaganda from Hellenistic powers defending the civilized world against barbarity. Fabius Pictor purposely emphasized the coalition of Italic peoples under Roman leadership, deliberately echoing the Greek coalitions against the Persians and Gauls. Undoubtedly, Fabius Pictor used available evidence, for instance on troops and Roman citizens, but in its entirety the manpower survey in Polybius 2.24 does not bear the weight of the calculations that are based on it.

Forces and casualties

About the invasion of Africa in 256, Polybius (1.26.7–8) states that “the whole body embarked on the ships numbered about 140,000, each ship holding 300 rowers and 120 marines [i.e. infantry soldiers stationed on warships]. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above 150,000.” The passage shows that Polybius' figures of troops are estimates based on the number of ships, and furthermore that the naval crews constituted the vast majority of the men involved. Rome equipped several fleets of hundreds of ships, the naval crews of which consisted in part of Roman proletarians and freedmen, but a majority of allies. The coastal cities of southern Italy had to contribute warships to the Roman war effort, and it is likely that also most of the rowers came from these cities. In addition, many poor inhabitants of the interior regions may have looked for employment as rowers on the Roman fleet (Pol. 6.19.3); Zonaras (8.11.8) mentions that during the First Punic War Samnites turned up in large numbers to man the Roman fleet. None of the large Roman fleets, however, was in operation for many consecutive years.

For the entire period of 264 to 241 Rome had to maintain armed forces on Sicily. The number of men involved, however, was relatively small. When the

war with Carthage arose, a consul normally commanded an army of two legions of 4,000 foot and 300 horse each, accompanied by contingents of allies, probably numbering less than the citizen troops. In 263 both consuls with their forces were dispatched to Sicily, but problems with the food supply soon forced the Romans to reduce the number of legions to two, probably with a similar lowering of allied troops. Regulus' invasion army of 256 was also quite small, consisting of 15,000 infantry and 500 horse: possibly two legions and about 7,000 allies (Pol. 1.16.1ff; 117.1; 1.29.9; 3.107.10). The land war did not put Roman manpower under much strain. On no occasion did the proportion of men under arms rise much above 5% of all adult men. The number of men ever having served during the First Punic War was significantly higher, since many soldiers died and survivors probably did not serve for much longer than six years.

The Romans were successful at sea against the Carthaginians, but three times a Roman fleet was wrecked by storm. The catastrophes that struck the Roman fleets killed thousands of infantry soldiers who were stationed on the ships. Most casualties, however, occurred among the rowers, tens of thousands of whom died, in majority non-Roman and from the poorer layers of society. In 249 10,000 men were sent to replace the casualties of the fleet (Pol. 1.49.1–2).

During the Second Punic War the operations at sea were much less crucial to the final outcome, and on both sides naval forces were smaller than during the previous struggle. Nevertheless, Rome experienced difficulties in manning its ships. In 214, when 150 ships were in service, requiring between 40,000 and 50,000 men, the Senate forced the propertied citizens to contribute slaves as rowers for the fleet, along with their pay and rations for a certain period. Livy adds that this was the first time that naval crews were raised from private funds (Livy 24.11). In 209 Scipio nearly doubled the crews on his ships, when allocating the strongest and finest-looking men among the Spanish prisoners to his fleet — a strong indication of the previous level of undermanning (Pol. 10.17). The problems were in part caused by the fact that Rome had lost many of its allies in southern Italy, in part by the huge war effort on land.

Polybius tells us that Hannibal entered Italy with about 26,000 soldiers. Many Gauls joined his army, and at Cannae he is said to have commanded a total of 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (Pol. 3.56.4; 3.114.5). It is unlikely, however, that he was able to replace his losses with seasoned troops. Rome began the war with six legions, but the need to wage war not only against Hannibal in peninsular Italy, but also on Sicily, in Spain, and against the Gauls in northern Italy forced the Romans to increase the number of legions rapidly. However, the number of legions, which rose to a high point of 25 in 212, gives a somewhat distorted picture, since the legions were increasingly undermanned. The number of soldiers under arms reached its

zenith in the years 214–211, when, according to the estimates of P.A. Brunt, 75,000 citizens and more were serving in the legions. The number of legionaries only dropped below 50,000 in the last year of the war. According to Polybius the number of Latin and other allies was “normally” equal to that of soldiers serving in the legions (n. 4 above), but that is quite uncertain for most of the Second Punic War. According to our sources, 20,000 men fell on the Roman side at Trebia, 15,000 at Trasimene and 47,000 at Cannae. Even if these figures are exaggerated, the losses seriously increased Rome’s manpower problems during the most difficult years of the war. The number of casualties among Roman citizens between 214 and 203 has been estimated at 75,000.¹⁵

For several years the proportion of Roman citizens under arms must have been well over 30%. The strain on the population was enormous, not only among citizens, but among allies too. In 209 twelve Latin colonies declared that they could not mobilize any more men. Livy repeatedly mentions a shortage of *iuniores* (22.57.11; 25.5.5; 26.35.2; 27.38.2), and tells about the enrolment of slaves and freedmen (22.11.7; 22.57.11; 23.14.2). In 212 or 211 the property qualification required for the status of *assiduus* was lowered: depending on the reading, either by 64 or 27%. This measure turned proletarians into *assidui*, and it is usually assumed that the purpose was precisely to make more men available for service in the legions.¹⁶ However, it is very likely that during Rome’s gravest crisis regulations concerning liability and qualification for service were suspended, and that the consuls brought under arms all the available men they could find. In other words, the reduction in property qualification of 212/211 may merely have brought theory closer to reality.

The mobilization of nearly 100,000 men in army and fleet enabled the Romans to fight their enemies on several fronts, defeating the forces that confronted them outside the Peninsula one by one, and at the same time keeping Hannibal’s army of seasoned veterans isolated in Italy. Being able to fall back on an enormous pool of potential soldiers Rome could bear large losses, while Hannibal’s manpower limited his ability to strike decisively.

Food Supply

Manpower and food supply were indissolubly connected. As we have seen, in 263 Rome shipped two full consular armies to Sicily, but problems of supply soon forced them to withdraw half of their troops. Armies needed many resources and materials besides food, such as water, horses, mules, oxen, wagons, tents, building material, firewood, weapons, cooking utensils, and clothing, but, with the exception of water, none of these goods was as instrumental in shaping the way wars were fought as food. This is due to a combination of

volume, necessity, and availability. Compared to other goods, food was required in great bulk; armies could do without it only for a very short time, and food was not available in sufficient amounts at all times and in all places.

The second half of this section is dedicated to showing that the differences in the food supply of the Punic and Roman armies operating in Italy during the Second Punic War were essential in determining the outcome of that war.¹⁷

Logistics

Logistical considerations governed the diet of the ancient soldiery. Armies needed to be supplied with food that could be transported and stored easily and without much spoilage. The advantages of wheat and barley in transportation and storage meant that these crops played an even larger role in the military rations than in the civilian diet. Rations were issued in the form of unmilled grain, since flour spoiled rapidly, and handmills were therefore an essential part of the equipment of infantry units and naval crews (Livy 28.45.15). According to Polybius (6.39), in his day Roman and allied infantry received rations of two-thirds of an Attic *medimnus* (i.e. approximately 26.5 kg.) each month, and we have no reason to assume that rations had changed over time. What else the soldiers ate, depended on the circumstances. If they were relying on organized provisions, which had to be brought by ship and/or pack-animal, their diets were limited, consisting largely of bread or porridge, pulse, meat, some olive oil and (sour) wine. If living off the land, they ate whatever food they could find. Hannibal's troops took away large herds of cattle whenever they plundered Roman farmland. The advantage of meat was that it could be transported on the hoof; its disadvantage that it could only be consumed if there was sufficient firewood and time to prepare it. A big burden was the need to provide green and dry fodder for the many thousands of animals that accompanied ancient armies. Using evidence from later times, we may estimate that horses needed 4 or 5 kg. of dry fodder each day and mules at least 2 kg. Roman horsemen were issued rations of barley, but one could not do without the almost daily grazing of the horses and pack animals (the so-called *pabulatio*).

To give an idea of the amounts involved, a consular army of two legions and allied contingents, and also including servants and muleteers, numbered about 20,000 men, and, together with some 2,000 horses and 1,500 mules, would consume daily about 35 tons of wheat and 25 tons of barley (to be supplemented by other kinds of green and dry fodder), and, if circumstances allowed, also some 20 hectoliters of olive oil and 100 hectoliters of wine. Armies could not take along sufficient supplies to feed them for long periods (i.e. a month or more), since that would require too many pack animals, which in turn would multiply the amount of food and fodder needed for animals and

muleteers, and create an unwieldy army train. (In our example it would take the impossibly large number of 20,000 mules to carry all the rations for 30 days.) Depending on the circumstances, the soldiers would be ordered to prepare and take along (partly on their back) sufficient rations to last them a certain number of days, usually not longer than 15 days or so.

Consequently, armies had to be supplied regularly with food and other requirements. The Romans created a supply system that consisted, apart from the army train, of two other elements: a supply base in or near the war zone, and a shuttle system that would bring supplies to the army. Alternatively, the army would visit its supply base regularly to replenish the stocks in the army train. Already during the First Punic War we can see this system in operation. During the siege of Agrigentum, local allies brought provisions into the town of Herbessos, from where the Romans besieging Agrigentum were supplied, until the town was captured by a Punic army and King Hiero had to take over the role of supplier (Pol. 1.18.9). In winter 217/216, the Romans gathered supplies in Cannae, the loss of which compelled them soon to engage Hannibal's army in battle (Pol. 3.107). During their operations against Capua (216–211), they shipped supplies from Etruria and Sardinia to a supply base on the Volturnus River (Livy 25.20.2–3; 25.22.5–6). The amount of animals (and thus fodder) that were needed (apart from the need to defend convoys) restricted the range of supply lines over land to little over 100 km. Overseas shipments were much more efficient and faster. Provisioning of armies over large distances therefore required access to waterways and a large fleet of freighters. The consul supplying the army besieging Lilybaeum in 249 had 800 freighters at his disposal (Pol. 1.52.6). Nonetheless, during the First Punic War it proved beyond the capacity of Rome to feed its troops on Sicily entirely from Italy, giving vital importance to the assistance of King Hiero and other local allies.

Tactics and strategy

Living off the land had clear advantages: it was not only cheap, but also diminished the opponents' resources. It neither required much effort in transportation, nor a sophisticated logistical organization. Such prominent examples as the army of Hannibal, which apparently easily lived off the Italian countryside, have given rise to the idea that ancient armies ideally took whatever they needed from the land, not bothering about bases or supply lines. However, potentially detrimental disadvantages were attached to living off the land, and certain conditions had to be met before an army could successfully gather all its needs from the countryside.

A good general would not simply let his troops roam about the farmland, but would execute foraging missions in a carefully organized way. When

Hannibal in the late summer of 217 sent out his entire army to forage in the fertile lands of Apulia, he used two thirds of his troops to gather provisions, and one third to protect the foragers (Pol. 3.100.6–7; 3.102.1; Livy 22.23.10). Similarly, grazing horses and pack animals always needed to be covered by strong units. Of vital importance in gaining a superior position in the open field was one's cavalry. Horsemen, often assisted by light-armed soldiers, were most effective in attacking or defending foraging and plundering troops. After its invasion of Africa during the First Punic War, for example, Regulus' army was temporarily successful in gathering rich spoils, because the Punic commanders had withdrawn from the open country. Conversely, during the first years of the Second Punic War Hannibal's army could successfully live off the land, because his Iberian, Numidian, and Gallic horsemen dominated the open country. Livy tries to paint a less bleak picture of the Roman situation in these years than Polybius, but on one thing both historians agree: Hannibal's horsemen were much superior to the Roman cavalry. Hence, the Romans had to let the Carthaginian army plunder the Italian countryside unopposed. Foraging easily involved troops in heavy fighting, as the Roman forces besieging Agrigentum experienced, and it was impossible to forage near the enemy if one wanted to avoid battle (Pol. 1.17.7ff.).

Large armies soon exhausted the surrounding countryside, which forced them either to move or to forage to ever increasing distances. The latter option only intensified the vulnerability of foraging missions. Living off the land became increasingly difficult in winter, when there were no ripe crops in the fields and stores were brought into the safety of walled towns. Armies living off the land had to prepare for winter early, which often forced them to end their operations still early in the year. In 217, for example, Hannibal moved to his winter quarters near Gerunium in Apulia already in late summer. Conversely, the campaigning season often started when crops ripened in the field, as witnessed by the events of the following spring:

All through the winter and spring the two armies remained encamped opposite each other, and it was not until the season was advanced enough for them to get supplies from the year's crops that Hannibal moved his forces out of the camp near Gerunium. Judging that it was in his interest to compel the enemy to fight by every means in his power, he seized on the citadel of a town called Cannae, in which the Romans had collected the corn and other supplies from the country round Canusium. (Pol. 3.107.1-3)

The restraints inherent in living off the land reduced an army's operational flexibility. Without external provisioning it was impossible to hold large forces for an extended period of time in the same place, which made it impossible to continue exerting pressure on the enemy or laying siege during winter. In

other words, armies living off the land were unable to exert control beyond their immediate reach. This is not to say that no disadvantages were attached to organized provisioning. Overseas shipments went little further than waterways could reach. Without external supplies one had to rely on local allies, but their means to feed large armies were also soon exhausted. Early in the First Punic War Rome welcomed the alliance with Hiero because Carthaginian superiority at sea made shipments to Sicily uncertain. In fact, Roman armies on Sicily had previously run short of supplies precisely for this reason (Pol. 1.16.7). In a sense lack of supplies ended the First Punic War: Carthage sent a large shipment of provisions to Hamilcar Barca's army near Eryx, and when the convoy was destroyed by the Roman fleet, Carthage was unable or unwilling to build yet another fleet. Carthaginian exhaustion may have been the underlying cause, but the fact remains that their main army's lack of supplies forced the Carthaginians to capitulate (Pol. 1.59.5–60.2).

Food Supply and Strategy in the Second Punic War

218–217 BC

The crossing of the Alps was a logistical challenge that could have been met if Hannibal had had sufficient time and the resources to prepare it carefully. These conditions, however, were not met. Because the route through the Alps offered little food for men or animals, Hannibal's troops suffered from want and exhaustion.¹⁸ Polybius says that Hannibal's army numbered more than 38,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry (and several elephants) at the crossing of the Rhône (3.60.5). Such a force needed large amounts of food and fodder daily. Six days after the ascent of the Alps the army was able to capture sufficient grain and cattle to last them for three days, but the duration of the crossing has been estimated at 24 days. It is impossible that the army had started with sufficient food and fodder to last them for the entire journey through the Alps, since that would have required a train of 10,000 mules, which would have been difficult to collect and impossible to feed. Being unable to collect sufficient stores while on the march through southern France, Hannibal's army began the ascent of the Alps with insufficient provisions, and his troops could supplement their provisions only inadequately with whatever they could take from the hostile peoples they encountered en route. Heavy losses among the pack animals aggravated their logistical problems. Polybius, referring to an inscription set up by Hannibal, states that the latter entered Italy with a force of 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry (3.56.4). If correct, these numbers indicate the heavy losses his army had suffered.

The army soon recovered after entering Cisalpine Gaul. Hannibal took quarters with his various Gallic allies until next spring, at first north of the Po, after the battle at the Trebia south of that river. Polybius tells us that the Gauls supplied the Punic army with abundant provisions, to which were added the supplies they captured when they took the Roman supply base at Clastidium (3.66, 68, 69). In contrast, however, Livy draws a picture of Hannibal's army continuously suffering from dearth (22.1.2, 15.2).

217–216

The fact that Hannibal lived off the land of his enemies governed the timing and location of his movements. During the next years his army kept moving between the three most fertile and productive regions of peninsular Italy. His troops, constantly ravaging and foraging, marched through Etruria, along the Adriatic coast to Apulia, and from there to Campania, where some time was spent in plundering the rich countryside. He left again for Apulia in time to prepare the stores that his army would need during the winter.

Polybius emphasizes the abundance of supplies gathered by the Punic army, but again Livy claims the opposite. He even alleges that Campania was inadequate to support Hannibal's army, which was therefore threatened with hunger. Most importantly, the Roman troops supposedly successfully hindered Hannibal's food supply. Quite revealing is the following difference in Polybius' and Livy's accounts. While Polybius has Flaminius' officers advise their commander to hold back and be on his guard against the superior numbers of Hannibal's cavalry, Livy has the officers tell Flaminius to use his cavalry and light-armed troops to keep the enemy's forces in check (Pol. 3.82.4; Livy 22.3.9). The alleged successes of Fabius Cunctator have to be seen in the same light. Finally, Livy claims that in the spring of 216 Hannibal's stores were exhausted and that he contemplated withdrawing into Gaul (22.32.3). Polybius, who noted that Hannibal's army had been able to prepare their winter quarters near Gerunium unhindered, says nothing of the sort.

Polybius' and Livy's accounts are clearly contradictory, but it is not just a preference for the Greek historian that makes him in this case the more reliable of the two. Livy's claims simply make no sense: supporting Hannibal's army for a few months would not have been a heavy burden on the Cisalpine Gauls, who continued to be close allies; lacking a strong cavalry the Romans could not attack Hannibal's foragers and still avoid waging a major battle; Campania cannot be regarded as inadequate to feed an army. The point of the distortion is obvious: the Romans did not like the idea that Hannibal's army strode through Italy unopposed. The *exemplum* of the Cunctator showed that the Romans preferred accepting superficial disgrace to shortsighted fame, and

gained success by unshowy means. In order to be effective this tendency required troubles on the Punic side, even if one had to make them up.¹⁹

Some scholars have argued that Hannibal's need to live off the land during these years made it impossible for him to employ a meaningful strategy.²⁰ However, the opposite was the case. The Roman armies received provisions from supply bases that had been prepared in or near the war zones. We see such a supply base in Clastidium in 218, and similar bases were arranged during the winter 218/7 in Ariminum and somewhere in Etruria, and in the winter 217/6 in Cannae. The Roman system of supply bases ideally suited the kind of warfare they had fought in Italy in the fourth and third centuries BC, when they and their opponents had fought in well-defined war zones. During the early years of the Second Punic War, however, Hannibal took the initiative away from the Romans, taking the war to regions of his choice. Capturing their supply bases impeded the Romans' food supply even more. Since the war was yet unfocused, the need to be on the move did not hamper Hannibal's strategy in any way. For the time being his main goal was to make an impression on Rome's allies: the havoc caused in the countryside would either compel the Romans to meet his army on the battlefield, or would expose their helplessness. At Cannae he managed to do both. However, his success at Cannae changed the nature of the war.

216–211

Capua was one of the largest cities of Italy, and its defection to Hannibal's side after Cannae turned this prosperous region into the focus of the war. The next years, which were fought over the control of Campania, were the hardest for the Romans to sustain, but crucial for the final outcome of the war. In 212 Rome concentrated a large force in fortifications around Capua, and kept up this enormous military effort until the city had capitulated and the struggle over Campania was won.

Hannibal, arriving in Campania in late summer or early autumn of 216, managed to capture the town of Nuceria, but failed to take Naples, Nola, or Cumae. During the winter he quartered his army in fortifications on Mons Tifata, but next year he was unable to change the situation significantly. After a long siege he managed to starve Casilinum into submission, but he was unable seriously to threaten the other garrisoned towns or the Roman troops. At the end of the campaigning season he withdrew his army into winter quarters in Apulia. The main problem for Hannibal was that Campania was less and less able to sustain his army. With Hannibal's troops gone, the Romans could ravage the countryside unhindered (Livy 23.46.9ff.). Hence, from 214 onwards Capua could hardly sustain its own populace, let alone maintain its

ally. Though Hannibal's army was still strong enough to forage in hostile territory, resources inevitably declined. In the summer of 214 Hannibal returned to Campania for a short time, in 213 not at all, probably because he realized that the presence of his army would only aggravate his ally's problems. In 212 he sent a small force to bring provisions (Livy 25.13.1ff.).

Although their resources and manpower were hard pressed, the static nature of their operations suited the Romans well. Around Capua they managed to exploit their superior numbers to good effect, while still avoiding battle with Hannibal's experienced troops. Rome could sustain the effort, because, apart from contributions of local allies, the supply base on the Volturnus River received supplies from Etruria and Sardinia (Livy 23.46.9, 48.2; 25.20.2–3, 22.5). Despite shipments coming in from abroad, during the most difficult years of the war the Romans largely had to rely on Italy. Hiero of Syracuse sent some minor shipments in 216 and 215, but after his death Sicily became the scene of large-scale warfare itself. While a fragment from Polybius' work mentions a Roman request of grain to the Ptolemaic court (9.11a.1–2), we have no evidence of a single shipment actually arriving. In Sardinia fighting was limited to 215, but we should not overestimate the amounts that the island could send, since until 207 it also had to sustain its permanent garrison of two legions. The fertility of Etruria was vital for Rome's ability to sustain its armies in Campania.

In 211 Hannibal made a final and desperate attempt to save Capua. He marched up to the walls of Rome, hoping to divert the legions, but they did not budge. Hannibal did not make a serious attempt at besieging Rome, because his resources were inadequate for such an enormous undertaking. As the sieges of Saguntum, Syracuse, and Carthage show, capturing large and fortified cities usually was a very protracted affair. Even the siege of a small town like Casilinum took the Punic army months to finish. Without external supplies Hannibal could simply not sustain an army around the walls of Rome long enough, and neither Carthage nor his Italian allies were capable of bringing the food and fodder his army would need to the walls of Rome.

In short, the defection of Capua changed the nature of the war in such a way as to expose Hannibal to the logistical restraints of living off the land. At the same time, the operations in Campania allowed Rome to optimize its main advantages: manpower and the resources of its dominion.

211–203

The campaigns in Campania being over, the Romans doubled their forces in Apulia and Spain. The troops in Italy were partly sustained by contributions from local allies, partly by shipments from Etruria, Sardinia, and increasingly also from Campania and Sicily. The Roman armies fighting in Spain depended on overseas shipments throughout the war (Livy 23.48.4ff.), and also

Scipio's invasion force in Africa received provisions from Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, and — now that the war there was over — Spain (Livy 29.1.14, 35.1, 36.1–3; 30.3.2, 24.5–6).

Hannibal remained tactically strong, and was virtually unhindered in his movements through southern Italy. At first his remaining allies were capable of adequately provisioning his army. His main problem, however, was that he could not concentrate their contributions in support of operations in Samnium, Apulia, or northern Lucania. Apart from the difficulty of hauling large amounts of food and fodder over mountainous areas, he lacked the manpower to protect such long supply lines. While the Roman presence at sea was limited between Rhegium and Tarentum, the Carthaginians could not ship supplies up the coasts of the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Sea. It is significant that the only shipment from Carthage that we know about landed in Locri (Bruttium) in 215 (Livy 23.41.10). It is not that Carthage did not want to support Hannibal's army — there was simply no way to do so in a meaningful way.

As soon as Hannibal moved elsewhere, his allies were helpless against the superior Roman forces. Gradually the living space of Hannibal's army was reduced to Bruttium. According to Livy (28.12.6–7), the final years brought hunger and disease, and even though we have warned against distortions on these issues in his work, in this case Livy may quite possibly be right:

For added to everything else was this also, that he had no hope even of feeding his army except from the Bruttian region. And even supposing all of it to be under cultivation, it was nevertheless too small to feed so large an army. Moreover, a great part of the young men, drawn off from the farming of the land, had been claimed instead by the war.

Conclusions

The peoples involved in the Second Punic War suffered terribly, the winners as much as the vanquished. The census figures show a significant drop, and population decline in the rest of Italy was probably even worse. However, Rome did not come out of the Hannibalic War as a weakened and exhausted state. Eagerly and confidently it sought war with the Hellenistic powers of the eastern Mediterranean. During the first decade of the second century Rome had permanently more than 100,000 men mobilized in army and fleet, which was a multiple of the number of men raised under Roman command before the First Punic War. However, the manpower pool from which Rome could draw had in the meantime not much increased, if at all. The pressure on Roman manpower had changed society in such a way that Roman citizens and their allies became used — and even eager — to wage war continuously and on a large scale.

Moreover, in order to be able to concentrate large armies in the various theaters of war Rome had to devise and improve its control of food resources in Italy and its overseas possessions. After the First Punic War Rome cannot be said to have exploited Sicily and Sardinia, but the Second Punic War forced the Romans to optimize the contributions these provinces made. Large shipments from Sicily and Sardinia, but also from their allies Carthage and Numidia, sustained the armies fighting against Macedon and the Seleucid Empire, and also those operating in Spain and northern Italy. While Italy offered a large pool of experienced veterans, the provinces provided the means to sustain the military effort.

NOTES

1. Rosenstein 2004, 85ff.
2. Thus, Brunt 1971, 399–401. Rejected by Rosenstein 2004, 189f.
3. Galsterer 1976, 106; Brunt 1971, 624ff., esp. 628; De Ligt 2007, 115–117.
4. Polybius 3.107.12; 6.26.7; Brunt 1971, 677–681.
5. *Formula togatorum*: Harris 1984b, 92: the war against Pyrrhus. Galsterer 1976, 82: no later than mid third century. Hantos 1983, 165f: in 225 at the earliest. At least 50 per cent allies: Rawlings 2007b, 52. Also Rosenstein 2004, 79f., assumes that defeated peoples would immediately contribute troops to the Roman army.
6. Galsterer 1976, 106.
7. Brunt 1971, 131–154; Rosenstein 2004; Erdkamp 2007b. On Roman demography in general, see Parkin 1992; Saller 1994; Scheidel 2001.
8. For an estimate of the death toll in Roman armies, see Rosenstein 2004, 107ff.
9. Erdkamp 1998, 261–268.
10. Lo Cascio 2001, 124ff.
11. Erdkamp 2006, 41–51.
12. The interpretation of the census figures, Polybius 2.24 and other evidence on the population of republican Italy is the subject of an ongoing debate. See in particular Brunt 1971; Lo Cascio 1994 and 2001; and various articles in De Ligt and Northwood 2008.
13. Suolahti 1963, 38–39; Brunt 1971, 15–16.
14. Rosenstein 2004, 185f.
15. Brunt 1971, 417–422.
16. De Ligt 2007, 124–127, with references.
17. On the food supply of Roman republican armies, see Erdkamp 1998; Roth 1999.
18. In contrast Seibert 1993b argues that the crossing of the Alps was carefully planned and successfully executed. See also Seibert 1989. On the journey through the Alps, see now Hoyos 2006.
19. In more detail, Erdkamp 1992.
20. Shean 1996.

CHAPTER FIVE

Phalanx and Legion: the “Face” of Punic War Battle

Sam Koon

Introduction

Pitched land battles were an important feature of the Punic Wars. They varied greatly on a grand tactical level, a level of analysis which focuses on large-scale troop movement and command; but to understand these battles, and the Punic Wars as a whole, it is fundamental firstly to have an appreciation of how armies fought at the level of individuals and small groups. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to assess the different ways the Roman and Carthaginian armies fought each other and to gain a better understanding of the experience of combat in this period.

In 1976, with the publication of *The Face of Battle*, John Keegan proposed a methodology for analyzing this level of combat, which aimed to challenge the traditional command-centered approach to battle narration and bring accounts out of the stereotypical and into, as far as possible, the realm of reality. His aim was to catch a glimpse of the combat experience of the individual soldier within the wider context of a pitched battle. As such his focus was not on generalship, logistics, strategy, or tactics, but rather on the subtactical mechanics and physical environment of the battle and how these may have affected the psychology of the individual soldier. This pioneering work has sparked a new school of thought in ancient military history and has inspired a number of soldier’s-eye-view histories, particularly in the field of Greek battle, where there are contemporary accounts, but also some on Roman warfare. As

there are no detailed eyewitness accounts of individual Punic War battles it is not possible to employ a “face of battle” methodology in the same way as Keegan, but an analysis with his general goals in mind will allow us to reconstruct much of the Punic War combat experience.

The main sources for the Punic War battles are chiefly literary. The general shortcomings of these sources will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8, but it is necessary to highlight some problems in the surviving battle literature which are specific to the aims of this chapter. Firstly, these sources are not contemporary to the wars. Polybius offers the best military account of the first two wars. His account is made all the more useful as he may have had some direct experience of Roman warfare; however he was still writing many years after the two conflicts he describes. Livy and Appian, the other main sources for the Punic Wars, were writing even later.

The second problem is that these accounts, which are focused on describing the main sequence of events, rarely describe in detail how individuals or small groups fought, resorting instead to metaphors or generic statements to explain the situation of large sections of the battle line. A more detailed description of close combat was often unnecessary as the majority of the audiences would have had direct experience of a similar form of hand-to-hand fighting. A modern reader, without the benefit of such experience, has to try to reconstruct this form of combat by piecing together the periodic, more detailed descriptions scattered throughout the surviving material.

The limitations of the sources are compounded by the chaotic nature of battle itself. It is not possible to record exactly what happened when many thousands of individuals fought for several hours over distances of a few kilometers. Therefore, every ancient author had to decide how to construct his narratives, usually succumbing to the use of certain literary conventions specific to the culture in which he wrote. For this reason, ancient accounts of the Punic War battles tend to fall into a similar pattern, which may suggest that they were literary creations rather than representations of the reality of the battle. This in itself is no reason to dismiss them altogether. For instance, there are only a limited set of tactical variables in a pitched battle between similarly armed heavy infantry, so the similarities of the battle accounts may actually reflect the limited and repetitive reality of heavy infantry engagement. Further, in order for literature to be convincing it must operate within the limits of what its audience accepted from their own experience. Thus, whilst Polybius was writing for a Greek audience, perhaps ignorant of Roman combat, Livy’s Roman audience had a collective military experience and were raised on a fundamental military ethos, which would suggest that our battle narratives were at least plausible.

It may never be possible to understand exactly what happened in any particular ancient battle, but by analyzing all the battle narratives within the sources for this period, it is possible to reconstruct a realistic “face” of Punic

War battle in general. Accordingly, the methodology employed here will move away from Keegan's as stated above. Rather than focusing on a particular battle, examining all the surviving battle narratives will make it possible to reconstruct a composite picture of an archetypal Punic War battle, in as much as this can be done for wars fought over a 120 year period with a great variety of troops and grand tactical movement.

Land battles made up a greater proportion of the combat in the Second Punic War than in the first or third and so much of the evidence used in this analysis will derive from this war. But many of the concepts discussed will be relevant to pitched battles throughout the three wars. An examination of the key features of the battles and similarities between the two armies will facilitate the approach employed in the rest of the chapter. The physical circumstances of pitched battles will be examined next, and finally the various forms of fighting which could be used by the different combat arms: the light infantry, elephants, cavalry and heavy infantry.

Key Features

Punic War battles were fought with a wide range of different troops, over different terrains, and at different times, yet there are a number of key features common to these battles. Although battle formations could vary widely depending on the grand tactical plans of the general, they were generally symmetrical. They were fronted with light infantry; elephants, if used, were placed ahead of the line; heavy infantry were in the center with the cavalry on the wings. The heavy infantry lines were usually of a similar length for both sides, with a larger army deploying with greater depth rather than employing a longer line. For this reason similar troop types generally faced each other. Fighting usually began with a period of light infantry skirmishing, or a charge of the Carthaginian elephants. The cavalry fought on the wings, trying to drive the opposition from the field before returning to influence the main infantry battle. After the initial skirmishing the light infantry would retreat through the battle lines and the heavy infantry would come into conflict. One side would generally be defeated when its flanks or rear were surrounded, either through enveloping infantry manoeuvres or by the returning enemy cavalry.

A wide variety of troop types were employed in the Punic Wars. Around half of the Roman forces were made up of their allies, and the Carthaginian forces were predominantly made up of mercenaries, including Africans, Celts, Spaniards, and Gauls. In general, their weapons were similar. The Roman heavy infantry were armed with a short sword, which could be used with equal effect for cutting and stabbing, an oval shield, and two *pila* or javelins.

This necessitated a spacing per man of between 3 and 6 feet.¹ Much less is known about the allied forces, but, seeing as they usually fought alongside the legions, it is likely that their organization was similar.

Although the Carthaginian formation was a phalanx, there is no evidence that they ever used the *sarissa*, or long pike, like other Hellenistic armies, instead employing a thrusting spear and shield. Polybius states that Hannibal armed his troops with captured Roman equipment early in the Second Punic War (3.87.3, 114.1), which implies that they would have had a comparable line-spacing and fighting style for the majority, if not all, the land battles of the Punic Wars. Of the mercenaries hired to fight for other Carthaginian generals, the Spaniards used a similar cutting and stabbing sword to the Romans. The Celts and Gauls may in contrast have used longer slashing swords, which would need more space per man. All would have used a roughly similar type of shield. It seems then that the Carthaginian and Roman infantry formations and combat styles were at least comparable, if not quite similar. Most variation occurred in light infantry organization, although these generally were armed with a small shield and missile weapons, such as javelins, arrows, or slings. They also fought at closer range with a sword or spear. The cavalry on both sides were also similarly armed with missile weapons and swords or lances for closer combat.

The heavy infantry formations used by the two sides did differ somewhat, with the Romans adopting a manipular system and the Carthaginians a phalanx, but, again, these two formations were quite similar in practice. Normal Roman battle order was a three-line system, with each line divided into ten maniples, or command units, with gaps between each maniple. As the maniples of the second line normally lined up behind the gaps of the first line, and assuming that the maniples of the third line formed up behind the gaps of the second, it is generally assumed that the “parade-ground” formation of the legion had a *quincunx* or chessboard appearance. The three-line system allowed for some form of line relief or replacement, as described by Livy (8.8.9–12), and kept the majority of men some distance from the immediate stress of frontline combat.

The Carthaginian infantry was formed in a phalanx, a dense mass of troops, which played an important psychological role, raising the morale of their own troops and intimidating their opponents by the depth and sheer size of the formation. We know much less about the organization of the Carthaginian infantry than about the Romans, but we must presume that it was divided into smaller units, probably around ethnic divisions, in the hope of compelling soldiers to fight better on account of their being positioned in groups with others who knew them. There must also have been small gaps in the line to enable an ordered advance and to allow the light infantry to retreat through the formation. These gaps would not have been as large as those in the Roman

line, as can be seen at Zama, where the Carthaginian first line struggled to retreat into the second. In general then the two formations were quite similar, although both offered particular tactical advantages.

Physical aspects

Battles were often preceded by light infantry or cavalry skirmishes until one side drew up their main battle line and the other chose to respond. Even before the fighting began, the battle line must have been a terrifying place to be in. An individual would have been part of a huge, closely packed crowd of many thousands of men and animals spread over a distance of a few kilometers. The proximity of one's fellow-soldiers would have offered moral support and a sense of shared danger, perhaps some feelings of safety through anonymity within such a large crowd, and a sense of increased bravery as part of a much larger system. Alternatively, the closeness of one's neighbors could feel suffocating and claustrophobic. These feelings would have been increased by the pulsating nature of the throng, pushing forwards and back, leaving a man helpless, with no freedom of individual movement, but rather swept up with the momentum of the group. The many thousands of enemy in front, although experiencing similar apprehension, to the individual would loom menacingly and any sight or sound of them would act as a jolting reminder of the coming danger.

The Roman heavy infantry, with their plumed helmets, the elephants and cavalry with their elaborate trappings, and perhaps even the Roman light infantry with their wolfskins, were dressed for this moment, to make them seem more imposing and to intimidate the enemy into immediate flight. We can safely assume that the Carthaginian infantry wore similarly impressive equipment for the same purpose. But this fantastic sight would have only been seen by the first few ranks of either battle line. The vast majority of troops' vision would have been obstructed by the soldiers in front of them and they would have caught only glimpses of the enemy line. Vision would have been further reduced by the clouds of dust raised from the dry ground by the feet of thousands of men. This would not only make it difficult to see, but irritate the eyes and choke the nose and mouth, aggravating the feeling of suffocation. In a number of Punic War battles our sources mention dust clouds, and we can assume that these were an issue in most of them, since they were fought on the sun-baked plains of Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Africa. The use of helmets would have further reduced the soldier's vision, as wearing a helmet, especially one with cheek protectors, has the effect of focusing the wearer's vision on the few meters in front of him.

An individual may not have been able to see much of what was going on in the enemy lines or even in the front line of his own army, but he would

certainly have been scared by the deafening tumult of a large group in close proximity to him. The growing apprehension of the coming battle may have caused some to fall into silence, but many thousands of others would have been talking, perhaps louder and more excitedly than normal, in an attempt to rein in their fear. Soldiers on both sides, unless very experienced in close combat, would call to one another to encourage their fellows and shout manically to intimidate their enemies.

Large numbers of armed men standing closely together would have also produced a cacophony of unintentional sounds. The clatter of accidental collisions, dropped weapons, the rattle caused by holding more than one javelin, the stamping of thousands of feet. Other non-human sounds would have been prominent too, such as the snorts of the horses or the trumpeting of the Carthaginian elephants, the stamping of hooves, and the periodic calls of horns and trumpets passing orders and signals along the lines. The odor of thousands of men standing for some time under a hot sun, carrying heavy weapons, and under the constant fear of the imminent battle would also have been highly disagreeable. Sweat, augmented by the metallic stench of adrenaline, would mingle with other smells such as the blood of men killed or wounded in preliminary skirmishing, involuntary urination, vomiting and defecation by scared men, in addition to that of the animals.

The period before a battle could vary between minutes and several hours, and would have been physically and mentally exhausting for all the troops. For those at the front, i.e. the light infantry and first lines of the heavy infantry, who could see the spectacle of the enemy line, fear and stress would have been immediate. For the light infantry this would have been alleviated to some extent by their ability to skirmish with the enemy, but the heavy infantry would have to wait, watch, and try to control their fears in the face of the enemy. For the rest of the troops, particularly those inexperienced in battle, this period would have been equally stressful. A combination of hearts racing, minds full of imagined horrific possibilities, the noises of the enemy and the claustrophobic nature of the formation may have led many to panic. To counter this terror, Greek military theorists advised putting one's best troops at the front and rear of a formation, to keep the rest from running and even force them to fight (Asclepiodotus 3.5–6). The Roman three-line formation is a variation on this theme. It kept the majority of the troops out of direct contact with the enemy for as long as possible, while the third line was composed of veteran soldiers, who could keep those in front of them in order. The youngest and most enthusiastic soldiers were in the light infantry and the first line of the heavy, so that their nervous energy would be an advantage against the enemy, as we shall see later when discussing the mechanics of infantry combat. The centurions within the infantry subunits would have led from the front and the

first rank would have been made up of men well known for bravery. A similar form of organization must also have been employed by the Carthaginians to counter the possibility of immediate panic and flight during this stressful period before battle.

Initial Skirmishing

Battles usually began with light infantry skirmishing. Those armed with long-range weapons, like archers or slingers, could fight from a distance, sending forth a hail of missiles against the enemy line. But those with shorter-range weapons, such as javelins, had to run forward to throw their projectiles. Polybius describes this hit-and-run form of combat at Ilipa, where “those who were hard pressed [were] always retreating to the shelter of their respective formations and then issuing forth again to resume combat” (Pol. 11.22.9–10).² The light infantry fought in waves, advancing out of their line to attack and returning to the mass as a place of safety. Advancing singly or in small groups to discharge their weapons, soldiers would feel more exposed to enemy missiles and so accuracy would be limited, since little time would be taken in aiming. In reality, individuals would be safer on their own than in bunches, which would offer an easier target for enemy weapons, but in times of danger it is natural for men to crowd together. In any event, most of these missiles would have been blocked by the small shields of the light infantry and the larger ones of the heavy would deflect longer-range weapons.

This period of combat was usually rather indecisive and its main purpose seems to have been to allow time for the deployment, and to improve the morale, of the heavy infantry behind. With the rest of the army watching, any overt bravery shown by the light infantry would reflect on the rest of the army and the skirmish could act as a microcosm for the coming battle. The light infantry could, however, act as an effective force, particularly when fighting alongside cavalry, attacking heavy infantry on the flanks or against elephants (Pol. 1.40.12–13; 15.12.3–4).

Elephant Charge³

Elephants were the Carthaginians’ most exotic weapon in the Punic Wars. They were usually placed in front of the main infantry line with a distance of about thirty meters between each animal. These gaps were often filled with light infantry to isolate the elephants from each other in an attempt to reduce the risk of panicking. The foremost purpose of introducing elephants on to

the battlefield was to induce panic in the enemy soldiers. For this reason their already striking appearance was enhanced with crests, head pieces, and even body armor. At times they were fed fermented wine to stimulate their fury, to encourage loud trumpeting and stamping in the hope of adding to their psychological impact on the enemy. Elephants do not appear to have been used in a pack to drive the enemy line back as a whole, but rather in isolation to puncture holes in and disrupt the enemy line by focusing their energy on a particular, localized point.

Polybius' account of the battle of Tunis (255) reveals how devastatingly effective such an elephant charge could be:

But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the melee. (1.34.5)

As Polybius shows, the men opposing such a charge had no choice but to pull back from the furious animal, causing great disruption in the line. In response to this attack javelins would be hurled at the elephants, which would only make their charge more unpredictable. At Ilipa (206) for example, Polybius describes the double-edged nature of the elephant charge:

as a consequence of this attack the elephants, assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and *velites* and harassed on every side, were suffering much, and doing as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. For in their wild rush, they destroyed all, friend and foe, who came in their way. (11.24.1)

There are similar accounts at Panormus (250) and the Metaurus River (207). In fact, this was such a common occurrence that Livy claims the drivers kept a chisel and mallet to brain the animal if it grew wild and began to attack their own men (27.49.1–2). Those who could not get away from the elephant would be trampled under foot, thrown to the ground by its strength or impaled on its tusks. Seeing such devastation at close range would have been terrifying, particularly for those who had never seen war elephants before.

By the end of the Second Punic War the Romans, through experience, did learn ways of dealing with elephants. At Zama, Scipio formed up his battle line with channels between the maniples, through which the elephants were to be forced, instead of using the usual chess-board structure. The light infantry began by harassing the animals with missiles, then running back to the maniples, making way for the elephants. As they ran through the gaps, the soldiers attacked them from both sides with javelins and thus chased them from the battlefield (Livy 30.33.15). Although they could be neutralized to some extent, elephants remained an important feature of Punic War battles.

Cavalry Battle

Cavalry played a vital role in Punic War battles. Polybius concluded his account of the battle of Cannae by stating that it was better to give battle with an overwhelming superiority in cavalry and half as many infantry, than to be in all respects equal (3.117.3). If one side’s cavalry could dispose of their opposition before the battle was decided, they could be used to outflank the enemy infantry formation and attack them in the rear, effectively ending the battle. This appears to have been the case at the battles of Tunis, Cannae, Herdonea (210), and Zama. Cavalry could also chase down those men who tried to flee, explaining the evidence we have for high casualty rates on one side in battles of this period. The importance of cavalry is underlined by the battle of Himera (211), where the much feared Numidians refused to fight on the Carthaginian side. The resulting lack of cavalry support, Livy tells us (25.41.4–5), caused the Carthaginian infantry immediately to turn in flight.

It has been noted above that, due to the generally symmetrical formations of the Punic War battles, cavalry units usually fought against each other. Although at times, as at Capua (212), they found themselves facing infantry, in this period cavalry generally only fought heavy foot soldiers when attacking the flanks or rear of an infantry formation. The heavier cavalry of the Roman and Carthaginian forces were shock troops rather than skirmishers, like the Numidians, but there is no evidence to suggest that their charge regularly ended in a collision of two massed formations at speed. In fact Louis Nolan, a nineteenth-century British cavalry officer, claimed that cavalry rarely came into contact following a high-speed charge because of “a natural repugnance to engage in deadly strife” (Nolan 1853, 279). Indeed, Keegan concurs in his account of Waterloo, arguing that such a collision would have ended in a growing pile of injured men and horses (Keegan 1976, 148). The tactical disinclination for collisions was encouraged in Punic War cavalry by the fact that they had no stirrups. If one can assume that in the majority of cases there was no collision, it appears the primary purpose of these charges was psychological, an attempt to inspire fear in the enemy units and cause them to break ranks and flee. However, as the hoped for disruption of the enemy rarely occurred, it is necessary to offer an explanation of how cavalry fought when the enemy stood their ground.

McCall argues that in this period the Romans employed two types of cavalry tactics (McCall 2002, 53–77). In the first type, the Romans would ride up to the enemy and, instead of crashing into them, would halt and begin stationary, individual, hand-to-hand combat, followed swiftly by a reformation of the cavalry unit. The second Roman tactic involved the cavalry dismounting and fighting on foot, as infantry.

Polybius' account of the Ticinus River battle (218) suggests that the Punic War cavalry could fight in a similar way to that proposed by McCall:

The cavalry met front to front and for some time maintained an evenly balanced contest, the engagement being both a cavalry and infantry one, owing to the number of men who dismounted during its progress. (3.65.9)

The cavalry did come into contact, but instead of ending in a massed scrimmage, the fighting continued for some time in what appears to have been stationary hand-to-hand combat. Polybius' account of the fighting on the Roman right wing at Cannae reveals a similar style of fighting:

When the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man. The Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in the melee, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began to drive the rest along the river, cutting them down mercilessly. (3.115.2-4)

Cavalry fighting as infantry is a common motif in the battle accounts of this period, and may just be a literary invention used to add interest to the narrative.⁴ But such an invention must have had some basis for the audience to believe it, so it is certainly possible that the Roman and Carthaginian cavalry could have fought in this way. Polybius does imply that it was unusual and that normal cavalry battle involved some form of wheeling maneuver. Appian, in his description of the Roman cavalry at Nephesis in the Third Punic War, describes one possible form for this maneuver:

Scipio divided them [his 300 cavalry] into two bodies and led them, with many charges, against the enemy, by turns discharging darts at them and quickly retreating, then coming back at them and again quickly darting away, for he had given orders that one-half of them should advance by turns continually, discharging their javelins, and retire, as though they were attacking on all sides. (*Lib.* 103.484)

Appian is far from a reliable source for this period and is the only one which records the battle in any detail. Yet, whilst it is impossible to know whether this account reflected the particular form of combat used in this battle, his description is certainly within the realms of possibility, and may reflect the form of combat proposed by Polybius and used by the cavalry in general. The Numidians used a very similar form of fighting, for example, at the Trebia River (218), where Polybius states that: "the Numidians easily scattered and retreated, but

afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring — these being their peculiar tactics” (3.72.10). Similar tactics can be seen for example at Heraclea Minoa (262: Pol. 1.19.1–4), Cannae, or the preliminary engagement before the battle which Appian calls Careone (206: *Iber.* 25.96–9).

Punic War cavalry engagements were flexible and could take different forms depending on the topography of the battlefield and the types of troops involved. Close fighting would involve slashing at the enemy with the long cavalry swords or stabbing with spears. Those who remained mounted would have had the advantage of height over those on foot and could have chased them down more easily, although horses would provide a larger target for the blows of men on the ground and many cavalymen would have had their mounts cut from under them. There is evidence that light infantry could fight alongside cavalry, such as at the Ticinus River (Pol. 3.65), the Trebia (3.73.7), and Cirta (203: Livy 30.11.9–10). It must have been in these more stationary engagements that this arm would have been telling. Where a battlefield offered more space, or Numidians were involved in the fighting, cavalry engagements appear to have been more dynamic. They would charge up to the enemy, hurl their missiles and perhaps fight hand-to-hand for a short time, before retreating to regroup and attack again in a series of wheeling evolutions.

Combat would continue, in either of the two forms outlined, until one side came off worse, turned, and fled. The reason for flight may have been psychological, owing to one side having higher morale than the other, or simply because one side had a superiority either in number or quality. After the other side had turned in flight, the victorious cavalry were free to pursue or return to the battle and attack the infantry. An example of this can be seen at Cannae, where Hasdrubal’s Celtic and Spanish cavalry turned back to attack the Roman infantry on the rear, while the Numidians pursued the fleeing allied cavalry as they were particularly skilled in this form of combat (Pol. 3.115.12).

Infantry Battle

The mechanics of infantry combat at the time of the Punic Wars has been a matter of much scholarly dispute for nearly a century. In 2000 Philip Sabin moved the debate forward significantly by proposing four theoretical parameters against which any model of infantry fighting should be tested. The first parameter Sabin outlined was the potential duration of the battles. Although infantry clashes in this period were sometimes decided very quickly, with one battle line becoming disrupted during or even before the first attack, surviving sources suggest that other battles lasted many hours, like Trasimene’s three hours (Livy 22.6.1). Additional evidence for long engagements can be gained if the “internal clock” provided by the grand tactical maneuvers described in

a number of our battle narratives are analyzed. At Cannae, for example, it must have taken at least an hour, and probably far longer, for Hannibal's cavalry to defeat the Roman cavalry, ride round to the opposite wing and drive off the Italian cavalry, before finally turning to attack the Roman infantry in the rear.⁵

Any credible model of heavy infantry combat must explain both the asymmetrical slaughter of battles such as the Trebia, Cannae, or Zama, and also the fact that battle, although it could last for many hours at a time, did not usually produce greater *mutual* slaughter. Sabin's second parameter then is the ratio of casualty rates on each side. During the mid-Republic, casualty rates on the losing side were frequently far greater than those of the victor. Often the losses for the defeated numbered over half the total strength. Even taking into account exaggeration and number rounding within our sources, the casualty rates do appear to have been heavily skewed. Sabin concludes that either fighting was heavily one-sided throughout the battle, or that both sides suffered relatively few casualties until one formation turned, fled, and was routed. The second option appears the more likely in the Punic War period as the losers often found themselves encircled by their enemy's envelopment tactics making escape unlikely. Where troops could flee, they would be ridden down in a long pursuit by faster enemy cavalry, as at Zama.

The third parameter aiding us in discovering the face of Punic War infantry battle concerns the mobility of these forces. In Punic War battles the infantry lines could pull away from the fighting and give ground intentionally or under pressure from the enemy line without breaking entirely. At Cannae, the center of the Carthaginian infantry line was driven back from a convex to a concave formation by Roman pressure, with the result that the Roman infantry became surrounded and were forced to fight on three flanks. It is of critical importance then for any model of combat to offer a convincing explanation of how heavy infantry could move backwards and forwards over hundreds of yards while maintaining some semblance of order and formation.

The final parameter Sabin presents is the role of reserve ranks. The Romans, unlike most other ancient armies, generally employed a multiple-line system. Thus, any credible model of infantry combat must show how the advantages of positioning fresh troops in a relatively shallow line could outweigh the physical and psychological advantages of a deep formation. These reserve lines could be used within grand tactical maneuvers, such as at the Great Plains or Zama, but their main purpose was to replace or reinforce tired troops. Therefore the model must also show how tired soldiers in the front line managed to withdraw and be replaced by fresh troops during sustained combat.

In recent years the traditional model of infantry combat, although very influential, has become less popular, since it does not appear to fit well with these parameters of battle. The traditional model proposed that combat took the

form of a massed infantry charge and shield drive of the whole front line following an initial volley of javelins. Adrian Goldsworthy instead suggested that drawn-out infantry combat must have been punctuated by lulls, during which the two sides could draw back from each other in order to rest and replace the wounded (Goldsworthy 1996). Building on this, Sabin derived a model that takes the form of a dynamic stand-off. He proposed that close-range hand-to-hand fighting with swords would have been a highly unstable state, requiring massive injections of physical and psychological energy. Therefore, he argues, there must have also been a "more physically and psychologically sustainable 'default state' within protracted Roman infantry contests, into which the combatants would naturally relapse" (Sabin 2000: 14). This default state would take the form of a small separation of the two lines creating a "safety distance", which would allow insults and missiles to be exchanged but would not be close enough for hand-to-hand combat. At many points along the line small groups, whose adrenaline and nervous energy had reached a peak, would surge forward for a short, localized flurry of hand-to-hand combat. This combat would end when one side got the worst of the exchange, necessitating a step back to reinstate the "safety distance". This form of stand-off interspersed with short periods of localized combat could last for hours with relatively low mutual casualties until one side finally broke and a rout ensued.

This theoretical model corresponds better with the parameters of mid-Republican battle than the traditional model of a massed infantry charge. It explains the low mutual casualty rates until a rout, even for battles lasting many hours, how the line could move forward and back over large distances without breaking, and how the default state of a stand-off could allow time for relief and replacement maneuvers within the lines and for the wounded to be carried to the rear. The model also appears to correspond well with the descriptions of infantry battle in our sources for the mid-Republican period as a whole (Koon 2007, 134-170). Although Punic War battle narratives are often not explicit in their descriptions of the fighting, where combat *is* depicted in detail, such as the accounts of Cannae, Ilipa, and Zama, it also appears to correspond well with Sabin's theoretical model.

Some of the depictions go even further than the dynamic stand-off model and appear to indicate that, at times, a different, though complementary form of combat could be employed in conjunction with the primary form of fighting. For example at Cannae:

At first they were evenly matched in strength and courage, as long as the Gauls and Spaniards maintained their rank; but at last the Romans, *after prolonged and frequent efforts*, pushing forward *with an even front and a dense line*, drove in [*or beat back*] the wedge-like formation which projected from the enemy line, for it was too thin to be strong; and then, as the Gauls and the Spaniards gave way

and fell back in confusion, pressed forward and without once stopping forced their way through the crowd of fleeing, panic-stricken foes. (Livy 22.47.4-6)

Initially the lines fight, evenly matched, for an unspecified period of time. This Roman combat is described as “prolonged and frequent efforts” (*din ac saepe conisi*). Livy’s use of *saepe* (“often, frequent” etc.) implies that this period of fighting involved a series of many attacks. These attacks would be small-scale isolated flurries rather than one large massed charge, from which it would be very difficult to pull the line back in order to launch a second attack. Livy also seems to be isolating this phrase from the rest of the sentence by using the past participle of *conitor*. It appears that, the “prolonged and frequent” attacks are a separate phase of combat distinct from, and leading to, the attack which follows. So, having forced the Gauls and Spaniards back with a series of attacks, the Romans move into what seems to have been a secondary phase of their assault, described as an advance with an even front and dense line (*aequa fronte acieque densa*). With this assault they drive back the thin enemy line, pressing forward through the disordered enemy.

From Livy’s narrative it can be seen that two different forms of combat were deemed effective for describing this and other Punic War battles. The most common was the stand-off punctuated with small-scale localized attacks. But a second, less frequent attack seems to have evolved periodically out of the first and took the form of a massed advance of the whole line. Massed advances would have been unfeasible against an enemy in an ordered battle formation, as they required the majority of men in the line to have equally high morale. Therefore they would only have been possible after the enemy line had been thrown into disorder, either by the localized flurries of combat during the stand-off or by panicking the enemy immediately prior to the battle. If the enemy remained in a cohesive formation, which was strong against frontal assault, the majority of soldiers would usually be disinclined to attack.

This reluctance explains the default rest state behind a safety distance, which is so central to the dynamic stand-off model. When making a frontal attack on an enemy formation in disorder and confusion, the psychological advantage for the aggressors would be far greater than against an organized enemy. It is because of this psychological change that a massed infantry advance would be possible and this would lead to a rout. The disproportionate final casualty figures suggest that it was in this final stage, when the enemy line had been broken and the whole offensive line had a will to fight, that the enemy sustained its heaviest casualties.

With these two forms of combat in mind, it is now possible to piece together a picture of what infantry fighting may have been like. After the skirmishers had withdrawn through the gaps in the battle lines, the infantry battle proper would begin. The two opposing armies would line up in a loose formation and

move slowly together until they were separated by a distance of a few meters, the "safety distance." The two armies would size each other up and hurl insults and missiles at one another. The safety distance kept men just outside the killing range for hand-held weapons, but within range of missile weapons, such as the Roman *pilum*. With so many thousands of missiles being thrown, some would find their mark, killing or wounding the victim and disrupting the line, but most would be deflected by shields and body armor. The already loud battlefield would erupt into a crescendo of noise, as the soldiers tried to intimidate their opponents into flight. Polybius describes such a moment at the battle of Tunis, where the Romans banged their weapons against their shields and raised their war cry (1.34.2). The screams of the wounded would also have a psychological impact on those around them. At times this would be enough to make the enemy turn in flight at the first onset, as at Ibera and First Herdonea. But in most cases a more balanced form of combat would follow. Natural leaders within the units of the line would slowly stir up the nervous energy of their neighboring troops until this energy exploded into an attack.

Such an attack could be sparked off by the bravest men bursting out, bringing less brave men along in their wake, and would consist of a relatively small number of men in a group or a number of groups, who would come out from the safety of their line with a shout, cross the safety distance and begin a short flurry of hand-to-hand combat with swords, against a localized section of the enemy line. The small, autonomous group of men, who made the attack in response to the visual stimulus of one member of their unit advancing out of the line, would themselves be able to decide when to withdraw and reinstate the safety distance, if they had come off worse in the fighting. Owing to their close proximity, the withdrawal could be signaled using visual signs. The hand-to-hand fighting would take the form of stabbing and slashing with swords and punching the enemy with shields to knock them off balance.

After the withdrawal, there would follow a further stand-off period, in which energy levels could once more build up, more missiles could be thrown and the wounded could be passed back through the line, until another attack was made. Many of these small-scale attacks would break out all along the line, wherever energy levels reached peak, giving the line the impression of a fluctuating wave. Accounts of Zama show that the rear ranks would support the front ranks actually doing the fighting, either morally or physically, and the natural lulls in the fighting would allow for line replacement or reinforcement. This stand-off could continue for many hours, with relatively few casualties, until one side's nerve gave in and the ranks began to break up. Polybius' account of Zama gives us some idea of the horror caused by particularly heavy combat:

the space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great

difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard.(15.14.1-2).

The carnage of the battlefield could only increase as one side became disrupted and began to turn their backs on the enemy, often leading to a secondary combat phase and rout. When this occurred, the visual and aural indications of the disorder and fear of the enemy line would be apparent to all of the members of the attacking force, especially those experienced in battle. At this point their natural fear and nervous energy may well have turned to blood lust. Owing to the indications of the enemy's confusion, perhaps seeing the backs of some enemy, or their standards dropping, hearing their cries of fear and pain, or even the enemy trumpets sounding the recall, the aggressors would be willing to cast aside their natural tendency for caution and to attack with far more aggression than normal. For the first time in the battle, the majority of the men would simultaneously have a will to fight. A massed advance would occur naturally as the more successful side began to sense victory. Alternatively, it could be created by commanders ordering an advance of the standards at a key point in the battle.

What would cause a battle line, fighting for an extended period with relatively few casualties, to break and expose themselves to the danger of a rout? Our sources offer various factors and help us account for such incidents. The first of these is superiority in numbers, such as at the Metaurus where a smaller force was simply overwhelmed by a larger one. However, through much of the Punic Wars larger numbers on either side do not appear to have been telling, as on many occasions battles were decisively won by a smaller force: good examples are Cannae, Ilipa, and Zama. Differences in the morale of the two lines could play a more vital role. A possible trigger affecting morale could be the death of a commander in the front line. On a number of occasions Livy suggests the shock death or injury of a general could cause his troops to panic, such as Gnaeus Scipio's injury at Munda (24.42) or the wounding of Mago (30.18). This may have been a rare occurrence, but a similar, though smaller-scale, impact may have resulted from the death of a centurion or well-respected file leader, causing a panic in localized pockets of men, which, if unchecked, could spread throughout the formation.

Fatigue could also play a role, whether through hard fighting and the accumulation of casualties or a lack of preparation before battle, as at the Trebia, Metaurus, and Ilipa. A more general loss of formation could be caused by the charge of elephants, as at the battle of Tunis, the retreat of front line troops into their reserve ranks, as can be seen with the confusion caused at Canusium

(209: Livy 27.12.15), or simply being caught off guard, as at Lake Trasimene and Baecula (Pol. 10.39.5).

A key feature of Punic War battles, which appears to have led directly to the disruption and rout of an infantry formation, were surprise attacks on the flanks or rear of the infantry. During the period of Hannibal's dominance in the Second Punic War, ambushes were common, with sources claiming that the surprise attack of a small group of men was often decisive, as at the Trebia, Gerunium, or First Herdonea (212). The grand tactical maneuvering of the infantry lines, which was so characteristic of Second Punic War battles, regularly allowed one side to envelop enemy infantry, partially or completely, and attack them on the flanks. This was employed by Hannibal at Cannae, although Scipio's army also mastered these tactics at Baecula, Ilipa, and the Great Plains. Infantry could also be attacked in the rear by cavalry returning to the battle after setting their own opponents to flight. Although Livy's description (23.29) of the Roman fighting at Ibera (215) suggests the possibility of an enveloped infantry formation fighting its way out if there were no cavalry attack on its rear, when such an attack did occur it usually signaled the end of the battle.

An explanation of the success of these attacks on flanks and rear can be seen in Livy's account of such an assault at Baecula (208):

the [Carthaginian] line was at first thrown into disorder, while the men tried to wheel and made their ranks face the shouts resounding on every side ... and the front line of the enemy, as the men gave way and were afraid of being wounded from the rear, lost its solidity ... (27.18.16-17)

The pressure of being attacked on two fronts would force the line to bunch up, causing them to become an easier target for enemy attacks while at the same time losing flexibility and their ability to defend themselves effectively. The disorder and fear in the line would make it much easier for infantry, cavalry, or even light infantry, to attack the enemy formation.

Similar characteristics of panic and disruption would occur with any of the triggers listed above but, whatever caused the rout, the result was the same. As Sabin suggests, we must "imagine men dropping their weapons and vainly begging for mercy, or blindly clawing at or even cutting down their own comrades to try to get further into the heart of the press, away from the executioners and towards an illusory way out" (Sabin, 1996, 77). Many thousands of men were killed, either cut down where they stood by the enemy infantry or chased down in flight by the cavalry. After the battle was won the victors stripped the enemy casualties of their equipment, carried their own wounded away and buried their dead.

Conclusion

Although Punic War pitched battles were not as decisive within the grand scheme of the wars as many other ancient engagements, their impact was devastating to those involved, both to the survivors and the dead. Punic War armies were combined-arms forces and as such there is too wide a range of possible troop interactions to examine within the limits of one chapter. Instead, this chapter has examined the most common forms of combat involved in Punic War battles, introduced some of the debates surrounding them, and tried to glimpse the experience of combat. An appreciation of what the fighting may have been like at the level of the individual is fundamental to a more accurate understanding of the battles fought in this period. When combined with a more traditional grand tactical analysis of the conflicts, we can offer clearer, more cohesive insights into how these battles were fought and won.

FURTHER READING

Other examples of works on ancient military history influenced by Keegan's methodology include Hanson 1989, various articles in Hanson 1991 and Lloyd 1996, Goldsworthy 1996 and 2000, Sabin 1996 and 2000, and Daly 2002. Lendon 1999 is a helpful discussion of the use of metaphor and literary conventions in ancient battle narratives. For examples of a more traditional model of infantry combat see Delbrück (trans.) 1975, 272–80, Adcock 1970, 9–10, and Connolly 1998, 142. For further information on more recent theoretical models see Goldsworthy 1996, Sabin 1996 and 2000, and an interesting model proposed by Zhmodikov 2000 based around a predominance of missile warfare. For a more in-depth explanation of a rout see Sabin 1996. Although not the focus of this chapter, commanders played a very important role in Punic War battles. For recent examinations of this role see for example, Daly 2002, Kagan 2006, and Sabin 2007.

NOTES

1. Polybius (18.30.5–9) states that the spacing per man was 6 feet, while Vegetius (3.15) claims just 3 feet.
2. Cf. Polybius 3.73.1–3 and 6. All translations of ancient sources in this chapter are taken from the Loeb collection.
3. On the use of elephants see: Scullard 1974; Peddie 2005 [1997], 253–265; and Sabin 2007, 419–421.
4. Oakley 1997, 597–598, discusses this regular battle motif in greater detail.
5. On these parameters see Sabin 2000. On the length of battle see Goldsworthy 1996, 201–6; Zhmodikov 2000, 67–78, has compiled a list from Livy.

CHAPTER SIX

Polybius and the Punic Wars

Craig B. Champion

The surviving writing of Polybius of Megalopolis constitutes far and away the most important literary source for reconstructing the history of the Punic Wars. From antiquity to the present day, Polybius' work (along with that of Thucydides) has set the standard for historical accuracy and precision by which all other examples of classical historiography have been measured (Champion 2004a, 18–23). Polybius' narrative of the First Punic War (Book 1) is completely intact (Lazenby 1996, 1–9); on events of the Second Punic War for which his text has been lost, we can use Livy's extant narrative instead, which followed Polybius closely as its principal source for the conflict (Nissen 1863; Tränkle 1977).

Polybius was born around 200 BC and died sometime after 118 (Eckstein 1992). During his long life he witnessed monumental and convulsive changes in the international state-system — primarily, the rise of Rome to a position of undisputed hegemony over the Mediterranean world. Recognizing that this development was of unprecedented magnitude and importance, he couches his reason for writing the history as a challenge to his readers: who, he asks, would not wish to understand “how, and by a state with what kind of constitution, almost the whole of the inhabited world was conquered and fell under the sole rule of the Romans in a period of not quite 53 years — an event without parallel in history?” (Pol. 1.1.5–6).

At the center of this story lie the cataclysmic struggles of the third century between the Republic and its great nemesis, the North African city of Carthage — the series of conflicts modern scholars call the Punic Wars, which propelled Rome to international hegemony. This chapter considers several ways in which these wars were central to Polybius' life and work.

Polybius' Formative Period and the Punic Wars

Polybius grew up as the political independence of the Greek states was coming to an end, with Rome assuming hegemony over them. He belonged to the political elite of the Peloponnesian city of Megalopolis, a powerful member of the Achaean Confederation of Greek *poleis*. Polybius' father, Lycortas, served several times as *stratēgos*, the highest elected post in the Achaean League. As a young man, Polybius himself enjoyed a political career of distinction and promise: he carried the remains of the Achaean hero Philopoemen in the latter's state funeral in 182; he was selected as an envoy for a diplomatic mission to the Ptolemaic court in Alexandria — at the age of about twenty — in 181/180 (though the mission was in the end cancelled); and he was elected to the second-highest office in the Achaean Confederation, that of *hipparchos* or cavalry commander, when he was thirty — the youngest age of eligibility for the post. At the time, few would have doubted Polybius was destined for the Confederation's *strategia*. Instead, his political career took a tragic turn when he was deported to Rome as a political prisoner in the aftermath of the battle at Pydna. He was to remain in Italy for the greater part of the next 16 years; during this period he conceived and wrote much of his *Histories*.

Polybius' personal predicament, it must be said, improved immeasurably over the years of his political arrest. He soon befriended P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, a young Roman noble and the son of L. Aemilius Paullus, conqueror of King Perseus of Macedonia (see Reiter 1988 for Paullus; Astin 1967b for Aemilianus), and he enjoyed considerable privileges: access to leading Roman and Greek statesmen in Rome and significant freedom of movement. Indeed, he went on hunting expeditions with Aemilianus, and later accompanied the younger man on military campaigns, being present with this Roman friend when Carthage fell in 146 (Pol. 38.19.1, 19a.1–4, 21.1–3, 22.1–3; Walbank 1972, 1–31; Champion 1997a). It hardly needs saying that none of these developments could have taken place had Rome not emerged victorious from its wars against Carthage in the previous century.

By the time Polybius came to maturity, therefore, Rome was the undisputed master of his world, and the Republic's greatest tests against Carthage had been resolved for about a quarter century. The international balance of power that existed, and continued, as Polybius gained political consciousness was radically different from what Greek statesmen of previous generations had known. As Polybius says, after the climactic events of 168 — and in particular after the public humiliation of the Seleucid King Antiochus IV Epiphanes at the hands of a Roman envoy — all knew they would be subjects and subordinates of Rome from that point on (Pol. 29.27.1–15; cf. 15.9.4–5, with Gruen 1984, 659 n. 226; Hoyos 1998, 25 n. 16).

By contrast, most Greek leaders paid scant attention to the western powers of Rome and Carthage throughout most of the third century. There were certainly some diplomatic contacts with Rome in this period — perhaps most notably a treaty of friendship (*amicitia*) struck between the Ptolemaic monarchy in Alexandria and the Republic in 273 — but they were infrequent and without lasting effect. To be sure, in the course of the Second Punic War, after Hannibal had won his initial brilliant victories against the Romans, King Philip V of Macedonia struck a treaty with the Carthaginian general (Pol. 7.9.1–17, with Bickerman 1944). But for the most part, Greek leaders ignored affairs in the western Mediterranean, and their warfare and interstate diplomacy went on almost solely within their own sphere (Golan 1971; Eckstein 2008, 3–118).

Polybius dramatically underscores this parochialism and insouciance regarding developments in the west when he reports on an international conference of Greek leaders at Naupactus in 217. The conference was called to negotiate a peace between Philip V and the Aetolian Confederation, who had been at war with one another since 220 (the so-called Social War). Polybius includes the speech delivered by one of the ambassadors at the conference, Agelaus of Naupactus, in which he urges the Greeks to come to their senses and cease and desist from their petty intramural squabbling. He warns his fellow compatriots that the ultimate victor of the war then raging between Rome and Carthage would be sure to invade Greece in an act of unjustified aggression. It would therefore be far better, Agelaus admonishes, that the Greeks unite against the barbarian invader, thus preserving themselves and their cities (Pol. 5.104.1–11, with Champion 1997b).

Philip V and the Aetolians did indeed negotiate a peace treaty as a result of this conference (Pol. 5.105.1–2), but despite Agelaus' warnings, Greek statesmen did not recognize Rome as the centrally important player on the international scene until the end of the third century (Holleaux 1921; now supported by Eckstein 2008). In this context it is worth noting that even when Polybius was writing the first five books of his work around 150, he made a concession to Greek ignorance of earlier events in the western Mediterranean. He chose the 140th Olympiad (220–216) as the starting-point of the *Histories* because he believed this marked the moment when the history of the inhabited world became an interconnected whole, or *symplokē*, leading to Rome's spectacular rise to Mediterranean-wide hegemony — and it demanded to be chronicled in a new way, universal in scope (Walbank 1985, 313–324; Champion 1997b, 112–117; Eckstein 2008, 79–83). Polybius found it necessary, however, to preface his work with two introductory books that covered the first war between Rome and Carthage for possession of Sicily — beginning with the 129th Olympiad (264–260) — because, as he states, most Greeks were unfamiliar with the earlier histories of the two western powers (Pol. 1.3.7–10).

Unlike statesmen of their grandfathers' generation, Greeks of Polybius' day were acutely aware that they lived in a world of overwhelming Roman power, and that this power was established in the previous century as a result of the Punic Wars. Any historical explanation of how this power had so radically transformed the world had therefore to come to grips with the gargantuan conflicts between the Republic and Carthage. These events justifiably were at the center of Polybius' political consciousness and undergirded his *Histories*.

Polybius' Sources for the Punic Wars

Polybius reveals his working methods and philosophy of history more than any other extant ancient historian, Greek or Roman. Indeed, he devotes an entire book (Book 12) to the topic of correct historiographical method, which turns out to be in large part a sustained attack on his predecessor as historian of the western Mediterranean, Timaeus of Tauromenium (see Sacks 1981 *passim*). In a passage in that book (12.25e), Polybius defines the historian's task as the collation and study of written sources, autopsy of relevant sites, and political experience. It is important to realize, however, that Polybius lived and wrote in a semi-oral, predominantly non-literate society. Written documents did not enjoy the status they have today as evidence for historical reconstruction. Consequently, serious historical research was thought to concern contemporary or near-contemporary events and to be derived largely from eyewitness oral accounts (Pol. 4.2.2–4; 12.25i.2–3, with Schepens 1975). Along these lines, one of Polybius' principal criticisms of Timaeus is that the other author relied primarily on written documents and lacked personal experience in the autopsy of sites, statecraft, and warfare — and that as a result he wrote without authority (see Marincola 1997, 133–158; cf. Champion 1997b, 114–116). As Polybius explains (Pol. 12.4c.2–5), questioning and cross-examining as many eyewitnesses and participants in the events he is narrating as possible is the most important part of the historian's activity.

In keeping with his historiographical prescriptions, Polybius was able to question both Romans and non-Romans of an earlier generation about their experiences in the war against Hannibal, and to interview younger men who had heard accounts from their elders (Pédech 1964, 358–372). He began the history with the 140th Olympiad because this practice was still possible for researching the history of the Second Punic War (Pol. 4.2.2–3). For earlier events, such as those of the First Punic War, he relied heavily upon written sources, and was consequently unable to conduct his ideal kind of research. This is true also for Book 2, about half of which is devoted to third-century Greek events: the so-called Achaean *prokataskene* (2.37–71; chapters 1–36 briefly narrate the Carthaginian recovery from defeat in the First Punic War and

establishment of power in Spain; the First Illyrian War; and Rome's wars against the Celts, culminating with the battle at Telemon in 225). For Greek events recounted in Book 2, Polybius mentions the *Memoirs* of the Achaean statesman Aratus (2.56.2) and the pro-Spartan historian Phylarchus (2.56.2; 3.26.3–4). These two writers, however, were not Polybius' sole written sources for Greek events in his first two introductory books (Walbank 1957, 26–35, esp. 27–8).

For the preliminaries to the First Punic War — especially the digression into the rise to power of King Hiero II of Syracuse (Pol. 1.8.3–9.8, with Petzold 1969, 157–62) — Polybius likely used the history of the Sicilian Timaeus (his aforementioned rival), which ended in the year 264 (Pol. 1.5.1). Since Timaeus' work survives only in fragmentary form — though those fragments are numerous (*FGrH* 566) — it is difficult to know how extensively he treated Rome in his history. That uncertainty notwithstanding, part of Polybius' animosity toward Timaeus — expressed in no uncertain terms throughout Book 12 — may have been due to Timaeus' recognition of the great importance of Rome's rise as early as the opening decades of the third century. Polybius therefore probably viewed Timaeus as a challenge to his exclusive claims to being the preeminent historian of Rome's rise, and went to great lengths to discredit his predecessor's work on that account (cf. Momigliano 1977; Vattuone 2005).

Meanwhile, for the First Punic War Polybius' two principal sources were Q. Fabius Pictor (*FGrH* 809) and Philinus of Agrigentum (*FGrH* 174). He found both to be deficient in historical method. Fabius, as a senatorial historian, exhibited a strong pro-Roman bias. Conversely, Philinus heavily favored the Carthaginian cause. Polybius does not accuse these writers of intentional falsehoods, but he warns that because of their patriotism and partiality they were rather like lovers incapable of taking an unbiased position. He insists that the historian must not hesitate to accuse friends and praise enemies; to do otherwise is to betray his profession (1.14.1–15.13, with Luce 1989; Marincola 1997, 158–174 for the causes of bias in classical historiographical conceptions).

Polybius' criticisms of Fabius and Philinus, however valid they may have been, also undoubtedly serve the ulterior motive of establishing his own expertise and credibility (Walbank 1985, 262–79). But they also attest positively to his critical use of literary histories and independent judgment. As previously noted, when Polybius recounted the events of the Second Punic War, he was less reliant on written sources and was able to conduct his favored sort of research based on the oral testimony of eyewitness accounts. It is clear, however, that written testimony continued to be important even then. More written sources for Polybius' account of the Second Punic War are known than for the First, but unfortunately most of these are shadowy presences for us — the works themselves lost and their authors little more than names. Fabius Pictor continued to be an important source for the second, as he was for the first war (Pol. 3.8.1, with Walbank 1957, 64 for Fabius' career in the

Second Punic War). Polybius does not regard other historians of the period so highly. He is sharply critical of Chaereas (*FGrH* 177) and Sosylus of Lacedaemon (*FGrH* 176), the latter of whom was Hannibal's teacher of Greek and accompanied him on campaign (Nepos, *Hann.* 13.3). These men were nothing more than prattlers in Polybius' eyes, and he seems to have objected to their sloppy and misinformed accounts of bogus senatorial debates over declaring war after news arrived at Rome of the fall of Saguntum (3.20.1–5).

Polybius also mentions some other Greek sources, many of whom seem to have been pro-Carthaginian. Most such are left unnamed. Modern scholars have attempted to identify some of these: one likely contributor, for example, Silenus of Caleacte (*FGrH* 175), also accompanied Hannibal on campaign, and may have been an important source for the Carthaginian general's military preparations in Spain (Pol. 3.13.5–14.8, with Walbank 1957, 28–29, 42; cf. Pol. 5.33.2–3 for mention of anonymous epitomators of the war).

Polybius' Roman sources for the war can be identified with a greater degree of confidence. A reference in Book 3 (3.6.1–2) to historians of the war against Hannibal most certainly refers to Roman authors, since Polybius says they presented the fall of Saguntum and Hannibal's violation of the Ebro Treaty as causes of the war. In addition to the aforementioned Fabius, Polybius would likely have consulted the work of L. Cincius Alimentus (*FGrH* 810), who also wrote in Greek. This author possessed the credentials Polybius demanded of the historian: he had been praetor in Sicily in 210/209 and had been taken as a war-captive by Hannibal (Livy 21.38.3). It is also likely that Polybius was familiar with the history of the senator C. Acilius (*FGrH* 813), also writing in Greek; he certainly read that of A. Postumius Albinus (*FGrH* 812), consul in 151, which he censures for its inelegant Greek and vapidty (Pol. 39.1). It is less certain that Polybius knew the Greek-language history of P. Cornelius Scipio (the son of Africanus), said by Cicero (*Brutus* 77) to have been elegantly composed. Equally uncertain is the extent to which Polybius might have consulted Cato's *Origines*, since, although it is clear that Polybius gained some knowledge of Latin during his long sojourn in Italy, we cannot know for certain how well he mastered reading knowledge of the language (Dubuisson 1985). For the same reason we cannot be confident that Polybius would have known the history of L. Cassius Hemina or any other Roman author writing in Latin (Walbank 1957, 29).

All of these historians, however, would have been fairly fluent in spoken Greek and moved in political and social circles also frequented by Polybius. In the case of Cato the Elder, Polybius and he were acquaintances, at the least. Sometime near the end of the 150s, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus finally convinced Cato to relent in his opposition to the idea of the repatriation of the Achaean detainees, of whom Polybius was of course one. Cato rose in the chamber of the Senate and asked his fellow senators whether they had nothing better to do than

discuss where some poor old Greeks were to be buried, in Italy or in Greece. The senators then decreed that the hostages should be allowed to return home. Through Aemilianus' intercession, Polybius inquired a few days later whether the repatriated elder statesmen were to regain all their former honors and positions. He was rebuffed when Cato quipped that what he was asking was analogous to Odysseus going back into the Cyclops' cave to fetch the cap and belt he had left behind (Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 9.2–3). This anecdote shows the thorough knowledge of Greek language and culture on the part of Roman senators (even those like Cato who publicly warned of the dangers of Greek cultural productions; cf. Gruen 1992, 52–83), and underscores the privileged access Polybius would have had to well-informed oral testimony.

Other written sources, intermediary between formal written histories and orally derived information, were also of crucial importance to his research on the Second Punic War. In Book 10 (9.3), he refers to a letter by Scipio Africanus to King Philip V of Macedonia, which apparently gave details of the war in Spain and the capture of New Carthage. Meanwhile, by far the most important documentary evidence for the war was found in the Roman public archives. Polybius demonstrates both his own consultation of these state documents and discussion of them with Roman authorities in his presentation of the history of Romano-Carthaginian treaty relations (Pol. 3.22.1–28.5, especially 3.26.1, an explicit reference to the records deposited in the quaestors' (or aediles') treasury beside the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus).

It is on the basis of this research that Polybius adamantly denied the existence of the so-called Philinus Treaty, which supposedly dated to the late third century and recognized Sicily as a distinctly Carthaginian sphere of influence (Pol. 3.26.2–7, with Hoyos 1984, 92 n.6; Hoyos 1998, 10 n.10; Serrati 2006, esp. 120–9). Among Roman public records, such as the Pontifical Annals (on which see Frier 1999), Polybius had first-rate documentary evidence for embassies sent out and received by the Senate. His accounts of the peace terms with Philip V, the Aetolians, and Antiochus III must derive from this sort of material (Pol. 18.44.1–7; 21.32.1–15; 21.43.1–44.3).

As for Carthage, Polybius interviewed Carthaginians who had known Hannibal (Pol. 9.25.2), and supplemented this information with cross-examinations of the Numidian King Masinissa and his son on matters large and small (9.25.4; 34.16; 38.7.1–8.15). Polybius also proudly reports his personal examination of an inscription on the Lacinian promontory in south Italy, upon which Hannibal himself had recorded his manpower and troop formations (3.33.17–18, 56.1–4). But even in this instance, Polybius supplemented this inscriptional information with interrogation of men who were present during Hannibal's crossing of the Alps (3.48.12). Typically, Polybius does not identify the informants whose oral testimony he relied upon; he refers only to eyewitnesses of Hannibal's passage of the Alps — whether they were

Carthaginians or Greek or Celtic mercenaries — as “those present at the time.” As F.W. Walbank (1957, 34) has observed: “Faced with the anonymity of almost all his informants, Polybius’ readers can only take on trust his facts and the exercising of his critical judgment in selecting them.”

However, there is every reason for Polybius’ readers to do so with confidence. As we have seen, Polybius lived up to his own rigorous historiographical standards as a painstaking researcher and historian with first-hand experience in the arts of politics and warfare; he traveled extensively in order to gain direct knowledge of the geographical and topographical background for events he recounted; and he carefully utilized archival documents and state records to corroborate his narrative (Pédech 1964, 377–389, 515–597). Moreover, he wrote near-contemporary history and valued eyewitness accounts and the cross-examination of participants in historical events more than written histories. It must be admitted that he only sometimes mentions the historians he consulted, and rarely indicates the manner in which he employed them or when he passes from one work to another. But the conventions of classical historiography did not require him to do so.

Therefore, all in all, Polybius was a remarkably well-informed, industrious, and insightful historian, who well deserves the reputation for accuracy and precision he has enjoyed throughout the ages (I leave aside the vexed question of his muddled account of the relationship between Saguntum in Spain and the Ebro Treaty (3.30.3–4; cf. 3.15.5), for which see Hoyos 1998, 150–173). By the standards of ancient historiography, we could not hope for a better source on the Punic Wars.

The Punic Wars in the structure of the *Histories*

The Punic Wars are the main subject matter of the *Histories* and constitute the starting and ending points for the work in its final form. In between, however, the organization is much less straightforward; Polybius determined the final structure of his history only as he worked through writing it over many years. His original plan was to begin with the 140th Olympiad (220–216), the period during which the Second Punic War began. However, at some point he decided that he must preface the history proper with two introductory books in order to cover the First Punic War, commencing with the 129th Olympiad (264–260) and taking up the story from the point at which Timaeus left off. Polybius eventually determined that he must extend the work in the other chronological direction as well, bringing the history down to events in which he was personally involved.

In his famous “second preface” in Book 3 (3.4.1–5.9), Polybius announces his change of plan to extend his work from 168 to 146/145. Although Rome

had completed its rise to mastery of the Mediterranean world with the victory at Pydna in 168 (with which the 30-book edition was to have ended), subsequent events demanded the addition of 10 books (the 10-book extension presumably comprised Books 30–39, with Book 40 as a summary and table of contents which would probably have stood as Book 30 in the 30-book edition; see Walbank 1985, 325). The victory at Pydna had marked the completion of the growth of Rome's power and its establishment of Mediterranean-wide hegemony. But Polybius states that he intended for his extension to allow contemporaries to decide whether Roman rule was acceptable or not, and for future generations to evaluate in retrospect the laudability of such dominion (Pol. 3.4.1–8). Walbank (1985, 325–343, esp. 341–343) has suggested that Polybius' real motive for writing his final books was that he was an eyewitness and participant in many of the events he relates and wanted to showcase the geographical knowledge gained from his recent journeys (Book 34; cf. Pédech 1964, 515–597; Walbank 2002, 31–52); indeed Polybius seems to corroborate this by acknowledging that the main reason for the extension was his prominent role in its events (Pol. 3.4.13) — therefore fulfilling his self-proclaimed prerequisites for the historian by demonstrating in his closing books his wide-ranging political experience and first-hand topographical knowledge.

The result was a 40-book series that opened with the First Punic War and closed with the year in which Rome finally destroyed Carthage. Books 1–2 cover the First Punic War (Book 1) and Roman history in summary fashion up to the eve of the war against Hannibal (Book 2). Book 3 follows the Second Punic War down to the climactic battle at Cannae in 216. Books 4–5 treat separately the contemporary history of Greece and Asia Minor down to the end of the Social War in Greece (217). Book 6 interrupts the historical narrative in order to provide an analysis of the Roman *politeia*, largely by way of comparison with other imperial states. In this book Polybius draws a lengthy comparison between the Roman and Carthaginian constitutions (6.51.1–57.15). In Polybius' representation, both Rome and Carthage were admirable states because they employed the “mixed constitution,” with its balanced blending of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. But at the time of the Second Punic War, Polybius maintains, the Roman constitution was at its apogee, while the Carthaginian government was already in a state of decline due to the predominant influence assumed by the popular element (6.51.5–8).

Books 7–11, existing only in a fragmentary condition, cover the decade after Cannae (216/215–207/206), notably including the period of Philip V's involvement in the Second Punic War and his infamous treaty with Hannibal (Pol. 7.9.1–17). Book 12 provides another break from the historical narrative in order to discuss correct historiographical practice. Books 13–33, much of

which survives only in meager fragments, treat in a continuous historical narrative the next 54 years (206/205–153/152). This was the period during which Rome established its hegemony over the Mediterranean world by virtue of its victory in the war against Hannibal. Book 34 again interrupts the historical narrative, this time to discuss the state of geographical knowledge and its place in good historical writing. Books 35–39 provide an account of the “time of troubles,” a chaotic and unfathomable period (152/151–146) in which several states, including Polybius’ Achaean Confederation, challenged Roman supremacy and suffered mightily as a result. Polybius presents the Roman siege and destruction of Carthage as the most tragic of all of these catastrophes, because it was undeserved and unprovoked (see the discussion in Section 4 below of Polybius’ survey of Greek opinions at *Histories* 36.9.5–8, with Walbank 1972, 174–176).

The pace of Polybius’ narration demonstrates the care and emphasis he placed on the history of the Second Punic War. Book 3 is devoted exclusively to the first few years of the war and is the longest of the complete books (containing 149 pages in the Teubner text). Polybius commonly devoted a single book to the coverage of half an Olympiad; that is, two years. This is the arrangement for Books 7–11 (216/215–207/206) and Book 13 (206/205–205/204). However, treating events in the later and climactic stages of the war, Books 14 and 15 narrate the events of a single year (204/203 and 203/202, respectively), as does Book 39, covering the year in which Carthage was destroyed (146/145). With this detailed narrative, we could compare eight books, each containing the events of an entire (and less climactic) Olympiad: Book 19 (Olympiad 146), Book 22 (Olympiad 148), Book 25 (Olympiad 150), Book 26 (Olympiad 151), Books 30–33 (Olympiads 153–156).

The wars between Rome and Carthage can therefore be considered the backbone of the *Histories* in a structural sense — as well as the most important historical events in determining the political realities of Polybius’ world. Reflecting these conditions, Polybius places strong emphasis on the period through the great narrative detail he employs in describing these struggles.

The Punic Wars and Major Themes in the *Histories*

For a long time scholars considered Polybius reliable and factual, but hardly creative; a writer who failed to imbue his history with sustained and consistent narrative themes. This negative assessment has had proponents from antiquity to the modern period. For example, the ancient literary critic and historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*de Compositione Verborum* 4; *FGrH* 76 T10)

stated that because of their monotonous and plodding style, writers like Polybius were insufferable and no one could endure reading their works to the end, while the modern critic Alfred Croiset declared that Polybius possessed none of the qualities of a great writer (“un grand esprit qui n’est pas artiste”; see Champion 2004a, 18–23). Moreover, in recent times many scholars have followed the lead of F.W. Walbank in regarding Polybius as a rather dull, pragmatic, utilitarian historian for whom only power and success in a ruthless world mattered; Polybius’ approach to his world has indeed sometimes been viewed in this sense as “Machiavellian” (see Eckstein 1995, 16–27). Recently, however, scholars have challenged this assessment, emphasizing instead the moral, didactic, and creative components of his thought and writing (Eckstein 1995; Champion 2004a).

This newer approach allows for appreciation of large narrative patterns and themes (which certainly do exist). Polybius states that the major purposes of his history were to explain Rome’s rise to universal dominion (see assembled references at Champion 2004a, 19 n.20), to provide lessons for statesmen for the successful conduct of public affairs, and generally to furnish a broad historical perspective for the general reader in order to help him bear more easily life’s vicissitudes (Pol. 1.1.2–3). However, other themes and patterns emerge through the narration itself, rather than from Polybius’ direct statements to his readership. One such is the idea of Rome’s rise and subsequent moral decline as the history approaches the time of composition (*pace* Walbank 2002, 193–211). Throughout his work, these themes are reflected in Rome’s political and military interactions with Carthage, which occupy the narrative’s center.

For Polybius, the primary determinant of a state’s success or failure is the condition of its constitution. But he believed that the institutional structures of *politeiai* were not in themselves stable; the best organized states were still subject to deterioration as quasi-biological organisms, with life stages of growth, acme, decline, death, and transformation. The “mixed constitution” first devised by Lycurgus and discovered by the Romans through trial and experience (Pol. 6.10.13–14; cf. Champion 2004a, 91 nn.68–69) was no exception; its balance gave it a long lease on life, but could not hold off the inevitable decline (6.57.1–9; cf. Roveri 1964, 181–185, 194–197).

The Roman “mixed constitution” was in Polybius’ eyes the best available political organization, and he believed it to be the most important factor in Roman imperial success. According to him, this success led to a political and moral peak at the time of the Second Punic War (Pol. 6.11.1–2, 51.5–8). Polybius’ account of the First Punic War certainly depicts Rome nearing such heights, maintaining that the war was the “longest, most uninterrupted, and greatest war of which we have knowledge” (Pol. 1.63.4–5). The decision to cross over to Sicily under arms in 264 was viewed by many, both at the time

of its occurrence and of the composition of the *Histories* as a reprehensibly aggressive action. Yet Polybius' representation of senatorial debates leading to the decision shows the senators aware of the moral quandary, agonizing over assisting the Mamertine usurpers at Messana. This account seems to be deliberately vague, shifting the apparent responsibility for attacking Sicily to a meeting in the popular assembly in order to accord with his historiographical predilections (1.10.3–11.4, with Champion, forthcoming).

In keeping with his predetermined goal, Polybius presents Roman (and Carthaginian) fortitude and bravery throughout the narrative of the First Punic War. Military training and discipline are frequently shown to save the Romans in difficult circumstances (e.g., 1.17.11–13; cf. 6.37.10–13). The determination to reconstruct fleets after disasters was, in Polybius' estimation, particularly remarkable (1.38.6). Meanwhile, as the long war of attrition against Carthage wore on, the public treasury was exhausted, but martial spirit alone sustained the Romans (1.59.6–7). In the final stages of this life and death struggle, when the fighting against Hamilcar Barca settled around the area of Mt Eryx in Sicily, Polybius compares the two combatants to game-cocks, physically exhausted but with courage undaunted, striking blow after blow until one of them should die (1.58.7–9). Finally, Gaius Lutatius Catulus, consul in 242, turned his marines into “athletes for war” for the decisive naval battle off the Aegates islands, which brought the seemingly endless war to a conclusion (1.59.12). All in all, therefore, Polybius deliberately describes Roman political and military excellences in order to present Rome in a positive light (1.13.11–13; cf. Pédech 1964, 303–330).

Such virtues are again emphasized in his narration of the inter-war period. In Books 2 and 3, he represents the wars against the Illyrians and Celts as defensive struggles against lawless and aggressive barbarians. Both opponents emerge from the account as treacherous and unpredictable, in sharp contrast with Roman rational behavior and steadfast discipline. For example, Polybius concludes his narrative of the First Illyrian War by stating that Roman envoys visiting the Achaean and Aetolian Confederations, Corinth, and Athens were able to justify Roman military operations across the Adriatic as freeing the Greeks from a terrible menace, “the enemy of all humankind” (2.12.6–8). As for the Celts, the conflict with them at Telamon in 225 is presented as an object lesson in the exercise of level-headed reason against unreasoning impulse and emotion, and Polybius likens the Roman victory to Greek heroics against barbarians in the Persian Wars and resistance to the Celtic attack on Delphi in 279 (Pol. 2.35, with Champion 1996).

As we have already seen, in Polybius' estimation the Roman political and military system reached its highest point at the time of the war against Hannibal, and, as in the first war and the wars with the Illyrians and Celts, Rome again appears in a defensive posture in the representation of the out-

break of the Second Punic War. In Book 3 Polybius lists several causes of the war — first is Hamilcar Barca's undying hatred of Rome. The historian maintains that Hamilcar would have reopened hostilities against the Republic soon after the naval defeat off the Aegates islands had it not been for the rebellion of the Carthaginian mercenaries, which led to the so-called "Truceless War" (Pol. 3.9.6–9). He returns to this theme with his coda to the list, introducing the "wrath of the Barcids," which recalls his first cause, and tells the story of Hannibal's oath of eternal enmity against Rome. The Roman seizure of Sardinia was the "greatest cause" and comes next (3.10.4; cf. 3.28.1–4). But it is important to recognize that its great significance in Polybius' view was its effect upon Hamilcar Barca and the Carthaginian people: an indignant Hamilcar promptly went about creating an empire in Spain with the express purpose of making war on Rome. This expansion into Spain is then the third and final cause of the war (3.10.4–6; cf. Hoyos 2003, 47–97). In the end, despite the admission that the Roman seizure of Sardinia was the war's greatest cause, Polybius' exploration of the war's roots portrays Carthage as the aggressor and initiator of the conflict, allowing Rome to remain committed to justice throughout the first six books.

Though he viewed Carthage as the aggressor, Polybius was full of praise for the superbly trained Carthaginian army under the leadership of its brilliant general. Hannibal displayed the same excellent generalship as his father had done in the final phases of the First Punic War (1.64.6; 2.1.7–9 (Hamilcar); 2.36.3–4; 3.89.5–6 (Hannibal)). In fact, the historian believed the Carthaginian forces under Hannibal were Rome's equals in fighting skill, military equipment, and experience (3.35.8; 8.1.1–8; 15.14.6; 15.15.6–7; 18.28.9–10). Hannibal carefully observed his enemy and calculated his options with shrewdness before taking any action (3.42.5–6, 51.6, 100.1–2, 111.1, with Pédech 1964: 242–3). Indeed, Polybius presents Hannibal as one of history's truly great men (23.13.1–2). Cannae was the fiercest engagement of the war, it revealed the excellent qualities of the combatants, and it also showed the Roman system at its best in its response to devastating military defeat (3.115.2–3, 117.1–2, 118.5–10; 6.51.5–8, 58.1–13, with Champion 2004a, 121–122).

However, this apex could not last: as Polybius states in no uncertain terms in Book 6, all things, including the best-devised political systems, are subject to change and decline. In the case of states, there are two basic causes for decay. The first is external in origin — such as unprovoked attack, prolonged war, devastating plague, etc. — and there is little one can say about it. The second is internal in origin and its development is susceptible of analysis. For Polybius, when a state attains unchallengeable sovereignty and dominion after many struggles (such as the Romans weathered against Carthage), its citizens become accustomed to prosperity and extravagance. The leading citizens'

rivalry for office then knows no bounds. The common people assume a dominant position, charging their leaders with financial improprieties and demanding fawning behavior from office seekers, and they come to control the government, directed by unbridled greed and emotion. The state has at this point devolved into mob-rule (6.57.1–9). Polybius elsewhere describes the masses in any state as full of irrational angers and aggressive impulses (6.56.11). His hatred of populist policies and demagogic political tactics is constantly on display in his work, though it may have been partly manufactured to advertise his political conservatism before his Roman captors (Champion 2004b).

Along these lines, Roman degeneration set in after the victory against Hannibal, according to Polybius. In many passages from Book 7 onwards, and with increasing frequency as the work progresses, Polybius takes care to remark upon signs of Roman deterioration (Champion 2004a, 144–169). For example, in discussing allegations that Titus Quinctius Flaminius received bribes from King Philip V of Macedonia, Polybius says he would confidently discount any such charges if he were dealing with earlier times, before the Romans acquired an overseas empire and still preserved their ancient principles. At the present time, however, only some Romans still adhered to earlier moral prescriptions, he writes, and he could be less certain that such charges were false (18.35.1–2). Similarly, in his eulogistic summary of the career of Scipio Aemilianus, Polybius speaks of the vicious tendencies of Roman youth in his day, who had given themselves over to extravagance, pleasure-seeking, and sloth (31.25.3–7).

The story of the Third Punic War and Carthage's tragic fall punctuates this change from the time of Roman moral excellence, in the First and Second Punic Wars, to degeneracy. It fell to Polybius' patron and friend, Scipio Aemilianus, to be the destroyer of Carthage, as the crowning and unprecedented climax of a glorious career. Polybius himself was present when the city was sacked (cf. Pol. 10.15.4–17.5, with Ziolkowski 1993 for the Roman sacking of cities); indeed Ammianus Marcellinus (24.2.14–17) reports that the historian personally formed part of the *testudo* (a screen formed by advancing troops locking their shields above their heads, resembling a tortoise's shell) that breached Carthage's walls. Yet it is in Polybius' account of the Third Punic War that we perhaps find the most negative portrayal of Roman behavior in the *Histories*. Polybius reports the opinions of Greek statesmen on the Roman action, giving four different viewpoints (36.9.1–10.7). One of his hypothetical Greek critics charges that in this action Rome practiced fraud and deception, a far cry from its earlier behavior in international affairs (36.9.9–11). In contrast to their earlier more honest statecraft, Polybius says that the Romans had for a long time been searching for a suitable pretext for declaring war against Carthage, since they had determined that the city must be destroyed

(36.2.1–4). His description of Carthaginian compliance with the Roman order to send three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum includes the lamentations and tears of friends and relatives left behind at Carthage, a concession to the “tragic” sort of historical writing Polybius usually scorns (36.5.7).

As Carthage burned in its death throes, Scipio grasped Polybius’ hand, weeping openly at the sight of the final destruction of Rome’s great adversary. When Polybius asked him the reason for his tears, Scipio, quoting lines from Homer’s *Iliad*, replied that he feared for the fate of Rome, knowing as he did the way of all human things. Polybius remarks at the marvelous character of the young man, who at the very moment of his greatest triumph reflected upon the nature of the human condition and the mutability of fortune (Pol. 38.21.1–3, 22.1–3). This paragon of Roman virtue was, in Polybius’ estimation, not one of many, but rather a throwback to a bygone day of greater moral rectitude — whose tears, his mentor suggests, would prove to be prophetic.

Conclusion

Polybius of Megalopolis, an astute and experienced Greek statesman, was remarkably well-informed on the wars between Rome and Carthage; his work is generally an excellent guide to their history. The Punic Wars were as central to Polybius’ *Histories* as the Persian Wars were to those of Herodotus and the Peloponnesian War to Thucydides. A man of his intelligence, background, and training could not have failed to appreciate the ways in which the Punic Wars had forever altered the world of the Greek states. Polybius chose to extend the chronological termini of his history in either direction in order to tell the story of Rome and Carthage more fully: his introductory Books 1–2 postponed the beginning of the history proper in order to recount the events of the First Punic War; the extension of the *Histories* ended with the year in which Carthage was finally destroyed. Finally, the Punic Wars were also central to Polybius’ work because they served as the main vehicle for his major narrative themes: the rise of Rome to Mediterranean-wide hegemony and the inexorable decline from the moral and political excellences by means of which the Romans had acquired their empire.

FURTHER READING

Any study of Polybius’ *Histories* must begin with F.W. Walbank’s monumental historical commentaries (1957, 1967, 1979). Moore 1965 is invaluable for the technical details of the manuscript transmission of Polybius’ text. The best general introduction to Polybius’ work is Walbank 1972. Walbank’s specialized studies on Polybius are of

fundamental importance: many of these are collected in Walbank 1985 and Walbank 2002. Pédech 1964 (in French) and Sacks 1981 are important for Polybius' methodology. Marincola 1997 and Marincola 2001 are indispensable for understanding ancient Greco-Roman historiographical conceptions. Gruen 1984 and Ferrary 1988 (in French) provide reliable and comprehensive guides to the political history of the Hellenistic Greek world and its contacts with Rome in the second century BC. Eckstein 1995 and Champion 2004a both emphasize the moral, didactic, and creative components in Polybian historiography. Felix Jacoby's great collection of the extant remains of fragmentary Greek historians, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Leiden: Brill Publishers 1926–1958), is now conveniently available on-line by subscription, with English translations and up-to-date commentaries (*Brill's New Jacoby On-Line*: <http://www.brillonline.nl/>).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars (apart from Polybius)

Bernard Mineo

The Republican Milieu

The first annalists

Q. Fabius Pictor is, with L. Cincius Alimentus, the oldest of the Roman annalists, the nearest also to the events linked to the first two Punic Wars, since he was contemporary with the war against Hannibal (Chassignet 1996). His account is of the first importance, since his membership of the *gens Fabia*, one of those great families that made Roman history, enabled him to have access to all the sources of historical information of the Roman state and notably to the pontifical tables and the *Fasti Triumphales*; a senator at the time of the battle of Cannae (Pol. 3.9.4), a cousin of the famous Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator (Plut. *Fab.* 11), he was at the heart of the Roman government system at the time of the Second Punic War, and for this reason one can consider his account as exceptional. Fabius Pictor seems also to have had important religious responsibilities. In response to the despair that took hold of minds after the defeat of Cannae, it was he, in fact, whom the Roman Senate sent to Delphi in 216 to question the oracle of the Pythia (Livy 22.57.5). He came back with Apollo's reply enjoining the Romans to observe religious rites, inviting them to pay him a tithe on the booty, after victory, and to beware of religious indifference (Livy 23.11). Not long afterwards, Rome added the *ludi Apollinares* to its religious calendar and set the date for them. Fabius' interest in the cult of Apollo is therefore very marked, so much so that people

have made the hypothesis that he belonged to the college of the *decemviri sacris faciundis*, the very one that was consulted several times during the Second Punic War – a likely hypothesis but based on no material proof.

All the biographical data that we have for Fabius Pictor thus easily accounts for the principal ideological characteristics of his *History of the Romans*, written in Greek, which clearly show his patriotism and his love for Rome (Pol. 1.14 and 3.8–9). This patriotism was displayed in various ways. Fabius made sure he emphasized the value and the discipline of Roman armies, minimized their losses, and exaggerated their successes, as shown by several passages where Polybius' narrative relies on the evidence of Fabius (de Sanctis 1915–1923). This is the case with Carthaginian losses in the battle of Cape Hermaeum (Pol. 1.36) or at the Aegates Islands, where Fabius seems not to have stressed the remarkable resistance of the Carthaginians, nor the large number of vessels lost by Rome (Pol. 1.60–61).

In a general way, it seems that Fabius went to great lengths to highlight Roman qualities, like good faith or the discipline of the troops at the time of the taking of Agrigentum in 261. It is probable that he sought also to redeem *virtus Romana* (the failure at Panormus because of the elephants: Pol. 1.41) and to heap praise upon the allies of Rome, like Hiero of Syracuse (Pol. 1.16).

Fabius' point of view was, therefore, very Rome-centered; he was also very conservative, and it is likely that the concern to stress the wisdom of senatorial authority goes back to him. The account of the beginnings of the First Punic War, in Polybius' version based on Fabius, thus shows us a Senate that found it absurd to give assistance to the perfidious Mamertines, whereas the people were in favor of the war because of the possibilities of enrichment offered by the conquest of Sicily (Pol. 1.11). Hannibal, likewise, was pronounced the only person responsible for the launching of the Second Punic War, which he undertook without the backing of the Senate of Carthage (Pol. 3.8.2–6).

Fabius Pictor's account was presented as annals and was chronologically structured year by year, with, each time, the indication of the names of the two eponymous consuls. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*AR* 1.6) in fact explains to us that his work, like that, moreover, of Cincius Alimentus, began with a rapid evocation of the earliest days of Rome, from the era of the legendary Evander, but that events contemporary with the authors were expounded with more precision. Fabius' account was based in part on autopsy, on oral tradition at least for the First Punic War, on state archives, on a poeticized account by Naevius of the War for Sicily, and on the evidence of Greek historians, like Diocles of Peparethus, who had gone into exile in Rome before the invasion of his island by Philip V in 200.

It is advisable to keep in mind what must have been the *raison d'être* of Fabius' account, compiled probably after the battle of Cannae. If such was the case, it must have been a work with a purpose, notably to maintain loyalty

among those Greek cities of Magna Graecia, Sicily, or Greece proper tempted to side with the victor of the moment. In order to win the sympathy of the Greek world, it was necessary first of all to demonstrate Rome's legitimacy in the two conflicts that had opposed the city to Carthage (Pol. 3.8.1–8) and also to make people forget the violence of the Roman armies in the past by making it appear as though, in reality, the Romans had the same values, even the same origins, as the Hellenes. It is understandable, under these conditions, that Fabius chose to write his work in Greek, even if there must have been other explanations: in this Rome where literary works written in Latin prose had hardly begun to exist, Greek must have been the language of culture of the Roman aristocracy, which doubtless had no difficulty in reading it.

It is to this Roman nobility, which might after Cannae have begun to doubt its destiny, that Fabius also wanted to speak to invite it to take fresh heart. The Roman past presented other circumstances where Rome had found itself on the brink of collapse, only to recover in the end. That was what happened notably with the capture of Rome by the Gauls, and it is not implausible to think that Fabius wanted to make the battle of the Allia into a defeat similar to the one the Romans suffered at Cannae, even if no fragment allows us to confirm this hypothesis. It is noticeable, however, that Livy's account of this episode stresses the importance of Camillus' Apollonian piety to account for the miraculous recovery of Rome (Livy 5.21, 23, 25, 28). Now, this narrative motif is very ancient and has every chance of going back to Fabius Pictor. Taking into account the important role played by this historian in developing the cult of Apollo in Rome, it is quite possible that, through his account of the saving of Rome after it had been taken by the Gauls, Fabius Pictor wanted to invite his compatriots to relink themselves to their history by behaving like their ancestors and accepting in their turn the patronage of the god of Delphi. This was a message consistent with the response of the divinity that Fabius had brought back from Delphi, and with the fact that he had placed the history of Rome from its earliest origins under the sign of a destiny embodied by Evander, son of Carmenta, the prophetess who played in Italy the role of the Pythia at Delphi, and who was the holder of the secrets of the *Carmina*, or *Libri Fatales*, which had been consulted several times during the Second Punic War by the college of the *decemviri sacris faciundis* to which Fabius Pictor had perhaps belonged. By highlighting the cult of Apollo (the divinity who protected the Trojans in the *Iliad* of Homer) in his work, Fabius Pictor in reality only deepened the legend of Trojan origins which, since at least the era of Pyrrhus, was beginning to take hold in Rome. It is, therefore, also likely that the account of the First Punic War stressed the role of another divinity who protected the Trojans, Aphrodite of Mt Eryx, who had diverted the attention of Hamilcar from the siege of Drepanum and at Lilybaeum, and thus made possible the victory of the Aegates Islands that put an end to the war.

A contemporary of Fabius Pictor, L. Cincius Alimentus was active at the time of the Second Punic War (Dionysius 1.6.2). He was praetor in 210 and commanded the legions in Sicily (Livy 26.23.1; 27.5.1). His *imperium* was prorogued (27.5.1, 7.12, 7.16). He participated subsequently in the military operations directed against Locri. After the disaster at Venusia in 208, he was sent on a mission to the Senate by Crispinus, the surviving but mortally wounded consul (27.29.1–6). He wrote in Greek an annalistic history of Rome that ran from the taking of Troy to the contemporary period — for which he must have been a precious source for his successors. Besides his political and military responsibilities, which enabled him to present information first-hand, Cincius Alimentus found himself a prisoner of Hannibal and even had the chance to confer with him in Greek about the military situation. It was from the Carthaginian himself that he got information concerning the total number of men who had followed the invader in 218 from the crossing of the Rhône (Livy 21.38).

In the period following, numerous annalists continued to be interested in the Punic Wars, which remained for them a near historical horizon. That is the case with C. Acilius, a Roman senator, who also wrote *Annales* in Greek, from the earliest times of Italy until his own era, doubtless continuing down to 184. His work appeared around 142 (Livy, *Per.* 53). No doubt he gave much space to an account of the Second Punic War in his work, certain passages of which were adapted in Latin by Claudius Quadrigarius. We know of a number of episodes whose translation focused on Acilius' account, notably that of the ten prisoners who supposedly went to Rome to plead for their ransom after promising to return and give themselves up in case of the Senate's refusal. According to the annalist, in reality many of them cheated on their promise and stayed in Rome. Consequently, they were disgraced by the censors (Cic. *Off.* 3.32.113). Acilius seems also to have given particular prominence to the feats of L. Marcius in Spain (Livy 25.39.11). Probably we also owe to him the anecdote relating the encounter between Hannibal and Scipio in 193 at Ephesus (Livy 35.14.1).

The first two Punic Wars had also been treated, in Latin this time, by L. Calpurnius Piso, tribune of the *plebs* in 149 BC, consul in 133 (Forsythe 1994), and C. Sempronius Tuditanus (consul in 129). The latter was the first to make mention of mistreatment inflicted by the Carthaginians on Regulus (Gell. 7.4.1–4). It is possible that the topicality of a project for refounding Carthage then pushed certain historians to report the Carthaginians' supposed cruelty in order to dissuade their compatriots from reviving the old enemy of Rome.

L. Coelius Antipater in his turn wrote a Latin monograph of seven books devoted to the Second Punic War (Chassignet 1996). For this reason, his work could not fail to attract the attention of Livy who often cites him in his third decad. His work was finished in 121 BC. He relies on various sources,

funeral orations (Livy 27.27.13), the account of Silenus of Cale Acte (Cic. *Div.* 1.49), who, like Sosylus, had followed Hannibal to record his expedition. He seems to have had a liking for dramatic motifs, the search for pathos, and to have introduced a supernatural element into his account (Hannibal's dream, Cic. *Div.* 1.49; the embarkation for Africa, Livy 29.25; the tumultuous crossing of Scipio's fleet, Livy 29.27.13).

Coelius seems to have been very interested, too, in religious explanations, which the pontifical tradition may have encouraged: thus he highlights the absence of religious scruples in Flaminius and attributes the defeat that the latter suffered at Trasimene to them (Cic. *Div.* 1.77); in contrast, he emphasizes the prudence of Hannibal who, threatened by Juno who appeared to him in a dream, holds back from stealing the gold column of Juno Lacinia's temple and has a small statuette of a cow made, which he causes to be placed on the top of the column (Cic. *Div.* 1.48).

Coelius seems also to have shown a certain independence of mind in not necessarily taking responsibility for all the romance that other annalists had developed around the exploits of Scipio Africanus. He thus affirms that the rescue of the consul P. Scipio at the Ticinus was not the feat of his young son but of a Ligurian slave (Livy 21.46.10).

Cato

In reality, however, we have to await the arrival on the scene of M. Porcius Cato to see the appearance of the first historical work written in Latin to move away from the annalistic method (Chassignet 1986). We know the life of this individual quite well thanks to the biographies devoted to him by Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch. Born in Tusculum in 234, Cato's first army service was at the age of 17 and he served in 214 under the consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Maximus. He played an important role at the time of the battle of the Metaurus in 207 and was quaestor to Africanus during the African campaign. In addition, he played an abominable trick on the latter, by informing the Senate of his excessive spending in Sicily during preparations for the campaign, and his living in a Greek style. Consul in 195 and censor in 184, Cato died in 149 after contributing to lighting the flames of the Third Punic War. His *Origines* contain an account of the First Punic War in Book IV, and an account of the Second in Book V.

We are left with only a few fragments of the *Origines* relating to the Punic Wars. We know that Cato particularly evoked the heroic action of the military tribune Q. Caedicius, who, in 258 near Camarina in Sicily, saved the consul's army, which was cornered in a gorge, through the sacrifice of his 400 men. Cato compared him to Leonidas at Thermopylae (Gell. 3.7). The other

fragment (Gell. 10.24.7) concerns the aftermath of the battle of Cannae, and the anecdote in which Maharbal asks Hannibal to send him to Rome with the cavalry, and promises to offer him the opportunity to dine on the Capitol.

Cato's point of view was more Rome-centered than ever; he did not fail to underline the moral superiority of Rome in the conflict, in contrast with Carthage, whose *mala fides* had to be condemned. Confronting the multiple defections of the Greeks of Magna Graecia and the hand offered by Philip V to Hannibal after Cannae, Cato reacted against the Hellenomania of the historians who preceded him. The choice of Latin, instead of Greek, is a first indicator of this. The Caedicius episode notably shows that the Roman was not ashamed of his city's history, which easily sustained comparison with the Hellenic world.

It is probable also that what we might call an "old Roman" viewpoint imbued his account of the Punic Wars: this, in conformity with the Catonian value system, will have illustrated the extent to which Rome owed its victory to the endurance and discipline of Romans brought up the hard way, like the peasants they were, and unaware of the luxury and ease of the Greek cities. Opposition to the Hellenizing tastes of the Scipionic circle was no doubt dramatized over the preparation for the African expedition in 204 and surely had a symbolic value. Likewise, the charisma with which Scipio Africanus was invested thanks to his dazzling victory over Hannibal, and his popularity in Rome after the war, must have fueled the suspicions harbored by the *homo novus* about the dreams of immeasurable glory felt by members of the old Roman aristocracy. As a result, Cato preferred to avoid providing the names of the commanders in his accounts of battles and was generally content simply to refer to an individual's function, so as to leave all the credit for the victory to the soldiers.

Poetry

The modern historian will not fail to examine with interest the other precious evidence offered to us by the epic composed by the poet Cn. Naevius, who was a contemporary of the first two Punic Wars (born about 275, died *circa* 201). A native of Capua, he settled in Rome after the First Punic War. Declaring himself profoundly Roman, he spent the dark years of the Second Punic War in Rome, while his native city took the side of Hannibal. While he was ageing, Naevius composed a long epic poem, the *Bellum Punicum*, devoted to the First Punic War, of which there remains only a small number of fragments (Warmington 1979: frgs. 27–65), but Naevius' text, very well known in the Republican era, may certainly have influenced historiographic output.

The poet Q. Ennius, born in 239 at Rudiae between Brundisium and Tarentum, composed a long epic poem in 18 books covering the period from

the legendary origins of the city down to Fulvius Nobilior's expedition to Macedonia in 189. He dedicated only a very few verses to the first conflict with Carthage (Warmington 1979; frgs. 231–238), since Naevius had already treated the subject, but he elaborated at length on the second confrontation. Among the rare surviving fragments relating to the war with Hannibal, one shows that the version of events according to which Aemilius Paullus opposed Terentius Varro's decision to give battle (Warmington 1979: frg. 274) was already in place. Another celebrates Fabius Maximus' delaying policy and his sense of the state's interest (Cic. *Off.* 1.84).

Authors Contemporary with the End of the Republic

The annalists of the end of the Republic (Chassignet 2004)

A contemporary of Sulla, Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, likewise wrote *Annales*, which began with an account of the Gauls' capture of Rome. His Book III dealt with the First Punic War, whereas the Second and the Third were respectively dealt with in books V–VI and VII–VIII. It seems likely that Claudius Quadrigarius used Acilius' Greek *Annales*, which he adapted into Latin (Livy 25.39.11–12). It is also probable that Livy used Quadrigarius abundantly, even if he does not quote him often. His style was characterized by a seeking for dramatic effect and pathos, and to this end he seems to have been tempted to exaggerate facts, notably the death tolls of battles.

Valerius Antias is the last great annalist whose historical output was able to influence accounts of the Punic Wars. A contemporary of Sulla, or of Caesar, his *Annales* went down to 92 BC at least. He is often quoted by Livy, who denounces his tendency to exaggeration or lies, whether with respect to detailed lists of victims, such as, for example, the number of enemies killed by the forces of L. Marcius in Spain (Livy 25.39.11–17), the number of *scorpi-ones* Scipio is said to have seized in Carthage (Livy 26.49.1–5), or the number killed among the Carthaginians during the taking back of Croton by the Romans (Livy 30.19.11–12), or the incident during the first battle where Scipio and Hannibal supposedly confronted each other in 202 (Livy 30.29.7). Like Claudius Quadrigarius, he would have shown a distinct predilection for dramatic effects, favoring direct encounters between the great figures of history — whether between Scipio and Syphax (30.3.6) or again between Scipio and Hannibal just before Zama (30.29.7). Finally, as perhaps a lover of spicy details, he may have relied on the verses of Naevius to claim that the same Scipio, far from returning his beautiful Iberian prisoner to her fiancé, may have kept her to satisfy his amorous passion (Gell. 7.8.3–6).

Diodorus of Sicily

Diodorus of Sicily was the author of a monumental work in Greek (Goukowsky 2006), which went from the mythical era through to 60 BC. Not much is known about him, except that he was born in Agyrium in Sicily, settled in Rome around 56 BC, and finished his *Library* around 30. Only Books I–V and XI–XX have come to us in their entirety; the rest is known to us only through a few fragments. This is exactly what happened with his account of the Punic Wars, notably the first which was contained in Books XXIII–XXVI.

In order to compile his account of the first conflict against Carthage, Diodorus largely used Philinus of Agrigentum, to whom he refers on two occasions in the fragments: at 23.11.1 with respect to the numbers landed by Hanno at Agrigentum; and at 24.11.1 regarding the number of Carthaginians taken prisoner during the battle of the Aegates Islands. He also had recourse to Fabius Pictor and maybe to a Greek source, more favorable to Hiero than to Carthage, namely the *Sicelica* of Silenus of Cale Acte. Diodorus' point of view was doubtless that of a Greek from Sicily, born in the city of Agyrium, aware of the suffering which Carthaginian harassments and the Roman conquest had brought upon the inhabitants. Thus the reader is struck, from the first lines of Book XXIII in which Diodorus begins the treatment of the First Punic War, by the emphasis given to Hiero in denouncing, at the beginning of the war, the hypocrisy of the Romans, who only ever talk about the word *fides* but in reality disregard it entirely (23, frg. 2). Diodorus' account also lays great stress on the arrogance of Regulus, who had responded casually to the proposals for an honorable peace offered by Carthage after the Roman consul's first successes in Africa. The reversal of the situation and Regulus' capture by the Carthaginians was, according to the historian, only a fair punishment for this Roman arrogance (23, frg. 12). A parallel between Regulus and Xanthippus, the Spartan mercenary in the service of Carthage, leaves no doubt of the preferences of Diodorus, who delights in stressing the Greek general's superior intelligence (23, frgs. 15–16).

Regulus is not the only Roman criticized by Diodorus, who likewise did not spare P. Claudius Pulcher, whose strategic stupidity he denounces, as well as the arrogance and the harshness of his dealings with the enemy (24.3). There is nothing, on the other hand, about his impiety or about the episode of the sacred chickens thrown into the sea. The Rome inclined to gentleness and clemency even towards her enemies, the city that Livy likes to depict for us, is scarcely to be recognized in Diodorus' account (Goukowsky 2006). Instead, the impression that emerges is of the harshness of the Roman conquest (at Agrigentum, 23.9; at Thermae Himeraeae, 23.19; at Palermo, 23.18.4–5; cruelty of Regulus' wife, 24.12).

Another characteristic of Diodorus' version is his concern to diminish the brilliance and the scale of Rome's victories and, by contrast, to accentuate her failures. Going by what he says, the Romans lost 20,000 men at Drepanum in 249 (24.1.4) compared with 8,000 according to Orosius, who reflects the Livian tradition (4.10.3). At Phintias (24.1.7), the Carthaginians supposedly sank 50 Roman ships, and made 13 others unusable, whereas Polybius' version does not mention any Roman losses during this confrontation (Pol. 1.53.12–13). Finally, at the Aegates Islands (24.11), the Romans are said to have lost 28 ships (compared with 117 for the Carthaginians). In the Livian tradition (Eutropius and Orosius) Rome is said to have lost only 12 vessels.

Only a few fragments have been preserved of the account that Diodorus gave of the Second Punic War and that corresponded to books XXVI–XXVIII of his work. These passages show once again the author's independence of mind, capable of pointing a finger at the grandeur or the weaknesses shown by the two camps, Carthaginian and Roman. The author does not seek, in fact, to offset the narrative impact of the horrors committed by the Romans: he does not hide, as does Livy, the fact that after the taking of Syracuse, the fate of its inhabitants was at such a catastrophic point that free men chose slavery in order to have a chance of being fed (26.20); he stresses also that the two Roman tribunes who opposed the atrocities committed by Scipio's legate at Locri were moved only by vexation at not having had their share of the booty (27.4), whereas Livy attributes a proper sense of justice to them so as to safeguard some of Rome's tarnished image in this affair (Livy 29.8–9). For all that, Hannibal's acts of cruelty are not hidden either (duels between fathers and sons, 26.14; cutting the throats of Italian allies, 27.9). But the same Hannibal is seen in a favorable light when Diodorus tells of the respect that he showed to the remains of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (26.16). Neither did Diodorus hesitate on occasions to hail the grandeur of the Romans, like that of Fabius Cunctator (26.3). What also seems to have emerged from these few fragments is the particular interest that Diodorus shows for great Greek figures, like that of Archimedes, whose inventions and exploits he presents by going much more into detail than Livy does (26.18) and offering a heroic version of Archimedes' death, where the murderer is condemned to be beheaded.

Few items remain from Diodorus' account of the Third Punic War, whose events were reported in his Book XXXII. But what clearly emerges is that Diodorus, like Sallust in the same era, saw in the destruction of Carthage and of Corinth in 146 a turning point in Roman history. Abandoning the mildness it had shown with regard to the vanquished as long as it sought universal hegemony, Rome from now on used terror to consolidate its empire over the inhabited world (32.4.5). Indeed, the picture he painted of the Romans' activities between 150 and 146 did not fail to reveal the Romans' lack of good faith, notably at the time of the multiple ultimatums addressed to Carthage, which were to conclude

with the order to evacuate the Punic city (32.4.6). Only Scipio Aemilianus saved Rome's honor by remaining a loyal, gallant, and respected man (32.6.7), who shed tears in front of the ruins of the ancient city (32.24).

Cornelius Nepos and Cicero

From Cornelius Nepos (c. 100–24 BC) we have retained two lives likely to interest a historian of the Punic Wars: an extremely brief *Life of Hamilcar*, and a *Life of Hannibal* containing a rapid résumé of the Second Punic War. The author used the works of Atticus and Polybius; he also knew the works of Sostylus and Silenus (*Hannibal* 13), but it is not evident that he actually read or made use of them.

At the end of the Republic, finally, the modern historian will not fail to find in Cicero's works numerous references to characters or events of the Punic Wars, which the orator was able to use as historical examples. Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator and Scipio Aemilianus, in particular, are often mentioned, notably in the *De Republica* and the *De Amicitia*.

The Julio-Claudian Era

Livy

Our knowledge of the events of the Punic Wars, and in particular those of the Second, would assuredly be very different from what it is today without the account of Livy (59 BC–AD 17), which we possess in its entirety for the war against Hannibal (Books XXI–XXX), and from which we can get a slight idea of the two others thanks to the summaries (*Periochae*) of Books XVI–XIX (First Punic War), and XLIX–LI (Third Punic War), and above all thanks to the account of them that Florus has left us. The work (*Ad Urbe Condita Libri*), probably begun around the year 27 BC, which saw the establishment of the Principate, bears the profound trace of hope born of the peace regained after Actium as well as the *princeps*' claim to re-establish the state based on law (*res publica restituta*) and to allow a return to the *mores* that, in the past, had allowed Rome to become an empire (Mineo 2006).

For the First Punic War, we must therefore essentially rely on the passage Florus devotes to it (1.18) about which the only thing one can say is that he can not have composed his work before the era of Antoninus Pius. His work certainly cannot be considered exactly as a simple précis of Livy's work, but the latter nevertheless constitutes its basic foundation. So, in reading Florus' account it is clear that Livy would have been keen to underline, indeed to exaggerate, the brilliance and scale of the Roman victories, as is the case for

the successes of Hiero (1.18.5) or at the Aegates Islands (1.18.6–14). The pro-Roman stance taken by the Paduan is found also in the exploitation of the theme of the *mala fides Punica*, cited to account for the treachery that allowed the consul Cornelius Asina to be captured. The valor of the Roman soldiers, their patriotism, and their leaders' sense of sacrifice seem to have been illustrated by numerous episodes, like that which celebrates the bravery of the military tribune Calpurnius Flamma, Cato's Caedicius (1.18.13–14).

Livy, if one can rely on Florus' text, may also have extolled the bravery of Regulus, the success of his arms in Africa, his patriotism, and his good faith in the famous episode where the Roman consul returns to imprisonment at Carthage, in accordance with his given word, after urging in Rome the continuation of the war against the Punic city.

It is easier to describe the originality of the Livian narrative of the Second Punic War, which has been preserved for us in its entirety (Books XXI–XXX). Reading it makes clear in particular that the author's aim in this part of his work was to illustrate the virtues that enabled Rome to emerge victorious from this conflict occurring at the time when the city of Rome was at the apogee of its moral development, despite the initial, very grave defeats that marked the years 218–216. His intention was to promote the values that encouraged civic concord, the source of the empire's grandeur, and to denounce the failings that led to discord.

This Livian demonstration, however, had an element of a gamble in it, to the extent that the first years of the conflict had been marked precisely by a succession of defeats which accorded ill with the idea that the city had reached its political and moral apogee just as the war was beginning. In order to free himself of this contradiction, Livy made his account of the Roman defeats between 218 and 216 into a sort of tragic parenthesis, whose causes went back to a revival of civic discord. The parenthesis, opened by Livy with the defeat of the Ticinus, closed in his narrative only after the battle of Cannae, with the edifying picture of a city, all classes united, welcoming Varro, the man defeated by Hannibal (22.61), an image that ends Book XXII and erases the other picture in which the author had depicted the disunity of the city at the moment of the departure of Varro and Aemilius Paullus, the one followed by the *plebs* alone, the other only by the supporters of the Senate (22.40.4).

For the period which opened after Cannae, the direction that Livy intended to give to his account was quite different. The text is in fact crisscrossed by his constant concern to illuminate the different factors of the dynamism that inexorably henceforth led Rome to final victory. Borne along by the values that in normal times are the basis of its identity, Rome then attains, in the Livian account, its moral and political apogee. The historian intended to show how the city of Rome then knew how to appeal to the great virtues that established its identity in order to face the Punic threat: with concord prevailing in

spite of difficulties and crises systematically overcome, the Romans appear inspired by a constant patriotism. Good faith prevails, as well as a sense of moderation, justice, decency, mildness, discipline, and above all piety (Mineo 2006, 270–288). The Livian account of the Second Punic War thus became a sort of mirror of the virtues of the programme of moral restoration sought by Augustus at the beginning of the Principate: it aimed at presenting to contemporary readers the guidelines that had enabled the Romans of yesteryear to emerge victorious from the ordeals of the past, guidelines that, in reality, referred to the ideological choices of the present. Between the narrated facts and the moment of writing, therefore, there intervened the ideology of the author and the preoccupations of his era, which added to the task of interpreting the annalists who had preceded him.

That is not the only impact of the author's ideology on the account of the Second Punic War. Taking inspiration from a long philosophical and historiographical tradition, Livy in fact integrated Rome's destiny within a concept of time made up of a succession of 360-year cycles, which linked the founding of the City, to its refounding by Camillus and finally by Augustus in 27 BC (Mineo 2006). Each of its cycles comprised, moreover, two trends of equal duration, one ascending, the other descending, following a principle of progressiveness that the historian had himself presented in his preface (*praef.* 9). In the Livian account each of these trends reveals the progress or decline of concord within the city. Now the reversal of the historical tendency of the second historical cycle of Rome intervened precisely during the Second Punic War, in 207 BC, the year of the battle of the Metaurus, which did away with the *metus hostilis*. The concept had been particularly important to Rome since Cato the Elder. Nearer to Livy, Sallust had just illustrated how the disappearance of fear of the foreign enemy in 146 BC, following the destruction of Carthage, had encouraged a tendency to decline: through lack of the solidarity based upon the need to defend the city against a foreign enemy, the Romans, more and more greedy and arrogant, had given themselves over to internal rivalries, which had progressively led to the civil wars. The Livian analysis was of the same nature, but the beginning of this trend went backwards in time so as to intervene equidistantly between the refounding of Rome by Camillus (in 387 according to the chronology of Fabius Pictor/Polybius adopted by Livy) and that of Augustus in 27. In this way, the restoration of the republic desired by the *princeps* could in fact appear as the point of departure for a new cycle and a new ascending trend.

The application of this dialectic of history thus made the year 207 the pivot of the historical cycle inaugurated by Camillus after the Gallic catastrophe. *Metus hostilis* having disappeared, a trend towards decline could start. It was impelled by the passage of the Roman armies to Africa, an event that was the point of departure for a new Mediterranean expansion by Rome, which, through making contact with the lifestyles of a Hellenistic East softened by

the taste for luxury, would contaminate Rome and make it lose its soul. It is in this particular context that one must interpret the long debate, set in the Senate, that pits old Fabius Cunctator against Scipio Africanus (28.40–44): the refusal of the Cunctator to let Rome embark on the venture into which his young opponent is leading her enables a line of demarcation to be drawn between Rome's Italian past and her Mediterranean adventure that is just taking shape, between the world of ancient virtues and that of new *mores*.

Even if the new descending trend inaugurated in 207 asserts itself only very gradually and remains for the time being almost invisible (Rome is still at its moral apogee), the Livian account soon multiplies the worrying signs that mark episodes where national concord and the cardinal Roman virtues appear threatened: revival of personal rivalries; weakening of Roman *fides* by unheard-of acts of cruelty; some first signs of impiety; weakening of *disciplina militaris* (Mineo 2006, 293–335).

The account that Livy gave of the Third Punic War has not been preserved. This episode was treated in books XLIX–LI, from which we have retained the *Periochae*, which do not allow us to determine the essential characteristics of the Livian version of this event. However, *Periocha* XLIX leads one to believe that Livy had endeavored to highlight the bravery and strategic intelligence of Scipio Aemilianus during this conflict. Likewise it is probable, in the light of the Paduan's historical philosophy, that the destruction of the city that had for a long time fed the *metus hostilis* was perceived, as it had been by Sallust, as a source of Rome's weakening: the importance accorded to this theme is confirmed by *Periocha* XLIX which emphasizes the debate that set Cato against Scipio Nasica on the subject. The brief report of the Third Punic War that is found in Florus (1.31) seems moreover to confirm this other aspect of the Livian account.

Pompeius Trogus

The *Philippic Histories* of Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary of Augustus, have come to us through a late summary edited by Justin. Book XXIX brings up the alliance of Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon, and on this score interests the historian of the Punic Wars.

Valerius Maximus

The *Memorable Deeds and Sayings* by Valerius Maximus, a contemporary of Tiberius, also contain interesting information regarding individuals contemporary with the Punic Wars whom he happens to mention. His evidence is interesting because of the variety of sources he uses, mainly Livy but also annalists and Greek authors.

From the Flavian Era to the Fifth Century AD

Plutarch

Plutarch (AD 50–120) taught philosophy and exercised priestly functions at Delphi, whose renaissance he favored, under the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. His *Parallel Lives* belong to the biographical genre. Therefore, he takes less care to recount battles than to report what best reveals the qualities and defects of men. For the Second Punic War, readers will turn especially to the *Lives of Fabius Maximus* and *Marcellus*, which are essentially set during this period; similarly one finds interesting information in the *Life of Cato the Elder*, touching on Cato's participation on the staff of Fabius Maximus during the taking of Tarentum in 209 (*Cato the Elder* 2.3), as well as his quaestorship alongside Scipio before the departure of the Roman expedition to Africa (*Cato the Elder*, 3.5–7) and his survey at Carthage.

The problem of Plutarch's sources is a complex one, in the sense that he only quotes them quite rarely. Livy seems at all events to have been one of his favorite authors for this period, but he sometimes refers to Polybius, to the philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea, to Cornelius Nepos, King Juba, Valerius Maximus, and even Augustus, whose funeral eulogy he read honoring the descendant of the great Marcellus of the Second Punic War. In fact, the biographer from Chaeronea, as R. Flacelière noted, had recourse to several documents at the same time when treating a given period (Flacelière 1964). Certain errors made by Plutarch lead one, however, to think that he sometimes worked quickly or quoted from memory. Thus, on Hannibal's treatment of the bones of Marcellus, neither Livy nor Valerius Maximus made the exact statements that Plutarch attributes to them (*Marcellus* 30).

Problems, however, arise not only from Plutarch's sources, but also from his literary design. Thus he does not hesitate to report a joke of Hannibal's just before the battle of Cannae, which managed to raise a laugh from all his army who were frightened by the Roman numbers (*Fabius* 15.4). This anecdote, which highlights Hannibal's extraordinary sang-froid, can be found nowhere else, and especially not in Livy who perhaps did not hold with recognizing this human trait in the most fearsome of Rome's adversaries.

Plutarch's convictions in moral and religious philosophy may also account for the originality of some of the information that he gives or for its particular perspective: this is the case with Fabius' piety (*Fabius* 4.4), while the author's interest in the mystique of numbers is shown in the amount paid for the celebration of the *Ludi Romani* (4.7). Elsewhere, the account bears the mark of the humane values that Plutarch wanted to place at the heart of human relations, notably justice and clemency (*Fabius* 20.3–6; *Marcellus* 20). Neither does Plutarch have the same concern to safeguard the *gravitas Romana* of

individuals as Livy does, who dismissed the version drawn on by the Greek biographer, where the young woman who prompts the Bruttian soldier of the Tarentum garrison into treason is herself a Bruttian, Fabius' concubine (*Fabius* 21.5) and not a Tarentine, as the Latin historian claims (Livy 27.15.9–11).

Plutarch's political choices are also sometimes very sensitive. Thus he criticizes Fabius, who showed poor taste in the pillage of Tarentum's works of art, whilst he welcomes the positive role of Marcellus, who by transferring to Rome numerous works of art from Syracuse contributed to the city's Hellenism (*Fabius* 22.6). The *Life of Marcellus* also presents a more detailed account of the siege of Syracuse (*Marcellus* 14–20) than that given by Livy. Plutarch gives particular prominence to the war machines constructed by Archimedes and to the figure of Archimedes himself. It is clear that the philosopher was happy to be able to celebrate here the power of the intelligence of a Greek who was the worthy child of Greek Sicily.

Plutarch also likes using literary themes to establish parallels between several historical figures: thus his Marcellus sheds tears over the fate of Syracuse, like Scipio Aemilianus later before Carthage (*Marc.* 19.2). The parallel is pursued when Marcellus refuses to follow the advice of those who wish to burn and destroy the city, a proposal that evokes the situation of Carthage in 146 and which, in narrative, allows a rapprochement to be established between the two men. Livy had silently left out this detail – though Plutarch may have invented it. Let us cite, to conclude, the *Life of Cato the Elder* which contains the account of the famous censor's embassy to Carthage, a mission which was the cause of the conflict (*Cato the Elder* 26–27).

Poetry

The first century AD has in turn left us a long epic poem dedicated entirely to the Second Punic War: this is the *Punica* of Silius Italicus (AD 26–102) whose principal historical source seems to have been Livy (Duff 1934).

Appian

Appian was a Greek from Alexandria (born at the end of the first century AD, died in the 160s). Having become a Roman citizen, he settled in Rome where he exercised the role of procurator during the reign of Antoninus Pius. He wrote a Roman history from the royal period to the reign of Trajan in Greek, dividing the subject of most of his books region by region. Thus the account of the Punic Wars is quite dispersed. Book V (lost) reported the operations led by Rome in Sicily against the successors of Hiero II, and notably the capture of Syracuse. The *Iberica* (VI) contains references to Hannibal's youth and the

prelude to the Second Punic War (with the taking of Saguntum). The *Hannibalica* (VII) treats the military operations against Hannibal in Italy. It is an account in which chronology is sometimes confused, including strange gaps (nothing on the defections of Capua, Locri, Herdonia, or Consentia). On the other hand, Appian sometimes elaborates at length on details, like that of the resistance of Petelia. Doubtless because he is addressing an eastern public that is Hellenic in culture, he commits himself instead to mentioning the old Greek cities of southern Italy, Tarentum in particular. As for the *Libyca* (VIII), it mentions the course of the three Punic Wars in Africa. The first is presented only briefly (3.11–4.17). The account of the next conflict is more sizeable (7.26–67.301). The causes of the Third Punic War, its course, as well as the destruction of Carthage are mentioned in the final section (74.338–136.648). Be it noted that this is the only complete and continuous account of this war. Finally, Book IX (also lost) devoted to Macedon mentioned the conclusion of a treaty between Hannibal and King Philip V.

Appian's clearly pro-Roman point of view does not, however, permit us to separate it from the Latin-language historiographic output. His account is besides very much marked by tragic aesthetics and by rhetoric (Goukowsky 2001). As for the problem with Appian's sources, it appears to be so complex that it is impossible to reach any certainty at all. For the first two wars, at any rate, it does seem that he used Coelius Antipater prolifically. We cannot exclude, either, recourse to Fabius Pictor. Things are no clearer for the final conflict, in which Appian once more doubtless drew on several sources, among them Polybius. The only points well established are that his account formed part of a tradition favorable to Scipio Aemilianus and stressed the role of discord in Carthage's final defeat.

Cassius Dio

Another sizeable ancient account relating to the Punic wars brings us to Cassius Dio (AD 164–?), who was consul in 229 with Severus Alexander (Reinhold 1988). He is the author of an 80-book history of Rome written in Greek, in which accounts of the Punic Wars occupied an important place (Books XI–XII, First Punic War; XIII–XVII, Second Punic War; XXI, Third Punic War). This part of the work, however, has not been entirely preserved, but is known to us only through the intermediary of a Byzantine compiler of the twelfth century, Zonaras, who quotes large extracts of it that reveal an account in which the Livian tradition was important without at the same time being exclusive. The question of sources is here all the more difficult to resolve in that Cassius Dio does not seem to have hesitated to embellish his account considerably, and thus sometimes to distort the facts somewhat in order to satisfy a very pronounced taste for rhetoric.

Eutropius and Orosius

For the later period, two rapid accounts, both inspired by Livy, shed some light on the history of the Punic Wars: namely Eutropius (second half of the fourth century) and his *Summary of Roman History*, and Orosius who wrote a *History against the Pagans* around the year AD 415.

PART II

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
AND AFTERMATH

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Outbreak of War

Dexter Hoyos

In mid 264 BC Rome and Carthage went to war after centuries of trade and treaty links. Their sudden antagonism occurred when they were both on the same mission: to help the Sicilian city-state of Messina, beleaguered by its more powerful neighbor Syracuse. Even so, after one clash further hostilities did not begin until 12 or more months later, one of many paradoxical features of the outbreak. The First Punic War began in a tangle of contradictions.

Roman-Punic Relations before 264: the Treaties

Carthage, as we have seen (Chapters 3, 4), exercised an old and widely-spread hegemony over her Libyan hinterland and parts of Sicily and Sardinia, as well as the African coastlands to her west. She had close ties with Phoenician-founded towns on Spain's south coast like Gades and Malaca. A long series of wars against the chief Greek city-states of Sicily, especially Syracuse and Acragas, had never led to any lasting expansion of her dominance beyond the Phoenician and native Sicilian cities of the island's west. In effect, Carthage's "empire" had been a stable entity in the central and western Mediterranean for nearly three centuries. This was not true of Rome. The Romans began in the early fourth century to impose their power beyond their own neighborhood, Latium, in a lengthy series of wars and alliances, and in some places by annexing areas into the Roman state itself. The war against Pyrrhus — actually against the Greek city of Tarentum whose ally he was — ended in 272 with all southern Italy's Greek states under Roman domination.

Rome, by far the largest and most populous city in Latium and one of the largest in Italy, early on developed active trade links around and beyond the peninsula, including with Carthage. Pottery jars (*amphorae*) in which

exports were shipped from Rome have left fragments at sites around the western Mediterranean from Spain's east coast to Carthage and other North African centers. Conversely, at Rome there was a street or quarter named the *vicus Africus*, apparently where North African merchants resided, while the votive goldleaf tablets in Etruscan and Punic found at Pyrgi, an Etruscan port not far north of Rome, show Carthaginians doing business there around 500 BC, the likely though still controversial date for their first treaty with Rome.

We have the Greek text of this and other agreements between the two republics, quoted by the Greek historian Polybius (3.22–24; see Chapter 2 for an extensive analysis with some differing conclusions). The first he dates to 509 BC while the second seems to date to 348, the year given by Livy for a Roman–Punic treaty. They both regulated how Roman and Carthaginian merchants should do business in one another's territories: basically, under official supervision and with some bans, imposed particularly on the Romans. These restrictions plainly aimed at preventing close Roman contacts or trading settlements in regions which the Carthaginians saw as their bailiwick, notably Libya, western Sicily and Sardinia. Bans on Carthage dealt only with possible military interventions in Latium: in the later treaty, for instance, “if the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to Rome, they shall keep the valuables and the men, but give up the city” (Pol. 3.24.5). The general atmosphere in both agreements is regulatory, cautious, and even suspicious, matching a remark of Aristotle's in the late fourth century about the Carthaginians making agreements with Etruscans and others about doing trade with, and “doing no wrong” to, one another (*Politics* 3.1280a).

A treaty that Livy mentions being “renewed” in 306 (9.43.26) is often judged to be actually a new agreement reported by the earlier historian Philinus (below). Then in 279 the two republics made their agreement about possible cooperation against Pyrrhus. Again quoted in Greek by Polybius, it was another cautious compact in which each promised not to make a separate peace with the king; if need arose, each would help the other against his attack. In fact, neither Rome nor Carthage did make peace with him, and their only military cooperation was a small raid from Sicily across the straits of Messina against some allies of his. Indeed, various provisos in the previous treaties had never been applied either — notably the ones evincing the greatest suspicion: we hear of no Carthaginian raids or captures in Latium or anywhere in Italy, though a marauding Greek armada which raided Latium in 349 is recorded (Livy 7.25.4, 25.12, 26.13–15). Nor is anything heard of Roman efforts to set up colonies in North Africa, and Diodorus' unique report of a small Roman colonizing venture to “Sardonia” (15.27.4) more likely means the colony set up in 385 at Satricum in Latium.¹

The “Philinus” Treaty

Philinus of Acragas, the pro-Carthaginian historian of the First Punic War, reported none of these treaties but did claim that an agreement existed under which “the Romans must keep away from all of Sicily and the Carthaginians from all of Italy” (Pol. 3.26.1–5). Polybius rejects the claim, even though his rejection is in turn disbelieved by many (see Chapter 2); in the present author’s view he is right to reject it. Philinus sought to put the Romans in the wrong over their aid to Messina in 264 but, even if he knew details of the quoted treaties, none of them would do the job. On the other hand, some of the bans in them might be flexibly “interpreted” for the purpose, including the Pyrrhus pact’s implication that one state should aid the other only if called on. The length to which partisan misreporting could go is well illustrated by Livy’s version of the famous treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon after Cannae — a distorted pro-Roman farrago that Livy preferred over the actual text quoted in his other chief source, Polybius (Livy 23.33.9–12; Pol. 7.9.1–17).

But, as an original authority on the First Punic War, Philinus’ claim impressed other less critical ancient writers, Livy among them: he and others looked for ways to show that the Carthaginians had broken the “Philinus” treaty before 264. They settled on the alleged (and perhaps true) appearance of a Punic fleet outside Tarentum just before that city surrendered to its Roman besiegers in 272. This rather desperate expedient shows, of course, only that these authors believed Philinus’ claim, not that they had independent evidence for it. Nor did Philinus’ alleged terms make much sense in the context of 306 or any other arguable date, for Carthage never controlled all of Sicily (in 306 most of the island was ruled by the powerful king of Syracuse) and Rome had no authority over southern Italy until 272. The clause in the treaty of 348 about possible Carthaginian attacks on “any city in Latium not subject to the Romans” of course was out of date on its renewal in 306, but the term “Latium,” if not changed to “Italy” or simply dropped, could have just been ignored. In turn, with Philinus’ alleged treaty unlikely to have existed, the question of who was to blame or was at fault in 264 will need to be approached in other ways.²

The absence of war plans

When Pyrrhus was sailing from Sicily to return to another futile round of war with Rome, he supposedly said “What a wrestling ground we are leaving to the Carthaginians and the Romans” (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 23.6). This might be unusual prescience or — more likely — was a later *ben trovato*. In reality it is hard

to find evidence of either state intending to fight each other. Around the time of the pact against Pyrrhus, a Punic admiral named Mago arrived at Ostia with a strong fleet to offer help to the hard-pressed Romans (Justin 18.2.1–5): indeed the pact may well have been one result. Mago then “with his Punic nature” (*Punico ingenio*) left, presumably for Tarentum, to confer with Pyrrhus — on the pretence, according to Justin, of being a peacemaker but really meaning to keep king and Romans embroiled. This act of supposed ill-faith was in fact reasonable from both Carthage’s and Rome’s viewpoints. As Justin notes, peace talks between Pyrrhus and the Romans did ensue (though they failed). Neither Mago’s *démarche*, therefore, nor a Punic fleet sailing up to observe the Roman siege of Tarentum in 272 can be treated as evidence for anti-Roman designs, even if Roman historiography tried to exploit the Tarentum incident to claim this.

That both states were intending war is asserted by the later historian Cassius Dio. For him, and one or two others more briefly, Messina was a pretext: actually each power coveted the territories and wealth of the other (frg. 43.1–4 = Zon. 8.8.2; cf. Florus 1.18.2–4). This realistic-sounding verdict merits attention as a historiographical phenomenon — revealing a thread of skeptical comment on power relationships that developed in later ancient history-writing — but there is nothing to support it. The colonies of Latin status that Rome founded on or near the coasts — Cosa in Etruria and Paestum south of Naples in 273, Ariminum in 268 and Firmum to its south four years later — are not easy to see as clues to a planned Punic war (for one thing, Ariminum and Firmum are on the Adriatic) but rather as watching over the coastal communications of a now fully Roman-dominated Italy, as Beneventum in central Italy, established in 268, did for interior communications across mountainous Samnium. Again, even if a pair of new junior magistracies called *quaestores classici* dates to the same period and the term means “fleet quaestors” — this is very debatable — it would be hard to see them as another war hint, for no first-class Roman navy existed.³

Other pieces of circumstantial evidence offer no clues either. One prominent plebeian family, the Atilii, one of whom was a consul in 267 with others to come in 258 and 257, is supposed to have had strong ties of kinship and commerce to southern Italy and so to have favored a war against Carthage for the profit of Roman and Campanian trade interests. These ties are speculative, inferred from the *cognomina* Caiatinus (of the consul of 258) and Calenus (of 335) as references to Caiatia and Cales in wealthy Campania, and in any case scarcely reveal political schemes.

The only ancient suggestion that any Atilius was prowar is an uncheckable claim by Silius Italicus, the epic poet of Hannibal’s war (circa AD 90), that M. Atilius Regulus, the consul of 267 and consul-to-be in 256, urged war in 264 (*Punica* 6.658–9). Since Silius’ context is a portrait gallery of the war’s

Roman notables, his depiction of Regulus as warmonger is to say the least doubtful. In the same scene he bestows on Ap. Claudius Caudex a triumph for victory over the Carthaginians (6.660–2), an award which is merely an invention. Certainly it was beyond even his inventiveness to present Regulus or any of his kinsmen playing an active role in 264. It could, of course, be argued that many members of Rome's political elite — family groups like the Atilii, Corneli, and Valerii, who would be prominent in the war, and also influential individuals like Ap. Claudius and C. Duillius (who as consul in 260 would be the first to defeat the Carthaginians at sea) — were as ready to fight a war southwards as in any other direction. Whether they were bent on a southward war, and one moreover against Carthage, is a different issue.

There is still less evidence that Carthage had a war with Rome in her sights. If she had, the Romans' war with Tarentum and Pyrrhus would have given her a matchless opportunity by allying militarily with these for a triple profit — to quash the supposedly incipient Roman menace, deflect the king permanently from Sicily, and make herself hegemon over the entire island for the first time in her history. But not even Justin's bias imagines that Mago the admiral had such a *renversement des alliances* in mind. Instead, Carthage allied with Rome against Pyrrhus, an alliance with little impact on events. When he left Sicily, its old status quo soon returned: Carthage ruling the western quarter, the variegated native Sicilian and Greek city-states comprising the rest.⁴

Ancient rivalries and mistrust persisted too, with the Carthaginians, and some Greek states like Acragas and Messana, anxious about a regrowth in Syracusan power. Carthage's greatest enemy down to 264 had always been Syracuse. Although at some periods, including recently under Agathocles, that city had held sway over some parts of southernmost Italy too — and, a century earlier under Dionysius I, had even intervened in the lower Adriatic — its basis of wealth and population was essentially Sicilian. It was natural for the general or generals in Punic Sicily to keep an eye on developments beyond their province and, if need arose, to intervene. There had always been Carthaginian forces both naval and military there, for security and protection of allied and subject communities. When Agathocles of Syracuse had sought to capture Messana in 315, he was foiled by just such a Punic *démarche*. The crisis of 264 began with another very similar act by another Punic commander, who again had Syracuse in his sights, not Rome.

Carthage, in fact, had never had the seriously bad luck of confronting a massive territorial power, for instance Macedon (though Alexander the Great had once threatened them with his attentions) or the Seleucid empire, or even Egypt with which she shared a common border near Cyrene. By 264 it was plain that Rome was such a power. The Carthaginians had watched the all but inexorable development of her dominance over Italy in the last three generations. In 264 Rome's adult male citizens numbered nearly three hundred

thousand, her nexus of Italian allies perhaps twice as many — resources that probably not even Greek Sicily, united, could match. If Carthage had plans before 264 to make war on Rome, we would expect careful and extensive military and naval preparations, just as for her Sicilian expedition of 480 and those against Syracuse in 409 and later. No such armaments are found until well after 264.

Syracuse and Messana

Syracuse was practically as old as Carthage or Rome, and had been the greatest Greek city-state in the western Mediterranean since the 480s. It had waged strenuous wars with Carthage for dominance over other Sicilian states, had inflicted some severe defeats on her, and under Agathocles had even invaded Libya and occupied much of Carthage's hinterland for three years (cf. Chapter 3). Despite the failure of this expedition, Agathocles had ruled most of Sicily until his death in 289, as well as extending Syracusan power as far east as Corcyra: only for it all to be lost once he was gone, as Greek Sicily descended anew into squabbles and wars, followed in 280 by a new war of Syracuse against the Carthaginians. It was the Sicilian Greeks' appeal for help from Pyrrhus, then in Italy, which led to the Roman-Punic pact of 279. His initially victorious warfare in Punic Sicily (278–276) was nullified by quarrels with his Sicilian allies, and after his departure hostilities ended with the usual *status quo* reaffirmed. Syracuse acquired a new military ruler, Hiero, who turned his energies toward consolidating his position at home and making war on the outlaw state of Messana.

Messana had been unceremoniously seized around 288 by Agathocles' dismissed mercenaries, Italians from Campania who ejected the adult citizens and appropriated their families. Campanian professional soldiery had long served both Carthaginian and Greek employers in the island, nor was the coup at Messana the first such: in 404 the same fate had befallen Entella in western Sicily (the descendants of those opportunists were still there in 264). Calling themselves Mamertines after Campania's war god Mamers — in Latin, Mars — the coup-makers spent the next 20 years fighting, looting, and in places conquering other Sicilian communities, on occasion even as far west as Carthaginian territory (even though they had supported Carthage against Pyrrhus). Their brazen success enticed a Roman-Campanian force in Rome's ally Rhegium, across the straits from Messana, to imitate them in 280 at the Rhegine citizens' expense. Embarrassing as this was for Rome, it was only in 270 that she forced the mutineers to capitulate and restored Rhegium to its exiles.

Hiero set out to destroy the Mamertines. Unsuccessful at first in a battle by the Cyamosorus River, perhaps in 269 although Polybius' very summary

account leaves the chronology vague (below), he renewed the effort most likely in 264, soundly crushed them at the Longanus River west of Messana, and formed a siege of the city. Diodorus records (22.13.6–8) how a Carthaginian naval commander, Hannibal, saved the Mamertine remnants: evidently keeping watch on events, he came over from the island of Lipara with his fleet to congratulate the victorious Syracusan, but he also installed a small protection force at Messana. Hiero can hardly have been unaware that Carthage was watching, for he was openly aiming to revive Syracuse's strength. He called off the siege and returned home to be acclaimed, like Agathocles in 306, with the title of king (Pol. 1.9.8).⁵

Difficulties with Chronology

Although the Mamertine crisis is here put in 264, there is actually much disagreement about dates, for no surviving ancient account offers clear guidance. The only connected narrative, Polybius', is brief and uses relative terms like "very soon" (*παρὰ πόδας*, 1.7.5, 1.8.2), "not long before" (*χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον*, 1.8.3) and "for a long time" (*πολὺν μὲν χρόνον*, 1.10.3, 10.9). The only clear indicators are Hiero's initial entry to power at Syracuse after Pyrrhus' departure in 276, and the consul Appius Claudius' crossing to Sicily in the 129th Olympiad (summer 264–summer 260 BC: Pol. 1.5.1), which works out as during the later half of 264 since Appius' consular year began with May 264.

Polybius' later obituary of Hiero, who died in mid 215, credits him with keeping Syracuse at peace, and his reign free from plots, for "54 years" (7.8.4). Since Hiero took his royal title after the Longanus if not before (perhaps informally: note Diod. 22.13.3, 6–7), simple arithmetic might suggest that the battle and Messana's rescue happened in 269 — indeed Polybius also has the Mamertines' discomfiture come *παρὰ πόδας* after the Romans retook Rhegium in 270 (1.8.2). This would have profound implications. In separating Hannibal's rescue and the Mamertines' appeal to Rome by half a decade, it not only would throw suspicion over Polybius' much tighter sequence — the Longanus and the appeal soon followed by Rome's intervention and the outbreak of war — but also could suggest that Messana's appeal in 264 was actually for help against its Carthaginian garrison. And if so, did Rome agree so as to provoke war with Carthage? Since Polybius' account has the Romans discussing the appeal in terms of war with Carthage, this reconstruction has had wide support.

Nevertheless, it incurs many objections. Polybius clearly knew that something important happened with Hiero's position in 269, but his wording is less than precise as Hiero's alleged "54 years" of peaceful, plot-free reign shows.

For in 264–263 Hiero was at war again, this time with Rome, and faced domestic anger over it: so Diodorus’ fragmentary but more detailed narrative reports (23.4.1). For precision then Polybius should have written “forty-eight,” but plainly his meaning is broader: the obituary sums up Hiero’s total length of rule and its most enduring traits. Initially the young Syracusan leader had had to cope with political risks to his position (Pol. 1.9.1–3), but he consolidated it after the Cyamosorus battle, where in a technical defeat his untrustworthy mercenaries were slaughtered by the Mamertines: he retreated home with his citizen troops “and thenceforward carried on his rule safely” (1.9.3–5). It is plausible that he then acquired the position of “general with supreme powers,” στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, typical for a ruler who avoided the title of king — like his predecessors Dionysius and (initially) Agathocles, and the date would be 269. Hiero then took some time to reorganize and improve Syracuse’s military strength (1.9.6–7), which allows the Longanus campaign and its aftermath to date to 264, as both Polybius and Dio’s epitomator Zonaras (8.8.4) imply.

Polybius’ other remark, about the Mamertines’ downfall coming *παρὰ πόδας* after the Romans retook Rhegium in 270 (1.8.2), cannot be literally pressed either. He uses the phrase to introduce this dramatic episode of defeat and appeals that led to international war; for similar dramatic impact he has described the Campanian seizure of Rhegium in 280 as occurring *παρὰ πόδας* after the Mamertines’ coup at Messana around 288 (1.7.5).

The major problem with his account is compression to the edge of obscurity. Diodorus, not Polybius, narrates details of the Longanus campaign and how Hannibal intervened to save the shattered Mamertines (22.13.1–8). Polybius merely reports Hiero’s victory and return to Syracuse, says nothing of Hannibal, but does state that the Mamertines put their citadel and themselves into Carthaginian hands (1.10.1). Diodorus does not mention the Mamertines actually appealing to either Carthage or Rome — Hannibal simply arrives from Lipara — but of his originally quite detailed account all we have are rather wilful Byzantine excerpts that often end abruptly, like this one. Given these considerations, the Longanus campaign in the small northeastern corner of Sicily, and its busy aftermath, can be reasonably placed in the first months of 264.

The Mamertines’ Appeals

The Mamertines themselves perhaps brought Hannibal in, for Polybius writes that “some had recourse (*κατέφευγον*) to the Carthaginians, others sent envoys (*ἐπρέσβευον*) to the Romans” (1.10.1–2). It makes less sense to see this as two opposed Mamertine factions, for both the handover of the citadel to Hannibal’s men and their later expulsion must have been done with general assent from the surviving Mamertines; the some-and-others phrasing looks like a stylistic

cliché (οἱ μὲν ... οἱ δέ) used for two different actions. Of course, it may be that some Mamertines preferred Carthaginian protection to Roman, and others the reverse, but there is no trace of a rift in the community. Zonaras' Dio-epitome has them appeal first — successfully — to Rome but then depicts them calling in Carthaginian help because urgent action was needed (Zon. 8.8.4–6). This is too much like a pro-Roman tidying up of details (giving Rome precedence in responding while accounting for Hannibal's swift rescue), but at least it recognizes the geographical pressures and timing realities that faced the besieged Longanus survivors.

They acted with self-interested logic. Their defeat put them into imminent peril of destruction and only Punic help was immediately available, but the Mamertines did not need unusual cunning to realize that lasting Punic dominance would severely compromise their independence (and freedom to maraud). Roman power now lay only a few miles across the straits, and it was plainly of no moment to the Mamertines that their own compatriots and copiers there had been punished. As Campanians they too had a claim to ties with Rome, and her protection (they surely reckoned) would be as effective against Syracuse as Carthage's — or better, for it would probably be less tight. Since any Roman aid would take time to come, it can be inferred that they accepted Carthaginian rescue for the short term while envisaging Rome's protection for the long. Naturally then, Hiero's return home did not lead them to cancel their appeal.

On the other hand, the Carthaginians were as resolved to keep their grip on Messana: Hannibal's garrison did not follow Hiero's example. It is scarcely a surprise then that, once the Mamertines learned of the success of their appeal, they ejected the Punic garrison. Whether or not they were encouraged to this by any message from Rome, the move was virtually inevitable. It is important to note, however, that the ejection was not an act of war.

Their appeal to Rome was, without doubt, for help against Syracuse. There is nothing to identify it as aimed against Carthage except Polybius' account of the ensuing Roman debate, which, according to him, assumed that it meant a Punic war (below). But although Hiero was no longer in the field, left to himself he might well renew the offensive as soon as he saw a chance. Worse still from the Mamertines' standpoint, he and Carthage might come to an understanding (as they did later) that would leave Messana helpless against renewed Syracuse attack, unless it had other protection. That was something only Rome could give.

Polybius and the Debate at Rome

When the appeal reached Rome, probably within a week of a ship leaving Messana, "the Romans" according to Polybius "were for a long time at a loss (πολὸν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρησαν)" how to react (1.10.3). Helping a band as

unsavory as the Mamertines would be an embarrassment, for Rome had good relations with the Greek world and prided herself on the virtue of good faith (*fides*): a message emphasized in 270 with the punishment of Rhegium's Campanian occupiers. Yet the Romans, Polybius continues — he soon shows that he really means the Roman Senate — saw that the constantly expanding Punic empire, if it added Sicily to its mastery of the other islands and its possessions in Spain, would become an encircling threat, indeed could use Messina as a bridge to Italy (1.10.3–9). So they judged it necessary not to leave Messina in the lurch — yet after long debate “in the end the Senate did not approve the proposal” (οὐδ' εἰς τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν γνώμην, 1.11.1) and it was left to “the masses”, literally “the many” (οἱ δὲ πολλοί, 1.11.2), who did.

The varied difficulties in this narrative, the only one that survives in any detail, have often been commented on — some more than others. A view that still has occasional support is that the Senate did ratify aid to the Mamertines: that Polybius reports only a temporary non-approval followed by a majority (οἱ δὲ πολλοί) of senators voting the other way. It is quite implausible all the same. The seeming separation (1.11.2–3) between οἱ δὲ πολλοί deciding for aid and next the δόγμα (decree) being enacted by the Roman people (ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου) is due to Polybius' arrangement of his narrative: first he explains the reasons why οἱ δὲ πολλοί so decided, next what the consul Appius did once the decree was enacted. Although δόγμα often means a Senate decree (Polybius usually makes this clear by adding “of the Senate”), he can also apply it to a vote by the Roman people in assembly if he thinks the context is clear (thus 3.27.7, 6.12.4; cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1.676–677).

Still less widely accepted is the argument that Polybius is wrong to depict the Romans as being worried at the growth of Carthage's empire and that in reality they saw the Mamertine appeal in a quite different light. The accepted view remains that they were indeed worried and wanted Messina as a position from which they could check Carthage's plans. Earlier modern historiography generally saw Rome's aid to the Mamertines as justified; as the step that in effect began her march to empire, it was judged an act of “defensive imperialism.” One of the chief difficulties with this opinion is that, as noted earlier, Carthage's territorial possessions in 264 were much as they always had been. Polybius' claim that they ruled “many parts of Spain” (1.10.8) has no evidence to back it up and he grossly exaggerates in calling them masters of virtually all Sicily save Syracuse (10.9). Besides this, a garrison in Messina probably under a thousand strong could hardly be viewed as evidence of an imperialist design on Italy.

So another modern interpretation discounts alleged Roman worry and defensive imperialism to follow Dio's analysis of equal greed on both sides and equally predatory intent — with the emphasis largely on Roman greed and predatory intent. This view holds that, since Romans had long been acquisitive

of both booty and territorial power, and now ruled all Italy, Sicily and Carthage's dominions beyond Sicily were their obvious next choices.

It is striking and paradoxical all the same that an appeal from Messana for help against Hiero should, as Polybius tells it, instantly cause the Romans to see a threat from — and a need for war with — Carthage. He does not explain this transfer of attention but simply takes it for granted. Yet it is nearly as surprising as if the American colonies' appeal to France in 1777 had led Louis XVI to envisage (and launch) war not with England, but with Holland. Even if the Romans did assume that aiding Messana implied fighting Carthage, the total absence of Syracuse from their debates in Polybius is still remarkable, for the only state of war existing in mid 264 was between it and Messana. In reality such a debate would have had to reckon with both Carthage and Syracuse being likely antagonists.

This in turn makes the consul Ap. Claudius' actions, some weeks later at the straits, a surprise. Finding both Punic and Syracusan forces besieging Rome's new ally, he offered to negotiate a settlement. Rebuffed by both, he succeeded in taking his army across the straits and then — perhaps after a second rebuffed offer of talks — trained his attention first of all on Hiero's army, which, after a hard battle, he forced to retreat before then doing the same to the Carthaginians. This hostile Roman interest in Syracuse persisted. Appius marched south against the city, sacking and plundering as he went; and although he failed to take it, both of the consuls of 263 renewed the effort with double his forces, compelling the harried Hiero to seek terms lest his discontented subjects rebel. He had received no help from Carthage; when a Punic squadron did sail up, it was after he had made peace and it promptly departed. At this point Otacilius, one of the consuls, took his two legions home (Pol. 1.17.1–2). In other words, the Roman army in Sicily in summer 263 was cut from around 40,000 horse and foot to half that.

The Case for Rome versus Syracuse

The record of events, as distinct from assertions by sources all of whom knew that the First Punic War had begun, suggests that what the Senate debated in mid 264 was whether to intervene against Syracuse — that is, to accept the Mamertines as allies and make war on their enemies. Indirectly this inference is supported by Polybius' narrative of what happened when “the Senate did not approve the proposal.” “The masses, worn down by the preceding wars and needing recovery of every kind, when the consuls pointed out, along with the already-mentioned matters of public policy [i.e., the threat to Italy], that the war brought to everyone individually great and evident benefits, decided to send aid” (1.11.2; Polybius' Greek is not particularly elegant either).

“Great and evident benefits” to individuals plainly meant plunder, a feature of victorious warfare which, as is often stressed, played as valued a role in Roman society as elsewhere. On Polybius’ showing, the consuls — Appius’ colleague Fulvius may have returned to Rome from besieging Volsinii in southern Etruria for the purpose — were urging the people to make war on the Mediterranean’s pre-eminent maritime power, whose heartland lay across hundreds of miles of sometimes treacherous seas with a 200-strong navy, while the Romans so far had two or three dozen warships (and no program to build more). This would be a costly, risk-laden, and open-ended venture, as likely to wear down οἱ πολλοί as the previous wars had, with no predictable terminus short of totally defeating (or being totally defeated by) Carthage.

By contrast, if Appius and Fulvius were urging war against Syracuse their arguments were more rational: it was an island power with rich but compact territory, and in 264 able to deploy only limited military forces. Hiero’s new model army at the Longanus had totalled 11,500, about two-thirds the size of one consular army (Diod. 22.13.2). At the same time older Romans could remember the empire of Agathocles, who, as mentioned above, had held sway over most of Sicily and parts of southern Italy down to his death in 289. He had rebuilt Syracusan power, after a lengthy period of decline in the later fourth century, to the level that Dionysius had attained. The theme of Italy under threat suits this awareness. Agathocles’ intervention in southern Italy and even the southern Adriatic had been of little consequence at Rome, but by 264 the prospect — even if still only potential — of Syracusan revival was hardly pleasing. It could disturb her recently imposed hegemony over Magna Graecia, for Italian Greeks might well prefer an old Greek hegemon to a new barbarian one.

Hiero may have supported the Roman crackdown on the Campanians at Rhegium — Dio even claims there was a treaty between Syracuse and Rome (frg. 43.1) — but that need count for little in 264: a Roman treaty with Tarentum had not prevented war in 282. Prompt action arguably would quash the potential Syracusan threat and also, very agreeably, would garner sizeable booty in a war fought in a limited theater and without need of a large war fleet (Agathocles’ navy had disappeared).⁶

Historiographical Displacement

The obvious objection is that this leaves unexplained how, from Polybius on, ancient historiography could transfer Rome’s alleged worry from Syracuse to Carthage. Yet, almost as surprising is how the ancient accounts nevertheless are clear that for the first two years the Romans concentrated their efforts against Syracuse (despite Appius’ clash outside Messina with its Carthaginian

besiegers), then halved their forces, and paid attention to Carthaginian Sicily only after that — and not with a major offensive but with a raid. Nor did they organize a fleet to match Carthage's for two more years. Neither Polybius nor any other source offers, or even notices a need, to explain any of this.

Once Hiero was out of the war after 263 he became, remained till his death, and was forever after lauded as, Rome's proverbially most loyal friend and ally. Carthage by contrast took another 22 years to defeat, then fought a second and even more harrowing war with Rome that established her perpetual image as Rome's fated and fanatical foe. On Carthage's behalf meanwhile, Philinus depicted Rome's aid to Messana as violating a sworn treaty with Carthage: not only did this justify, for him, Carthage's immediate alliance with Hiero against Messana, but he surely treated the Roman decision to help the Mamertines as aimed against her. As mentioned above, his history was known to Roman writers who certainly believed him about the treaty. It is likely enough, too, that the first Roman historian, Philinus's approximate contemporary Fabius Pictor, was just as concerned from an opposite standpoint to stress the theme of enduring enmity (he was no more aware than Philinus of the old treaties). Certainly, by the time he wrote, most Romans did believe that the debates in 264 were over fighting Carthage: for Polybius, who used both Fabius and Philinus as sources, takes it for granted.

That aid to the Mamertines originally envisaged war with Syracuse was not completely forgotten. Silius Italicus makes envoys from besieged Saguntum in 219 remind the Romans of their past help to besieged Messana:

vos etiam Zanclem Siculi contra arma tyranni / iuvisse egregium ... / ...
duxistis

— “you also judged it noble to aid Zancle [Messana's original name] against the arms of the Sicilian tyrant” (*Pun.* 1.662–3, 665). His phrasing is the more noteworthy because Saguntum was under Carthaginian siege: Silius could have made the argument stronger by claiming that Messana too had been attacked by Carthage, yet he does not. Where he found the item cannot be known, but his verses attest that some thread of a contrary tradition survived.

The Counteroffensive against Messana

Apparently, as soon as the decision by the People was known at Messana, the Mamertines removed their Punic protectors with their commandant Hanno. Polybius succinctly writes merely that they did so with a blend of threats and guile (1.11.4). Dio offers a detailed story of a military tribune named

C. Claudius being sent to Messana by Ap. Claudius and, despite a naval skirmish in which he lost some ships, succeeding in forcing Hanno out (Dio frg. 43.5–10; Zon. 8.8.7–9.5). We lack Diodorus' version but we do have an excerpt about Appius' own dealings afterwards, from Rhegium, with the Carthaginians and Syracusans besieging the city (Diod. 23.1.2–2.1). Not only did these dealings follow a defeated attempt to cross the straits but envoys from the Punic general, a second Hanno, are reported making the same arrogant comments to Appius which Dio says were made earlier to C. Claudius by the commandant Hanno: notably that the Carthaginians with their navy could prevent the Romans even from washing their hands in the sea.

The second Hanno, who had a fleet as well as an army, is therefore much likelier to have made these comments than the first, who had only his small force in Messana. Diodorus looks more trustworthy than Dio's eulogistic tale of C. Claudius, which seems inflated from, at most, a mission by an officer sent ahead by Appius to announce to the Mamertines (and Hanno the commandant) that Messana was now a Roman ally, and that Appius was on his way with an army and transport ships. Whether he seconded the Mamertines' moves to expel the garrison cannot be decided, but he will certainly not have stood in their way. The Mamertines as a sovereign people had the right to ask their erstwhile rescuers to go, and the garrison was not harassed as it left — a missed opportunity, one might think, if the Romans were eager to provoke war, for, as noted earlier, the expulsion itself was not an act of war.

At Carthage, nevertheless, it caused a furious reaction. The luckless commandant was executed, and Hanno the general was sent to Sicily to organize military and naval forces for a new attack on Carthage's ex-protégé (Pol. 1.11.5–6). He had time to make an alliance with Syracuse's ancient rival Acragas and, more important, another with Carthage's own ancient enemy: for Hiero was as perturbed as the Carthaginians at the news of the Roman intervention. This was a real *renversement des alliances*, and it took the Romans very probably by surprise.

When Appius and his legions and transports reached Rhegium, they found Messana cut off and Punic warships patrolling the straits. Despite the vigorous rhetoric at Rome about threats to Italy and easy booty, he offered to negotiate (so Diodorus reports), but was rebuffed and read a stern lecture by Hiero about Rome's choice of allies. An attempt to sail across the straits was forced back by the Carthaginian fleet, at which point Hanno the general sent envoys to restore ships and crews he had captured and to urge Appius against war, adding the hand-washing comment just mentioned (Diod. 23.1.4–2.1). None of this is in Polybius' compressed narrative but (some tedious Diodorean rhetoric apart) it can be believed. Appius tried another crossing and this time succeeded — whereupon, in Polybius' account, he tried to negotiate a settlement (1.11.10–12).⁷

If both Diodorus and Polybius are accurate, Appius thus made two efforts at negotiating a peaceful settlement and this seems possible enough, for Diodorus' excerpts do not cover every event. It is also possible, though, that in his drive for concision Polybius displaces Appius' overtures, which in Diodorus are detailed and objectively told, from Rhegium to Messana. That Appius did make overtures is the remarkable feature. Even if he was expecting to fight Carthage, the addition of Syracuse to the enemies list should scarcely have been surprising — still less so discouraging as to prompt him to consider giving up his enterprise. If, on the other hand, the Romans had planned a Syracusan war and expected Carthage to stay out of it, Appius' reaction to the situation he found on reaching Rhegium is far more explicable.

Carthaginian Calculations and the Escalation of the War

Dio is the only ancient author who suggests that the expansion of Roman power across the entire Italian peninsula may have been viewed with concern at Carthage, though he depicts her attitude as simply mirroring Rome's — each fearing the other's expansionism (frg. 43.1–3 = Zon. 8.8.2). In reality, whereas Rome had witnessed no Punic expansion in generations, Carthage had observed the opposite with Rome. Nor would she have missed a salient feature of it. Rome would receive an appeal from an allegedly threatened community for help against a third party, would provide it, and as a result would extend her hegemony to new territory. The Campanians had called her in against their Samnite neighbours in 343, so again the Lucanians in 298; and then Thurii's appeal in 285 against the Lucanians had led ultimately to the Tarentine war and her subjugation of all southern Italy. Carthage's own dealings with other states could, of course, show similar methods, especially her support for native or Greek Sicilian cities to initiate wars against Syracuse or Acragas. Carthaginians could therefore recognize *Realpolitik* where they saw it, or thought they saw it.⁸

Although we have no report of opinions or debates at Carthage, her recorded actions are instructive. They were not wholly consistent. She made no attempt to press the Mamertines to cancel their appeal, or send her own envoys to dissuade Rome from accepting it, or even reinforce the garrison at Messana — any or all of which were feasible in the time available. Yet when the garrison was browbeaten into leaving, its commandant was crucified for "cowardice and lack of judgment" (Pol. 1.11.5) and a siege launched against her recent protégés. Hanno the general did not, however, want to fight Rome's relieving army: he blocked Appius' first effort at crossing, but handed back the ships and crews he had captured. While urging the consul not to take

matters further, he was adamant that Appius would not be allowed to cross to Sicily and that Carthage would not negotiate an end to the war (Diod. 23.2.1). Hiero was equally emphatic, and Appius' second attempted crossing met Punic opposition again, though he eluded it. Yet when the consul fought the Syracusans encamped to the south of Messana, Hanno did not move from his position on the northern side. It is understandable that another Diodorean excerpt reports that Hiero believed his new ally had treacherously allowed the Romans across (23.3).

Nor did the Carthaginians send the king help until too late — as he was making peace with Rome (Diod. 23.4.1). They were, it seems, willing to let him fight on his own, until it became plain that this war would not drag on like so many of their own Syracusan wars. Even after Hiero made peace they were slow to act further. It was the raid into western Sicily by the consul M'. Valerius later in 263, and the defection from Carthage by the native Sicilian city Segesta, that finally prodded them into sending over powerful forces. Whether these were meant to try to overthrow the new order in eastern Sicily — Messana confirmed as Rome's ally, Syracuse close to becoming a Roman client state — or simply to hold the Punic west against any fresh incursion, the Romans reacted in their turn, sending both consuls of 262 with armies into the west. With their siege and capture of Acragas (262–261) the Punic War began in earnest. Now the Romans decided to build a navy.⁹

The Carthaginians were therefore clear on two successive matters of policy in 264–263: to check further Syracusan expansion, and prevent Rome from acquiring a foothold in Sicily. But their counsels seem to have fluctuated over how to implement these aims; and the home authorities seem to have left much to the initiative of the commanders on the spot. That Carthage was prepared to ally with Syracuse in the end, when the prospect of Roman intervention became real, indicates her geopolitical priorities: better the rival whose qualities had been known for two and a half centuries than a new one whose potential was effectively unlimited.

Roman intentions in 264 were therefore very likely limited to Messana and Syracuse. That the Mamertines bloodlessly expelled the Punic garrison would accord with this: had war been aimed against Carthage, or even against Carthage together with Syracuse, it would have been more expedient to massacre the garrison as provocation (a pretext would have been easy). Appius had to drive off the ensuing Punic besiegers as well as Hiero, and it will have been in this context that according to a poet some decades later — maybe Ennius — he “declared war” on the Carthaginians (“Appius indixit Karthaginiensibus bellum”: Cicero, *de Inventione* 1.27; cf. Silius, *Pun.* 6.660–1), informally at any rate.¹⁰ But for the rest of the Syracusan war Rome and Carthage kept aloof from each other. Just possibly this might have led to a settlement like those in earlier times between Carthage and Syracuse, when a dividing line like the

Halycus River had demarcated areas of influence. Instead, the last-minute Punic decision to send some help to Hiero, and then M'. Valerius' raid into the Carthaginian west, prompted active hostilities to resume and intensify.

It can be doubted, in any case, whether such a settlement would have lasted. Segesta showed that Punic control in western Sicily was vulnerable, and Syracuse — which strove after 263 to maintain a precarious independence — might have proved a flashpoint, inadvertent or not, for a new Roman-Punic confrontation. The constant force of Roman, and also perhaps Carthaginian, self-interest, suspicion, and acquisitiveness would hardly have petered out indefinitely along the Halycus or some other line. Once Rome's forces entered Sicily, a virtually irrevocable die was cast. She may have planned only a short, limited, and profitable war in the island's east, but Carthage's reading of the long-term implications of the aid to Messana was sound. That the First Punic War was ultimately inevitable therefore seems correct but, paradoxically, neither side in 264 planned or wanted it.

NOTES

1. On Rome's peacetime contacts with Carthage see Palmer (1997); the *vicus Africus*, Palmer 1997, 73–8, 105. On the treaties: Scardigli 1991, with bibliography; Scullard 1989b, 517–537; Cornell 1995, 210–214, 325–326; Bringmann 2001b; Serrati 2006. 'Sardonia' (Σαρδονία) = Satricum: Huss 1985, 137 n.12; Diodorus' regular word for Sardinia is Σαρδῶ or Σαρδοῦς, Theophrastus' allusion to a colonization attempt in Corsica (*Historia Plantarum* 5.8.2) cannot be dated or assessed.
2. On Philinus' treaty: works cited in n. 1; also Scardigli 1991, chapter 3; Hoyos 1998, 9–11, with bibliography there at n. 10; Steinby 2007, 78–84; A.M. Eckstein, *CQ* 2010 (forthcoming). Those accepting its genuineness rather outnumber the sceptics.
3. Dio's possible source for his analysis: Hoyos 1989 suggests L. Arruntius, an Augustan-age historian of the war and reportedly a slavish follower of Sallust's style and, arguably, his moralistic attitudes. *Quaestores classici*: E.S. Staveley, in *CAH²* 7.2.422–5 (finance); Loreto 1993 (one quaestor only from 267, for administrative tasks); Steinby 2007, 71–2 (fleet responsibilities).
4. On causes of the war: e.g. Heuss 1970 [1949]; Molthagen 1975 and 1979; Harris 1979, 111–14, 167, 172, 182–90; Huss 1985, 216–222; Lazenby 1996a, 31–42; Hoyos 1998, 17–66; Bleckmann 2002, 57–112; Zimmermann 2005, 18–25; Loreto 2007, 9–43.
5. On Hiero see Berve 1959; de Sensi Sestito 1977; Hoyos 1985c.
6. Molthagen 1975 argues very similarly, but (1979) revises the rescue of Messana to 269 and the outbreak of war to a war-declaration by Carthage at the end of 263.
7. Frontinus, *Strat.* 1.4.11 tells how Appius' fleet eluded the Carthaginians; disbelieved by Loreto 2007, 268–9.

8. Earlier appeals to Rome for help: Salmon 1965, 195–200 (Campanians), 257–8 (Lucanians); T.J. Cornell in *CAH* 7.2, 359–62 (Campanians), 377 (Lucanians), 450, 456 (Thurii).
9. Valerius' raid: Diod. 23.4.2–5.1; Zon. 8.9.12; cf. Naevius, frg. 29–30 Warmington 1936, *ROL* 29–30 = frg. 35 Baehrens, "Manius Valerius consul partem exerciti / in expeditionem ducit"; Hoyos 1998, 108–111. That both consuls carried out the western campaign (Zon.) contradicts Polybius' statement about Otacilius departing with his legions. Some scholars date it to 262 under the next consuls: e.g. Molthagen 1975, 118; Scullard 1989b, 546–547.
10. So too Loreto 2007, 41 n. 101.

CHAPTER NINE

A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264–241 BC

Boris Rankov

The First Punic War transformed Rome's relationship not just with Carthage but with the whole of the Mediterranean world. All the protagonists at the outbreak of the war would have been astonished at how different the stakes and objectives were at its conclusion. This shift was in part a reflection of the sheer length of the war, but it also derived from the major changes that the war itself brought about in the combatants' military structures and strategic postures. These changes in turn arose because the principal theatres of war, Sicily and, to a lesser extent, Sardinia and Corsica, were islands, which the hostilities turned into potential and actual stepping stones between Africa and Italy, and vice versa.

The Origins of the First Punic War

None of this would have been easily predictable in 264 BC when the war began. At that time, Rome was still recovering from a major war against Pyrrhus, ruler of the Hellenized kingdom of Epirus (modern Albania), who had been called into southern Italy to assist the people of Tarentum against Roman expansionism. In the course of this conflict, the Carthaginian admiral Mago had appeared off Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber in 279 offering to make a treaty of mutual aid, including Carthaginian naval support, against Pyrrhus, to which the Romans — after some hesitation — had agreed (Val. Max. 3.7.10; Just. 18.2; cf. Pol. 3.25.1–5; Livy, *Per.*13).

After the final withdrawal of Pyrrhus in 275, Rome sought to regain control of Tarentum, but a first hint of future hostility between Rome and Carthage arose when a Carthaginian fleet appeared offshore of the Roman siegeworks in 272, this time as a demonstration of support for the city. According to Livy (*Per.* 14; cf. 21.10.8), this breached an existing treaty between the two powers, normally taken to be that recorded by the pro-Carthaginian historian Philinus of Agragas, which is ascribed to 306 (cf. Livy 9.43.26). This treaty supposedly excluded Rome from interference in Sicily, and Carthage from interference in Italy; but Polybius, who is our only direct source, rejects its historicity (3.26.3–5; see Hoyos 1985). Meanwhile, some Campanian troops who had been installed by Rome in the city of Rhegium at the toe of Italy had seized control of the city for themselves and had then captured Croton as well, so that in 270 a Roman consular army had to be sent to suppress them (*Pol.* 1.7.8–13; *Dion. Hal.* 20.16; Livy, *Per.* 15).

Ironically, the immediate cause of the First Punic War was an appeal to the Romans by a similar garrison of Campanian mercenaries known as Mamertini (“the people of Mars/Mamers”) who had previously seized control of the city of Messina in Sicily, just across the straits from Rhegium. These men had served not Rome but Agathocles of Syracuse in his attempts to carve out an empire in Sicily and southern Italy. When he died in 289, they had captured Messina and turned to raiding and plundering their neighbours, and the Campanians in Rhegium had become their allies when they too rebelled. After the recapture of Rhegium, the Mamertines had come under pressure from the new ruler of Syracuse, Hiero II, and it was a defeat at his hands in 265 which led some of them to appeal to Carthage and others to appeal to Rome (*Pol.* 1.9.3–10.2; *Diod.* 22.13).

Up to this point, the Romans had shown little or no interest in Sicily. Moreover, they had only recently punished their own Campanian mercenaries at Rhegium and the Carthaginian general Hannibal had already sent troops to occupy Messina (*Pol.* 1.10.1, 11.4; *Diod.* 22.13.7). It is unsurprising, therefore, that, according to Polybius (1.10.3), the Senate voted to reject the appeal. However, when the issue was put to the Roman people by the consuls of 264, the assembly — which under Rome’s political system consisted of the very men from whom any army would be drawn — was swayed by promises of booty and voted to assist the Mamertines. One of the consuls, Ap. Claudius Caudex, was put in command of the expedition and immediately sent to Messina (*Pol.* 1.10.3–11.3), where the Mamertines managed to persuade the Carthaginians to withdraw before letting in the Romans. The Carthaginians began to blockade the city by sea and besiege it by land, whereupon Hiero II decided to join with them against the Mamertines and the Romans. The First Punic War had begun.

Phase 1: The War in Northeastern Sicily and the Siege of Acragas (264–262 BC)

Despite Polybius' assertion (1.10.5–9) that when they entered upon the war the Romans already saw Carthaginian expansion in Sicily as a potential threat to themselves, there is no real evidence to substantiate this. The initial stages of the war rather suggest that their aims were limited to the traditional desire for glory and booty, and differed little from the motives they had displayed during their own expansion into southern Italy. Carthaginian and Syracusan aims were perhaps more strategic, in that both of them were genuinely concerned about the presence of the Mamertines and the Romans in the north-east of what they regarded as their island.

Messana was now hemmed in by a Carthaginian fleet at Cape Pelorias at the northern entrance to the Straits of Messina and by separate Carthaginian and Syracusan armies on land. Nevertheless, the consul Ap. Claudius managed to bring his army over by night from Rhegium — a distance of seven miles, perhaps only one to two hours' rowing time with the prevailing current — on a rapidly assembled fleet of pentekontors and triremes borrowed from Tarentum, Lokroi, Elea, and Naples. Claudius then fought a land battle against each of his opponents, with the result that Hiero withdrew to Syracuse, where he was besieged by Claudius, and the Carthaginians were bottled up in their own camp (Pol 1.11.1–12.4; 15.1–13; Livy, *Per.* 16; Diod. 23.1–3; Dio 11, fr. 43; Zon. 8.8–9). In the following year, 263, the Romans sent both consuls with armies to take over from Claudius, and after this had persuaded most of the cities of the area to support Rome, the consul M'. Valerius marched on Syracuse. Hiero decided to come to terms and made peace, handing over prisoners and agreeing to pay an indemnity. Moreover, he became an unfailing source of support and supplies for the Romans throughout the war, and played a significant part in helping them to win it. Valerius returned home to celebrate a triumph over the Carthaginians and Hiero. He commemorated his relief of Messana by taking the honorific name "Messala," which was subsequently passed down to his descendants (Pol. 1.16–17; *Acta Tr.*; Zon. 8.9).

Despite this success, in 262 the Romans once again sent both the consuls to Sicily, and the Carthaginians were forced to bring in reinforcements to the island from Liguria, Cisalpine Gaul, and Spain through the harbour of the allied city of Acragas (Agrigentum) on the southwestern coast. Realizing the latter's strategic importance, the new consuls, L. Postumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus, marched across the island and laid siege to the city. Carthage sent over further reinforcements, probably through their base at Lilybaeum (Marsala) at the western end of the island, and this army now advanced down the south coast towards Acragas via Heraclea Minoa. A battle was fought outside Acragas,

in which the Romans were eventually victorious and the Carthaginian army was forced to retreat to Heraclea. When the Carthaginian forces still besieged in Acragas broke out and fled, the city was captured by the Romans and the inhabitants enslaved (Pol. 1.17.6–19.15; Diod. 23.7–9; Zon. 8.10).

The fall of Acragas completely changed the strategic situation. Not only had Rome moved the theater of war well beyond her initial objective and gained a foothold at the opposite end of the island, but she had realized that if she was to protect Messana and her new ally Syracuse, she would have to counter the Carthaginians' control of the sea and the coastline. Conversely, if the Romans were to continue to bring their own troops into the island through Messana and Syracuse, they would have to ensure that they had ships which could both carry them and defend themselves from attack, and it was now that the decision was taken by the Senate that Rome should build a fleet of her own.

Phase 2: Rome Becomes a Naval Power (262–257)

Polybius (1.20.1–2) was in no doubt that the capture of Acragas caused the Senate to change its strategic objective to that of forcing the Carthaginians out of Sicily, but once again he was looking at the situation with hindsight. It is certainly clear that the Romans now began to have a much clearer appreciation of the importance of sea power. This was probably prompted by Ap. Claudius' risky and improvised crossing of the Straits of Messina in 264, and by Carthage's ability to bring reinforcements into Sicily almost at will in 262. There will have been many senators, moreover, who could recall the alarming arrival of Carthaginian fleets off Ostia in 279 and off Tarentum in 272. It does not follow, however, that this realization about sea power had yet led them to consider Carthage's presence in Sicily as a direct threat.

One reason for supposing this is that Polybius (1.20.7) does not indicate any immediate move by Rome to build a fleet, and in fact refers to months of enemy raiding of the Italian coastline during 261 as the trigger for her ship-building program. The latter only began in earnest under the consuls of 260, Cn. Cornelius Scipio and C. Duilius, with the construction in only 60 days of 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes (Pol. 1.20.9; cf. Pliny, *HN* 16.192). It has recently been argued that Polybius exaggerates Rome's previous lack of naval capacity and that Rome had indeed possessed a navy of her own before this time (Steinby 2007), but the evidence for the latter is limited and our sources are unequivocal in recording Rome's reliance on her "naval allies" (*socii navales*). Moreover, Polybius (1.20.14) is quite explicit about the origins of the ships which carried the legions across to Messana in 264, and that these included no quadriremes or quinqueremes such as those possessed by the

Carthaginians. It is true that the story that Roman shipbuilders had to use a Carthaginian quinquereme that had run aground and been captured in the operations of 264 as a model for their own vessels suits Polybius' purpose in emphasizing Roman inexperience. Moreover, Rome's new ally Syracuse had been the birthplace of the *penteres* (quinquereme) and was still a significant naval power, so the interest in the Carthaginian vessel may indicate no more than a desire to match features of its design (Pol. 1.20.15–16). Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that the Romans had previously possessed any such ships of their own, and the accompanying story about the mass training of crews on benches ashore is plausible enough (Pol. 1.21.1–3): the method was used on other occasions in antiquity, and was recently copied with success to train crews for a modern reconstruction of an Athenian trireme.

The consul put in charge of the new fleet, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, lost no time in trying out his command. Whilst waiting for the main body to complete its maiden training voyage down the Italian coast, he went ahead to Messina with a squadron of seventeen ships, and thence to Lipara off the northeastern tip of Sicily in the hope of taking over the island and its harbor. Here, however, he was taken by surprise by a Carthaginian naval force which had come across from Panormus (Palermo), and he and his ships were captured, as a result of which he acquired the name of Asina or “she-ass” (Pol. 1.21.3–7; cf. Pliny, *HN* 8.169). Emboldened by this, the Carthaginian commander, Hannibal, sailed out to intercept the remainder of the Roman fleet, which his prisoners had presumably told him was sailing down the coast of Italy, but was routed with the loss of most of his 50 ships near the toe of Italy (Pol. 1.21.10–11). Rome had won her first significant sea battle of the war, but still greater success was to follow.

As a result of Scipio's capture, his fellow consul, C. Duilius, who was already in Sicily, took charge of the fleet once it arrived, presumably at Messina. Polybius says that the ships were now equipped with a new weapon, the *korax*, usually known by its Latin name *corvus* (“raven”), but the success against Hannibal may suggest that the device had already been installed. The *corvus* was a retractable boarding bridge rigged forward on each ship, so that it could be swung from one side of the bows to the other and dropped on any attacker attempting to ram in the head-on manner that had become the norm in Hellenistic naval warfare (Murray 1999). The boarding bridge was 4 feet wide and 36 feet long overall, with a 12 foot slot at its inboard end which allowed it to pivot around a pole 24 feet high. It was lifted and manoeuvred by means of a rope passing through a pulley at the top of the pole and attached to the bridge by a ring, at one end of a pestle-shaped spike from which the “raven” got its name. The spike was designed to lodge in the attacker's deck and lock the hulls together so that Roman marines could fight their way across and board (Pol. 1.22; cf. Frontinus, *Strat.* 2.3.24; see Thiel 1954, 101–28;

Wallinga 1956). It is not impossible that part of the significance of the captured Punic ship was that it helped to determine the design and dimensions of the *corvus*, which are carefully recorded by Polybius.

When it was reported to Duilius that the Carthaginians had put in at Mylae (Milazzo), about 25 miles away along the northern coast of Sicily, and were devastating the territory round about, he set off to engage them with his victorious fleet. Hannibal came out with 130 ships but rapidly succumbed to the *corvi*, losing 50 ships altogether according to Polybius (1.23), including a “seven” taken from Pyrrhus. Duilius was awarded Rome’s first ever naval triumph and allowed to erect two *columnae rostratae*, columns decorated with the bronze rams of the ships he had captured (Serv. *ad Georg.* 3.29; cf. Pliny, *HN* 34.11.20; Quintilian 1.7.12). Part of a later inscription copied from one of these survives and confirms some of the details of Polybius’ account (*CIL* 1². 25 = *ILS* 65 = *ILLRP* 319).

The victory at Mylae and their new-found naval power enabled the Romans to extend their operations to Sardinia and Corsica in the following year, 259 BC. This suggests that it had been these islands that had been used as the bases for raiding the Italian coast. At any rate, the new consul, L. Cornelius Scipio, began by capturing the Corsican city of Aleria, although he narrowly averted disaster in a storm, in gratitude for which he dedicated a temple to the *Tempestates* or storm gods (*ILS* 2–3 = *CIL* 1². 8–9 = *ILLRP* 310; cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 6.193–4). He then moved on to Sardinia, where he put some Carthaginian ships to flight and captured Olbia. Even though he was eventually forced to withdraw by another Carthaginian fleet, he was awarded a triumph over both Corsica and Sardinia (*Acta Tr.*; Val. Max. 5.1.2; Flor. 1.18.16; Zon. 8.11).

The other consul, C. Aquillius Florus, who was conducting land operations in Sicily, fared less well losing either 4,000 or 6,000 troops in a battle against Hamilcar near Thermai Himeraiai on the north coast. After this, the Carthaginian general was able to capture both Enna, which controlled a major land route across the center of the island, and Camarina on the south coast (Pol. 1.24.3–4; Diod. 23.9.4). As a result, the consuls of 258, A. Atilius Caiatinus and C. Sulpicius Paterculus, together with Florus who stayed on as proconsul, spent much of the following year attempting to retrieve the situation on the island. Although their siege of Panormus failed, they captured two towns named as Hippana (or Sittana) and Mytistraton and retook Camarina and Enna before going on to besiege Lipara on its island (Pol. 1.24.8–13; Diod. 23.9.5; Zon. 8.11). For these successes, which between them seriously limited Carthaginian access to the western half of the island, Atilius and Florus were both awarded triumphs. Sulpicius also conducted naval operations in Sardinia, where the fleet under Hannibal that had caused the withdrawal of Scipio was defeated, and many of its surviving ships were later caught in the harbor at Sulci and destroyed. For this, Sulpicius too was awarded a triumph,

while Hannibal, who had also lost the battle of Mylae, was crucified (Pol. 1.24.5–7; *Acta Tr.*; Zon. 8.12).

With the balance once again swinging in Rome's favor, one of the consuls of 257, C. Atilius Regulus, took charge of naval forces. While on his way to raid the Carthaginian base at Lipara, he ran into and defeated a Carthaginian fleet off Cape Tyndaris, which lies on the northern coast of Sicily directly south of the Lipari Islands (Pol. 1.25.1–4; Zon. 8.12). After the Carthaginians had been forced to withdraw to Lipara, Atilius appears also to have raided Melite (Malta), 60 miles off the southeastern tip of Sicily (Naevius, *frag. comica* 37; Oros. 4.8.5), and his successes were rewarded with a triumph (*Acta Tr.*). Meanwhile, the Senate had decided that the time had come to invade the Carthaginian homeland.

Phase 3: Rome Takes the War to Africa (256–253)

The invasion of 256 was to be carried out by a truly massive fleet of 330 ships. On the apparent assumption that all these ships were quinqueremes, each of them carrying 300 rowers and 120 troops, Polybius (1.26.7) calculated that this would have involved almost 140,000 men. These were put under the command of both the consuls of 256, L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus, the brother of the successful consul of the previous year. Although Polybius does not make it explicit, a fleet of this size would normally, for logistical reasons, have had to move in successive squadrons, concentrating only when battle was thought to be imminent.

That the imminent invasion was no secret to the Carthaginians is implied by the size of the fleet which they made ready to deal with it, and by the fact that it was in place to do so when the time came. According to Polybius, a total of 350 ships were sent across to Lilybaeum at the western end of the island, and then moved down the south coast to Heraclea Minoa under the command of Hanno, the general who had lost Acragas, and Hamilcar, the admiral who had been defeated at Tyndaris. The route taken by the Roman invasion fleet was the only one practicable at this time. After they had advanced down the coast of Italy to Messina, they would then have to continue along the east coast of Sicily via Syracuse, round Cape Pachynon to Camarina, which had recently been recaptured, and then along the south coast via Acragas up to the vicinity of Selinus, from where it was possible to make a direct crossing to Africa (Pol. 1.25.7–9). The alternative route from Messina, along the northern shore of Sicily, was precluded precisely because of the lack of friendly harbors on that coast, and because it would have taken the Romans past three major Carthaginian bases at Panormus, Drepana, and Lilybaeum. Roman intentions

would have been confirmed to the Carthaginians well in advance by C. Atilius Regulus' operations against Lipara and Malta the previous year. These had probably been carried out precisely to make the route safe, which, incidentally, implies that the invasion may have been planned as early as the end of 258. The Carthaginians could thus be more or less certain that with a fleet installed at Heraclea Minoa, 30 miles southwest of Selinus, they would be in position to intercept the invasion force when it came.

The engagement that eventually ensued has usually been referred to as the battle of Ecnomus, and may have involved the largest number of combatants of any naval battle in history (Lazenby 1996, 1 with n.2). Polybius, however, is the only ancient writer to mention Ecnomus in connection with the battle, and he simply says that this was the place where Roman land forces had been concentrated and where they were evidently taken on board by the fleet (1.25.8). He does not say that the battle was fought here, which is simply a modern assumption. Polybius is, however, explicit that the Romans went into battle towing horse transports. It is simply not credible that had the Carthaginian fleet been anywhere near Ecnomus the Roman fleet would have put to sea in such a formation. Moreover, Polybius describes the Carthaginians as putting to sea specifically to fight the battle after being addressed by their commanders (1.27.1–2), and it is hard to see where they could safely have come ashore beforehand with the entire Roman invasion army in the vicinity. It follows that the battle cannot have been fought off Ecnomus but further up the coast, at a place where the Romans were not in a position to put the transports ashore. The only other ancient source to locate the battle, the Byzantine historian Zonaras (8.12), says that it took place off Heraclea. Although Zonaras was writing in the twelfth century AD, he was excerpting from the third-century AD historian, Dio, who was evidently following a tradition separate from Polybius both here and elsewhere. The location near a base which we know to have been occupied by the Carthaginians makes sense, both in terms of Carthaginian strategy and of the defensive Roman advance described by Polybius, and in any case is entirely consistent with Polybius' text.

In the battle, which broke up into three separate engagements, the *corvus* enabled the Romans to defeat each of the opposing squadrons in turn (Pol. 1.26.10–16). The Carthaginians lost more than 30 ships sunk and 64 captured, while the Romans lost only 24 ships sunk (1.26.10–28.14). More importantly, the Carthaginian fleet was so badly mauled that, after Hanno had bought some time with peace negotiations (Dio 11, fr. 43.21; Zon. 8.12), it was withdrawn to Africa, leaving the invasion route open (Pol. 1. 29.4). After rest, repair, and reprovisioning (possibly back at Acragas) the Roman fleet moved on in successive squadrons led by a 30-ship advance guard (Diod. 23.11). With the Carthaginian ships gone, these squadrons would have been able to proceed unchallenged past Heraclea Minoa, and then to rest and take

on water before making the 100-mile crossing from somewhere near Selinus to Hermaion (Cape Bon). There, only 40 miles northeast of Carthage, the fleet was once again concentrated before advancing on Aspis/Clupea on the other side of the cape, where the Romans beached and successfully laid siege to the city. The Senate then advised that one consul should return to Rome with the fleet, while the other should remain in Africa with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. L. Manlius Vulso thus returned to celebrate a naval triumph while M. Atilius Regulus stayed behind and laid siege to a city by the name of Adys, perhaps Uthina (modern Oudna; Pol. 1.29; *Acta Tr.*; Zon. 8.12).

Meanwhile, the Carthaginians recalled Hamilcar from Heraclea with 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, where he joined Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostar in command of the army in Africa. They then advanced to relieve Adys, but Regulus attacked and captured their camp. Faced with this defeat and a simultaneous invasion by their Numidian neighbours to the south, the Carthaginians were forced to negotiate with Regulus, but his demands were excessive and the war continued (Pol. 1.30–31; Dio 11, fr. 43.22; Zon. 8.13). Concluding that they needed a better commander and a better army, the Carthaginians now employed one of the mercenaries they had recruited in Greece to take over. This was Spartan by the name of Xanthippus, who retrained the infantry and showed them how to use their elephants correctly.

The following year, 255, Xanthippus brought the Romans to battle at an unknown location on level ground, deploying the elephants in a line in front of his army, with cavalry on the wings. This was the first time that Carthaginian citizen troops had faced the Romans, since their army in Sicily and Sardinia consisted almost entirely of allies and mercenaries, and they now made up the center of the infantry line. The Romans countered by massing their heavy infantry in a short, deep formation to face the elephants and so managed to hold them for a while, while some of the troops on the left wing managed to rout the mercenary troops on the Carthaginian right and break through to their camp. The Carthaginian cavalry, however, which heavily outnumbered the Roman horse, first swept them away and then attacked the flanks and rear of the Roman army, while the troops of the Roman center who had fought their way past the elephants were mown down by the phalanx of Carthaginian citizen troops. Most of the Roman force was killed, apart from 2,000 men on the left wing who escaped to Aspis and about 500 who were taken prisoner, including Regulus (Pol. 1.32–4; Zon. 8.13); the Carthaginians lost around 800 mercenaries killed.

The battle was a disaster for the Romans, and on hearing of it the Senate immediately sent out the fleet under the consuls of 255, M. Aemilius Paullus and Ser. Fulvius Paetinus, to recover the survivors who were holding out at Aspis. They appear to have followed the same route as the invasion force of the previous year, except that south of Selinus they were supposedly blown off

course to the island of Cossyra, 43 miles east of Aspis (Zon. 8.14). Since, however, they then took the island by force, the detour may have been deliberate, in order to establish a base where the fleet could concentrate before descending upon Africa en masse. Off Cape Hermaion, they were met by a Carthaginian fleet of 200 ships, and in the ensuing battle, captured 114 of them. After further success on land, the fleet was able to bring off the remnants of Regulus' army and sail for Sicily (Pol. 1.36). Regulus himself appears to have died in Carthaginian hands, although the story — immortalized by the poet Horace — that he was sent back to Rome to negotiate a peace treaty and returned, true to the oath he had taken, when the negotiations failed, appears to be a romantic fiction (Livy, *Per.* 16; Hor. *Od.* 3.5; Florus 1.18.98–109; Eutr. 2.24–5; Orosius 4.10.1).

The defeat of the invasion of Africa was then compounded by a natural catastrophe, when the returning fleet was overwhelmed by a storm off Camarina, from which only 80 ships escaped to limp round Cape Pachynon and into Syracuse. Polybius (1.37) says that it was the greatest ever catastrophe at sea, and blames the consuls for ignoring advice not to sail along the south coast of Sicily. In fact, as we have seen, the alternative route round the Carthaginian-held west of the island was out of the question logistically; nor did the Senate consider the consuls to have been at fault since they were both rewarded with a triumph over the Cossyrans and a naval triumph over the Carthaginians (*Acta Tr.*). The notion of Thiel (1946, 444; 1954, 114) that the *corvi* had made the Roman ships less stable, and that this was a contributory factor to the disaster, is untenable. There is no reason why the boarding bridge, weighing perhaps a little over a tonne (Wallinga 1956, 21), could not have been dismounted and stowed for voyaging, or at least lowered to the deck, where it would have made an insignificant addition to the weight of the 120 troops — perhaps seven tonnes in all — who could be carried at that level (*ibid.*, 78).

The Roman withdrawal from Africa and the loss of the fleet at Camarina enabled the Carthaginians to go back on the offensive. They quickly retook Cossyra (Zon. 8.14) and then struck a very significant blow when their commander in Sicily, Carthalo, recaptured Acragas and destroyed the city. The Romans now built a new fleet of 220 ships in record time — only three months, says Polybius — which was sent out under the command of the experienced consuls of 254. These were Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, who had been defeated and captured at Lipara in 260 but had apparently been released, and A. Atilius Caiatinus, who had won a triumph in western Sicily in 258. After the disaster off Camarina, and with Cossyra and Acragas lost, their aim was evidently to open up the north-coast route to Africa instead. Having joined up with the survivors from Camarina at Messina, they advanced along that coast. A number of cities, including Tyndaris and Soluntum, came over to them, and Kephallion,

Panormus, and Drepana were besieged. Carthalo was able to come to the aid of Drepana, only 15 miles north of Lilybaeum, but both Kephallodion and Panormus were taken (Pol. 1.38.5–10; Diod. 23.18; Zon. 8.14), for which successes Asina was awarded a triumph (*Acta Tr.*).

These operations enabled the consuls of 253, Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Sempronius Blaesus to reinvade Africa along the northern route, attacking Lilybaeum on the way. Our sources do not make it clear what was achieved there apart from raiding the coast of Tripolitania east of Carthage at least as far as the island of Meninx (Djerba), legendary home of the Lotus Eaters, but it was significant enough for Blaesus to be awarded a triumph (*Acta Tr.*). At Meninx, however, the fleet became stuck fast on the shoals as a result of the large tidal range here, which is unusual for the Mediterranean. Having floated themselves off by lightening ship, they then sailed back to Sicily, once again passing Lilybaeum to reach Panormus. At some stage after this, however, instead of coasting they appear to have made straight across open sea, and off Cape Palinurus in Lucania the Roman fleet once again succumbed to a great storm in which more than 150 ships were lost (Polybius 1.39.1–6; Diod. 23.19.1; Orosius 4.9.11).

Phase 4: Stalemate: the Struggle for the Sicilian Coastline (252–243)

Polybius (1.39.7–8) says that after this disaster the Roman Senate decided to abandon the sea and rely on their army instead. Whilst it is true that land-based operations predominated for the next two years, this does not necessarily indicate the change in overall strategy implied by Polybius. In fact, Roman efforts appear to have been concentrated on securing the remaining harbors along the north coast of Sicily, while the Carthaginians tried to hold onto as many as possible, especially the key ports of Lilybaeum and Drepana at the western end of the island closest to Carthage. The result was an effective stalemate which lasted for most of the next decade.

The consuls of 252 BC, C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Servilius Geminus, failed to take Heirkte near Panormus, but did capture Thermai Himeraii between Soluntum and Kephallodion and, more importantly, Lipara as well (Pol. 1.39.13; Diod. 23.19–20; Zon. 8.14; Oros. 4.9.13); Aurelius was awarded a triumph (*Acta Tr.*). It was most likely now that Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, one of the victors over Regulus, was sent over from Africa to Lilybaeum with a large army including 140 war elephants (Pol. 1.38.1–5). When C. Furius Pacilus, one of the two consuls sent out in 251, returned to Rome, Hasdrubal seized the opportunity to besiege the other consul, L. Caecilius Metellus, at Panormus. Metellus had a ditch dug outside the walls, and stationed his light

troops in front of it with instructions to provoke Hasdrubal and his elephants to attack and then withdraw into it. Stung by missiles from the ditch and the walls, the elephants began to turn back on their own troops, throwing them into confusion, at which point Metellus led his legionaries out from the city gate and routed the Carthaginian forces. Hasdrubal's army was massacred, and all of his elephants were captured. He himself escaped, but was condemned to death and executed when he returned to Carthage, while Metellus was awarded a triumph at which he famously exhibited the elephants he had taken (Pol. 1.40; Diod. 23.21; Dion. Hal. 2.66.4; Zon. 8.14).

The Romans had previously attacked both Selinus and Lilybaeum, Carthage's main base in Sicily, without success (Pol. 1.39.12), but Hasdrubal's defeat enabled them to renew their efforts. For 250 BC, the people elected two consuls with distinguished naval experience, C. Atilius Regulus, the victor at Tyndaris, and L. Manlius Vulso who had celebrated a naval triumph for the battle of Ecnomus/Heraclea. The construction of 50 new ships brought their fleet up to 200, and with this they proceeded to Lilybaeum. Before they arrived, the Carthaginians evacuated and completely destroyed the city of Selinus so that, as Polybius says, in the whole of the island only Lilybaeum and Drepana were left under Carthaginian control. On arrival, the consuls laid siege to Lilybaeum by both land and sea, and the Greek and Celtic mercenaries who held it were soon threatening to mutiny against their commander Himilco (Pol. 1.39.15; 1.41–43; Diod. 24.1.1; Zon. 8.15).

In desperation, Carthage sent reinforcements under Adherbal, who was apparently able to get through and take command at Drepana, while Hannibal, the son of the Hamilcar who had helped to defeat Regulus, made for Lilybaeum with 10,000 troops. Hannibal landed at the Aegates Islands, only 10 miles northwest of Lilybaeum, apparently without the Romans realizing that he had arrived. Then, as soon as a following wind got up, he deployed his troops on deck, hoisted sail and swept into Lilybaeum past the astonished Romans, who dared not follow him into the hostile harbour. The reinforcements were disembarked, and at dawn the next day Himilco led them and the existing garrison in an attack on the Roman positions, but was repulsed after a desperate struggle. That night, Hannibal sailed out of Lilybaeum with his fleet and joined Adherbal at Drepana. The siege of Lilybaeum continued to go badly for the Romans, who were unable for a time to prevent a blockade runner called Hannibal the Rhodian from using local knowledge to sail in and out almost at will. Eventually, however, he was overtaken and captured, and his quinquereme was used to intercept the other blockade runners who had followed his lead. Then Himilco's Greek mercenaries came up with a plan to make use of gale-force winds to set the Roman siege works alight. This was spectacularly successful, and the Romans had to revert to a passive siege, but disease and Adherbal's disruption of

their supply lines ensured that they suffered more than the Carthaginian garrison (Pol. 1.43–48; Diod. 24.1.2–4; Zon. 8.15).

Because of heavy losses amongst the personnel of the Roman fleet, the Senate decided to send out replacements, although it is significant that they had to travel overland from Messina because the Carthaginian fleet held Drepana. The besiegers also received an unpopular new commander, P. Claudius Pulcher, one of the consuls of 249, who decided to embark the best of his troops for a naval attack on Drepana. Setting off at midnight, he appeared off Drepana around dawn. The story was later told that when he took the auspices before the battle, and the sacred chickens would not provide a good omen by eating, he threw them into the sea so that they might drink instead (Cicero, *Nat. D.* 2.7; *Div.* 2.20; Livy, *Per.* 19; Suet. *Tib.* 2.2; Flor. 1.8.19). On discovering his approach, Adherbal got his crews aboard and led his fleet across the harbor along the shoreline opposite where the Romans were entering. The latter then attempted to withdraw from the harbor in some confusion in order to form line of battle with their sterns against the coast. Adherbal attacked from seaward, pinning the Roman ships against the shore, and when he saw that he was losing the day, Pulcher fled. He got away with 30 ships of his left wing, but the other 93 were either captured or run aground (Pol. 1.49–51; Diod. 24.1.5).

After the battle, Adherbal sent the prisoners and captured ships to Carthage. Meanwhile, Carthalo, a former Carthaginian commander in Sicily, had arrived at Drepana with 70 ships. Adherbal now gave him another 30 and ordered him to deal with the remnants of the Roman fleet at Lilybaeum. Attacking at dawn, Carthalo managed to set fire to some of the Roman vessels and towed away or broke up some others, while Himilco launched an attack from the city. With the Roman fleet crippled, Carthalo moved on to Heraclea to wait for a Roman supply squadron that had been sent to sail round the south coast of Sicily. The convoy had been brought from Rome to Syracuse by Pulcher's consular colleague, L. Iunius Pullus, who had then sent it ahead round Cape Pachynon. As the convoy moved up the south coast, apparently in ignorance of what had happened at Drepana and Lilybaeum, Carthalo put out to meet it. The quaestors in charge of the convoy therefore anchored off a small coastal fort held by the Romans, possibly Phintias, from where they brought down catapults to cover their ships. As a result, Carthalo was only able to tow away a few ships, and withdrew to wait at a nearby river estuary. He was then informed that Pullus was on his way with the main Roman force, so he came down past the convoy to meet him. Like his quaestors, Pullus declined to fight and instead made for a rocky shore near Camarina where he anchored. Possibly because the weather was worsening, rather than follow him Carthalo found the shelter of a cape where he lay between the two Roman fleets, and then before the storm hit he rounded Cape Pachynon to find safe haven. The

Roman fleets, however, were caught without shelter and were totally destroyed (Pol. 1.52.5–54.8; Diod. 24.1.6–9).

In the end, Pullus escaped to Lilybaeum with only two surviving ships. He attempted to rescue the situation by seizing Mt Eryx, which overlooks Drepana (Pol. 1.55.5–10; Diod. 24.1.10–11), but the defeat of Pulcher and the loss of the two fleets had caused a military and political crisis. Eventually, A. Atilius Caiatinus, who had twice led Rome's armies in Sicily, was appointed dictator, with L. Caecilius Metellus, the saviour of Panormus, as his deputy, and the two of them then took over the command in Sicily (*F. Cap.*; Livy, *Per.* 19; Suet. *Tib.* 2.2; Zonar 8.15). Pulcher was put on trial for treason (*perduellio*) and, although he escaped the death penalty, was eventually made to pay a massive fine (Pol. 1.52.1–3; Schol. Bob., p. 90 Stangl). Later, Pullus was also arraigned, but apparently committed suicide to avoid being brought to court (Cicero, *Nat. D.* 2.7; *Div.* 2.71).

Despite the Carthaginian successes, the Romans maintained their pressure on Sicily. The consuls of 248 who relieved Atilius and Metellus were C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Servilius Geminus, who had campaigned together in 252 when they took Thermai Himeraiai and Lipara. They continued with the existing strategy of besieging Lilybaeum and attempting to take Drepana, even when Carthalo raided Italy, as did their successors, L. Caecilius Metellus and N. Fabius Buteo, who succeeded in capturing the island of Pelias off Drepana. Meanwhile, the Senate had made warships available to private citizens with which they raided the African port of Hippo Diarrhytos (Bizerte), 40 miles northwest of Carthage, for booty, even defeating a Carthaginian squadron off Panormus as they returned to Italy (Zon. 8.16).

By 247, a new Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar Barca, had arrived in Sicily. It is ominous that one of his first tasks was to finish dealing with the mutinies that had broken out amongst Carthalo's mercenaries because they were no longer being paid. The need for booty may even have been one of the factors that encouraged him to continue Carthalo's policy of raiding southern Italy, ranging from Lokroi and Bruttium at the toe right up to Cumae just north of the Bay of Naples. At the same time as his attack on Lokroi, he may also have raided the territory around Katane (Catania), only 30 miles north of Syracuse. These raids, which suggest that the Romans had no effective official fleet in operation, were carried out from Hamilcar's base at Heirkte, which he had recaptured in 247 and from which he also laid siege to Panormus nearby (Pol. 1.56; Diod. 24.6; Zon. 8.16).

By 244, however, Hamilcar was no longer able to sustain this effort. He seized Mt Eryx overlooking Drepana from the Roman garrison and withdrew his land forces there to support the town, while his ships apparently returned to Carthage (Pol. 1.58.2–3; Diod. 24.8). It was then that the Romans decided at last to build one more fleet.

Phase 5: The Stalemate is Ended: Roman Victory at the Aegates (243–241)

Polybius says that Rome was by now so financially exhausted that the new fleet had to be financed by private subscription. Groups and individuals agreed to pay for the construction of single vessels on the promise of repayment once the victory had been won. In this way, the money was raised for 200 quinqueremes built on the pattern of the ship taken from Hannibal the Rhodian eight years before, and this fleet was placed under the command of C. Lutatius Catulus, who had been elected consul for 242 (Pol. 1.59.5–8). Catulus' consular colleague, A. Postumius Albinus, also held an important priesthood as Flamen Martialis, and the Pontifex Maximus, L. Caecilius Metellus, had insisted that he must remain in the city of Rome (Livy, *Per.* 19; Livy 37.51.1–2; Val. Max. 1.1.2; Tacitus, *Ann.* 3.71), so the next most senior magistrate, the *praetor urbanus* Q. Valerius Falto, was appointed to be the other fleet commander. Catulus and Falto descended on the harbour at Drepana and the approaches to Lilybaeum, now empty of Carthaginian vessels, and constructed siege works around Drepana (Zon. 8.17).

In the meantime, the fleet was set to training for the sea battle that they knew must come when the Carthaginians reacted to this renewed offensive. It was in any case essential for the latter to keep Hamilcar supplied at Eryx, and so, early in 241, a commander by the name of Hanno was sent out from Carthage with a relief force. He put in first at Hiera ("Holy Isle"), the most westerly of the Aegates Islands, just over 20 miles from Lilybaeum. His plan was to make a run for Eryx, offload his supplies, and take Hamilcar and his mercenaries on board to fight the Romans at sea. Catulus, however, was informed of his arrival and moved his fleet out to the nearest of the islands, Aigousa, about seven miles off the coast. Despite contrary winds and rough weather, Catulus and Falto decided that it would be best to engage Hanno before he reached Hamilcar, so the next morning, 10th March, 241, they deployed for battle. The Carthaginians cleared for action and came out to meet them, but the Roman fleet was better trained and won the victory, sinking 50 ships and capturing another 70 together with their crews, some 10,000 prisoners in all (Pol. 1.59.10–61.8; Diod. 24.11; Val. Max. 2.8.2; Zon. 8.17; Eutr. 2.27.2). It has been suggested that the wreck of a Punic oared vessel found off Marsala was that of a victim of the battle (Frost 1981), but the remains are inconsistent with those of a warship.

Hanno was forced to withdraw to Carthage, where he was condemned and crucified. For Carthage, this was the end, since it was no longer possible to send Hamilcar the supplies he needed, and he was given the power to do whatever he felt was necessary. His assessment was that he would have to sue for

peace, to which Catulus agreed. The final terms, established after a commission of ten senators had been sent out from Rome, were that the Carthaginians would be required to evacuate Sicily and all the islands between Sicily and Italy completely, not to make war on Hiero and Syracuse, to hand over all Roman prisoners without ransom, and to pay an indemnity of 3,200 talents (*ca.* 83 tonnes) of silver over ten years; neither side was allowed to attack, interfere with, recruit from or make alliances with the other's allies (Pol. 1.62.1–63.3, cf. 3.27.2–3; Diod. 24.13; Nep. *Hamil.* 1.5; Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 2.27.4). After nearly a decade without a significant Roman victory, both Catulus and Falto were awarded naval triumphs (*Acta Tr.*). The war was over.

The First Punic War and its Strategic Significance

The key to understanding the strategies of the First Punic War is to view the land-based and naval operations as an integrated whole. After the initial struggle around Messana and the capture of Acragas (itself prompted by the need to stop Carthaginian reinforcements coming through the port), there was hardly any fighting over territory in the interior of the island. Finding themselves involved in an overseas war, even in an island separated from the Italian mainland by no more than a couple of miles, the Roman Senate rapidly came to understand the importance of a fleet both for the transport of one's own troops and supplies and to challenge the movement of enemy forces. The decision to invest so much effort into the construction for the first time of a major Roman fleet was both brave and momentous, and was rightly recognized as such by Polybius. The Senate was also quick to grasp that the voyaging of large numbers of oared warships depended on the availability of landing points along the route where crews and troops could rest and obtain water and food (Gomme 1933; Rankov 1996). It was thus the First Punic War which taught the Romans how to use sea power, so that they ceased for ever to be the landlubbers they have been claimed to be (Thiel 1946).

Roman mental maps, based on roads running in straight lines between towns and cities (Sherk 1974; Janni 1984; Dilke 1985; Austin and Rankov 1995, 112–18), were easily adapted to the deployment of sea power around Sicily and across to Africa, and the Senate used the experience of the war to develop their sophistication. Despite the obvious advantages of approaching Africa past Syracuse and the eastern and southern coasts of Sicily, and despite her naval successes at Ecnomus/Heraclea and Cape Hermaion, Rome learned from the disaster at Camarina and concentrated on seizing control of the safer northern coastline instead. Conversely, the Carthaginians recognized the threat both to their homeland and to their control of Sicily and fought

stubbornly to hold onto to their bases at Lilybaeum and Drepana and to regain those they had lost, especially Panormus. The events of 249, when Pullus' convoy was lost in a second storm off Camarina on the south coast because it could not be brought past Drepana on the north, emphasizes how much hinged on this. In the end, it became obvious to the Roman Senate that Lilybaeum and Drepana could only be taken if they could be cut off from Carthage and that they had to find a way to finance another fleet. Once that fleet was victorious and the route to Africa lay open, it is hardly surprising that the Carthaginians asked for terms. It is equally unsurprising that the Romans, in their exhaustion, decided to make peace then and there.

While annual warfare was the norm for the Roman Republic, the First Punic War was unique in demanding the attentions of both consuls and their armies every year for such a long period — 24 years in all. As Polybius recognized (1.63.4–8), it was a conflict of exceptional magnitude, and lessons were learned on both sides. Within four years of the end of the war, Rome took advantage of Carthage's attempt to put down a revolt of her mercenaries in Sardinia to order the Carthaginians out of the island (Pol. 1.88.8–12). Over the next six years, they then conquered the island for themselves, together with Corsica. From 227, Carthage's stepping stones to Italy, Sardinia and Corsica, and Sicily, became the first two standing provinces of the Roman empire.

At the same time as they were forced out of Sardinia, the Carthaginians sent their last general in Sicily, Hamilcar Barca, to take command of their forces in Spain. There he carved out a new empire for them, which his son, Hannibal, was determined to use as a base from which to strike back at Rome. He knew that he could not go by sea, because by 218 the Romans held not only the three great islands of the western Mediterranean but the whole of the mainland coastline from southern Gaul, through Liguria, down into Italy. Thus Hannibal decided that he would have to go by land, and cross the Alps.

FURTHER READING

The principal ancient source for the First Punic War is Polybius (1.11–64), who should be read in conjunction with the indispensable commentary by Walbank 1957. The best and most detailed modern account of the war can be found in Lazenby 1996a, who judiciously discusses all the available evidence and is also very readable. Other useful modern accounts include those by Caven (1980, 1–66), Scullard 1989b, and Goldsworthy (2000, 63–140), and for an in-depth discussion of the origins of the war see Hoyos 1998. The analysis by Thiel 1954 of Rome's use of sea power at this period has been hugely influential, but its underlying thesis of Roman incompetence at sea is essentially flawed; for a critique of Thiel's outlook with regard to the Second Punic War (but also relevant for the First War) see Rankov 1996. A detailed discussion of

what we know about the ships and fleets of the period can be found in Morrison and Coates 1996, while two of the clearest discussions of naval tactics in the ancient Mediterranean have been produced by Lazenby 1987 and Whitehead 1987. For the Hellenistic period, however, the significance of head-to-head ramming has only recently been recognized by Murray 1999 and, although he does not discuss the *corvus*, his paper forms a basis for understanding why it was adopted and in what circumstances it would have been used; for a reconstruction of the *corvus* itself see the monograph by Wallinga 1956. A good description of the armies of each side is provided by Goldsworthy (2000, 25–62); also valuable is Head 1982, although he does not always make clear the basis for his reconstructions of ancient warriors, while the use of elephants in land warfare is well discussed by Scullard 1974.

CHAPTER TEN

Roman Politics in the First Punic War

Bruno Bleckmann

The First Punic War is already described in the historical work of Polybius as a series of events in which the Romans, after years of fighting, with a determined and united effort brought down Carthage, the great power that had initially been Rome's equal.¹ Polybius' contemporary, Naevius, in his epic devoted to the war, may have highlighted the Republic's unparalleled collective exertion and the test of perseverance that the war represented. Exemplary figures like A. Atilius Caiatinus who is praised in Cicero's *Cato*, L. Caecilius Metellus, and most notably the martyr for Roman values M. Atilius Regulus, whose legend was already presented with all known details in the historical work of Sempronius Tuditanus, gave to the collective memory of the First Punic War an aura of the fulfilment of old Republican values and harmony. The First Punic War seems, therefore, the earliest to fit the idealizing picture that Sallust drew of domestic politics down to the end of the Punic Wars: "Before the destruction of Carthage, the Roman people and Senate made policy together peacefully and prudently; there was no struggle amongst the citizens, neither for esteem nor power: fear of the enemy kept the citizenry in their good qualities" (Sall. *BJ* 41.2). Jochen Bleicken, not entirely uninfluenced by this idealizing view of an allegedly untainted and trouble-free period, which is based on a sharp contrast with the conditions prevailing from the time of the Gracchi onwards, characterizes the time from the middle of the fourth century till the end of the third as "a time of comparative calm and stability," and Staveley calls the entire period before the end of the war with Hannibal a "golden age of stable and ordered government."²

Compared to the dramatic crisis of the late Republic beginning with the Gracchi, but especially with the civil wars of Sulla or Caesar, the third century may indeed appear to be a phase of relative peace in internal politics. Conflicts within the governing class, the patrician-plebeian nobility, may initially be described as an obvious element in the political culture of this period which does not by itself modify the picture of relative concord. The nobility, which in the third century was not yet shut off as it was in later times, but still fairly open to new elites from Italy, did indeed have a common ethos and common norms and values, and through *mos maiorum* was united in solidarity.

But in this set of common values there was also a competitive element.³ It is no coincidence that one of the best-known texts illustrating the competitive aristocratic ethos of the middle Republic concerns a figure from the time of the First Punic War. It is the *laudatio funebris* for L. Caecilius Metellus, consul in 251 and 247 BC. In this funeral oration Q. Metellus praised his father in a series of superlatives and highlighted the individual achievements that were reached in aristocratic competition and acknowledged by all: "Q. Metellus, in the funeral oration which he made in praise of his father L. Metellus, who had been pontiff, twice consul, dictator, master of the horse, one of the quindecimvirs for dividing the lands, and the first to lead elephants in his triumph in the First Punic War, has left it in writing that his father had attained the ten greatest and best things, in the search after which wise men have spent all their lives: for he had wished to become the first warrior, the best orator, the bravest general, to perform the greatest achievements under his own auspices, to enjoy the highest office, possess consummate wisdom, be regarded as the most distinguished senator, by honorable means acquire a large fortune, leave behind him many children, and be the most illustrious man in the state" (Pliny, *NH* 7.139–40).

Anyone who belonged to the nobility was fully expected to measure himself against others and compete for military glory, political influence, riches, and prestige. This competition was not conducted as an all-round fight, but rather through alliances and electoral agreements, using a network of connections for mutual advantage, and mobilizing not only one's own clients but those of one's political friends. Decisions in the Senate and daily politics at the Forum were therefore quite inevitably accompanied by constant conflicts, and Roman politics could not be conducted save with intrigues and constant struggles for power and influence.

The composition of the parties at work in this process fluctuated constantly. The assumption that there were coherent and permanent groupings of families connected by marriage, like the Claudii and Atilii, who supposedly worked together, or the Aemilii, who were tied to the Fabii — a view propounded by older prosopographic scholarship — has proved illusory on critical examination of the source material. It is wholly out of the question that these tight

groups of aristocrats were also united by programmatic positions in domestic and foreign policy, such as a conservative view of expansion to the north or a radical-populist view of expansion to the south. The only fairly permanent type of political collaboration that can be confirmed in the period of the First Punic War is between immediate relatives. In the *Fasti* we find several examples of brothers or first cousins, such as the brothers M'. Otacilius Crassus, cos. 263, and T. Otacilius Crassus, cos. 261; the brothers Q. Lutatius Catulus, cos. 242, and C. Lutatius Cerco, cos. 241; the cousins or brothers A. Atilius Caiatinus, cos. 258, and C. Atilius Regulus, cos. 257, cousin of his predecessor, and M. Atilius Regulus, cos. suff. 256 and brother of the consul of 257. These family clusters are explained by the fact that an office-bearer could make his power and prestige evident not only through the election of a close relative, but also through being able to preserve some of his own measures and political decisions beyond his own year of office. The latter is particularly clear in the case of the proconsul Q. Lutatius Catulus, whose peace terms, though highly controversial in Rome, were carried through by the skilful maneuverings of his brother.⁴

Conflicts in internal politics arising out of competition in the aristocracy were thus part of the system by which politics and society in the Republic worked. Nuances are, however, possible in the way the balance between the competitive element and the basic consensus in the aristocracy may be described — and particularly during the First Punic War. In view of the serious changes in the institutional structure and regulation that first occurred in the course of the third century and came to an interim conclusion with the enactment of the *cursus honorum* through the *lex Villia Annalis*, the first decades of the middle Republic are characterized by a dynamism that kept up with the profound changes in external policy.

Thus the internal conflicts during this time of upheaval were possibly more serious than is commonly assumed. Certainly, it would seem to be an exaggeration to place the disagreements of this time in an unbroken continuum stretching from the Struggle of the Orders to the conflicts at the close of the Roman Republic. But some of these internal conflicts were already being fought in the third century with a ferocity and intransigence that are completely comparable with the later period of the civil wars. The consequences are much more limited only because the adversaries in this period did not have the means to pay armies out of their own fortune. A minimum level of consensus was therefore enforced by the simple fact that individual nobles were able to attain greater measures of prestige and power only if they had recourse to serving in the state's institutions. The few weeks that an aristocrat had as consul to command the manpower levied for a summer campaign was used in such a way, however, that his own success was highlighted before another man had the same chance in the next year. As a result there predominated not respectful

agreement with the Senate but an effort, often pursued without regard to losses, to garner the greatest possible personal glory in the shortest time.

This singular kind of warfare, conducted in short bursts and driven by individuals' striving for prestige, becomes clearer if one puts aside the picture of the heroically fighting Roman collective painted by Polybius and adopts more strongly the perspective of Dio-Zonaras, in which the First Punic War is conceived primarily as a series of ambitious campaigns by individual generals: a picture that comes through repeatedly in the annalistic sources that Polybius uses.⁵ This unflattering sketch of relations within the nobility in the First Punic War is completed by reports of fights over the assignment of commands, of possibilities of waging war for financial gain, of attempts to block careers by means of lawsuits. It finally becomes clear that military efficiency and imperial expansion were possible not in spite of these conditions in domestic politics, but precisely because of them, which is the explanation for the extremely bold and aggressive warfare of individual consuls who were ambitious in the highest degree. Here too one may draw analogies with the late Republic, when imperial expansion advanced in step with the escalation of internal conflicts.

This picture of relations within the aristocracy at the time of the First Punic War may have been deliberately overdrawn in a few aspects, but it is still supported by the interpretation of a whole series of crucial episodes whose twists and turns are not entirely explicable by military decisions but by the dynamics of domestic politics and the rivalry between nobles. This begins with the decision to accept the petition for help by the Mamertines in 264 and to send a consular army to Messana. This decision was made, as Polybius' account reveals, in a violent altercation between the Senate (or rather the majority of the Senate) and the consuls. The direct security interests of Rome, which might have produced a consensus decision for war, were not touched on in the resolution to go to war. The Carthaginians at this time were far from being a threat to the extent that Polybius represents them. Furthermore, the imminent subjugation of the Campanian Mamertines by Syracuse was a Sicilian matter and had no immediate effect on Roman rule in Italy. In the main, the decision to go to war is attributable to the ambition of the consul Appius Claudius alone, since he was familiar with the rich cities of Sicily and their lucrative possibilities for plunder, owing to the long-standing connections between groups of Oscan mercenaries and Campanians. In the appeal by the Campanians of Messana he saw an ideal opportunity to gain military prestige and material means which were equivalent to the chance offered his colleague Fulvius to complete the subjection of Volsinii.⁶

The resistance that confronted Claudius in the Roman Senate was hardly due to philanthropic scruples that might prohibit giving help to the Mamertines as enemies of the Greek cities, nor to fear that this would depart from a strategically appropriate expansion to the north. Rather, the majority of the Senate

was concerned with preventing a Claudian from gaining a decisive advantage in the aristocratic competition through taking excessive booty. For this reason, Claudius — against the resistance of the Senate but apparently in agreement with his colleague Fulvius — used the citizen assembly, which he induced to order support for the Mamertines and give him the command of this campaign (Pol. 1.11.3).

The sources are not agreed about Claudius' success in his first campaign. This is because Roman historiography was influenced by biased family traditions that glorified the successes of one's own *gens* and sought to belittle those of rival *gentes*. The outcomes of the campaign, which in reality were apparently neither outstanding nor particularly disastrous, were pointedly not rewarded with a triumph by the Senate, whose majority wish had been ignored by Claudius. Only Claudian family tradition knows of a triumph for the consul of 264, which is probably not invented but may have taken the form of a private demonstration of prestige without a Senate decree.⁷

The campaign of the year 263 was able to build on the foundations laid by Claudius. This time the two consuls M'. Valerius and M'. Otacilius were authorized to deploy their forces in Sicily with its promise of rich booty. In the battle against Hiero of Syracuse the two consular armies advanced together only intermittently — at other times they marched separately. Such a procedure was due to the difficulties of supplying a large body of men, and the possibility that in this way booty could be gathered quickly in the smaller cities of eastern Sicily. All the same, in this case again an element of internal aristocratic rivalry was not lacking. For M'. Valerius seems to have made every effort to distinguish himself as the sole outstanding general, by waging a separate war. From the booty of Catana he had a sundial erected in his name in the Forum Romanum (Pliny, *NH* 7.214; Censorinus, *de Die Natali* 24.7). Most notably, however, he claimed to have liberated Messana from its Carthaginian-Syracusan siege, for which he received the nickname Messala. The campaign of 263 did not end, as Polybius suggests, with the peace treaty that was finally imposed on Hiero II. Because the ambitions of the consuls were not yet satisfied by the success against Syracuse, they waged a campaign deep into the west of Sicily, which apart from the peaceful taking of Segesta, was by and large unsuccessful.⁸

Aristocratic rivalry played a decisive role in the escalating naval war, too, even if some of the events were dictated by the reaction of Carthage, which only in 262 really committed itself on a large scale to retain the positions in Sicily as part of its own empire. This escalation of Carthage's involvement forced Roman policy to remain committed to taking the whole island, as had been foreshadowed in the western campaign of 263 and was not at all ambitious given the forces Rome had available. Conquering Agrigentum, which after a long siege was only feasible when the Carthaginians had left the city,

made it much clearer than in the generally still modest campaign of 263 that the booty from the rich Greek cities made an increase in effort seem worthwhile. To engage Carthage at its own level, it was essential to build a fleet. If the Carthaginian fleet could be kept in check, then it would be possible for an ambitious general to reach a quick outcome in the short period of his own supreme command.

The consul C. Duilius seems to have successfully pushed through the Senate and the citizen assembly the plan for building a great fleet, which had been discussed in Rome for some time and been supported in the Senate by, for instance, the ex-consul M'. Valerius, after the winter break of 261–260 had seen a high proportion of the Roman positions in Sicily lost through attacks by the Carthaginian fleet. A tightly organized and rapidly completed fleet-building program and command over the fleet gave the consul unprecedented powers. The discrepancies in the sources lead us to assume that the question of who was to command the new fleet brought fierce rivalry between the two consuls. The main sources, Polybius and Cassius Dio (Zonaras), agree only that in 260 one of the two consuls received the prestigious and successful *provincia* of the fleet command, while the other was to wage the less spectacular land war. They give conflicting information about the roles of C. Duilius and Cn. Cornelius Scipio.

According to Polybius, it was Cn. Cornelius Scipio who was given “the command of the naval forces by the Romans.” Only after his colleague C. Duilius “heard of the misfortune of the commander of the fleet” — Scipio was captured at Lipara, which in Roman tradition gave him the nickname *Asina* — did Duilius “hand over the legions of the land army to the military tribunes” and “transfer to the fleet himself” (cf. Pol. 1.21.4 and 23.1). In Cassius Dio (Zonaras), however, Duilius from the beginning has command of the great new Roman fleet under construction, and from Rome directed the building of it. Scipio, who had been given the command of the land troops, was dissatisfied with this allocation of the areas of responsibility (*provinciae*) and tried to compensate for his disadvantage by carrying out a surprise attack against Lipara with the small fleet he had available to accompany his land operations, and this became his undoing. To replace the captured Cn. Cornelius the *praetor urbanus* was now sent as commander of the land troops; Duilius followed after a while with the finally readied main fleet, which he then equipped in Sicily with the famous “ravens” (Zon. 8.10.8–9 and 11.1–5).

In this conflict of versions Polybius’ report is usually given preference. Since, however, the source that Cassius Dio used is based on an annalistic author who is independent of the late-annalistic Livian tradition and contains information of high quality, it is not out of the question that Dio’s version recounts the truth, especially as Polybius’ narration aims to play down the

behavior of Scipio Asina to bring it into line with the Scipionic family legend and belittle the merits of Duilius. In factual terms it is possible to establish many connections between Dio-Zonaras' narration and the inscription on Duilius' column, which has the authority of an authentic document and reflects accurately how great was the gain in prestige that Duilius, coming from a plebeian family on the rise, could gain from the first successful Roman naval battle.⁹

Duilius' column was erected in a prominent position in the Forum Romanum (near the Rostra). Above all it demonstrated the popularity gained by the general through his great success at Mylae, for one may assume that this exceptional honor was granted by a decision of the people (obviously through intervention by tribunes of the *plebs*). Moreover, the erection of the column was only one of a number of honors and measures that aimed to preserve the memory of the victory. Thus Duilius was given not only a special form of triumph, the *triumphus navalis*, but also the extraordinary privilege of being escorted to his home in a particular way, apparently a smaller version of a triumph. The votive temple that Duilius had erected after his great success was also intended to recall several aspects of his great deeds as a naval victor. It was dedicated to the sea-god Janus and stood not only on the *via triumphalis*, but was also in the immediate vicinity of the dock where the fleet had been built.

There is some evidence that the vast prestige he gained was not accepted ungrudgingly by the members of his class. Rather, Duilius gained this prestige in a climate of bitter rivalry with the other aristocrats, in which the people, acting as arbiter, stressed Duilius' achievements. Obviously, therefore, fellow aristocrats like the coterie of Scipio Asina made every effort to stop him getting a second chance, despite his experience and his prestige in naval warfare. In any case, there is an indication of this in the subsequent career of Duilius, who was able to acquire the censorship immediately after the success at Mylae (258) but thereafter only received an insignificant dictatorship as an aged statesman for holding elections in 231, whereas his militarily incompetent colleague, Scipio, who came from the high aristocracy, acquired a new consulate as early as 254.¹⁰

The naval victory of Mylae brought great spoils and the prestige of defeating an old naval power, but strategically its effect was slight. After Duilius' withdrawal and triumph at the end of February 259, Hamilcar used the winter break to regain lost territory in Sicily quickly. It became clear that Roman warfare with its seasonal limitations was inappropriate if it wanted to bring to its knees a well-organized state like Carthage that was capable of long-term strategic planning. The Romans did not take steps to improve leadership structures to make possible the long-term pursuit of military aims. Rather, the prestige won by Duilius through the victory of Mylae became a model for consuls who annually succeeded each other and wanted to achieve maximum

success during their term of office, and to this end they committed the fleet they had available for only a few weeks to at times highly risky operations. In poorly coordinated, mostly seasonal campaigns that only lasted beyond the winter break if an extension of command was granted, which was rare, it was first necessary to overcome setbacks suffered in the winter break in which Carthage sought to regain territory.

But mainly the ambitious aristocrats sought new and spectacular fields of action in ventures that reached further and further afield. Prominent examples are the only partly successful expedition by L. Cornelius Scipio to Corsica and Sardinia (259), which was nonetheless rewarded with a triumph; the operations carried out on a wide front by A. Atilius Caiatinus in Sicily, which ended with a failed move against Lipara; the Sardinian campaign of C. Sulpicius Paterculus; and finally the attack on Malta by the fleet of C. Atilius Regulus, the consul of 257 and victor at the naval battle of Tyndaris. Close examination of the texts in turn reveals that the African strategy of Regulus was in no way a radical change in the practice of war; rather, it was the result of a certain consistency in the increase of boldness in operations. This increase had already led to the formulation of Sulpicius Paterculus' plan in 258 to sail from Sardinia to Africa (Zon. 8.12.4). The crossing to Africa was probably one of the aims behind the attack on Malta in the year 257 (Orosius 4.8.5; Naevius, frg. 37 Blänsdorf).

The assertion by Cassius Dio that the consuls of the year 256 had been appointed for the African expedition on the basis of their competence (Dio, frg. 43.20; cf. Zon. 8.12.8) is problematic because M. Atilius Regulus, the brother of the consul of 257, was only appointed *consul suffectus* after the death of Q. Caedicius, who had initially been elected. Possibly, however, the influence of the Atilian family clan contributed to the fact that after the election of Regulus all resources were concentrated and both consuls shared the command of a fleet unprecedented in size. After the fleet, even before the crossing to Africa, had won an outstanding victory near Ecnomus off the south coast of Sicily, peace negotiations with Carthage seem to have occurred. After repairing and re-equipping the fleet in Messina, however, the two consuls risked the *tour de force* of crossing to Africa.¹¹

At first this expedition encountered no problems of any kind, owing to the inferiority of the Carthaginian fleet. The army was able to land safely in Africa, and after taking Aspis pillaged Carthage's rich countryside and freed Roman war prisoners. For the winter break M. Regulus was able to obtain an extension of his command, while Manlius Vulso returned to Rome and celebrated a *triumphus navalis* there. From the letters that Regulus sent to Rome in the following months, it is clear that the aim of the general remaining in Africa was to retain the command and his opportunities for prestige as long as possible. The worry about the arrival of his successor was his main motivation to

take up peace negotiations with the Carthaginians after further great successes during the winter season: “Marcus, who had beaten the Carthaginians on land and sea, but worried that his successor could arrive from Rome and gain the honour of the victory, invited the Carthaginians to negotiate a peace” (Pol. 1.31.4).

These peace negotiations were made more difficult because Regulus needed to gain at any rate the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, given Roman expectations and Rome’s great sacrifices, since otherwise he could not count on the Roman people’s consent. After the negotiations had failed, Regulus considered it necessary to force the decision during his period of office at all costs. For this reason he joined battle on the plain near Tunis, under unfavorable conditions and without making himself familiar with the new tactical skills for which the Carthaginian troops had to thank the recently arrived military expert Xanthippus. The desire typical of the nobility, “to perform the greatest achievements under his own auspices,” explains both the success of this Atilius who, thanks to previously never achieved fleet preparations, had carried out the African project that others had earlier aspired to; and also his failure.

There was no immediate attempt of any kind to improve methods of waging war after the failure of Regulus’ efforts to obtain peace. Thus, the expedition undertaken by Servius Fulvius Paetinus and M. Aemilius Paullus, the consuls of the year 255, with some 350 ships, was no mere aftermath of the Regulus expedition: in addition to rescuing the Roman citizens who had remained in Africa, the two consuls were pursuing ambitious aims. After Cossura had been plundered and a Carthaginian fleet destroyed near Cape Hermaeum, they tried to establish themselves in Africa, but had to return owing to difficulties in obtaining provisions. On their way back, in an attempt to round off this successful outcome through shows of strength to the Sicilian Greeks, the consuls ignored the advice of their nautical experts and sailed along the southern coast of Sicily coast, where off Camarina they ran into a heavy storm that almost completely destroyed the fleet. Despite this failure the two consuls were granted a triumph and, in addition, Aemilius Paullus was honored, like Duilius, with a *columna rostrata*.

The consuls of the year 254 were caught up too long in individual operations on the north coast — where they had signal success in taking Panormus — to be able to reach Africa with their grand fleet. No fundamental change in strategy was adopted in that year’s campaign. In 253 the Roman fleet sailed once more to Africa via the northern Sicilian coast, which was now more secure, but owing to fierce Carthaginian resistance, could not establish a base and was finally forced to return after it had reached the Lesser Syrtis gulf (Gulf of Gabès). During the hasty return from Panormus to Italy another 150 ships were destroyed in a storm. This meant a loss of at least 30,000 Romans and allies, as each ship was manned by 200 or even 300 rowers.

The history of the great loss-sustaining fleet voyages of the 250s did not come to an end as a result of any change in strategy undertaken by the generals recruited from the nobility, or because the Senate, whose leadership responsibilities were poorly defined at this time, switched from naval to land war. Rather it was decisive that, owing not only to the great loss of life but also to the material burden of equipping the fleet, resistance amongst the people to recruitment for naval service constantly increased. The initial coalition of interest between nobility and people, which had been based on the fact that naval warfare was lucrative for both parties and been demonstrated in the enthusiasm at Duilius' successes, was broken by the repeated catastrophes. That naval warfare was prohibited (presumably after agitation by tribunes) under the impact of the naval catastrophe of 253, is stated less clearly by Polybius, who only reports that the "Romans" acted collectively, than by Dio-Zonaras, whose version is clearly preferable in this instance to that of the Livian tradition: "When they (the consuls) were returning home, they were struck by a storm and their fleet was destroyed. Therefore the people believed the damage was due to lack of seafaring experience, and voted the order to keep off the open sea (i.e. waters outside the Italian coasts) and guard Italy with only a few ships."¹²

That this law at first remained in force for only a few years was due to the outstanding victory that Metellus as proconsul won in the winter break of 251–250 against the Carthaginians near Panormus, for which he was honored to an excessive degree, the basis for the later pride of the Metelli. What the consuls had not managed to do in the preceding years, the consuls of the year 250 wanted to achieve by ending the war with a crossing to Africa. In the euphoria brought on by the victory of Panormus they were able to get a decision from the citizen assembly that implicitly abrogated the resolution of 252 and expressly gave them the task of taking the fleet to Africa. The attack on the Carthaginian base of Lilybaeum undertaken by this fleet, now increased to 200 ships, was not intended to complete the conquest of Sicily; rather, the consuls C. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, who had already held office in 257 and 256 respectively and had led great naval forces, planned the capture as a curtain-raiser to the crossing to Carthage. However, the Carthaginian garrison at Lilybaeum offered unexpectedly determined resistance, and, in addition, a large Carthaginian relief force under the leadership of Hannibal was able to enter the city, so that the great operation was delayed and the Roman army, continuing the siege of the city during the winter break with only a part of its complement, got into serious difficulties. Furthermore, the Carthaginians used the standstill in Roman war activity to risk attacks with their fleet as far as Italy.¹³

The actions of P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul of 249, must be described against the background of this critical situation. His failure led to the most serious internal crisis in the long war, and also to the reimposition of the law

prohibiting naval warfare. In the original sortition of the *provinciae*, Iunius Pullus had been given the fleet with which he was to sail along the south coast of Sicily to Lilybaeum. Claudius had been given command of the land troops, with whom he marched along the north coast to support the troops besieging Lilybaeum. He was not satisfied with this rather limited military task, but had a large new fleet built outside Lilybaeum and trained selected troops for naval fighting, using brutal methods at times. The attempt to surprise the Carthaginian fleet near the second important Carthaginian base at Drepana was a total failure. Claudius was completely surprised when he was forced to recognize “that the enemy against expectation neither fled nor panicked in reaction to his attack” (Pol. 1.50.1). He was unable to regroup his fleet, part of which had sailed into the harbor of Drepana. A large number of the ships were sunk during the chaotic maneuvers, and others were captured by the Carthaginians.

Claudius’ tactical failure would in itself not have become his nemesis — in this respect the Roman people were still surprisingly lenient towards generals recruited from the nobility — but it was rather the way he behaved when he returned to Rome after Iunius Pullus’ fleet was destroyed in a storm and there were acrimonious and apparently physically violent discussions in the Senate about the continuation of the war. A faction of the aristocracy opposed to Claudius stripped the consul of the supreme command while he was still in office, by commanding him to appoint a dictator. Claudius countered by pointedly nominating his client Claudius Glicia as dictator, who *de facto* depended on his directions. This behavior is understandable in a conflict situation in which the precise power relationship of a magistrate and the Senate (fundamentally changed through the *lex Ovinia* in its recruitment and its position *vis-à-vis* the magistrate) was still not fully clarified, and in which self-assured consuls like Claudius did not regard themselves as executives of the Senate and nobility. Only at a second stage in the dispute did Claudius finally capitulate and in place of Glicia, who was forced to abdicate, appointed the seasoned consular A. Atilius Caiatinus as dictator.

The high-handed way Claudius exercised his office led to his prosecution after his year in office. In contrast to radical Greek democracy, impeachment was foreign to the Romans, as was the notion that neglect of the people’s interests should be punished. But in the psychologically charged atmosphere that must have prevailed after the defeats and catastrophes of 249, and which had an impact on religious cult, a few tribunes of the *plebs* saw a propitious moment for agitation and for gaining political cachet by initiating a prosecution of Claudius. The accounts of the historiographical sources, which are marked in part by an unfavorable legend about the alleged arrogance of the Claudii — a legend that only developed in the late Republic — do not reveal exactly what the object of this trial was, in what form it was handled, and in what way it was determined by the fundamental political problems of the day.¹⁴

Even Claudius Pulcher's alleged delict is unclear. Normally it is assumed that he was accused of having acted sacrilegiously in the rites immediately before the battle. According to K.J. Hölkeskamp's interpretation, however, the actual bases of the trial were the abnormal appointment of Glicia and Claudius' refusal to act according to the aristocratic code, while the religious offences were a mere pretext. An exact reading of the relevant passages about these alleged offences shows, however, that they have only indirect connections with the trial: the sacrilegious behavior during the augural rites led to the defeat for which in turn the ex-consul was put on trial.¹⁵ Presumably, the religious offenses were not the subject of the trial even on a formal level, but rather the method of warfare itself, which had severely harmed the Roman people. The charge in this impeachment, for which the tribunes of the *plebs* relied on official help from magistrates *cum imperio*, was probably the very vague act of "high treason," *perduellio*, which can be compared with the crime of *prodosia*, betraying the interests of the people, familiar from Athenian history. This also becomes clear in the oldest source on Claudius' trial, namely Polybius (1.52.3), for whom the sacrilege at the auspices was irrelevant: "Publius, however, was despised by the Romans and vehemently blamed for acting carelessly and without judgment, and because it was his fault that Rome suffered heavy losses. Therefore he was later put on trial, where heavy punishments and penalties were imposed on him."

The notion that magistrates needed to justify their mistakes never developed beyond very rudimentary beginnings at Rome. Nevertheless, this trial is not a unique case, but has parallels up to the trial of Servilius Caepio after the catastrophe of Arausio in Gaul (105 BC). These trials contrasted totally with the way the arrogant *nobiles* thought of their offices, and what was decisive in bringing them about was a situation in which agitating tribunes of the *plebs* were able to find allies amongst the nobility.

In view of the lack of sources written close to the time of the proceedings, it is difficult to tell whether in Claudius' trial the entire nobility sided as a body with the tribunes against Claudius the loner, and whether the trial is evidence for the so-called change in function of the plebeian tribunate in the Classical Republic, after which the tribunes acted no longer as representatives of the special interests of the *plebs* but exclusively as instruments of Senate policy. If one accepts accounts of the details of the trial in the later sources, the tribunes and nobility presumably did not form an impressive serried front against Claudius. The impeachment, initially presented before the *comitia curiata* by the tribunes with the official help of magistrates from the nobility, could not be carried through because other office-bearers who were loyal to Claudius were able to stop this trial through the usual means of obstruction such as successful observation of warning signs, *obnuntiatio* (Schol. Bob. 90 Stangl). Obviously, tribunes on Claudius' side raised objection to the

resumption of the impeachment (Schol. Bob., *ibid.*), even if they did not dare to go further in defense of the unpopular ex-consul. Owing to this resistance from the nobility, the tribunes Pullius and Fundanius, who were responsible for the prosecution, had to give up conducting the process before the assembly of the people and conduct a trial involving a fine before the *concilium plebis*, which ended in a money penalty for Claudius.

Close examination shows that Claudius' trial also fits the known picture of Roman domestic politics in the late Republic: amongst the tribunes, some, but by no means all, were prepared to tie themselves to the interests of the nobility, while by the same token the nobility was also split, and some supported the agitation of tribunes acting in the "people's interest," while others opposed it. It is also clear that popular agitation was profitable in the later career of Fundanius Fundulus, who was instrumental in conducting the trial, as he became an aedile in 246¹⁶ and consul in 243 — the *cursus honorum* was not yet established at this time. The fact that legends focused on only a limited number of personalities in Roman history meant that Fundanius Fundulus was forgotten as one of the great *populares* of the third century, and only few "ancestors" of the Gracchi, such as Flaminius, were remembered.

Claudius' trial was thus only one part of the agitation directed against the continuation of the naval war that had caused so much loss. At the same time — according to Zonaras in the year 247 — the prohibition of naval warfare already legislated in 252 "owing to the mishaps and the material costs" was renewed and made stricter through a plebiscite. It was not any new strategic orientation of a now reasonable nobility that was responsible for the return to land warfare in the following years, but rather a "popular" legislative initiative that was in future to protect the *plebs* from great material and human losses through reckless naval warfare by a few representatives of the aristocratic elite. In accordance with these conditions, the war could only be conducted in the following years as a series of rather small land operations in which the breakthrough promised by Fundanius Fundulus in 243 did not come, though there were some territorial gains. All the same the Carthaginians, though weakened by the long war, were able to maintain their hold, along with a few fortresses in the west of Sicily, on the grain-rich island of Sardinia above all, which was particularly important to the Carthaginian empire.¹⁷

After a few years of only moderately successful land warfare against the positions still held by Carthage and supplied by sea, the return to naval warfare could only be undertaken because, technically, the fleet fitted out by the two consuls of 242 was only a voluntary levy (Pol. 1.59.6). In this they took advantage of the fact that the Roman state had no monopoly on war operations in the third century, at least in naval warfare, and that in the years after 247 enterprising individuals waged a lucrative privateering and pirate war against Carthage often in apparently substantial operations (Zon. 8.16.8).

In this way, despite the lengthy pause in the naval war there were no difficulties in fitting out a new fleet. The force behind this was C. Lutatius Catulus, who succeeded in unseating his colleague by bringing into play suspicions of a religious nature; however, he then had to share command of the fleet with the praetor Valerius Falto, who self-confidently asserted his claim to a share in the glory.

Lutatius Catulus' decisive action brought him success only when the term of his consulate had expired and his time had already been extended, perhaps at the behest of his brother and successor in office Q. Lutatius Cerco. In this he — like many of his predecessors — appears to have proceeded with extreme intrepidity, in order to intercept the Carthaginian supply fleet heading in the direction of Drepana. From the sources it emerges that the consul gave the command to sail in spite of stormy weather. The risky undertaking turned out well, however, partly because the heavily laden Carthaginian ships were less maneuverable than the Roman ones. The victory at the Aegates Islands (241 BC) did not, however, end with the total destruction of the Carthaginian fleet, and it is also certain that the Romans suffered losses. They were still far from fulfilling their original more ambitious aim of attacking Carthage itself, an aim which had been formulated in the tradition of earlier ventures.¹⁸

As regards the motives that caused Lutatius Catulus to seek a peace accord after his naval victory, Dio-Zonaras writes: "The Carthaginians sent ambassadors to Catulus to negotiate a peace. He was inclined to end the war because his term of office was just expiring, because moreover he did not believe he could destroy Carthage in a short time, and because he did not want to give his successors the glory he had won with his own efforts" (Zon. 8.7.3). If one accepts Dio-Zonaras' account, it was not complete exhaustion that made Lutatius ready for peace, as Polybius (1.62.7) asserts, but rather the realization that there would not be enough time during the short extension of his command for a voyage to Africa, and that it was better for his own prestige to push through a peace treaty ending the war rather than give a successor the glory of the complete subjection of Carthage. For this reason peace conditions were dictated to Carthage that were remarkably moderate and, most notably, left the important island of Sardinia in Carthage's possession.

Being too favorable to Carthage, this draft treaty aroused violent protest at Rome, particularly from those whose ambition depended on the continuation of the war and an attack in Africa, and who were able to push through the rejection of the peace proposal by the citizen assembly.¹⁹ That the war was not continued was solely thanks to Lutatius Catulus' good fortune that his successor in the consulate was his own brother Lutatius Cerco, who by making a few clever modifications to the draft treaty was finally able to push through a ratification of the peace. Because the peace of 241 had been passed with an

extremely slender majority and in a climate of intense conflicts in domestic politics, it is not surprising that only a few years later, when Carthage had become defenseless, the treaty was “corrected” by forcing the cession of Sardinia, an especially bitter blow to Carthage.

A close examination of the vicissitudes of the First Punic War shows that this war would, on the one hand, not have been feasible for the Romans without a certain basic consensus between the members of the nobility, but that, on the other hand, concrete decisions were made in a very tense and conflict-ridden political atmosphere and that the picture drawn by Sallust of harmonious unity in the struggle against the external enemy is too one-sided to apply to this phase in the history of the Republic. The relatively great importance of the citizen assembly at this time, which in 264 gave Appius Claudius a special command against the reservations of the Senate, and in 241 refused to ratify the first peace treaty, cannot be explained by the fact that Rome at that time was a democracy but by the fact that, in the competitive struggle within the aristocracy, particularly great importance was accorded to the decision-making and arbitrating function of the citizen assembly, and that, owing to their engagement in naval warfare, broader sections of society were affected by political decisions.²⁰

Making use of the assembly to the point of demagoguery, in a way that is very comparable to the later period of the Gracchi, is only one partial aspect of an intense competitive struggle within the aristocracy which characterized the office-holding of many magistrates, who acted without solidarity when they ignored the allocation of *provinciae* or took care when making strategic decisions not to leave any part of the glory they had gained to their successors. The struggle to gain military glory explains to a great extent the imperial dynamic of the Middle Republic, but, on the other hand, it was practiced in ways that threatened the well-being of the entire state. Certainly at this period of competition within the aristocracy there were none of the extreme phenomena familiar in the Late Republic such as private armies and client soldiery, political murders and attempts by institutional means to preserve personal power contrary to *mos maiorum*. But in the barely bridled political ambitions of individual members of the governing class in the third century, we see patterns of behavior completely comparable with those of aristocrats in the later Republic. The much-quoted concept of “disintegration” is therefore inappropriate to describe the historical development of the nobility. “Disintegration” suggests that a governing class that had at first lived in harmony was more and more obviously falling apart, while in reality a bitter competitive struggle, constantly pushing at the boundaries of class solidarity, had been present from the beginning. Owing to the size of the empire, this competitive struggle was ultimately waged with weapons that shattered the Republic’s state institutions, which had always been weak in any case.

NOTES

1. In the main, the research findings of my monograph of 2002 (Bleckmann 2002) are summarized here in compressed form. For differing analyses of the history of the *nobilitas* of the Middle Republic see Beck 2005; Hölkeskamp 1987, 2004a, and 2006.
2. Caiatinus: Cic., *Cato Maior* 61; cf. Beck 2005, 230. Regulus: Bleckmann 1998. "Calm and stability": Bleicken 1975, 371f.; Staveley 1989, 444.
3. Cf. on this the numerous works by Hölkeskamp (see note 1).
4. Illusory marriage ties: cf. especially Lippold 1963; Càssola 1962; and for the collaboration between Aemilii and Fabii, Münzer 1920. Overview of the various branches of faction-theory: Hölkeskamp 2001. Relatives: cf. Beck 2005, 129f.
5. The quality of the relatively extensive narrative of Cassius Dio (mainly in the summary by Zonaras) is controversial. That it is of higher value than the Livian tradition (now too incomplete to be reconstructed) can be demonstrated in details such as the account of the unlucky journey of L. Cornelius Scipio in 259 or the peace of 241, in which according to Livy Sardinia was already given up.
6. The decision in 264: cf. also Bleckmann 2002, 63–77, with thorough criticism of the detailed account in Pol. 1.10–11. Carthaginians in no way menacing: cf. the criticism by Heuss 1970, 26f. Oscan mercenaries and Campanians: Bleckmann 1999. On the significance of the war against Volsinii: Millar 1989, 150; Bleckmann 2002, 68–70. This war was concluded by Fulvius Flaccus in 264 and not by Q. Fabius Gurgus in 265, cf. *CIL* 6.40895–96; *FTr* p. 547 Degrassi; Festus s.v. *picta*, p. 228 Lindsay; Propertius 4.2.3–4.
7. Eutr. 2.18.3 and 19.3; Sil. Ital. 6.661f.; Suet. *Tib.* 1. Cf. Bleckmann 2002, 78–84.
8. United and separate action by the consuls: Zon. 8.9.16; Naevius frg. 3, "Manius Valerius consul partem exerciti in expeditionem duxit." Details of M'. Valerius' campaign seem to have been reported also in the historical painting in the *curia Hostilia*: on Pliny, *NH* 35.22 cf. Molthagen 1979, 60–62; Bleckmann 2003, 88–90. From Pol. 1.16 by contrast it should not be inferred that M'. Valerius in this campaign sought possibilities for separate exploits. His nickname Messala: Bleckmann 2003, 90f. Campaign in western Sicily: cf. on this Hoyos 1998, 108–10. That Heuss 1970, 47, exclusively uses Polybius for his account of the completion of the campaign of 263 leads him to problematic conclusions on the supposedly limited nature of Roman war aims: cf. Bleckmann 2002, 93 n. 2.
9. On the capture of Agrigentum cf. Pol. 1.18.8–19 and Zon. 8.10.2–5, with Bleckmann 2002, 98–100. Rome's broader involvement after the capture: Pol. 1.20.1–2. The conscious formulation of the war aim (total expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily) signified no break with the previous conduct of the war in Sicily, but merely continued the previous course of expansion more deliberately and consciously than before. M'. Valerius and the grand fleet: *FGrH* 839 F 1, 4; on the date of this statement: Thiel 1954, 53. Polybius' account preferred: Thiel 1954, 188.

10. Duilius inscription: *ILLRP* 319; on the authenticity of the text: Bleckmann 2002, 116–125; Kondratieff 2004, 10–14. Duilius' exorbitant privilege: particularly clear in Florus 1.18.10; cf. further *Inscr. It.* 13.3, 13; *De vir. ill.* 38.4; Val. Max. 3.6.4; Livy, *per.* 17; Sil. *Pun.* 6.663–9. Votive temple: Beck 2005, 226 with reference to Livy 40.51.6. A different verdict on Duilius' later career, with arguments thoroughly worth consideration: Beck 2005, 227.
11. On the campaign of 257, which was carried on after the battle of Tyndaris: Bleckmann 2002, 157f. On kinship relations among the Reguli, correctly recorded by Zonaras 8.15.8: Beck 2005, 231 n. 11.
12. Aemilius Paullus' *columna rostrata*: Sehlmeier 1999, 119f. Constructing the fleets until 253 can only have been financed by sharing the costs, which particularly burdened the politically influential first class, cf. on the material burden Appian, *Sic.* 1.1. The later private involvement of leading citizens (Pol. 1.59) merely copied the method originally enforced by the state. On Nautius' unsuccessful agitation against Regulus' voyage cf. Bleckmann 2002, 180 n. 2. "When they were returning home": Zonaras 8.14.6. In the Livian tradition the Senate makes the decision (Eutr. 2.23; Oros. 4.9.12). On the preference for this tradition by Rotondi 1912, Eltester 2003, etc., see the arguments of Bleckmann 2002, 179 n. 2.
13. Voyage to Africa in 250 authorized by the citizen assembly: Zonaras 8.15.3, "They (the Romans) decided by vote that the consuls should sail to Africa." Carthaginian raids as far as Italy: Pol. 1.41.4. On the often problematic interpretations in the secondary literature: Bleckmann 2002, 183.
14. *Lex Ovinia* and Senate: Cornell 2000; Bleckmann 2002, 142. Psychologically laden atmosphere: cf. on the establishment of the first Secular Games in this time period Zosimus' admittedly very obscure report (2.4.1: due to plagues and wars; the "plagues" should refer to the epidemic in the winter-camp before Lilybaeum in 250–249, cf. Zon. 8.15.2); Censorinus, *de Die Natali* 17.10.
15. Hölkeskamp 1990; see Cic., *Nat. D.* 2.7; Schol. Bob. p. 90 Stangl; cf. Bleckmann 2002, 196.
16. In this period he again presented himself as the representative of popular interests by prosecuting Claudius' sister: Val. Max. 8.1, *damn.* 4; Gell. 10.6; Suet. *Tib.* 2.3.
17. Ban on sea warfare renewed: Zon. 8.16.2. Indirectly confirmed by Pol. 1.59.1. Against Walbank 1957, 125, cf. Bleckmann 2002, 192 n. 5. Fundanius Fundulus' certainty of victory: Diod. 24.9.2, cf. Pol. 1.59.1.
18. On Lutatius Catulus and Lutatius Cerco, and the original project of an expedition to Africa: Bleckmann 2002, 214–218 with ref. to Val. Max. 1.1.2, against Thiel 1954, 320.
19. Explicit on the motives for rejection: Zon. 8.17.5f. The fact of the rejection at Pol. 1.63.8, who in hindsight adduces constitutional reasons; cf. Pol. 3.21.2 and Livy 21.18.10.
20. Millar 1989. On this debate cf. Hölkeskamp 2006, 363 with n. 9.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Roman Politics and Expansion, 241–219

Luigi Loreto

“...what’s going to happen — that’s the question”. Poirot shook his head and murmured: “As you say, Mademoiselle — it is the future that causes one inquietude.”

A. Christie, *Dead Man’s Mirror*, 1932

There was no such thing as a second Thirty Years War of 1914–1945, and there was no such thing as Toynbee’s Great Roman-Carthaginian War of 264–201.

The main question is whether the years 241–219 make up a period as such; only then could they bridge the two wars in a continuity. There is a major divide in the characteristics of Roman foreign policy and grand strategy around 230. The years before show a return to what was typical of the years up to 264; in the years after, elements emerge that will typically mark the following half century.

241–219 is an *entre-deux-guerres* that was no such thing.

Going Back and Going Forward. (New) Gallic Frontier, Northern Quadrant, and Italian Federation

Without the revolution in grand strategy of 264, Rome would have spent the 250s conquering Cisalpine Gaul. From the 280s, if not before, she had been lurching toward a final solution to her historic Gallic peril, the major constant of her grand strategy in the last century and a half. Pol. 2.31.8’s domino effect

refers only to the strategic *niveau*: the unprecedented success of 225–224 eventually opened up the way to that final solution.

It was immediately after the Punic war in 240 and not merely 15 years later that Rome got back on her old course. The first Gallic campaign, which began in 240 and not, as usually maintained, in 238, was intended to be as important and definitive in its scope as that of 225–222. Only it was not successful from the beginning, and was prematurely concluded — let us say, postponed — because of growing difficulties with the Carthaginians. Nonetheless, it probably led to the foundation of Faventia as a Latin colony in 239.

But there is indeed something in the war of 225–222 that singles it out as being in a class of its own — its geomilitary *envergure* in two respects: the width and rapidity of the operations and the breadth of conception of the war plans.

It is easy to find a military explanation for the former. It lies in the topographical features of the area: there were no major geophysical obstacles and above all no major geohuman one, that is, no major fortified towns to be besieged — Mediolanum itself, the only thing comparable to a town, was easily stormed. There was very little, if any, Clausewitzian war friction.

In 225, in a strategy embracing the whole of her northern frontier, Rome deployed her own and her allies' forces so as to contain the Gallic push south into Etruria, to menace its flank from the northeast through an alliance with the Veneti and a corps at Ariminum, and to drive a wedge between Insubres and Boii in the north by the alliance with the Cenomani (Pol. 2.23.2, 5; 24.5–8), in order to be ready to counterattack as soon as the push was exhausted. This was, in fact, what happened. Notwithstanding its weakening by the garrisoning of Sardinia, the southern corps held the Gauls long enough to enable it to join the northeastern corps whose approach on its flank had obliged the enemy to retire; this led to a second pinch maneuver with the corps from Sardinia landing at Pisa, culminating in the victory at Telamon (Pol. 2.27–31.3). A counterinvasion of the Boii territory ended the campaign, preparing for the next (Pol. 2.31.4; Zon. 8.20.2). It should be stressed that there were *two* pinch manoeuvres at a strategic rather than merely operative level. As a rule this kind of plan is not the easiest to bring off.

A pinch maneuver appears to have been planned again in 223, this time an offensive against the Insubres, whom Rome attacked from the south, while the Cenomani attacked them from the east (Pol. 2.32.1–2). This is to be inferred from the fact that, after their initial defeat, the Romans did not retreat southward but moved eastward to join the Cenomani and renew the attack from their territory (Pol. 2.32.4; *Barrington Atlas*, T. 39).

In 224 and 222 they concentrated their forces in only one direction instead; in 224 to destroy the Boii, presumably moving from the southeastern base of Ariminum; in 222 joining the Cenomani from the southeast, that is, from the conquered Boii territory (Pol. 2.31.8, 34.3–5).

The war saw a major innovation as opposed to all preceding Gallic campaigns, including those of 240–236. That was the merging — operationally and strategically — of the two northern theatres, the Western, Ligurian-Northern Etruscan, and the Eastern, the Low Po-Gallic, once and for all. From now on it was conceived as a whole in Roman grand strategy. Lucius Aemilius moved from Ariminum to Faesulae and, after Telamon, attacked the Boii from Liguria — viz. from the rear (Pol. 2.26.1, 31.4). In 223–222 the attack on the Insubres was again directed from Liguria through the territory of the Ana(ma)res, crossing the Po probably at *Ad Padum*. The double triumph of 223, “de Galleis et Liguribus,” aptly epitomizes this.

A word on the Italian Federation. Tarentum was the unnoticed winner of the Punic war. On the other side, the Federation was on the verge of self-disintegration in the late 40s as a consequence of the never-ending war. This was what brought Rome to the *va-banque* of the Aegates campaign. It was Falerii’s fate to be chosen — and not casually — as the sacrificial victim to teach Italy a lesson and put the clock back to 264, the time of Volsinii. After Falerii’s destruction, Italy remained completely — almost ghostly — quiet. But Polybius’ collective security notation (2.23.12) highlights the true feelings of Rome’s allies toward an external war like the Sicilian one.¹

Going East?

On the eve of the First Punic War Rome was about to become the fifth great power of the Hellenistic state-system. At the end of the war no major Hellenistic chancery took her seriously as a contender for this position. *That* was the major effect of the 23-year war and its most immediate conclusion.

Just as she had in the 260s, Rome in 241 wished to become a member of the club. This is the reason behind her Alexandria embassy of 241, the embassy to the Seleucids shortly after, and, closer to home geopolitically speaking, of her endeavor to become the protecting power of Acarnania circa 239–236. The Aetolians’ insulting rebuff to this attempt shows, above all, how completely Rome had lost all her “prestige of power” even in the eyes of a regional state at the very periphery of that state-system. The somewhat more polite *fîn de non-recevoir* by Ptolemaic (and maybe Seleucid) chanceries only highlighted that. The contrast with 273 when Egypt, the only existing superpower, had approached her only stresses further the disastrous diplomatic effect that the war had had on Rome’s status in the game of international relations.²

The First Illyrian War represents a partial but major change, though not in its origins but in the settlement following its conclusion. The two moments may, indeed, be regarded as an expression of very different attitudes.

Geopolitically, the paramount power of the Italian Adriatic coast is automatically a major Adriatic sea power — even without possessing a permanent fleet — but it is not for that reason also a *Greek* power. Nothing supports the hypothesis that preconceived major interests existed in the area.³

Nothing points to economic imperialism. The fact that up to this moment the Roman government had always had absolutely no ear for requests for intervention (Pol. 2.8.3) proves quite the contrary. It has to be stressed how even the *démarche* of 230 seems to be taken unwillingly. The embassy is apparently a minor one — only two members and neither of consular rank (Pol. 2.8.3; differently Dio 12, frg. 49.2–3, 5; Zon. 8.19.4; and also Flor. 1.21.3; Pliny, *NH* 34.24; Appian, *Ill.* 7.17, probably throws in the Issaeen envoys with the two Roman ones).

Nothing points to political imperialism either. Had the Romans simply been seeking a pretext for war, the pirate attacks themselves would have been more than enough. The reluctant sending of an embassy proves just the contrary, that they did not like the very idea of involvement. Against, there is only Dio's tradition (Zon. 8.19.3), which depends on a late anti-imperialist annalist and gives no reason why it should be a mere *prophasis*.

Maps are to be read for what they show, not for what we think they (ought to) show. One might say that it was natural for Rome to control the Greek part of the Gulf of Otranto, and even all Illyria. But just as there is no such thing as a natural frontier other than in the minds of some politicians and historians, so control of the Adriatic coast of Greece is not a natural need for a main power in Italy. With her Adriatic colonies Rome had already secured her coast. And you do not need to defend what has already been created as a defence system.

According to Pol. 2.8.2–3, regional expansionism by Agron and thereafter by the dowager Teuta led to a recrudescence of piracy — among whose endemic victims were the Italians. After the seizure of a lot of their merchants Rome sent the inquiring embassy. The embassy went wrong, largely due to an unskilled junior envoy (Pol. 2.8.6ff.; to be noted that *völkerrechtlich* Teuta's response is correct, Coruncanius's a gratuitous insult). There followed an attack on the envoys with the murder of at least one (Pol. 2.8.12).

Though probably not ordered by Teuta — *contra* Fabius (Pol. *l.c.* and Flor. *l.c.*; Livy, *Per.* 21) — who would have acted (as did the dey of Algiers in the analogous case of 1827) directly during the audience (so indeed Dio 49.3–4) and not afterward, such a kind of episode has an inherent major gravity for the envoy-sending power and its prestige in any international system — in 1827 the French consul was only slapped. And this *as such* has to be stressed.

It was not because of the incident that Rome had to intervene — as is normally believed⁴ — but because of its position in the diplomatic scenario that had been unfolding in the region since the end of the Punic war. You simply

cease to exist as an international power if, after your ambassadors have been repeatedly laughed at (as by the Aetolians circa 239–236) you now also let them be killed.

Polybius (2.12.7) speaks of *aitiai* of this second “first transmarine *diabasis*” (the Sicilian being the first “first”) — a geopolitical view that manifestly appeals to him (see also Pol. 2.2.1). He gives none apart from the events he has just related in 2.8 — just like Liv. *Per.* 20, which points to Fabius as archetype. Accordingly, *these* events are what he means by *aitiai*. And he is right.⁵ The cause of the war is a strictly diplomatic one. *Rectius*, diplomatic in its origins, macrostrategical in its reasons: the reaffirmation of Roman military power as an instrument of dissuasion. A power that others badly needed to be reminded of.

It is the contingent episode of the attack on a major Italian trade convoy during the siege of Phoenice in circa 230 and the capture of many merchants which, by its magnitude, compels the Roman government to follow up — at least by sending an inquiry embassy — the protests of the Italians, first and foremost probably Tarentum; a major role by Syracuse is also not to be dismissed, above all — we might add — if one thinks of the autonomous diplomatic role that Hiero tried to maintain toward Rome.⁶ But the point to be stressed is that, if the two were the *Schutzmächte* of the Italiotes up to 272–261, now they were themselves part of the Roman system.

The dynamic must not be lost sight of. In this first phase, it is the major scale of the attack — bound to occur sooner or later, given the recrudescence of Illyrian expansionism and accordingly *not* a random incident — that makes it impossible for the Roman government to continue in its indifference toward the protests of the Italians. Otherwise Rome would have lost the main significance of her paramount role in the Federation, military protection. But equally significant is how little the Roman government intervened. Out of all the possible options, an inquiry embassy is the least.

In the second phase, Rome had to act militarily — now, as forcefully as she could — because she would otherwise have lost all her credibility as a major regional power in that periphery of the Hellenistic international system. Rome could simply not afford to tolerate such an episode, which was a major affront. In 229 the credibility of Rome in the Hellenistic system was at level zero, as Teuta’s very behavior shows. What had to be reasserted was the existence of Roman strength as such. The magnitude of the military apparatus employed, its disproportion to a simple higher police operation, is the clearest proof of this fact. Absolute discredit, not simply the “prestige of power” was at stake.

The stress that Pol. 2.12.5 (Fabius) puts on the *kathékousa philanthropia* with which the Roman envoys to the Aetolians and the Achaeans were received thereafter — and which probably goes back to their reports to the Senate — shows how badly this was felt to be needed by Roman diplomacy. Now the Aetolians, at least, no longer laughed at the Romans. These three diplomatic

facts combined, the Aetolian insult, the major affront by Teuta, and the due acknowledgment of 228 together with admission to the Isthmian games (Pol. 2.13.8), make the reasons for the First Illyrian War evident.

The new feature is that with the war Rome became a Greek landpower — a territorially minor one on the very periphery of the Hellenistic system, yet a major one in the neighboring western Mediterranean.

The embassies, also sent to Athens and Corinth (Pol. 2.12.8), show that Rome was aware of this and wanted to make sure that the Greek international community was aware of it too, though this did not mean that Rome pursued willingly, and from then on, a major involvement in Greece as such — which is something quite different. On the other hand, this was not an inevitable outcome of the war. Rome could have been satisfied with a perfectly successful demonstration of military power and left the Greek Adriatic coast to itself. Ready, and known to be ready, to come back any time it was needed.

To become Greek, to enter *territorially*, even at the periphery, into the Hellenistic international system, is a foreign policy choice, or at least one with foreign policy implications. There is no question of chance here. In fact, whether the identification of CIG 1837b (= IG XII Suppl., 200) as one of the treaties concluded by Rome after the war is correct or not — very probably not — there is no room for doubt — against the current trend — about the incorporation, in some more or less loose juridical form, of part of the Illyrian coast into the Roman (colonial) empire.⁷

Polybius (2.11.8, 10, 12) relates the *deditio in fidem* of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Issa, and of the Ardiaeans and Parthini tribes alike (2.11.10–11, 12.2). It should be remarked that the case is the same as for Messana in 264, and, probably in these very months, for Saguntum. Appian, *Ill.* 7.21 speaks of them *tout court* as *Romaion hypekooi* (subjects of the Romans), paralleled by Pol. 3.16.3, which, since it refers to the late 20s, is still more significant.

It is a false problem to look for a treaty, not simply because the sources do not always mention one when there is one, but because the formalization of a *foedus* was not an indispensable prerequisite to entering the Roman empire. The *deditio* did not need to end in a *foedus* and it put the *dediti*, inasmuch as they no longer existed as an international subject, within the Roman empire.⁸ The formula of protectorate is improper not for Eckstein's reasons, but because it implies survival as an international subject — whose external activity is mandated to the protecting state — which is not formally the case with a *deditio*, which extinguishes the *dediti* as a state.

Deditio is technically the juridical extinction of a state as such (compare *debellatio* or unconditional surrender in modern international law), which thereafter can be restored anew by Rome — which is the case, of course, when the *deditio* is only a formal expedient to achieve Roman protection, as by Messana or Saguntum. Surely the *archon* of Pol. 21.32.6 is not a permanent

Roman prefect as Mommsen supposed, but *that* should constitutionally have been the case. Accordingly, when the Romans — almost instantaneously (Pol. 2.11.6) — gave Corcyra and Apollonia their freedom back (Appian, *Ill.* 8.22), this is what they had lost by *deditio* — not, as maintained by Coppola, the freedom they lost to the Illyrians — and that can only mean their reconstitution as a subject of international law and the annulment of the *deditio*. But this applies only to the two towns and corresponds to the fact that the *deditio* here is expedient, as with Messana, not the consequence of a lost war. Annulment is not for Epidamnus and the tribes. This must also mean, there being no other alternative, that the others remained *dediti* — which again is the only thing that can technically be meant by *tattomenoi* of Pol. 3.16.3 applied to the late 20s. In any case it is also not wholly correct to assume that we have no trace of treaties as a *foedus aequum* can be rightly assumed for Issa.⁹

Finally, as regards Pharos we know it was among Appian's *hypekooi* (*Ill.* 7.21), which is consistent with the fact that it was surrendered by Demetrius — who was more probably its governor (Appian, *ibid.*) than its ruler (against Eckstein 1999). And since it was not among those which got their freedom back, but later appeared in Demetrius' possession, the only cogent conclusion is that it was among the territories Rome gave to him (Pol. 2.11.17; Appian, *Ill.* 8.22). That is to say that the Romans disposed of Pharos as being theirs, *not* that they gave it back to Demetrius. Accordingly, there simply could not have been a treaty with Pharos before the end of Demetrius' rule, which appears to be formally subordinate to Rome as Rome limits it temporally, a fact that usually remains unremarked (Appian, *ibid.*). A treaty, if any, could only have been with Demetrius. That is not to be excluded, as Rome gave him a principality and, it may be supposed, would have fixed his position by treaty.

Methodologically, the fact that there are no (major signs of) formal alliances does not necessarily mean political disinterest, it can also mean that there was no alliance simply because the territories were juridically in Roman possession. There are not two but three lines of hypothesis: disinterest, formal equilateral alliance, territorial acquisition (or a mixture of the last two). In the light of this, it is a somewhat distorted view to place the issue as one of "first Greek-Roman alliance," that is, the first willing and major Roman involvement in Greece proper.

If the specific events of 229, as such and no more, obliged *military* intervention, this does not mean that what followed was also obliged to happen. The Adriatic became an established Roman area of *political* control and on this basis Rome entered the Greek system. The paramount fact is the most obvious one. Rome redrew the political structure of the whole region. And, in this regard, the intensity of her direct political-territorial control is of secondary importance.

And this, the opening of a new quadrant, is a major change in Roman grand strategy and foreign policy. Whether Rome was conscious of the full implication for the future of this has to remain open. In effect, it appears more the consequence of an internal choice of means for grand strategy — specifically concerning the East — than of direct military-political, that is, territorial, presence, which is what in the same years leads to the creation of transmarine provinces.

In the organization of the aftermath of a war there is almost always a measure of chance and contingency and the influence of multiple factors that are different from that of an expansion policy. The case of Sicily 241–227/5 confirms that.

There are several points against Eckstein's recent thesis, which infers Rome's complete disinterest in Illyria from the complete absence of any major Roman political presence in Illyrian affairs after 228. It is true that nothing shows a major territorial interest, that is, a political bias, by Rome in Greece, not only before but even after the Illyrian war. But it is also true that a territorial-political presence on the Greek Adriatic coast does not necessarily prove the contrary, as Eckstein suggests.

Eckstein's error is to equate a major political presence there with a "... large and intentional Roman encroachment into Greek affairs," in other words, expansionism. But — and remember, we are at the farthest periphery — this is not necessarily true as a principle. Rome established a form of (direct) major political control of some areas of Illyria merely as *a contingent consequence of the war*; from this no compulsory conclusion follows as to her intentions toward Greece and the East. A domino effect may be just as intentional as unintentional.

Against the argument that Rome could have "created a coherent, contiguous stretch of Roman-dominated" territory "far inland" is that the opposite does not necessarily prove disinterest — for instance, Rome did not do that in Sicily up to 227/225. It could prove simply that Rome *could not* do that, viz. that she did not have the necessary military means. First, she would have had to extend her operations: one cannot see how the regions that had not been involved in the war could have otherwise been enclosed in a Roman zone. Rome did what she thought at the moment provided the best possible solution to the regional geopolitical problem using the means at disposal.

That Rome did not get more (territory) still does not prove that she got nothing, nor that she did not *want* to get anything. Simply, Rome could not get more operationally and, above all, any attempt at getting more would have implied the real risk of a major war with Aetolia and Macedonia. Besides, given the reason for war, Rome did not need to get more. The war was not a war of conquest.

The existence of a territorial Roman presence is confirmed from another point of view, by the reason given by Polybius for the following war (3.16.1, 4). This can mean nothing else but a pre-emptive strengthening of the part of the

Roman Federation beyond eastern Italy before the coming war with Hannibal. If Rome had been “completely absent” from Illyria, as Eckstein maintains, there should have been no grounds for that.

Behind Polybius’ report of this pre-emptive move is his *first* mention of Macedonia as a major factor in Roman grand strategy representations (3.16.4). The Roman problem in 219 is to avoid a situation whereby Demetrius’ local imperialism could degenerate into a Macedonian push towards the Adriatic. The so-called Second Illyrian War — which is no more than a colonial police operation against a local gangster and minor vassal who has begun to think of playing foul — is less the *prolegomenon* to the First Macedonian War than the *paralipomenon* of the war of 229–228.

The geostrategical peril is not so much the hypothesis of Macedonian expansionism toward Italy — *à la* Pyrrhus — or of an anti-Roman alliance of Carthage and Macedonia — in which Macedonia cannot have been thought interested, even by the most neurotic Roman senator — but of regional Macedonian expansion towards the Adriatic — encroaching on Demetrius’ own. This could have included an attack on Roman Illyria to which Rome could not but respond with a major war, which would have dangerously doubled Hannibal’s war. This is less than and different from Holleaux’ thesis of *current* conflicting Roman and Macedonian imperialisms,¹⁰ and does not pre-suppose that Demetrius was already a Macedonian agent or that there was already any push towards the Adriatic; but rather the contrary, because, with the Hannibalic war impending, Rome could not risk offending Macedonia. It was just to pre-empt the future.

And these — no less, but also no more — are the first unintended consequences of the territorial involvement of 228.

From Paradox to Paradox. The Carthaginian Factor

The geostrategical effect of the First Punic war for Rome — if any — was not the surrender of Sicily but to have conjured up a major enemy from a natural and traditional friend. The Carthaginian factor in Roman grand strategy had completely turned about. The paradox is that in the first five or six postwar years Rome tried to cope with this by simply convincing herself that this was not the case — at most by completing a presumed forward defense line by seizing Sardinia and Corsica. This happened in the middle of summer 237 — after accepting a request for help from the mutinous mercenary garrison against the natives in 238 — through imposing on Carthage (too weakened by the Libyan insurrection to risk a new war) an additional protocol to the 241 peace treaty.

During the insurrection Rome's attitude varied from active logistical help to Carthage to hostile stiffness. In 235–233 Carthaginian agents supported native resistance against Rome and, above all, Punic warships operated in Sardinian waters easily finding a base in some of the island's ports. Rome tried to dislodge them with an ultimatum — a mere bluff, that was soon called by Carthage, thus inflicting a debacle on Rome's coercive diplomacy. The sources (Zon. 8.18.9, 12; Gell. 10.27.3–5) have been almost unanimously rejected. Unjustly, for this goes against the principle of anomaly, as it allows no room for the only legitimate argument, that an error occurred in Zonaras's summarizing process, since nothing points to the usual sleight-of-hand, an annalistic invention: Rome comes out humiliated.

The reason for doubt — Carthage's presumed weakness — is to be reversed: everything shows that, even after the insurrection, this was not the case.¹¹ In 231 a much more prudent *démarche* was taken, sending an inquiry embassy to Hamilcar in Spain — possibly in order to exert some form of pressure — whose only result was an ironical rebuff (Dio 12, frg. 48). Far from being the paramount power in western Mediterranean, Rome was not only unable to expel the Carthaginian navy from Sardinian ports — which she thus appears not to have been in a condition even to occupy by land — but the very calling of her bluff in 233 attests that nobody in Rome could think of a new war even at the price of diplomatic disaster.

No linear clarity is to be found in Roman behavior between 241 and 233 because there was none. Different political lines coexisted, prevailing by turns and accordingly presenting a confused picture. Actual appeasement lying behind a general return to a traditional grand strategy and foreign policy, whose first expression is the Gallic war of 240 and which informs the help to, even the collaboration with, Carthage during the first stage of the insurrection, coexists with a harder line that employs the chance of 238–237 to fulfil the objective dating back to 261 of securing a glacis in the Tyrrhenian islands.

One simple fact is extremely revealing. In the extreme Carthaginian situation *nobody* in Rome thinks of renewing the war.

The conclusion is that if a lesson had been learnt in Rome, by *everybody*, from the catastrophic course of the 23-year war, it was that a continental power could not defeat Carthage. The reverse was also true, of course — but it was not Carthage that had started that war. Certainly, in 201 she was defeated, but only due to being falsely overstretched by Hannibal. Even “hawks” are not blind.

The Ebro Treaty

Really too much has been written on the Roman-Carthaginian Convention of circa 226–225,¹² the so-called Ebro Treaty — which it is not correct to label as “Hasdrubal's Treaty,” as proposed firstly by Badian, not least because the

initiative came from Rome and not from Hasdrubal.¹³ Contrary to the modern way of thinking, correctly placed in its context it is not strange in itself. As a very good historian, Polybius knew that it was a minor fact. He refers only *incidentally* to the Convention — something that is usually ignored — in no more than four lines.

The questions that ought to be posed, and are usually not, are two: to whom and why was the demonstration that the Convention had been violated important as a *Schuldfrage* of the Hannibalic War?; and for which of the two powers was it a diplomatic victory and for which a defeat? Since the first question does not belong here — though the answer is: Carthaginian internal politics — we shall deal with the second.

At its core the convention at least provides that the Carthaginians would “not cross the river to make war” — *epi polemoi diabainein* means more than simply “cross in arms,”¹⁴ it refers to the crossing by a great army to conquer. The Convention accordingly draws a line of demarcation, which is a purely military one. One cannot but think of what a great historian has written about British strategy in the nineteenth century: “The first strategy was the line not to be crossed. The drawing of a line on the map, accompanied by a warning...not to cross it...To be effective, Britain had to draw the line across a region in which the rival showed little or no interest: it must be unlikely to cross the line, except to give a signal that it was escalating a crisis.” And geopolitical lines already had a long tradition in Roman-Carthaginian relations.¹⁵

Seemingly, it is Rome that imposes a limit on Barcid expansion. In reality, it is Rome that recognizes not only the Barcid Spanish empire but is committed to respecting its extension — in the future — over almost the whole of Spain, as about 6/7 of it lies south of the Ebro. It is improbable that the Barcids could have pursued a conquest of the remaining northern sector, substantially the Greek one, since it would have required long and complex military operations — sieges — when it would have been more simple — and more in the Carthaginian way of warfare — to strangle the Greeks navally and economically. Moreover, the Convention did not exclude — implicitly, it allowed — treaties, commercial or even of alliance, with the Greek communities.

Though Rome had no interests whatsoever in Spain it does not follow that she — conceding what she had not and had no interest in — conceded nothing. She recognized an empire and its future expansion — which is by no means insignificant if one remembers that she had tried to stop Barcid subimperialism diplomatically six years earlier.

What Rome gets from the bargain is the juridical guarantee — albeit an implicit one — that the Carthaginians will not join forces with the Gauls from the north. Crossing the river to make war means going east over southern Gaul. A politics of contingent appeasement is also the one recognized by Pol.

2.13.6 behind the Convention. But, above all, the Convention has a specific contingent military function for Rome — usually unremarked¹⁶ — which links it, on the immediate strategic *niveau*, with the impending Gallic war. Its function is to give the Romans a separation zone between Gauls and Spanish Carthaginians and, accordingly, an immediate reaction time. While before the convention Rome had no right, under international law, to ask the Carthaginians for an explanation of any military movements in the Pyrenean area and, diplomatically, would not even have had the time needed to understand whether these were intended for an invasion of the Cisalpine or not, the Convention now gave the means, not only to question immediately but, beforehand, to control any dubious movement.

Before 226–225 any Carthaginian army could move towards the Pyrenees and also cross them. Any such movement would have been explained through the usual slow diplomatic channels as regional operations. By virtue of the Convention, it now constituted *eo ipso* an anti-Roman act, and accordingly the Roman government would know immediately that it was under attack. The Convention has a specific military function, which represents the true gain for Rome in the contingency. And she deals directly with the Barcids and not with Carthage because this function relates to Barcid Spain as such and to it alone. All this has absolutely nothing to do with the concept of sphere of influence, which was sometime *à la mode*.

To understand who was the diplomatic winner one has to refer the drawing of the line to the two opposite categories of *uti possidetis* and *ne plus ultra*. In the first case it would be a prohibition to any further expansion; in the second, the recognition of even a *future* empire, and accordingly the legitimacy of Barcid Spanish subimperialism as such. The greater this possibility of expansion, the bigger the weakness of those who conceded it.

As Barcid territory ended at most a little north of Akra Leuke, according to the *opinio constituta* from Sumner (1967),¹⁷ that is, at the very least 300 km. south of the river and, above all, since the Ebro was the most northerly line conceivable, the concession was the greatest thinkable — short of an improbable drawing of the line in southern Gaul. And, historiographically, that is why Carcopino looked for a textually impossible alternative to the Ebro like the Júcar. Whether the Romans negotiated, or not, among different possibilities, or decided from the beginning to offer the Carthaginians the best one, it was the outermost *ne plus ultra*. Accordingly, the Convention was the greatest diplomatic defeat for the Romans. Temporal urgency — due to a real or supposed imminent Celtic offensive — is the worst enemy in diplomacy.

Materially, in fact, the Romans exchanged nothing for nothing. That is to say, they gave what they did not have and were not even interested in having to gain time against an imaginary Carthaginian-Gallic coalition. The bargaining *as such* and the *geopolitical* extension of nothing given singles out the

substance of the diplomatic defeat, the recognition of a militarily, that is geos-
trategically, major difficulty — inferiority to the Carthaginians.

This is clear also from the very simple diplomatic principle that the weaker power is the one that “comes.” The Barcids are seeking nothing, not even to be let alone, as they are ready to respond by force. It is the Romans who seek what amounts, by its immediate geomilitary usefulness, to a typical treaty of reassurance. And Roman awareness of military impotence — in means and geography — is behind Pol. 2.13.5.

On the Carthaginian side, to adhere to the Convention — this manifest Roman weakness notwithstanding, which could only be an invitation to do exactly what was feared — reveals a true and typically Punic desire for peace in the long run on the part of the new Barcid chief, in a momentous change from Hamilcarian revanchism. Hasdrubal could easily have simply refused any conventions at all, leaving a more or less phantasmagorical menace impending on Rome within the critical scenario of the Gallic threat — with the effect of diverting military forces. Nor could Hasdrubal have feared a war with Rome after the defeat of the Gauls. The refusal of less than a treaty was not enough of a pretext, and Rome, clearly now so weak, would have also been weak, or weaker, after a Gallic war.

Saguntum

Somewhat elliptical in its dating, Pol. 3.30.1 says that “many years” before Hannibal’s office Saguntum made a *deditio in fidem* to Rome. If he is not mistaken, it was probably 228/227.¹⁸

Two things usually go unremarked: it was not Rome’s initiative and it was something different from an alliance. From this follows that (1) the political interest was principally Saguntum’s not Rome’s; clearly the Saguntines preempted a Carthaginian submission. (2) As *dediti* the Saguntines were formally a part of the Roman empire; that this remained theoretical takes nothing from the real function, that in the event of attack it was Roman space that was involved. As indeed the Romans would promptly remind Hannibal (Pol. 3.15.5).

At Saguntum history repeats itself; it is Messana 264 all over again.

Rome had no direct interests in Spain — that is, her only wish was to control Carthage — and Saguntum’s offer could have been a source of political embarrassment vis-à-vis the Barcids. Though surely not pleased, the latter could not formally oppose. Rome could not have refused if she wanted to remain a major power. Besides, she could take some revenge for the rebuff of 231 and obtain an observation post. Polybius (3.15.13) shows that Rome knew how Saguntum could become a useful base.

Rome's military dispositions and grand strategy

Rome's military dispositions of 225 are highly instructive as to the main preoccupations of her grand strategy. With an impending major Gallic war, her main concern was a defensive one in the outer Mediterranean space. Almost 40% of the total available military force of 11 legions was deployed in Sardinia (two legions, admittedly with a double function, covering also the flank of maritime Etruria: Pol. 2.23.6, 27.1; cf. 24.3), Sicily, and Tarentum (one legion each: 2.24.13). A major reserve in Rome — *contra* Walbank, of not four but five legions — was obviously able, given its central position, to hurry northward or coastward (Pol. 2.24.9). It was the first time since 240 that a major military corps had been located in Sicily, let alone Tarentum.

It is apparent from a glance at any map that the geostrategical concern, indeed major nightmare, behind all this is a seaborne attack by Carthage. This configuration does not contradict the significance of the Ebro Convention, it completes it, as the Convention covered only a terrestrial northwestern attack route but gave no possibility of warning of an attack by sea. The configuration covers instead all possible areas for landings; it should be remembered — against Brennan — that Tarentum looks southwards, as the Carthaginians well knew, from as recently as 272, not eastwards.

The nightmare scenario is not so much a coalition or even alliance as the Carthaginians using the Gallic attack for a seaborne offensive to regain the islands at least. That nothing of the sort happened is the best proof that nothing of the sort was in store at Akra Leuke, let alone at Carthage. It was a *cauchemar* and a doubly false one, being both belated and unreal. As usual, bad digestion left over from the years 235–231 was the cause.

Anyone who, like Rich, denies the role ascribed to Carthage by Polybius (2.22.10–11) is thus not to be followed. The point is not the reality of the threat, but its perception in Roman grand strategy — which is maximal. Again, as in 264, it is a case of mirror thinking.

The Ebro Convention in turn, in its militarily contingent function, confirms what Polybius expressly says: the Roman government planned on the assumption of an imminent major war with Carthage. The convention's scope was not to de-escalate this impending peril but only to pre-empt a specific strategic event, a double Punic and Gallic attack — or, more precisely, to gain the necessary reaction time.

Just when Hamilcar was brooding over the bitterest revenge policy, everyone in Rome was trying to convince themselves that the Carthaginian peril was over. They understated the intentions of Carthage — at least of the Barcid faction — in the early 230s.

Slowly, during the mid 230s, a change in perception began which led, in the mid 220s, to another, opposite paradox, the third since 264. When the new Barcid leader appeared to be a truly Punic peace-oriented one whose politics — at least in the medium term — were concentrated on an inner and pacific consolidation of the Spanish empire (Pol. 2.13.1, 36.2; Diod. 25.11.1), Rome assumed an impending major aggression as certain.

When considering the events from the Roman viewpoint it is not so important how much this follows from a correct perception or from a growing paranoid anamorphosis. In any case, Rome's timing of her perceptions of the role of the Carthaginian factor seemingly failed twice.

Restoring the Prestige of Power. Grand Strategy, Constant Means, and New Perspectives

From at least the beginning of the third century BC the traditional instrument of Roman grand strategy was the use of military force in coercive diplomacy. Immediately after Catulus' peace Rome, in a war that was as short as the army deployed was disproportionate, destroyed Falerii and deported its population — an act of extreme arrogance, which was meant, and meant to be known, as such, because as such it had its own function and logic. In these very months a seemingly strange offer was made to Egypt: a major military aid in its Syrian war.

After a war that had been a very close thing, that had not been won, but had merely not been lost, and that, above all, had lasted 23 years, it would be no surprise if your reputation as major military power appeared to have evaporated somewhat. This — restoration of the “prestige of power” constituting the most important instrument of Rome's grand strategy — is the reason behind these otherwise disconcerting episodes.

Unsurprisingly then, the forces deployed against Teuta — a consular army and 200 ships, that is, as great as in the climatic moments of the Punic war — are disproportionate to the kind of enemy involved, a bunch of pirates (Pol. 2.11.1, 7). It is precisely its disproportionate nature that is the major and first true meaning of the campaign that was mounted: the answer to a major diplomatic affront was an almost total mobilization of Roman military power. This is the typical logic of massive retaliation. This show of force — of *real* force — paid its dividends with the respect accorded afterwards to Roman embassies.¹⁹

The Second Illyrian War too has a dissuasive function as its main cause. The local gangster who defied his boss (Pol. 2.16.4) must get due punishment,

not to pre-empt a local threat or the loss of local influence — as has been maintained — but because not responding adequately could foster Macedonian designs on the area, which Rome would then be obliged to counter at the sensitive moment of a great war with Carthage. A firm response signals that Rome is not ready to admit challenges.

Again, in 225 and above all 224 (Pol. 2.31.9; Zon. 8.20.2), it is on the enormous concentration of forces — both consular armies — that the Romans count as an instrument of major psychological persuasion to compel the Boii to surrender. And — be it remarked for the first time — the publication of the *formula togatorum* is a dissuasive act *par excellence* — a pure exhibition of power. Let the enemy know what power lies before him, and then let him choose. This has always been the practice of every great power. It is more useful to allow some kind of military data to be known — maybe even overstated — than to keep them secret.

Now and then even senators have dreams. Around the early 220s someone in the Roman Senate began to have some great visions. In plans and dispositions, as in politico-strategic activity as a whole that reveals a perception of geopolitical and geomilitary interaction, lies a greatness of vision that even marries Spain to Illyria. When we read Polybius we look at something drawn in highly cartographical contours, and what we see in reading him is what the decision-makers themselves envisaged.

It is something unprecedented in Rome's decision-making. Macrostrategically, the Punic War singled itself out by a somewhat restrained geographical vision. Even if there was already a geocartographical perception of grand-strategy space, it was not on this scale. The key thought inspiring the Ebro Convention was the link between a Gallic war in Cisalpine Gaul and a Carthaginian attack from Spain; behind the Second Illyrian War it was the link between the latter and an eastern Greek crisis.

The military dispositions of 225 are of unprecedented complexity in Roman military history. They show how Rome thought geostrategically about Italy and her outer defence in the case of a double war. Sardinia is even ascribed a dual role, as forward defense against the Carthaginians and an unforeseeable threat to the flank of a Gallic force advancing southward in Etruria — as the complex amphibious operation undertaken by Regulus shows. As such, it is more akin to the war-plan against Carthage for 218 and the Scipionic strategy of the second decade of the century than to anything in the First Punic War.

The Gallic War not only singles itself out by the breadth and high complexity of its operations, whose successful execution attests a great capacity for coordination and accordingly for intelligence and communication (e.g. Pol. 2.26.1, 27.1, 27.4, 28.1, 32.4) that was not to be found in the Punic war, but also and unprecedentedly merges two historically separated frontiers into one, no minor change as regards Roman geostrategical representations of Italy. It

is difficult not to link this manifestly new, structural ability to think in terms of interactions between quadrants, which in turn points to a new, more agile and broader strategic mentality, with a generational change in Roman decision-makers.

A territorial colonial empire is a form of grand strategy. It was not Rome's grand strategy until 227/225, but a conscious one afterwards. Then a praetor was sent to Sardinia and to Sicily,²⁰ but there was no permanent introduction of a new magistrate, simply because there could not be according to the Roman constitution. And also because it is not what Zonaras (8.19.10) says about the reason for the renewed Sardinian rising. Otherwise he would have stressed that the introduction of a *permanent* governor caused it.

It is interesting when one considers Sicily to note that Sardinia, which was practically in a permanent state of insurgency, did not become the *provincia* of an properly appointed magistrate for at least nine years, remaining always within that of the consuls. If that was the case with Sardinia, how much more so should it be for a pacified territory like Sicily. After the peace-keeping operations of the brothers Catuli as consul and proconsul in 240, no Roman magistrate and accordingly no significant garrison was sent there until 227/225 other than, perhaps, a quaestor at Lilybaeum with a few troops, who, constitutionally, in his very function as auxiliary of the consul, stressed the very interim status of the island.

The solution that was adopted in 227/225 cannot necessarily be thought to have been considered definitive and permanent. Though it eventually became so, we cannot say if this would have been the case without the Hannibalic War. But it reveals a new constitutional device designed for the military scenario in the sense of a direct and more stable inclusion in Roman juridical and military space. The same conception lies behind the Illyrian settlement, for the *dediti* as such were a part of Roman territory *tout court*.

In the mid 230s Carthaginian warships — and they could not have been merchant vessels, otherwise there would have been no problem — were in some Sardinian (western/south-western?) ports (Zon. 8.18.12). The historian who puts the question of where sea power lay in the western Mediterranean after 241 finds his best answer here. Another is to be found in the conception of the 225 deployment, that of an outer glacis covering *by land*, with the allocation of major *armies*, all possible areas of seaborne attack. This reveals how little Rome thought of herself as controlling the Mediterranean. She did not rely on sea power, she feared that a major attack would likely be mounted from the sea; what this underlines is that she thought Carthage perfectly able to do that and herself not even able to contest it offshore.

In 264 Rome was indeed a naval power, but not of the first rank. She did not conquer Carthage at sea. Until 229 we hear nothing of Roman fleets, only of their absence — though some ships would certainly have escorted troops to

Sardinia and Corsica (Zon. 8.18.7). The 200-strong fleet of 229, a mammoth overdeployment for the task in hand, is the show of strength expected from those who have not shown it before. It also testifies to the fear that something could otherwise go operationally wrong in a complicated amphibious campaign. Only such a great display of force could hope to cope with an enemy operating the centuries-old practice of naval guerrilla warfare; and yet, even so, a far from minor disaster was faced at Nutria (Pol. 2.11.13). Operationally, Rome made the right choice. Of the 200 ships it is to be assumed that, on these very grounds, many were triremes, as smaller and lighter units were more appropriate for the waters and more suitable for dealing with the swift Illyrian *lembi*. The campaign showed how Rome had remained committed to the mere ancillary role of her navy in terrestrial operations which had informed the Punic war.

There was no Roman master-spy at Pella in 241, probably not even in 229. Someone might have been there in 221, the knowledge of the renewed Macedonian strength providing the background of intervention against Demetrius.

The repeated paradoxes in the false statement of Carthage's policy confirms the absence of any major intelligence that characterized the Punic War. On the other hand Rome reacted immediately, even anticipating Gallic moves in the years around 225 (Pol. 2.22.7–8, 23.2, 23.5; Oros. 4.13.5). The alliance component of her grand strategy reveals an unmistakably good knowledge of political intra-realities of Cisalpina, just as the soundness of the plans and their execution reveal a corresponding knowledge of its geography. Just as before, there is a major contrast in intelligence quality. The reason lies in the different cultural context. Rome had long known the Gauls and had a mentality much closer to theirs than to that of the Carthaginians.²¹

NOTES

1. On the concept of grand strategy Loreto 2006, 62 ff.; on the Roman one between the 280s and 220s, Loreto 2007. For the first war cf. Loreto 2007, 144 ff.; for Faventia, 148–149; Liguria, 150–152; for the parafactual scenario, Loreto 2001, 101 ff. My ensuing strategical analysis is new; among traditional narratives, with which I do not agree on all points, the best is still de Sanctis 1967, 1.296–309; see also Dyson, 29–34. On the Italian Federation: see Loreto, 2007, 135 ff.; 143–144, and *infra* Chapter 19.
2. See Loreto 2007, 153–169.
3. Instead for economic interests, e.g. already in de Sanctis, 1.283, 284, 287; above all in Càssola 1962, 229–230; Harris 1979, 196, stresses the defence of trade. Against Càssola, if the interest had been introduced by the Punic war (a) Polybius would have remarked on it and (b) one does not see then why military

- intervention should have materialized only thirteen years later. *Status quaestionis* in Càssola 1962, 230–231, and also de Sanctis, 288; afterwards Harris, 196–197; de Souza 1999, 76–80, who reads Polybius wrongly twice.
4. E.g. Eckstein 2008, 41, does not explain why war became inevitable *just now*.
 5. Now Eckstein 2008, 36 ff., strictly follows Polybius too (also Gruen 1984, 1.366).
 6. For Syracuse, Eckstein 2008, 33–34. Singularly Eckstein — who incorrectly focuses on Brundisium, a Messapian town with a superimposed Roman colony (i.e. garrison) — does not think of Tarentum. On Hiero: Loreto 2007, 159.
 7. For the identification: Derow 1991, 261–270; similarly later Coppola 1993, 116 ff. Against, besides our own arguments *infra*, see Eckstein 1999; and 2008, 45 ff. Trend, e.g. Gruen 1984, 1.17, 25; 2.367–368; and now Eckstein 2008, 52–53, 56–57; and *passim*, with a very good *status quaestionis*, 42 ff.; and also Coppola 1993, 119–127 who speaks of equal treaties and no Roman political control, but rests on a double *petitio principii* (124) and does not perceive that even so, from the Roman point of view, there could not but be a political involvement. A misunderstanding of foregoing historiography in Derow 1991, 267.
 8. From a different approach a similar conclusion in Dahlheim 1968, 55 n.9; 85 n.8, expanded with interesting observations by Ferrary 1988, 30–33, 42–43; and 29, 31, on source silence.
 9. Cf. de Sanctis 1967, 1.293 n. 96. The complete source dossier on the ensuing juridical statuses in de Sanctis, 291–3. Corcyra and Apollonia: Appian, *Ill.* 8.22: de Sanctis, 293 n. 97; Coppola 1993, 120–121. Against Mommsen, de Sanctis, *ibid.* The following discussion is of Eckstein 2008, 29 ff.
 10. *Status quaestionis*: Eckstein 2008, 63 ff., also against but for very different reasons, and whose thesis (68) is self-contradictory; if Rome had such a small interest in Illyria she would have had no grounds for pre-emption against Demetrius or, at least, the problem could have been deferred to the end of the war with Hannibal. On the contrary, the very urgency of a pre-emption shows the importance allocated to the situation.
 11. Protocol in Schmitt *SV4* 3, no. 497; for Sardinia, Hoyos 2007, 154 ff., 248 ff.; Heftner 2007; Loreto 2007, 246, 248, 250. *Id.*, 122, 249–252, for events in 236–233, who did not think it necessary to reaffirm historicity, as is now done here — literature against now in Hoyos 2003, 61, 247–248 n. 7; add Rich 1996, 19; an exception is Seibert 1993a, 35–36. Roman attitudes during the insurrection: Loreto 1995, 196 ff.
 12. A good discussion of chronology in Hoyos 1998, 154–158. Being concluded with a local though semi-independent authority — the Spanish *strategos* — and not with the metropolitan government it was technically not a treaty but a convention; Polybius speaking both of *synthekai* and *homologiai* is correct only in the second case. Rome had no need and no time to have it ratified by Carthage. The point is usually not stressed (only in Mazzarino 2003, 138, 147; Walbank 1967, 168).
 13. *Status quaestionis* in Schmitt *SV4* 3, 205–207; Càssola 1962, 246 ff., and Hoyos 1998, 158 ff.; add now Rich 1996, 2–3; Eckstein 2006, 170–171; highly original, Mazzarino 2003, 121 ff., 136 ff. Sources: Schmitt, *SV4* 3, no. 503.

14. Such as Walbank 1967, 168; Badian 1980, 161; Scullard 1989a, 28; too mildly also Schmitt *SVI* 3, 205. Already correct instead: de Sanctis, 1.400. Not only theoretically ... minor armed parties could then cross the line.
15. Ingram 2001, 129. For geopolitics in the Roman-Carthaginian treaties cf. Loreto 1995–6 (published 2000).
16. A military nature: also Eckstein 1984, 61; 2006, 170; but he does not specify its meaning and its contingent character, which cannot be a mere “warning off.” *Petitiones principii* vitiate Walbank 1967, 169.
17. E.g. Badian 1980, 63; Scullard 1989a, 31; Eckstein 1984, 60; Huss 1985, 276–277; Rich 1996, 2, 20; Hoyos 1998, 172.
18. The reference to Hannibal’s office, to be meaningful, implies that the *deditio* occurred in the era of his predecessors; after 226 and up to 222 Rome, after conceding so much in the Ebro Convention, would not have run the least risk of alienating the Barcids; and in Hasdrubal’s very first years Rome appears less preoccupied with Carthaginian enmity as she undertakes without fear the Illyrian war. *Status quaestionis* in Hoyos 1998, 178 ff. If a mistake, the likeliest is the simplest, an exchange of months for years, as 222 would be the perfect year.
19. See Loreto 2007, 112–123; Falerii, 114–115, 136, 143; Alexandrian embassy, 122, 159 ff., for whose historicity also now Heftner 2004, but with a different explanation (offer of mercenaries), which I do not agree with. “Disproportionate nature”: it is incongruous to doubt the notice without arguments and then remark on the “enormity” of the expedition as does Gruen 1984, 2.360.
20. On the creation of the provinces Dahlheim 1977, 51–53; 65 ff.; Brennan 2000, 1.89–95; following observations mainly ours. On Sicily also Loreto 2007, 274–277.
21. See also Loreto 2007, 133–135.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Carthage in Africa and Spain, 241–218

Dexter Hoyos

Defeat in the First Punic War radically changed Carthage's position in the western Mediterranean and, ultimately, her geopolitical priorities. Until 241 BC her great-power preoccupations outside Africa had been islands: especially Sicily and Sardinia where she dominated large tracts of territory. The peace with Rome in 241 expelled her from Sicily and, as we shall see, not long after the Sardinian province was lost too. At home, political relationships took on forms that were simultaneously new and old. In the end it proved impossible for the Carthaginians to avoid a second confrontation with Rome — nor perhaps did they wish to.

Domestic Politics before the Truceless War

For much of her history Carthage's political life had been dominated by military leaders: the long-lasting supremacy of Mago and his descendants from circa 530 to circa 396, most of them successful generals, was only the most notable. Whether military families or particular generals were similarly dominant in the era of Carthage's famous enemies Agathocles and Pyrrhus (320–270) or during the first part of the First Punic War is not known, but by the 240s the leading political figures were again military. In North Africa a vigorous general Hanno, conventionally called “the Great,” was pushing the borders of Carthaginian hegemony further west and southwest, while, in the increasingly forlorn war with Rome in Sicily, the commander was Hamilcar nicknamed “Barca.”

Hanno is called “the Great” (*megas*) only by Appian and Dio; neither of them explains why (*Iber.* 4.16; *Lib.* 49.213; Dio in *Zon.* 8.22). An earlier Carthaginian grandee named Hanno gets the same unexplained sobriquet from Pompeius Trogus (“*magnus*”: *Prol.* 20). That it stands for Punic *rab*, “chief” or “great one,” is questionable, for among numerous inscriptionally attested Carthaginians styled *rab* are a few known from literary sources too (like a fifth-century Hanno, father of a general who sacked Acragas in Sicily in 406), which yet do not give them the same nickname; and in any case *rab* was a broad title used for the chief priest, the heads of administrative bodies, and even generals — a general was *rab mahanet*, “head of the army.” If *megas/magnus* does reflect a Punic term, it may have been a family epithet misunderstood by whatever writer was ultimately behind Trogus’, Dio’s, and Appian’s mentions. This could slightly strengthen the possibility that the two Hannos were related. The earlier Hanno the Great had been executed on suspicion of treason, but a son Gisco had survived and even recovered his primacy in the state.¹

Our Hanno first comes to notice around 247 as general in charge of Libya (*Pol.* 1.73.1; *Diod.* 24.10). If Appian can be trusted — not an automatic certainty — he was still active enough after Zama in late 202 to be a peace envoy (*Lib.* 49.213; but not in Polybius or Livy). This would make him a relatively youthful general forty-five years earlier, implying excellent political connections. The same can be inferred for Hamilcar Barca, who also came to prominence then. His appointment when “*admodum adulescentulus*” (according to his biographer Nepos, *Hamil.* 1.1) again suggests sound political connections. By 240 he had three daughters old enough to be married: this and Hanno’s reported longevity permit the tentative inference that both had been born around 280.

They were probably politically associated at this time. Hanno was the far more successful general, extending Carthage’s dominance southwest to Hecatompylus-Theveste (Tébessa) and probably westward to Sicca, also applying unsentimental rigor to collecting high taxes from Carthage’s subject Libyan communities to fund the war effort. Hamilcar’s war in Sicily was deadlocked, his forces small (not much over 20,000) and unpaid for years. It would not be surprising if this irked him — not much of the funds amassed in Libya found their way to Sicily — but he needed political support at home to keep his command, and that meant keeping on terms with Hanno (who was evidently no more inclined than Hamilcar to seek peace with Rome). The admiral who lost Carthage’s final battle off the Aegates Islands in 241 was crucified — the frequent fate of failed Carthaginian commanders — but though Hamilcar too faced some hostility on his return, having negotiated the crushing peace with Rome, he avoided prosecution. Had Hanno been Hamilcar’s enemy, it would have been an unmissable opportunity to get rid of him.

Appian seems to have a confused inkling of this situation. He reports Hamilcar averting the threat of trial for misconduct in Sicily but puts it four years later: if so, it would improbably have occurred just when Barca had saved the republic from ruin (below). Appian then appoints him and Hanno generals to suppress “some rising of the Numidians” (*Iber.* 4.16–17), whereas the chronology of events in 237 hardly allows time for this distraction. It is likely that Appian has mixed his wars up and the real threat came in 241. He has Hamilcar avert it by cultivating “those in public office” or “leading the state” (*tous politeuomenous*). His son-in-law Hasdrubal is described as the most popular (*demokopikotatos*) of them but, if the date was indeed 241, Hanno must be included too. Probably the leading *politeuomenos*, he was still holding his generalship; Hamilcar had resigned his (Pol. 1.66.1) and returned to private life.²

The Truceless War

Hanno was the obvious man to deal with the over 20,000 restive foreign mercenaries and Libyan conscripts now back from Sicily. Carthage owed them large arrears of pay, but the man who had squeezed years of painful taxes out of Libya inadvisedly tried to beat down their claims. When they encamped at Tunes outside Carthage, the task was transferred to Gisco, Hamilcar’s recent deputy in Sicily, well respected by the soldiers and not closely identified with Hamilcar, whose refusal to take part in the talks the men strongly resented (Pol. 1.68.12–13), or with the arrogant and penny-pinching Hanno. Gisco played fair with the men and produced the funds to pay them. Hanno may have been the leading *politeuomenos* in Carthage, but nothing indicates that his leadership was unquestioned or his faction the sole one.

Gisco’s success was ruined after soldiers hostile to the agreement staged a violent coup. The extremists included both mercenaries and Libyans: the army’s new leaders were a Libyan, Mathos, a Campanian Roman named Spendius (Polybius calls him a runaway slave), and Autaritus the leader of the Gallic contingent (Pol. 1.69.4–6, 77.1); later on another Libyan named Zarzas played a brief part (1.84.3, 85.2). Murdering or driving away opponents, and seizing Gisco with his companions and funds, they instigated hostilities against Carthage and incited the Libyan subject peoples to revolt. This “truceless war,” as Polybius once describes it (1.65.6), would last three years and four months, probably from late 241 to winter 238/237, and produce a complete and enduring reversal of Carthage’s domestic fortunes and military orientation.³

Why did the bulk of the returned army follow the extremists? Polybius takes refuge merely in depicting it as barbarous, confused, and easily intimidated (1.69.6–14), later resorting to metaphors of cancerous tumors and generalizations about barbaric *vs* civilized *mores* (81.5–11). Realistically, many Libyan

veterans may have worried that, if the mercenaries departed, they themselves would be at the mercy of the resentful Carthaginians — who still had Hanno's loyal army in being somewhere, for as soon as military operations began we find him at its head (73–74). The Libyans must have been aware too of the depth of discontent at home. Not just the ordinary population but at least some of the local elites were keen on revolt, as shown by the swift recruitment of Libyan volunteers — 70,000 came in eventually — and funds which included jewelry donated by evidently well-off women (70.9, 72.1–6).

What motivated the mercenaries, a miscellaneous range of Balearic islanders, Gauls, Iberians, Ligurians, and “*Mixellenes*” — perhaps southern Italians and Sicilians (1.67.7) — to join the mutiny rather than take their money and leave? They surely were persuaded to look for grander rewards than just their pay. Even if sacking and plundering Carthage was all but impossible, forcing her to terms could still bring enticing benefits, such as ample land and slaves from the city's wealthy territories (on these: Diod. 20.8.3–4; Pol. 1.29.7, 71.1). It is striking meanwhile that neither side recruited slaves as fighters, even though slaves had joined revolts more than once in the past (for instance in 396).⁴

The rebelling Libyan communities may have shared in the “unholy oaths contrary to decent principles,” as Polybius terms them, which were sworn by the insurgent troops (1.70.6). That any more formal bond was forged is unlikely. There is no sign of a common council as in the contemporary Achaean and Aetolian Leagues in Greece; deliberations and decisions were made by Mathos, Spendius, and their associates. The revolted communities were repeatedly disrupted by Hamilcar's ensuing *chevauchées* through their territories and his storming or winning over of Libyan towns. Rebel coins — many of them overstrikes on Carthaginian ones — with the Greek legend ΛΙΒΥΩΝ, “of the Libyans,” do not suggest otherwise even if the Punic letters *A*, *M* and occasionally *Z* on some have another meaning than the initials of Autaritus, Mathos, and Zarzas as issuers. Their likeliest use was for paying foreign merchants and fresh mercenaries, whose access to rebel-held territory became easier after Utica and Hippacra defected from Carthage around mid 239: “of the Libyans” in Greek could reassure payees that the coinage had genuine backing and perhaps also stressed that the Libyans' secession was permanent and legitimate. (A different interpretation of their find-spots and styles, though, puts them 30 years later, to the middle of the Second Punic War.)⁵

Hanno, as general in Libya, confronted the rebels first with his army but, failing to make progress against them, opened the way for Hamilcar Barca to be reappointed general too. In a series of bold and risky operations Hamilcar won victories in the field, first beside the Bagradas River north of Carthage, later in the Libyan countryside — where, after being encircled by rebel forces and their new Numidian allies, he was saved when the Numidians changed sides. He then campaigned through Libya attacking or winning over rebel

communities, thus interfering with supplies to the armies that were cutting off Carthage by land and besieging Utica and Hippacra further north.

Though ignored by Polybius' increasingly Barca-focused account, Hanno remained in the field, for eventually Hamilcar got into such difficulties again that he had to call on him to join forces with him (summer 239?). With the rebels at Tunes continuing their blockade of Carthage and, for several months in 239–238, tightening this into a regular siege but yet never launching an assault, we may also infer that an adequate garrison of citizen troops and reliable mercenaries held the city. Attitudes there and in the armies began to tilt in Hamilcar's favor. When he and Hanno did join up, they had so complete a falling-out that operations came to a standstill. Why they quarrelled we are not told, but the context suggests disagreement over the military operations. The home authorities — presumably the senate (the *adirim*) and sufetes — chose to resolve the impasse by having the troops themselves decide which of the two should command them. The decision was for Hamilcar; and although Hanno was replaced, the new general — one of Carthage's numerous Hannibals — quite clearly and maybe officially acted as Barca's lieutenant (Pol. 1.82.1–5, 12).

The quarrel is often taken as revealing that Hamilcar and Hanno headed opposing political factions — Hanno's conservative, landowning, Africa-orientated, and even pro-Roman; Hamilcar's comprising the mercantile, outward-looking, perhaps democratically inclined elements in Carthaginian society. Yet, as noted above, they are as likely to have been political associates hitherto, if with Hamilcar as the lesser partner. Hanno's later bitterness towards the Barcid family's ascendancy cannot be seamlessly retrojected into earlier times. Their quarrel — even though temporarily eased a year later — was followed by his more or less complete exclusion after 237 from influence in state affairs. By contrast, Hamilcar's energetic even if sometimes perilous operations against the rebels, the victories he won, and (if Appian can be trusted) his son-in-law Hasdrubal's popular standing at home all led to him replacing Hanno as the leading *politeuomenos* and, finally, as the state's dominating figure. All this is enough to explain Hanno's legendary enmity.

For the home authorities to let the soldiers themselves choose between the two seems unique, although it may be partly compared with the troops in Sicily in 382 choosing to replace their deceased general with his son. It can be inferred that Hanno's and Hamilcar's domestic supporters enjoyed more or less equal political support, at any rate among the *adirim*, causing deadlock there. Whether the decision was made by all the troops — deserters, mercenaries, any Libyan volunteers, as well as the citizen officers and men — is not clear, but it seems Hanno was let down easily: not removed from his generalship but simply required to “leave the army” (Pol. 1.82.12, cf. 82.5). As there was no limit to how many generals could be appointed, the citizen body at

Carthage could quite properly elect his replacement Hannibal without further despoiling Hanno, though the latter's relations in the city with the increasingly ascendant Barcid elements must have been prickly.⁶

Another episode is socially and culturally illuminating. When Hamilcar earlier had found himself trapped by rebel forces and their newly arrived Numidian allies, he was able to turn the tables thanks to the Numidians' commander, a dashing young cavalryman named Naravas. As Polybius tells it, Naravas' family ties to Carthage and his own admiration for Barca prompted him to change sides with his men (1.78.1–10). Naravas seems to be the same as *Nrwt*, the ancestor of a royal Numidian who governed western Libya soon after the destruction of Carthage. He was thus a member of the royal family of eastern Numidia's Massyli people and uncle of Masinissa, the future unifier of Numidia (and scourge of Carthage) who was born circa 240 and, according to Appian, raised at Carthage.

Hamilcar in gratitude promised Naravas his daughter in marriage (obviously a sister to the *politeuomenos* Hasdrubal's wife). Such ties between Carthaginians and foreigners were not rare. As early as 480 another leader named Hamilcar, who waged bitter war against Syracuse and Acragas, was himself half-Syracusan by birth. In 307 an exiled Syracusan named Arcesilaus settled and married at Carthage; his grandsons were to play a critical role at Syracuse during Hannibal's war. One of Hamilcar's granddaughters, Carthaginian by birth (thus not a daughter of Naravas), would marry two successive kings of Naravas' Massyli; and a powerful political ally of the Barcids, Hasdrubal son of Gisco, would give his daughter, the famous Sophoniba, as wife to Syphax, king of western Numidia's Masaesyli — after whom she would briefly and tragically become Masinissa's. Later still, one of Masinissa's grandsons, another Hasdrubal, would be a Carthaginian leader in the Third Punic War. Carthaginian notables had hereditary friendships with Roman aristocrats too, including one of Hannibal's doughtiest opponents, Fabius the Delayer (Livy 27.16.5 — *hospitium* with Hannibal's officer Carthalo). Without doubt Hanno the Great's family, too, was well connected within and beyond North Africa.⁷

Hamilcar had no quick successes after Hanno's departure. Utica and Hippacra had defected. So did the mercenaries in Sardinia, massacring Sardinia's resident Carthaginians. Hamilcar's operations in the countryside did bring the besiegers of Carthage to the brink of starvation and thus forced a raising of the siege, but not the blockade from Tunes. A complex new campaign across Libya did end with the entrapment of a large rebel army under Spendius at a site (unknown) that Polybius calls Prion, "the Saw," whereupon Hamilcar first accepted its capitulation and then massacred the entire army save for Spendius and his nine lieutenants, who were showily crucified instead outside Tunes (about mid-238). Even then Mathos was able to rout one part of Barca's army and crucify his colleague Hannibal and other prisoners in Spendius' place.

This disaster led to the temporary reconciliation between Hamilcar and Hanno. It was on Hamilcar's terms: a delegation of eminent senators, along with reinforcements and Hanno, came out to conciliate him (Pol. 1.87.2–6). Now he and Hanno did cooperate in the operations which defeated Mathos' retreating forces near Leptis on the east coast, probably in winter 238–237, and then compelled Utica and Hippacra to capitulate. Since we find these cities and the bulk of Libya unfriendly to Scipio Africanus' invasion in 204–203, it seems that Carthage sensibly chose to impose lenient terms on rebel communities, no doubt also imposing pro-Carthaginian oligarchs. No doubt, too, loyalties were strengthened by the profits and opportunities that flowed after 237 from the growing Punic province in Spain.

The Loss of Sardinia

Either before Hamilcar set out with his veteran army for Spain, or perhaps afterwards, Carthage was confronted by a new and unexpected crisis. An expedition was also being readied to regain Sardinia, whose natives had meanwhile chased out the mercenary mutineers, when a Roman embassy arrived to denounce the armament as really aimed against Rome. After Carthaginian envoys to Rome explained the situation, the Romans produced a different complaint: that Carthage had foully mistreated the Italian traders arrested early in the Truceless War for dealing with the rebels. Next they proceeded to the extraordinary step of declaring war. Desperate for peace, the Carthaginians discovered that the price was not only to renounce Sardinia and also Corsica, but to pay over a lump sum of 1,200 talents.

A Carthaginian expedition to recover the island was fully predictable — and the Romans had, a year or so before, rejected the mutineers' offer of Sardinia. They acted now surely with the knowledge that Carthage lacked means to resist the seizure. She had a tested army (unless by now it was on its way to Spain with Hamilcar) and still some warships, but a second Roman war would have been on a totally different scale than the Truceless one — and to finance it she would have had to oppress the Libyans all over again. It is hard to explain the Romans' volte-face in 237 as simply because they regretted not exacting Sardinia in the peace of 241 or in 238, just as it would be hard to overlook that the seizure occurred when Hamilcar Barca, their persistent and unbeaten opponent in Sicily, had become the dominant *politeuomenos* and Carthage under his leadership was preparing major new military enterprises. An attack on Italy might not really have been feared, but Sardinia as a base for a recovery attempt on ex-Punic Sicily may well have seemed a future possibility, one to be averted early.

Rome showed no great interest in Carthaginian doings after this — or in fact in either of her own new possessions. The province in Sicily was very

much left to itself without even a regular governor until 228; Sardinia was not actually taken over until 235. Supposed Punic intrigues against Rome and periodic diplomatic clashes in the 230s turn up only in late sources (Zon. 8.18; Oros. 4.12.2–3) and cannot be believed: most are suspiciously reminiscent of the Sardinia crisis and of the famous confrontation at Carthage in 218 between Rome's envoy and the Carthaginian senate; while another, alleged for 230 (Zon. 8.19), grotesquely has a planned Punic attack scared off by the sudden appearance, in Africa, of a Roman army heading for North Italy. On the other hand, it is altogether plausible that the rape of Sardinia seared a deep resentment into Hamilcar's and other Carthaginians' souls.⁸

The Barcid Ascendancy and the Iberian Empire

From 237 on, Hanno and his political friends were sidelined while Hamilcar's faction dominated affairs. As noted earlier, Appian is mistaken to claim that after the Truceless War both men were appointed to new generalships. A more credible excerpt from Diodorus reports only Barca being appointed (25.8), chiming with Polybius' account of him quickly launching his Spanish expedition (3.10.5, cf. 2.1.5). Diodorus' seeming effort to limit his generalship to "all Africa" (sometimes emended by moderns to "all Iberia") is likely the writer's own input if not his Byzantine excerptor's. Another excerpt describes Barca as "being general over Carthage" (*kata Karchedona*) and sending his son-in-law Hasdrubal back to Africa to quell a Numidian rising (Diod. 25.10.1). Other evidence shows his successors — son-in-law Hasdrubal, then Hannibal — exercising authority over both Punic Africa and Punic Spain.⁹

When Hamilcar died campaigning in winter 229/228, his son-in-law was at once chosen to replace him: by the Carthaginians, writes Polybius (2.1.9); by the "folk" (*laos*) and the Carthaginians, says Diodorus (25.12). Hamilcar's selection by the army during the Truceless War, and Polybius' account of his son Hannibal's election as general in 221 — the Carthaginians awaited the army's choice in Spain and then their citizen assembly ratified it "unanimously" (3.13.3–4; so too Nepos, *Hann.* 3.1; Livy 21.3.1) — suggest that Diodorus or his source used *laos* to mean "army" as was done for Pyrrhus' army (Diod. 22.8.2). Appian claims that the *adirim* confirmed the soldiers' vote for Hannibal (*Iber.* 8.29) but, with no other evidence that Carthaginian generals after election had to be confirmed by the *adirim*, at best he is reporting a political acceptance from that complaisant body. All three Barcid generals, then, owed their positions to military support ratified by popular vote: a combination relying on and reinforced by continuing success in warfare and empire-building. Nepos succinctly notes the benefits for the homeland: "with arms, horses, men, and money he enriched the whole of Africa" (*Hamil.* 4.1).

Whether the generals were subordinate to the home authorities, controlled the republic's affairs themselves, or were practically — maybe even legally — independent from Carthage continues to be debated. That they were under the home authorities has been inferred from various items: notably Hannibal sending to Carthage for instructions following the Roman *démarche* in 220 over Saguntum (Pol. 3.15.8; Appian, *Iber.* 10.37); the Roman ultimatum in 218 to Carthage, not Hannibal, over his sack of Saguntum; the decision in 216–215 to send forces from Carthage to Spain and Sardinia instead of to Hannibal despite his earlier request (Livy 23.12.3–5, 32.5–11); and Hannibal's later complaint — disbelieved by Livy — that those authorities (and Hanno the Great) had caused him to fail in Italy by starving him of meaningful support (30.20.2–4; contrast 30.42.15). Yet none of these is persuasive.

Hannibal's request for "instructions" from a senate that all the sources present as nearly unanimously on his side was surely as self-interested a propaganda gambit as was his complaint nearly 20 years later that it had failed to support him (all the more if he blamed Hanno for this, when our sources are unanimous about the latter's powerlessness). The Roman ultimatum over Saguntum, in turn, correctly treated Carthage as the responsible state, for Hannibal was Carthage's general. In any case Carthage's rejection was a foregone conclusion, as shown by the chief envoy Fabius Buteo's on-the-spot response: a declaration of war. Arrangements for military reinforcements and funds, in 215 and at other times, certainly had to be handled at Carthage — generals on active operations could not organize them — but if the senate was wilfully flouting Hannibal's wishes, we must wonder why it gave his loyal brother and spokesman Mago command of the forces redirected to Spain and why a close relative of theirs, another Mago, was a senior officer in the simultaneous expedition to Sardinia ("ex gente Barcina": Livy 23.41.1).

Independence from Carthage, formal or practical, was asserted for Hasdrubal and Hannibal by their contemporary the historian Fabius Pictor (Pol. 3.8.1–8). It has occasionally won support because the "Ebro treaty" of 225 was struck with Hasdrubal alone and did not bind the Punic state, and because Hasdrubal founded a famous new capital called New Carthage by the Romans (Cartagena today) but in Punic simply *Qart-hadasht*, "Carthage." The Ebro accord, however, should be explained otherwise; while a Spanish Carthage can be matched by other places in the Phoenician and Punic world named "new city" — *Neapolis* in Greek (for instance Nabeul on Tunisia's east coast) and *Qart-hadasht* in Punic. Hasdrubal's new Carthage emphasized to the Iberian peoples and the outside world the confident resurgence of his homeland, and the key importance of its new continental province.

He and the other Barcids not only held their commands as elected Carthaginian generals, but took recorded action in Africa as well as Spain: Hamilcar sent him back around 236 to defeat a Numidian attack (above), he

went to Carthage in about 228 on political matters — Fabius claimed it was a failed move to make himself monarch, which is not persuasive — and Hannibal in 219–218 made military arrangements encompassing Spain, Africa, and Carthage herself as war with Rome approached (Diod. 25.10.3; Pol. 3.8.2; 3.33.5–18). Polybius stresses that the war's direction on all fronts lay with Hannibal throughout, though naturally he acted through lieutenants in theaters outside Italy (9.22.1–6) and though it should be inferred, naturally again, that these often had plenty of leeway. Again, his treaty with Philip V of Macedon in 215 shows him accompanied in Italy by Carthaginian senators (*gerousiastai*) who also took the treaty oath (Pol. 7.9.1); he had had them or others in Spain too, for in 218 the Romans demanded that he and his counselors be handed over (3.20.8: *syndroun*).

Fabius' waspish claim that the war was brought on entirely through Hannibal's vices, and against the unanimous wish of the city's leading men, is sensibly refuted by Polybius: that, if so, these latter could have agreed to hand him over as demanded whereas Fabius fails to explain why they stuck with him for all 17 years of the war (3.8.9–11). Fabius' verdict against the Barcids is understandable. He was a Roman senator at the time and his famous kinsman Fabius the Delayer proved Hannibal's devoted foe. Moreover, from 202 (Livy 30.42.13) the anti-Barcid faction at Carthage was as keen to decant onto the defeated general all the blame for the war as, it seems, he was to blame his defeat on the hapless Hanno the Great. Carthaginian *politeuomenoi* hostile to him strove in the 190s to stir up their guest-friends at Rome against him, and in the end succeeded (n. 7). If Fabius was influenced by these biases it should be no surprise.

Livy may be rhetorical in depicting the *adirim* in the 220s and after Cannae as almost entirely pro-Barcid (21.4.1, 23.12.6–8) — or he may not, for it is in line with Polybius' and Diodorus' assertions of the Carthaginians' ready approval of Hasdrubal and then Hannibal as generals, and Polybius' stress that Hannibal was wholly in charge of affairs during the Second Punic War. Many Barcid kinsmen are found in important positions: Hannibal's two younger brothers, their close relative Mago mentioned earlier, Hannibal's nephew (if Appian is right: *Hann.* 20.90) and able lieutenant Hanno, son of a "Bomilcar the king" (Pol. 3.42.6 — probably meaning "sufete"), and this Hanno's possible brother Hannibal, an officer serving in Spain in 215, also son of a Bomilcar. Throughout the Barcid ascendancy, other politically powerful men were closely associated with the generals, beginning with Hamilcar's son-in-law Hasdrubal and continuing with Bomilcar, his other Carthaginian son-in-law, who may have been the admiral active between 215 and at least 211, and with a Himilco, "a member of the Barcid faction" whom Livy depicts sneering at Hanno the Great in the senate after Cannae (23.12.6–7). Another *politeuomenos*, Hasdrubal son of Gisco (Sophoniba's father), was first a vigorous

colleague of the younger Barcid brothers in Spain, then the initial defender of Africa against Scipio's invasion. By then, if not from the start, he was more likely a leader in his own right — as suggested by his daughter's prestigious marriage to King Syphax — than simply a member of the Barcid faction.

Of the opposition to this political complex we have only two names: Hanno the Great himself and, in 203–202, a high-ranking associate called Hasdrubal Haedus (“the Kid”). Haedus, as Livy tells it, more or less conceded to his Roman listeners that their faction had never succeeded in influencing their fellow citizens (30.42.11–15; cf. Appian, *Lib.* 50.217). The Barcids may not have been able — or inclined — to prevent outspoken critics from attaining some offices and becoming senators, but they do seem to have had numerous enough kinsmen, supporters, and strong allies (like Hasdrubal son of Gisco) to maintain a vigorous hold on the *adirim*, magistracies, and administrative organs for over 30 years (cf. Chapter 21).¹⁰

The Barcid Dominion in Spain

By a combination of warfare and diplomacy the three Barcid generals imposed Punic control over most of southern Spain and then the central plateaux. Carthage thus became a major territorial power on two continents, her armies taking precedence over what was left of the navy. Hamilcar landed at Gades, the ancient Phoenician colony, in 237; by the time he perished in battle nine years later he was operating in the mountains north of modern Alicante and Cartagena. Carthage's long-established trade with all the Phoenician colonies along the peninsula's southern coasts, and with Spanish peoples inland, had never (on existing evidence) amounted to territorial control; the closest this had come to Spain was the offshore island of Ebusus, Carthage's since before 600. With Punic Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica lost and the Numidian lands west of Libya not attractive enough in resources, the Iberian peninsula was a rich field for conquest and exploitation — with the added advantage of distance from Rome. As Nepos implies, it abounded in agricultural produce, precious metals (silver above all), and manpower, slave and free.

Hamilcar and Hasdrubal came to be conventionally viewed as opposites: Barca the bold and warlike empire-builder, Hasdrubal the diplomatic and pacific consolidator. This was false hindsight, for both used force as they judged fit and Hasdrubal increased the size of the already large army created by his father-in-law to 60,000 foot, 8,000 horse, and 200 elephants (Diod. 25.12). Both also used diplomatic ties where that would work — not that it always did, for Hamilcar died through trusting a Spanish ally who turned against him — so that Punic Spain came to consist, it seems, of a mosaic of subject and allied communities. The latter would include the old Phoenician

colonies like Gades as well as various Spanish towns and peoples: for instance, Castulo near modern Linares, which provided Hannibal with a wife (Livy 24.41.7; Silius 3.97), and the unnamed community whose king became Hasdrubal's new father-in-law (Diod. 25.12).

Both Hamilcar and Hasdrubal also founded cities: Hamilcar one named Acra Leuce whose site is debated (perhaps Roman Lucentum, at or near Alicante on the south coast, less plausibly a site inland) and Hasdrubal the Spanish Qart-hadasht, on a better anchorage south of Lucentum and grand enough from the start to attract Roman notice. Twenty years after its foundation its male inhabitants alone numbered 10,000, including 8,000 free citizens (Pol. 10.17.6–10). Hasdrubal's conciliatory reputation may owe much to his interesting initiative following his new marriage, to have himself acclaimed "supreme general" (*strategos autokrator* in Diodorus 25.12) — "by the whole Iberian people." What this amounted to in practice in southern Spain circa 228 is obscure, but should at least mean that the Spanish communities under Punic dominance recognized him as their overall lord in an act of supposedly free choice. He may have intended this as a symbolic parallel to his choice as general by the Carthaginian troops, and surely also as a public-relations gesture to the peoples under his rule. Not, however, as a genuine step toward equality or collaboration in empire. The peoples of southern Spain remained firmly under Carthaginian control and Carthaginian administrators; nor did Hannibal make a similar gesture.

The mineral wealth of Spain was exploited and developed by the Barcids. Pliny the Elder writes of a mine of Hannibal's, at an unidentifiable place later called Baebelo, that produced 300 pounds of silver daily (*NH* 33.97). It had probably been started earlier, though even so a yearly output of over 100,000 pounds — equivalent to over 8 million Greek drachmas or over 1,330 talents — seems too large for a single mine and Pliny may mistakenly give to Baebelo alone a source's estimate of the whole region's output (the Sierra Morena?). The best-known products of Barcid-era silver are finely wrought coins showing bearded and beardless male profiles with differing features, some (not all) laurel-wreathed and with a club behind them; the reverses mostly depict an elephant, though another displays the long-established Carthaginian type of a horse standing before a palm-tree. The profiles are widely, though not unanimously, thought to portray the Barcid leaders from Hamilcar and his son-in-law to Hannibal and his two brothers, but no coin bears lettering and the identifications are a modern theory.

Those showing a club imply, to start with, that the profiled male is Hercules, whose famous emblem was this weapon: and as Carthage's city-god Melqart was equated in the ancient world with Hercules, it is reasonable to see the profiles as a strikingly Greek-style Melqart, sometimes depicted young, sometimes old. Beyond that everything is speculation. Even the widely agreed

interpretation that the coins display a family devotion to Melqart above all other deities (cf. Chapters 16, 21, 28) remains hypothetical. The other evidence for Melqart as the favoured Barcid god is thin: Hannibal's pilgrimage to the ancient temple of Melqart at Gades in late 219 (Livy 21.21.9) is not proof, for not only was Melqart the city-god of Carthage but his Gaditane temple was reputed to be far more ancient than Carthage herself (Velleius 1.2.1, 3; cf. Pliny, *NH* 19.63). The antiquity of Gades' temple very likely made Hercules a figure of reverence to Spaniards as well as Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans, which may well explain the coin-profiles with clubs. Hannibal's difficult march to Italy could recall Hercules' mythical journey, as Livy makes the elder P. Scipio contemptuously point out (21.41.7), but this hardly reveals a family cult.

The Barcids surely revered all Carthage's deities; the clubless coin-profiles may well represent other important gods, like those with temples on New Carthage's hills. Polybius calls these Asclepius (probably Eshmun), Hephaestus (Kusor?), Cronus (another Baal, perhaps Baal Shamim) and Aletes, perhaps a Spanish silver-divinity (10.10.8–11). Strikingly, Melqart had no leading temple in Hasdrubal's city. Instead Barcid family devotion more likely focused on Baal Hammon and his consort Tanit, conventionally though not invariably identified with Zeus/Jupiter and Hera/Juno. This devotion endured from Hamilcar's famous sacrifice in 237 to "Jupiter" and the oath that his son took there and claimed to have obeyed throughout his life — "never to feel goodwill towards the Romans" (Pol. 3.11.5–12.1; Nepos, *Hann.* 2.3–6; Livy 35.19, with a tendentious version at 21.1) — at least to Hannibal's dedication of his inscriptional memoir in the temple of Hera at Cape Lacinium in 205 (Pol. 3.33.17–18, 56.4; Livy 28.46.16). It is noteworthy too that the gods in his oath to the treaty with Macedon start with "Zeus and Hera," with "Hercules" coming fifth (Pol. 7.9.2).¹¹

The Ebro Accord and Saguntum

As noted earlier, Rome paid small attention to Carthage and Barcid Spain after 237. A supposed fact-finding embassy to Hamilcar in 231 is recorded only by Dio (frg. 48); no other source mentions it, not even Dio's epitomator Zonaras. The point of Dio's story is that Hamilcar embarrassed the envoys, explaining that he was in Spain to gather the means to pay Rome the war indemnity imposed in 241 — in other words, the tale probably originated in a Barcid-friendly narrative. This may not prove it a fiction but equally does not strengthen its chance of being true. In any case, by 231 Hamilcar had been in Spain for more than half a decade of Roman uninterest, nor was there any further Roman diplomatic contact for five or six years. The Romans' own

activities in these years focused on Gallic North Italy and the rowdy Illyrian peoples across the Adriatic, whose mistreatment of Italian traders and other misbehavior prompted a full-scale military expedition in 229–228 and a follow-up nine years later.

Barcid Carthage drew Rome's notice only when she was exercised about the invasion threat from the northern Gauls in 226–225. Polybius, who views the Barcids as planning a revenge war from 241 on, states that it was the growth of Punic Spain that made Rome decide to intervene there, but he immediately qualifies this by claiming that the Gallic threat distracted her temporarily (2.13.3–6). Logically this should mean that by 222, with the Gallic invaders annihilated and North Italy subdued, intervention in Spain would follow, but after 222 the Romans regularly ignored messages from Spain from the anxious Saguntines (Pol. 3.15.1–2), preferring to spend three further years intervening up and down the Adriatic.

They had approached Hasdrubal in 225 (or, less likely, 226) to make an accord binding him simply “not to cross the Iber in warfare” (Pol. 2.13.6–7, 3.27.9; cf. 2.22.9–11), the sole proviso according to Polybius. “Iber” was the Greek name for the Ebro River in northeast Spain. Livy and later sources put further provisos into the accord, notably turning the Iber into an international border between Carthage's and Rome's territories and giving Saguntum a security guarantee: items plainly foisted into the agreement by later Roman apologias to justify Rome's resort to war in 218. In fact, Hasdrubal's fiat ran up to the Tagus River at best (the egregious Appian says the Iber but describes the Tagus: *Iber.* 6.24) while Rome's still stopped at the southern edge of the plains of the Po and even after 222 did not reach the Alps. To view the accord as somehow a Roman *diktat* forced onto a weak Hasdrubal hardly fits this context (cf. Chapter 12); still less does the once popular, unconvincing view that the Greek colony Massilia in southern Gaul was really pulling Rome's strings, anxious to set up a territorial buffer between Punic Spain and Massilian territory. Nor is it any more plausible to see the “Iber” as a river south of Saguntum such as the Sucro (Júcar) or Tader (Segura). Polybius almost suggests this once (3.30.3) but must be writing clumsily — as he rather often does in his early books — since everywhere else he knows, and shows he knows, the opposite. That Appian expressly places Saguntum north of the river is no support (*Iber.* 7.25; *Lib.* 6.23–4), given his geographical confusions and his later assertion that Hannibal refounded it as New Carthage (*Iber.* 12.47). But no doubt it suited some Roman writers to push the claim that Saguntum did lie north of the Iber, to make Hannibal a treaty-breaker twice over.

The gathering invasion by the North Italian Gauls included a strong force of warriors hired from across the Alps. The Gauls' preparations took some time, during which Roman anxiety mounted (Pol. 2.22.1–2, 7–8). The embassy

to Hasdrubal occurred at this time, and some features of Rome's own military preparations merit notice. As well as forces mustering to confront the Gauls from the north, a legion was stationed at Tarentum, another in Sicily, and one of the consuls of 225 sailed for Sardinia with two (2.23.6, 24.13, 27.1). These spread-out deployments plainly were not for facing the Gauls. It looks very strongly as though they were meant to discourage some potential seaborne onslaught from the west and south. The consul sent to Sardinia had not long arrived there when he returned to Italy and joined forces with his colleague to crush the Gauls (2.23.6, 27.1); conceivably, he had learned of the accord and judged it now safe to leave the island.

In this context, the embassy's mission — to conciliate Hasdrubal (2.13.6) — makes sense. It shows that Rome knew he directed Carthage's affairs not only in Spain but also in Africa, and shows too that the Iber line was meant as a concession. While the accord was phrased from the Roman point of view, it amounted in effect to conceding that the Carthaginians could practice warfare throughout the Iberian peninsula south of that line. Implicitly, they would practice it only there. The Iber, in turn, must mean the Ebro, for a "concession" confining Hasdrubal within the south of his existing sphere of influence was no concession.¹²

The Carthaginian senate in 218 insisted (Pol. 3.21.1) that the accord was made directly with him and not with the republic itself (another point sometimes used for the independence hypothesis). This was no doubt true — just as Hannibal's treaty with Philip V is not recorded as being formally ratified at Carthage — and it clarifies why the Roman embassy to Hannibal in autumn 220 called on him to respect the accord as well as the security of Saguntum (3.15.5), particularly as he had just subdued virtually all of the peninsula south of the Ebro. Unfortunately, Polybius' account of the proceedings in 218 between the Roman war envoys and the spokesman for the *adirim* leaves out crucial details. The envoys came to demand reparation for Hannibal's sack of Saguntum; but Carthage's spokesman chose also to mention the Ebro accord, dismissing it rightly enough as irrelevant to Saguntum; then stressed that Saguntum had not been an ally when the peace of 241 was made, which guaranteed the security of both states' allies. Thus we are not told why the spokesman mentioned the accord, or why the Roman envoys did not rebut his argument about the allies' guarantee with the elementary point that this could not cover pre-241 allies alone. (Polybius, copied by Livy, makes the point for him: 3.29; Livy 21.19.2–5.) Incidentally, if the guarantee did solely apply to pre-241 allies as Carthage now claimed, all those won in Spain and Numidia by the Barcids would have been fair game for Rome to attack. The Roman envoys refused to discuss the guarantee question at all, said nothing about the accord, and repeated their demand for reparation (3.21.1–8).

A lengthy and surely ill-placed digression by Polybius ensues, on all the Roman-Punic treaties down to 225. Then we find Fabius the chief envoy

announcing war (3.33.1–4). The most likely reason why Fabius avoided the guarantee issue is that Saguntum was probably not an ally at all, yet Rome, while refusing to admit this, was treating it like one. As for the Ebro accord, it may be noted that the envoys to Hannibal in 220, the first to him from Rome, had “solemnly urged him” to respect it (*diemartyronto*: 3.15.5). Essentially a convention made with one leader, the accord could not automatically bind another. Hannibal had made no reply to the urging, commenting instead solely on Saguntum, which the envoys had also demanded he respect (15.5–7; see also below).

But even if Polybius’ dramatic compression has the war envoys in 218 enter Carthage and simply announce Rome’s demands (3.20.6–9), for the first Roman mission to Carthage in 19 years not to outline Rome’s dealings, however intermittent, with the Barcids is not believable. As noted just now, the accord was arguably relevant in Roman eyes because Hannibal’s sweeping campaigns had brought him up against the Ebro. A reference to it in 218, even if brief, explains why the Carthaginian spokesman in turn mentioned it. But Hannibal and Carthage had a reason for rejecting its continuing validity.

Barcid Attitudes to Rome

Polybius regards Hannibal’s dealings with the envoys in 220 as influenced by both youthful anger and his inherited plan for a war of revenge (3.15.8–11). Allegedly, this plan had been handed down by Hamilcar, actuated first by the humiliations of 241 and 237, and encouraged by Carthage’s revival (3.9.6–10.6). This hypothesis of “Barcid wrath” has long been questioned, rightly. That the Romans in those decades felt intermittent concern at a possible Punic revanche attempt was suggested above, but seriously only in 237 and then in 226–225. Had they felt constant anxiety, they could have struck a telling, perhaps fatal blow on Hamilcar’s sudden death in 229/228, or in 221 when Hasdrubal was abruptly assassinated and Hannibal replaced him, a youthful figure whom the envoys in 220 seem to have thought they could hector. By 220 too Rome was friendly with Saguntum, which had long been sending messages about Punic power in Spain, messages consistently ignored until Hannibal showed his mettle by reaching the Ebro line. Nothing suggests that the Romans still had worries about a Punic revanche.

If the Barcid leaders schemed this, they kept it well hidden. When their contemporary Fabius Pictor looked for someone to blame for the war (see above), he fastened on Hannibal’s alleged personal vices of greed and power-seeking, which, he averred, had been taught him by Hasdrubal; Hamilcar seems not to have been mentioned. The “wrath” version probably developed after Hannibal told (or was said to have told) the story of his boyhood oath to the Great King.

It quickly became the dominant explanation. A war scheme, though, would have been gravely handicapped by Barcid failure to keep a reasonable fleet in being. When war came in 218, just over 100 warships were available: 50 in Spain — only 32 were actually able to fight — and 55 or somewhat more at Carthage (Pol. 3.33.14; Livy 21.49.2, 4). Yet it cannot have escaped everyone's notice that throughout these decades Rome had a navy of some 220 quinqueremes. All were put on a combat footing in 218. Only then did Carthage in turn start rebuilding her own navy, to mount sadly amateurish naval operations which were not successful even in warding off repeated Roman raids on her African coasts (her admirals, Bomilcar included, proved uninspiring).

The Barcid generals' attitude towards Rome until 219 seems to have been watchfully cool, not covertly aggressive. Just as Rome made no move to disrupt their and Carthage's affairs when either Hamilcar or Hasdrubal suddenly perished, Carthage in turn did not attempt to intervene when Italy faced the Gallic invasion of 225. A truly Machiavellian Hasdrubal intent on war could have signed the Ebro accord to put Rome off guard, and then attacked. Offered in effect a free hand to subdue nearly the whole peninsula, he was happy to accept — but he maintained his large army. A comparison could be made with Britain and France before 1914 and again during the 1930s, not wanting war with Germany but remaining anxiously on guard against her.

Rome's friendship with Saguntum, which dated back "several years already before affairs under Hannibal" (Pol. 3.30.1), did not offend against the accord as such — Rome was not intervening "in warfare" south of the Ebro, even when she afterwards settled political strife in the town (3.15.7) — but threatened it by implication. For Hannibal to berate the envoys in autumn 220 about the link cannot be a surprise. He perhaps suspected that the next Roman move might indeed be a formal alliance with Saguntum, as an excuse to send troops. Messina in 264 (cf. Chapters 9 and 11) and Sardinia in his lifetime could serve as ominous warnings. By publicly consulting his home authorities over what to do about alleged Saguntine aggressiveness (3.15.8, 11; Appian, *Iber.* 10.36–9), he signalled his suspicions, and his ensuing siege challenged Rome to reveal her own intentions.¹³

Saguntum was moreover only one, if the more pressing one, of two issues that now concerned him and Carthage. Barcid dominance at home and in Spain rested on victory and exploitation. If he reaffirmed the Ebro accord, Hannibal, still in only his second year of command, would have nowhere to look for these essentials save in Numidia and Mauretania — regions much less enticing and never, apparently, of much interest as potential conquests. Even if Rome, improbably, would agree to abandon Saguntum, he needed northeastern Spain too. Both Barcid dominance and Carthage's new role as a continental great power required it. Hence no mention of the accord in his acerbic response to the envoys in 220, and the Carthaginian denial of its relevance in 218.

The risk of a crisis with Rome was obvious should Carthaginian forces indeed “cross the Ebro in warfare.” It was predictable, then, that despite the Romans’ failure to intervene in any way on Saguntum’s behalf during its prolonged siege in 219, Hannibal and Carthage followed up by making preparations for war — yet waited until Rome declared it before crossing the river. By then, of course, Hannibal had greater plans.

NOTES

1. Hanno the Great: Geus 1994, 116–118, “Hanno 18”; cf. Gsell, *HAAN* 2.252–3; W. Huss, *DCPP* 208–209. Fifth-century Hanno “the *rab*” (*hrb*): C. Krahmalkov, *Rivista di Studi Fenici* 2 (1974), 171–177; Geus 1996, 106, “Hanno 6”; Schmitz (1994), 2, 10–11.
2. *Baraq/barak*: Gsell, 2.257 n. 7; Krahmalkov (2000), 126. Geus’ view (1994, 74 n. 432) that, because nothing is known of Hamilcar’s father Hannibal, he did not belong to a leading family is unconvincing; the same would hold for Hanno the Great and his earlier namesake. Hanno’s Libyan campaigning: Diod. 24.10; Huss 1985, 246 n. 232; Hoyos 2007, 15–19. *Hekatompylos*-Theveste: Diod. 24.10.1; E. Lipiński, *DCPP* 442–3. Hamilcar’s three daughters: he had a son-in-law Hasdrubal by 241 (below), promised a daughter to Naravas *ca.* 240, and by 218 Hannibal’s nephew Hanno, son of a Bomilcar, was an active senior commander.
3. Chronology of the war: Walbank 1957, 148–149; Seibert 1993a, 14, 22–23; Loreto 1995, 211–213; Hoyos 2000, cf. 2007, 275–276.
4. Polybius’ moralizing comments: Walbank 1957, 145; Loreto 1995, 9–11; Ameling 2000; Champion 2004, 83, 89, 142, 242–245. This war figures in Gustave Flaubert’s classic novel *Salammbô* (1862); cf. Siebenmorgen *et al.* 2004.
5. Coins with ΑΙΒΥΩΝ: Robinson 1943, 1953; Carradice and La Nièce 1988; Acquaro 1989; Loreto 1995, 96–101; Hoyos 2007, 140–142, 198–199. Manganaro 1992 argues for a Second Punic War date.
6. Conservative Hanno *vs* liberal Hamilcar: notably Gsell, 2.253–256, 260; Walbank 1957, 118; Picard 1967, 60, 68, 75–7; and Picard and Picard 1968, 202–216; Gómez de Caso Zuriaga 1996, 224–228, 278–293, 351–353; Barceló 2004, 64–65 and Chapter 20 below. Hanno and Hamilcar originally allies: Hoyos 1994, 264–266, 270–271; and 2003, 22–23, 36–37. Son elected general in Sicily by father’s troops: Diod. 15.16.2.
7. *Nrwt*: *KAI* 141; Camps 1960, 187–188, 216–218, 283; Picard 1966; Huss 1985, 260 n. 65. Masinissa raised at Carthage: App. *Lib.* 10.37. Earlier Hamilcar in 480: Hdt. 7.166; Geus, 36–40, “Hamilcar 1.” Arcesilaus: Pol. 7.2.4; Justin 20.8.14. Barca’s granddaughter, queen of the Massyli: Livy 29.29.12. Sophoniba: Geus, 200–201. Masinissa’s grandson Hasdrubal: Geus, 156–157, “Hasdrubal 15.” Carthaginian friendships with Romans: also Livy 33.45.3.
8. The Sardinia crisis: Pol. 1.79.5, 88.8–12; 3.10.1–3, 15.10, 27.7–8, 28.3–4; Livy 21.1.5, 40.5; 22.54.11; Appian, *Iber.* 4.15; *Lib.* 5.19; Zon. 8.18; Schwarte 1993;

- Loreto 1995, 194–199; Hoyos 1998, 132–143, and 2007, 248–252; Ameling 2001. Its date: 238 is more popular than 237 (e.g. de Sanctis, 3.1.388 n. 34; Lippold 1963, 122; Hampl 1972, 440; Harris 1979, 190–193; Scardigli 1991, 231–235; Rich 1993, 62; Seibert 1993a, 23; Goldsworthy 2003, 146; H. Beck, in Chapter 13 below. For 237: Scullard, *CAH* 7.2².369; Loreto 1995, 211–212; Hoyos 2000; Ameling 2001. On the “confrontations” in the 230s: Hoyos 1998, 144–149, discussing earlier views; L. Loreto, Chapter 11 and Beck, Chapter 13, with views differing from this one.
9. Scope of the Barcid generalship: Hoyos 1994, 252–256, discussing other views. Wollner 1987, 92–102, tries to pin down Hamilcar’s post-237 generalship with formal definitions; the Carthaginians more likely did not. “Numidian rising”: perhaps by the unknown “Micatani” (Diod. 26.23).
 10. Hanno son of Bomilcar: Geus, 121–124, “Hanno 22.” His possible brother Hannibal: Geus, 94–95, “Hannibal 11.” Bomilcar the admiral: Geus, 18–20, “Bomilcar 2”; Polybius once calls him “the *basileus*” (3.42.6), perhaps meaning “the sufete” (thus Huss 1983, 27–28) but, just as with Hanno the Great’s supposed sobriquet, it would be strange for a single sufete to be so remembered — perhaps Bomilcar was sufete in 218 itself; or else held office often enough (as a leading faction member?) to earn the epithet. Hasdrubal son of Gisco: Geus, 143–148, “Hasdrubal 8”; Hoyos 2003, 142–143; possibly brother to Hamilcar son of Gisco, captured in Malta in 218 (so Geus, 58–59). Hasdrubal Haedus: Geus, 150, “Hasdrubal 12.” Barcid generals’ position in Spain in differing view-points: e.g., Groag 1929, 17–29, 48–49, 97–107; Eucken 1968, 72–86; Wollner 1987, 95–108; Scullard, *CAH* 8.21–3, 27–8; Hoyos 1994; Lancel 1995b, 376–380; Barceló 2004, 67–69, 111–112, and in Chapter 20 below.
 11. That Carthage had once controlled, then lost, southern Spain is, however, argued by Koch 2000. Acra Leuce: Diod. 25.10.3; at or beside Lucentum: de Sanctis, 3.1.396; Gsell, *HAAN* 3.131; Richardson 1996, 17; Hoyos 2003, 63–69; Olcina Domènech 2006, 106–109. Not Lucentum but elsewhere in southeast Spain: Sumner 1967, 206–211; Picard, *LDC* 218; Barceló 1988, 119–121; 2004, 71–2. On Barcid rule in Spain: Picard 1968, 209–222; Barceló 1989; Seibert 1993a, 25–74; Lancel 1995a, 376–382; 1998a, 47–97; Hoyos 2003, 55–97. The temples in New Carthage: Walbank 1967, 108–110; Huss 1985, 276 n. 65.
 12. On Pol. 3.30.3 as clumsy phrasing: Hoyos 1998, 161–166. Recent discussions of the accord and Saguntum include Bringmann 2001a; Serrati 2006, 130–134; Erdkamp 2009, who holds that Rome was preparing a war against Carthage when the Gauls unexpectedly invaded; L. Loreto in Chapter 11; and H. Beck in Chapter 13. Massilia’s influence on the accord: list of proponents in Hoyos 1998, 170 n. 41; add Lancel 1995b, 74–75; Bender 1997, 96; Goldsworthy 2003, 138; Barceló 2004, 89; Serrati 2006, 130; but rightly rejected most recently by Erdkamp 2009, 11.
 13. Rome and Saguntum: earlier literature in Hoyos 1998, 175–181 nn. 2, 4–5, 10, 14; add Lancel 1995a, 82–90; Barceló 1996, and 2004, 90–93, 101–105; Goldsworthy 2003, 144–150; Serrati (previous n.).

PART III

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Reasons for the War

Hans Beck

Causes and Caveats

As to the reasons why they broke the peace, I propose first to write an account of the causes of complaint which they had against each other and of the specific instances where their interests clashed. ... But the truest cause for the war was, I believe, the one least openly expressed. What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.

These lines stem from the famous fifth-century Athenian historian Thucydides (1.23), who set out to explore the underlying forces that triggered what he believed was the greatest disturbance of mankind, the so-called Peloponnesian War (432/1 to 404 BC). There is a lively scholarly debate on what Thucydides meant by this precisely, but it is generally accepted that the explicit distinction between superficial “causes” (*aitiai* in Greek) and a more profound, “truest cause” (*alethestate prophasis*) is his “greatest single contribution to later history-writing” (Hornblower 1991, 65). Discerning underlying reasons from publicly alleged causes and grievances has since become axiomatic to an understanding of the origins of war. While the allegations may well have genuine explanatory force, especially in their capacity to trigger hostilities, the readiness of societies to embark on major warfare requires a far more complex explanation. That war itself results from a lack of choice or predetermination is hard to swallow, and Thucydides’ notion of inevitability, or necessity (*ananke*, in Greek), is arguably unsatisfactory. All the same, it helps to understand why he has found so many followers from Machiavelli to modern “realists,” who subscribe to the belief that conflict and confrontation are defining — and inevitable — features governing interstate relations.

The debate on the origins of the Second Punic War is even livelier, and it is certainly more controversial. An enormous amount of ink has been spilled on the topic, both by ancient authorities and modern scholars, and it is baffling to see how passionately, if not fiercely, some writers engage in what seems to be an endless story.¹ The topic is, of course, of some relevance. For the Greek historian Polybius, a contemporary of the Third Punic War, the war with Hannibal marked the beginning of a period of “the fifty-three years [from 220 to 167] in which the Romans succeeded in bringing almost the whole inhabited world under their rule” (1.1.5). The Hannibalic War hence was considered the defining moment in the history of Rome’s foreign expansion, from regional power in Italy to empire, and of the entire Mediterranean world.

This view was universally accepted in antiquity. Toward the end of the Republic, if not earlier, the transformation of the Mediterranean Sea into a “Roman sea” (*mare nostrum*: Caesar, *BGall.* 5.1.2) was seen as a teleological development. The only real threat to this came from Hannibal, who in the early years of the Second Punic War inflicted a series of disastrous defeats on the Romans. But those crisis years did not break Rome’s power, let alone its spirit. Instead, Augustan propaganda presented those defeats as tests of endurance, which made the Romans even more determined to pursue their course of action (Livy 22.54.10). The expansion of Rome from city-state to empire was thus regarded as a linear process, carried out in a series of just wars, with the war against Hannibal its climax. This reading of the past was complemented by overtones of divine support for Rome’s cause against Carthage and the deceitful deeds of Hannibal. In the aftermath of the Second Punic War, the term *Punica fides* (“Punic fidelity”) soon became a prominent Roman proverb for notorious unfaithfulness, which captures the spirit of stigmatization of anything Punic and, in contrast, the praising of Roman loyalty and justice.²

Modern writers picked up on the propagandistic undertones, charging their accounts with subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) verdicts of cultural chauvinism. A more harmless version was the identification of Rome and Carthage as stereotypical land and sea powers respectively, the one relying on agrarian income and leading a frugal lifestyle, the other perceived as a Punic trading empire, indulging in luxury goods from overseas. This perception was particularly prominent in post-Enlightenment Germany, where it paved the way for more detrimental scholarly opinions. Some of these asserted ethnic and, at times, racial differences between Romans and Carthaginians, which, in turn, were promoted as the underlying causes of their conflict.³ Today’s scholarship is not free from contemporary ideologies, especially in light of what has been framed the “clash of civilizations.” The vast majority of historians, it should be said, disagree with an oversimplified scheme of tracing the roots of today’s cultural, religious, or ethnic conflicts back to the ancient Mediterranean

world. But the underlying notion that the Second Punic War was, indeed, an event of geopolitical importance stands largely unquestioned.

The first caveat kicks in here. It is almost banal, but too important to go unmentioned, that both powers were unaware of the fact their conflict would alter the face of the earth when they entered into the Second Punic War. In the eyes of contemporaries, it was not a struggle for world hegemony. This does not mean that both parties were unconscious in their actions, let alone ignorant of the more immediate implications. Before a Roman embassy arrived at Carthage in the spring of 218, authorized to declare war if the Carthaginians refused to comply with its demands, the senate at Rome had revisited all conceivable scenarios. Roman power had grown steadily since the end of the First Punic War (264–241). In Italy, Rome's position was firmly strengthened in a series of campaigns against the Gauls and other tribes north of the Po river. At the same time, the establishment of more permanent dominions in Sicily and Sardinia added to the *arrondissement* of Roman power overseas. In 225, the Roman *formula togatorum* (register of enrolled forces) listed 700,000 infantrymen and 70,000 cavalry, including the joint forces of Romans, Italians, and other allies (Pol. 2.24).

This was a relatively comfortable position from which to embark on a war with Carthage, yet the First Punic War taught the Romans that such a conflict was likely to be extremely wearying. After a series of large naval campaigns, the war dragged on, forcing the Romans to deploy infantry troops to Sicily on a permanent basis. Fighting there soon came to a stalemate, with little progress but high casualties (note, e.g., Fabius Pictor, *FRH* 1 F28). The battlefields of the new war with Carthage were expected to be in Spain and Africa, territories that were even more remote, and more consuming, than the Sicilian war theater. Later Roman tradition claims that some senators, in light of this, warned of and raised doubts concerning the dangers of such a large overseas adventure (Dio 13, fr. 55.1–8, *contra* Pol. 3.20.1). Authentic or not, it is clear that Rome had no reason to anticipate a quick decision on the battlefield. Driving Hannibal's forces out of their Iberian strongholds, and hence disconnecting Carthage from its resources in the western Mediterranean was difficult enough. This, however, was a clearly limited scope. At Rome, no one fantasized about world hegemony.

On the Carthaginian side, the scope was more concrete. Weakened by the harsh stipulations of the peace treaty that concluded the First Punic War, and following the losses suffered in a conflict with their previous mercenary forces, Carthaginian politics of the 230s and 220s were determined by a desperate need for compensation. This is a more or less conventional view of the rise of Barcid rule in Iberia, in the sense that it regards the exploration of new resources as its main purpose (see below). Nonetheless, it certainly helps to capture the situation and put Carthaginian actions into perspective.

Hannibal's strategy was built on the assumption that he would defeat the Romans in pitched battle and then have them agree to a peace treaty that redefined the parameters of their relations and respective spheres of interest. Such reasoning was in line with the dialectic of interstate relations in the Hellenistic world. The constant competition to maximize power and resources, as well as their influence on other states in order to communicate their pursuits, called for accelerated renegotiations of any given status quo. Consequently, the immediate results of warfare — the recognition of spheres of interest, the payment of indemnities, or the loss of territories — were temporary at best, since they were exposed to the challenges of future warfare that might well lead to a revision of previous arrangements. This interpretation of the mechanics of interstate affairs must have been on Hannibal's mind when he marched against Italy: a surprise attack and a series of victorious battles, followed by a peace treaty that realigned the current state of affairs between Rome and Carthage. What in hindsight, then, looks like a struggle for world hegemony was, in fact, a conflict rooted in, and confined to, the power relations in the western Mediterranean basin. None of the parties involved anticipated that the Hellenistic superpowers of the eastern Mediterranean would crumble and fall only a few decades later, one after the other eliminated by the victor of the Second Punic War.

The second caveat has similar bearings. Several ancient authors produced contemporary histories that included a synopsis of the events leading to the Hannibalic War, relying on first-class evidence such as eyewitness accounts, the study of documents, and sometimes active participation in the events described. At Rome, at least three writers stand out. The earliest of them is Q. Fabius Pictor, a senator (probably of praetorian rank) and legate during the war (cf. Chapter 7). Fabius' work on the history of Rome, from its origins to his own days, marked the beginnings of Roman history writing. It is easy to see how the Second Punic War stimulated the emergence of the genre, the calamities of warfare calling for a new type of discourse on state action and social meaning (in Greece, the Peloponnesian War had similar bearings on Thucydides' writing). Fabius' formative impact on Roman historiography can already be detected in the writings of his most immediate successor, L. Cincius Alimentus, praetor in 210 and at some point prisoner in Hannibal's camp (*FRH* 2 F10). His account largely followed Fabius' lead, both in terms of structure and contents. Finally, M. Porcius Cato, as a young tribune, cut his teeth in the later stages of the war and went on to the consulship in 195. His work on the history of Italy, entitled *Origines* ("The Beginnings"), was written some time after 170. It set a different tone than Fabius', but its emphasis on geography and spheres of interest in the western Mediterranean (*FRH* 3 F4.10; 7.5) betrays that Cato, too, made an opinionated, innovative, and lasting contribution to the ancient discussion on the causes of the war.⁴

The writings of these historians were complemented by the works of Q. Ennius, who published a monumental epic poem on Roman history (*Annales*), from the downfall of Troy to his present days. It was hugely successful; recitations attracted large crowds, and many readers memorized long passages by heart.⁵ Neither Ennius' nor any of the other accounts mentioned here have survived in full. But the messages of these authorities resonate in the works of later periods, notably in those of Polybius and Livy, which invite an understanding of the Roman point of view. The reasons for the Hannibalic War, as put forth by Fabius Pictor and writers after him, are relatively well known.

For Carthage, the opposite holds true. Hannibal had two professional historians in his staff, Sosylus of Sparta and Silenus from Sicily, who produced what seem to be extremely competent accounts of the war as it unfolded. Their works have been lost (merely three fragments survive). Another historian, Philinus of Acragas, wrote a pro-Carthaginian account of the First Punic War, which assembled valuable information on the relations between Rome and Carthage prior to the Hannibalic War, including recognitions of spheres of interest and treaty obligations. Philinus' work, too, is almost entirely lost (five fragments survive), and it has become an exercise in precarious *Quellenforschung* to recover fragments of his work from later sources. This process is treacherous in and of itself. For instance, it has been shown that Polybius, while following Philinus throughout many sections of his introductory chapters, seems to have interwoven the accounts of his forerunners to a degree that makes it virtually impossible to discern Philinus from other sources. But even if the attempt of *Quellenforschung* was more fruitful, it must be remembered that the text would have been extrapolated from sources opposed to Philinus and the viewpoint he presented. In other words, the writings of pro-Carthaginian authors are lost, and what little there is left is transmitted via sources that were highly critical of, if not openly hostile to, their interpretation. The Carthaginian tradition has been wiped out. With it much of the most fundamental information on Carthage's political culture and decision-making process, its ruling elite and its conduct of interstate affairs has vanished.⁶

This alone should raise suspicions about a strictly legalistic approach to the *Kriegsschuldfrage*. With no Carthaginian sources available, it is highly questionable to apportion blame, raise allegations, or make accusations of treaty breaches. The details of this will be discussed below, but for now it is important to note that whatever has been transmitted in our sources comes through the filter of the Roman tradition. This tradition, however, bears the marks of innate sociocentrism; its validity, or "truth," was unquestioned by Roman society simply because it originated from within that society.⁷ Moreover, as the Mediterranean empire expanded, so Rome's degree of confidence in its own cause grew. In light of such contamination, one should

accept that much of the actual background history of the origins of the Second Punic War is lost beyond recovery.

Causes of Complaint

The Romans had a clear understanding of the origins of the war. As far as immediate causes of complaint were concerned, the capture of Saguntum was considered an act of aggression that forced them to respond. This view was already promoted by Fabius Pictor, who, as a senator, was most likely present during the discussions in the house when the news of the fall of Saguntum arrived. In Fabius' work, Hannibal's attack was sweepingly labeled an "injustice" (*adikia* in Greek: *FRH* 1 F31). This view became the dominant one. It was accepted by many writers after him, including Polybius. In fact, Saguntum was soon singled out as the event which outstripped all others leading up to the war. Such an overemphasis naturally raises suspicion, and it invites a brief revision of the particulars of the Saguntum case. The issue is notoriously debated among scholars, and it seems almost like flogging a dead horse to revisit it (cf. also Chapters 11, 12 and 16 for debate).

Saguntum was a coastal city in eastern Spain, lying south of the Ebro river. At some point in 226, a Roman delegation traveled to Spain to conclude a treaty with Hasdrubal. The main reference for this Ebro treaty is Polybius, who says that it contained only the clause that "the Carthaginians will not cross the Ebro River under arms" (3.29.3). It thus appears that both parties defined their respective spheres of power in Spain; Carthage was left with the territories south of the Ebro while the Romans claimed suzerainty over everything north of it. Saguntum had signed an agreement with the Romans at some point prior to the Ebro treaty; Polybius, who makes only vague reference to this, says that that happened "many years" (3.30.1) before Hannibal took up the Barcid command in Spain in 221. Modern scholars are puzzled by just how many years before 221 that pact came into being. The sack of Saguntum could have been regarded as *adikia* if the city was a friend of Rome and hence possibly acknowledged as a Roman protectorate prior to the Ebro treaty. On the other hand, an alliance after the Ebro treaty would have been seen as hostile Roman penetration of the demarcated Carthaginian sphere of interest in Spain.⁸

The silence on the sequence of events is not the only missing piece of the puzzle. The nature of Rome's relations with Saguntum is also obfuscated. Polybius claims that it was considered an alliance, and it seems that this view was uttered by Roman envoys to Carthage as early as 218. But a formal alliance is improbable. Polybius depicts this relationship originating from an act of self-surrender (*deditio*) by the Saguntines, who are said to have "given themselves

into the *fides* ('good faith,' in Greek *pistis*) of Rome" (3.15.8). There are various hypotheses as to what that *deditio* entailed and if indeed it made the Saguntines formal allies of Rome. Yet it is worth remembering that one should not assume too formalistic categories in Roman foreign relations in the mid Republican period. The persistent reference to *fides* implies that the Saguntines were simply friends of the Romans, rather than allied subjects.⁹ The whole idea, then, of a Carthaginian attack on a Roman ally which forced the Romans to retaliate falls short of being a smokescreen.

No matter what the nature of their relations were, when Hannibal attacked Saguntum in the spring of 219 and laid siege to the city for the next eight months, the senate at Rome did nothing but debate and send embassies. This inaction posed a significant embarrassment to the Romans. In fact, in light of much boasted *fides* it was so embarrassing that it called for yet another obfuscation. Livy's narrative, which may reflect contemporary voices, preserves traces of a tradition that placed both the siege and fall of Saguntum and Hannibal's invasion of Italy into one consular year — that of 218 — which dramatically cut short the course of events (21.15.1–5). At the same time, this exculpated the Romans from the allegation of inertia during the siege of an ally and friend. In such a revised chronology, there was simply no time to aid the Saguntines. In summary, then, the Saguntum affair is shaky at best. Rome promoted it as decisive cause of complaint, but references to the event lack precision and verifiable detail in virtually all regards. It is almost as if Saguntum is a red herring.

In any case, the affairs revolving around Saguntum were only the latest chapter in a long history of Carthaginian contraventions of earlier contracts. In Cato's history, the list of Punic treaty breaches mounted up to six instances (*FRH* 3 F4.9). The textual problems aside — it is not quite clear if Cato refers to contraventions to six treaties or six contraventions to one and the same treaty — it is obvious that any such list resembles a "swathe of invented confrontations" (Hoyos 1997, 147) rather than something that should be taken at face value. The spirit in which such a stigmatization of "treaty-breaking Punics" (*Poeni foedifragi*: Cic. *Off.* 1.12) was advertised has already been mentioned. The subject matter of it naturally relates to the vexed problem of Romano-Carthaginian treaties, another scholarly minefield that needs to be crossed, albeit quickly.

Polybius outlines six treaties between Rome and Carthage, five authentic and one false, which he presents as relevant to the history of their mutual relations (3.22–27). The five authentic treaties were signed in 509, 348, 279, at the end of the First Punic War (241) and again in 226, the aforementioned Ebro treaty. The sixth agreement in this list is the so-called Philinus treaty, probably from around 306, which Polybius, in a celebrated passage, dismisses as fake (3.26). Unlike the authentic treaties, which were preserved on bronze

tablets in the treasury of the aediles, Polybius was unable to find any traces of Philinus' treaty in the state archive. It is futile to argue, as so many have done, that a copy of the treaty reported by Philinus was kept somewhere else, or that Polybius had no full access to the archive, that the treaty may well have been hidden from him, or that it was removed altogether, and so on. "In fact," Polybius forcefully concludes, "there is no such document at all, nor was there ever" (3.26.5).

According to Philinus, the treaty stipulated that "the Romans were obligated to stay away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy" (*FGrH* 174 F1). Such a division of interest spheres would have been in line with the inherent logic of earlier and later treaties. Its implications resemble those of the Ebro treaty. For, if authentic, Rome's decision to cross into Sicily, the campaign that triggered the First Punic War, would have been an open breach of the Philinus treaty, just as the alliance with Saguntum would have been a contravention of the Ebro treaty (if the latter indeed was concluded prior to the *deditio* of the Saguntines). The issue will likely remain unresolved — Philinus' promotion of the cause and Polybius' rejection both carry the same weight, with neither prevailing over the other. But maybe there is indeed one piece of evidence that speaks in favor of Philinus. Polybius states that the treaty of 279 was largely a renewal of that of 348 (3.25.1–2), which had allowed the Carthaginians to seize territory in Latium. By the time of the Pyrrhic War, the Romans insisted that all of Italy, and certainly Latium, was their sole sphere of interest. This is confirmed by various, independent sources. It is thus inconceivable that, by the 280s or 270s, the seizure of territory in Latium was granted to Carthage, which implies that the treaty of 348 must have been modified at some point before an additional renewal was stipulated in 279. The Philinus treaty could have provided such a readjustment.¹⁰

To be sure, if this reconstruction is authentic, it does not necessarily make Polybius a "liar."¹¹ It is difficult to conceive that Polybius, who is so opinionated here, would have boasted about the matter if indeed he had known the opposite to hold true. One cannot but assert that Polybius believed in what he wrote. When actually commenting on the Roman crossing to Sicily prior to the First Punic War, he makes it clear that he disapproved of the Romans' original consent to have received the Mamertines into their friendship and afterwards to have helped them, since the Mamertines had "treacherously seized not only Messana but Rhegium" (3.26.7). Polybius, hence, went as far as to criticize Rome's course of action as morally flawed but, juristically, he felt the need to acknowledge that such behavior complied with existing treaties.

What is more likely, then, is that Polybius' judgment was deeply prefigured by Rome's worldview as promoted since the works of Fabius Pictor, Cincius, and Cato. The commonly accepted view was that the Carthaginians had attacked a loyal Roman ally, that they were notorious treaty breakers, and that

they had no reliable structures of government (on which see below). This attitude was highly coherent in itself, and much conforming to Roman self-perceptions. It created a perfect “other” to Roman society — the Romans operated on *fides*, they respected existing treaties, and they lived in a well-governed *res publica*. The sociocentricity of this view made it most compelling. This means that Roman society never challenged the validity of this attitude. It had originated from within society and was promoted to give order and meaning to its actions; this alone made it true. In this line of reasoning, there was simply no place for a treaty like that proclaimed by Philinus. Polybius says that most Romans were largely ignorant of the earlier treaties between Carthage and Rome, since they had been concluded so long ago (3.26.2). What preserved them from total obliteration was the existence of actual hard copies, the oldest of which were written in difficult Latin and in rough shape. In other words, the historical memory of even Rome’s ruling elite did not last long enough to actively remember the existence of those agreements, let alone their details. It is easy to see how the Philinus treaty could have fallen through the cracks of society’s memory. And the disappearance of a hard copy could be attributed to so many different reasons that it shouldn’t give scholars reason for pause.

All of this leads one to reason that Rome and Carthage, while at peace, shared a lively exchange of goods and ideas, and that they concluded a series of treaties in which their respective spheres of interest were defined as both states grew to become hegemonic leaders in their respective realms. Yet despite various attempts to trace divisions and demarcate suzerainty spheres, interstate relations in the western Mediterranean prove to have been more complex. Most importantly, in the actual state of affairs Rome and Carthage were active agents in the other’s dominion. Such an environment naturally triggered grievances that revolved around the thorny issue of treaty obligations. But the breach of any of those agreements does not explain the recorded reasons for war, nor does it fully account for the underlying reasons, domestic and abroad, that paved the road to war.

Underlying Reasons

Before Hannibal left for Spain with his father in 237, four years after the end of the First Punic War, Hamilcar “took him by the hand, led him up to the altar [i.e., where the departure sacrifice was performed], bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans” (Pol. 3.11.6–7). Hannibal, aged nine, did as his father told him to, sealing his oath as a binding spell on his life. The episode of Hannibal’s oath was hugely popular in Roman tradition. Although it is not entirely clear when it was first

circulated — Polybius is the earliest authority to report it — it almost certainly was connected to a more general belief that was shared by the Hannibalic War generation.

According to Fabius Pictor, Hasdrubal, who had succeeded to the Barcid command after the death of Hamilcar in 229, was full of “acquisitiveness and power-lust” (*pleonexia* and *philarchia* in Greek: *FRH* 1 F31). His hatred for the Romans led him to handle affairs in Spain in a way that was openly opposed by the leading men at Carthage. When confronted with requests for modesty, Hasdrubal allegedly sought to overthrow the home government. The plan fell through and he henceforth acted even more despotically and independently from his home government. Hannibal followed that path when he precipitated war against Rome “off his own bat and against the will of the Carthaginians” (Fabius Pictor, *FRH* 1 F31). From the Roman point of view, his actions came full circle, affirming his famous oath of eternal hostility.

In antiquity, the “wrath of the Barcids” figured as the most prominent underlying reason for the Hannibalic War. According to the Romans, the hatred of Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal was bound to trigger a war: at some point it would bring about a clash with the Romans and their allies. That motive was even more forceful since, in its extended version, it included the claim that the headstrong Barcids had dissociated themselves from their home government. Consequently, that line of argument prepared the ground for a most ingenious apologetic strategy, allowing Roman writers to put into Carthaginian mouths that the Barcids acted in discord with the existing treaties between Rome and Carthage.

The “wrath of the Barcids” can be dismissed from the academic discussion; it is not convincing to credit Barcid resentment over issues with Rome as a driving element in the relations between the two. Most likely, this was yet another way to shift all blame to Carthage’s side. But this is not to deny, of course, that the Carthaginians, and the Barcids in particular, must have felt unrelenting grudges against Rome. The Peace of 241 had put Carthage in a difficult position. In its final version, which was ratified by the People’s assembly at Rome, it was agreed, *inter alia*, that the Carthaginians should evacuate all of Sicily as well as the islands between Sicily and Italy and pay nearly 80 tons of silver in 10 annual installments.¹² That this agreement threw Carthage into more than an economic crisis is readily illustrated by the so-called Truceless War (241–238), a revolt of the mercenary armies that had fought for Carthage throughout the war against Rome. The indemnities imposed by the Romans brought the payments for the mercenaries for past services to a grinding halt. They then took things into their own hands, and the Carthaginians required more than two years to crush the rebel force, secure the very basic supplies of their city, and finally consolidate their position in North Africa.¹³

In the next year, the Barcids set sail for Spain. The declared goal of their mission was to explore new sources of income. To achieve this, the government at home may have hoped to turn the coastal regions of southern and eastern Spain into some sort of Carthaginian dominion, although the details of this were subject to future developments. Spain, in any case, was crucial. As a result of the Truceless War Carthage was excluded from Sardinia (238). Another series of minor confrontations with Rome is reported for the following years, the authenticity of which is not always ascertained, but the general trend is clear. In 241 and again throughout the 230s, Carthage's radius of action in the western Mediterranean was persistently curbed — Sicily, Lipari, Sardinia, the coastal strip of Liguria were all sealed off, leaving Spain as the only source of compensation. The Carthaginians had already exercised some influence on Iberian affairs in the past. The region was not unfamiliar to them; there seems to have been a network of contacts and communications that remained by and large intact throughout the first war with Rome. If the Peace of 241 was ever to be revised, the grounds for such a revision lay in Iberia. On the Barcids rested the hopes of Carthaginian society.

Naturally, this put Hamilcar Barca in a strong position. How strong a position is a different matter. The political arrangement between him and the home government is notoriously debated (cf. Chapter 12). Scholars have gone to great pains deciphering the legal underpinnings of Barcid leadership — some have even asserted a *de facto* military monarchy — but given how little is known about the politics and society at Carthage, that task is likely to remain fruitless. In any case, under Hasdrubal, Hamilcar's successor in the Iberian command, the autonomy of the Barcids was bolstered by the foundation of a new administrative, economic, and military centre, Carthago Nova, in circa 225 and by the minting of new coinage that heralded a dynastic rule in Iberia. Nevertheless, as seen above, notions of Hasdrubal's alienation of the Carthaginian leaders at home are mostly a Roman invention. There is not a single piece of unbiased evidence that hints at discontent at Carthage with the Barcid conduct of affairs in Spain.¹⁴

On the other hand, the growing stretch of authority between Carthage and Spain that accompanied the rise of the Barcid Empire must have dismayed the Romans in their dealings with Punic Iberia. Cassius Dio reports (fr. 48) that in 231 the Romans sent their first embassy to Spain to check on Hamilcar. The note does raise suspicions since it resembles references to later embassies, but it might very well be authentic. Five years later, the Ebro treaty was struck between another Roman delegation and Hasdrubal, which indicates that the Romans regarded the Barcids as representatives of the Carthaginian state. According to Polybius, in 220, on the eve of the Saguntum affair, another embassy was sent. Various attempts have been made to determine the precise mandate of that mission, with no cogent conclusions. But for the moment it

is worth noting that the Roman envoys, after a heated discussion with Hannibal, traveled from Iberia to Carthage to see if his actions were backed by the home government. Finally, when the Romans declared war in 218, after news on the fall of Saguntum had arrived, the embassy was sent not to Hannibal but directly to Carthage. It is not altogether unreasonable, then, to see how, and why, Roman allegations of Carthaginian unfaithfulness came into being. For a decade or so, the senate dealt with different Carthaginian authorities. Throughout that exchange, the Barcids and their home government were mostly acting hand in hand, but the division as such of state authority between a dynasty and the state, along with their different styles and settings of communication, was certainly alien to Roman political culture.

It has been stated that the Romans for long paid no attention to the Iberian theatre, but that reading is formulated with the deception of hindsight. From their first embassy to Hamilcar to a treaty with Hasdrubal and another embassy to Hannibal and Carthage, they persistently indicated interest in Iberian affairs. Since the western Mediterranean was only one sphere of action among others, it is even more misleading to speak of Roman uninterest in the rise of the Barcids. But why did the Romans get involved in Punic dealings in Iberia at all? Did they, as many have argued, fear a strike at Sardinia and Sicily, and were they therefore planning for a pre-emptive war? Were the Romans determined to swallow the Carthaginian domain? Or were they not planning for war at all, but merely responding to the situation as the Barcids unfolded it?

These questions naturally lead to the more general issue of the guiding principles and goals of Roman foreign policy, which must be placed in a wider context of Roman political culture. The issue is of extreme importance, and it would be highly desirable to provide a similar contextualization of Carthage's foreign behavior. Yet the sources simply do not allow for this. Roman tradition often labels the Barcids with a Greek-style democratic and demagogic tenor. By implication, Hannibal's dynasty seems to have enjoyed widespread popular support for ruthless foreign expansion. Such a picture is too stereotypical to cast light on Carthage's political culture. It is important, and frustrating, to recall this lack of information.¹⁵

For Rome, more can be said. In a hugely influential study, it was argued that the Republic was so successful as an imperial power because of its exceptional bellicosity and thirst for plunder and booty.¹⁶ That thesis was, in turn, a response to the traditional scholarly belief in Rome's "defensive imperialism," as postulated by the greatest Roman historian of all times, Theodor Mommsen. According to Mommsen, Rome fought mostly defensive wars, and its empire was thus merely regarded as a by-product of its victories in an endless series of unsought military conflicts. More recently, Roman dealings prior to the Hannibalic War were once again interpreted along those lines, when they were described as "essentially defensive, in the sense that they

were prompted above all by the wish to curb Carthaginian expansion in Spain.”¹⁷ On the other side of that debate, it was argued that the Romans were no more bellicose or imperialistic than any other Mediterranean society, they were simply better at war.¹⁸

It is a common thing to label scholarly attitudes in order to communicate them, and it is usually acknowledged that the academic investigation behind such reductions is much more complex. Yet the labels of that particular debate — offensive, defensive, bellicose, and so on — are not entirely helpful. Nor is the concept of imperialism, with its manifold modern assumptions. For instance, it is hard to see how the intention to curb another state’s expansion in the area of a third party qualifies as “essentially defensive.” Along the same lines, such action could easily be labeled as “imperialistic” or “essentially offensive” (or maybe “imperialistically offensive”). All states of the ancient Mediterranean took part in the competition to maximize their power and resources as well as their influence on other societies in order to achieve their aims. But not all did so on the same societal, economic, and cultural presumptions.

At Rome, the affairs of the Republic were firmly in the hands of a ruling elite, the members of which filled the public offices with and without *imperium*. Since the late fourth century, if not earlier, success in office, in politics, and on the battlefield vindicated the aristocracy’s claim to leadership. Service to the Republic served as the most exclusive vehicle of social distinction. Consequently, the link between public achievement and social hierarchy created a climate of fierce competition. Firstly, Roman society operated on the assumption that achievement, as such, was tied to office-holding, which provided the only platform for distinction. But the number of offices was notoriously small; on the eve of the Hannibalic War a mere six magistracies with imperial command were available each year. Secondly, the nature of aristocratic achievement was clearly a military one. *Imperium*-holders were expected, and in any case called upon, to expand the Republic’s territories, increase its resources, and reduce its foreign enemies. The famous *elogia* of the Scipios, some of which predate the Second Punic War, shed much light on this. They list the public offices held by the deceased and then boast about the enemies that were subdued under each family member. Two *elogia* explicitly state that the Scipios earned their distinction *apud vos*, i.e., “among you” and, in this sense, “for you,” which highlights the connection between public service and social distinction.¹⁹

Toward the end of the Second Punic War, aristocratic competition for honour and distinction clearly left its marks on the actual course of warfare. The consuls of 203, Cn. Servilius Caepio and C. Servilius Geminus, were assigned commands in Italy, yet toward the end of their term, Caepio crossed into Sicily, hoping that he would enter the African war theater from there. In

202, the consul Ti. Claudius Nero forcefully insisted on Africa as his *provincia* — his demand was articulated so forcefully that the Senate could not but allow him to cross into Africa with the same command (*parique imperio*) as Scipio Africanus. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 201) made the same request in the following year. In the meantime, P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. I 205), who was in fact in charge of the African campaign, did whatever he could to conclude the war under his own *imperium* in order to harvest the glory of victory over Hannibal.²⁰ The pattern is well known. Roman generals tended to either drag out warfare or take a short cut to peace, depending on the time frame of their command power, so that they could earn the distinction of victory. Concerns about the treatment of enemies came second. The career of T. Quinctius Flamininus is the most famous example for this.

Would Roman nobles also initiate a war solely on the grounds of earning glory? The case of Ap. Claudius Caudex (cos. 264) immediately comes to mind, although much of the tradition about him is highly contaminated. Also, the post-Hannibalic War era provides ample evidence, including Cn. Manlius Vulso's sordid campaign against the Galatians (189). But the matter is more sustained, and its ramifications more far-reaching, than these instances suggest. In a more recent study on the First Punic War, it is argued that warfare between Carthage and Rome was mostly determined by the military ethos of the nobility as well as personal ambitions of its members. According to that interpretation, the quest for aristocratic glory was a driving force in Roman foreign affairs — the author even questions if there was any long-term strategy at all to balance, or control, that force — while Carthaginian policies are understood as a response to the developing claims of Rome's generals.²¹

The quest for distinction was deeply rooted in Roman political culture. Demands to increase the Republic, surpass the ancestors (*maiores*), and set new precedents of exemplary behavior were omnipresent. More than that, this competitive ethos soon became compulsory, as it created certain expectations on the part of the common people. In order to gain popular support and be (re-)elected to office, Roman aristocrats simply had to be successful. In this sense, the burden to achieve was a vital presumption for the recognition, and reassurance, of a family's social status. Much of that family's symbolic capital rested on the famous feats of its ancestors, its persistent renewal through the glorious deeds of the present generation, and on the prospective promise to live up to those ideals in future. To engage, not only in warfare, but in territorial expansion with the purpose of subduing foreign lands and societies was a compulsory, if not natural behavior. War and empire-building were immediate mandates, not because the Romans were more bellicose than other societies or because they had the "hearts of wolves, insatiable of blood, and ever greedy and lusting after power and riches," as has been remarked by one of Rome's greatest enemies, Mithridates of Pontus (reported by Just. 38.6.8). Military

success was built into the very foundations of Roman political culture. It served both as the starting assumption and as the implicit agenda of that culture. On the eve of the Hannibalic War, many senatorial families were ready and willing, if not eager, to take on the mandate of making Rome greater.²²

“What Made War Inevitable”

Had another war between Rome and Carthage then become a necessity? In the decade after the peace that concluded the First Punic War, Carthaginian politics were driven by silent preparations for revision. The rise of Barcid power in Spain was clearly a backup operation to pay Rome the war indemnities, as Hamilcar Barca famously put it when first confronted with investigations by Roman emissaries. But the desire to recover from the devastating blow of the Lutatius treaty must have been only one goal among others. The nature of Mediterranean interstate affairs, Hellenistic affairs in particular, saw the expansion of power over other states as a legitimate course of action that was never questioned. Yet the extension of state power depended on many factors that did not always coincide (military prowess, manpower and resources, able leadership, the lack of any of these on the side of the opponents). While some states, at any given time, found themselves in an unfavorable constellation, and hence fell prey to others, their fortunes would almost certainly turn at some point in the future. That would be the moment for the resolution of past grievances. Carthaginian society staked much on such a turn of fortunes, with Spain as an almost ideal platform for recovery. To pursue this policy, the authorities at Carthage seem to have made huge concessions to their commanders. Maybe Carthage and the Barcid dominion in Iberia did in fact become a state conglomeration that was glued by some sort of dynastic power. But such a development makes sense only if the Carthaginians, at home and in Spain, all agreed that the revision of the power structure in the western Mediterranean was highly desirable, if not necessary.

The Roman concept of interstate relations was different. Rome did recognize the equality of some other powers. Yet equality was conceded “only beyond the range of effective power, and every attempt was made to build up power where it had shown itself deficient” (Badian 1968, 5). It is almost too banal to mention, but too important not to acknowledge, that this verdict holds true for the entire history of the Roman Republic. The only limitations came in 53 BC and again in AD 9, when after two devastating battles at Carrhae and in the Teutoburger Forest a policy of factual coexistence was eventually implemented vis-à-vis the Parthian Empire and Germany. Until then, the Roman Republic had not had a single neighbor that was not reduced in war.

Much of that expansion was geared toward the realization of the ruling elite's binding ethos, including its almost total commitment to public service and military success. This ideal vindicated the leadership of the nobility as a distinct social class, and it was supported actively and consciously by Roman society in general, including the lower classes, who looked at it almost as a guarantee for the well-being of the community as a whole. Throughout the third century, in two major wars against Pyrrhus and Carthage and then again in a series of campaigns in northern Italy and Illyria during the 230s and 220s, the inherent mechanics of that political culture had shown themselves to be extremely successful. When Barcid Iberia appeared on the Roman radar a few years after 237, the nobility responded with the dispatch of embassies and the formation of more regular ties with some cities in the region which, in turn, reported back to the Senate to keep it informed about Carthaginian movements. Rome's response manifested itself in very basic stipulations: the reassurance of earlier treaties, the demarcation of spheres of interest, and the creation of friendship ties. As the dealings between Rome and Carthage in Iberia intensified, those arrangements did not help to govern their grievances, let alone contain them. Instead, both sides looked at them as causes for complaint that justified their actions toward the road to war. The extent of the coming conflict was of course unanticipated. At Carthage, no one imagined just how close Hannibal would come to a total revision of the Peace of 241. The Senate at Rome was probably more optimistic, but when Roman envoys declared war on Carthage in the spring 218, no one foresaw that victory and annihilation would be separated only by a very, very thin line.

NOTES

1. A full list of references is impossible. The following works have become most influential (all with much further reading): Meyer 1913; Täubler 1921; de Sanctis 1932; Kramer 1948; Walbank 1957, 167–172, 305–361; Astin 1967a; Hoffmann 1972; Welwei 1977; Schwarte 1983; Rich 1996; and various contributions by Hoyos (see References).
2. *Punica fides*: Waldherr 2000; cf. Hoyos 1987.
3. Cf. Vogt 1943, who probably marks the climax of such a perception. Ameling 1993a offers a valuable synthesis on the developing approaches in European academic cultures throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
4. After H. Peter's seminal work, more recent editions of Fabius', Cincius' and Cato's histories include Beck and Walter, *FRH*, which also provides much biographical information and commentaries on fragments. The Budé series covers those authors in *L'Annalistique romaine*, tome I (1996, ed. M. Chassignet) and *Caton* (1986, ed. M. Chassignet). English editions of Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus are available online in *Brill's New Jacoby*, *FGrHist* 809 (ed. J. Dillery) and *FGrHist* 810 (ed. T. Habinek).

5. Skutsch 1985; cf. also Gildenhard 2003; Walter 2004, 258–279.
6. The works of Philinus, Silenus, and Sosylus have now been re-edited and commented on, *FGrHist* 174 (ed. C. Champion), *FGrHist* 175 (ed. B. Dreyer) and *FGrHist* 176 (ed. E. Millender). Walbank (1945) continues to be extremely important on Philinus.
7. The concept of sociocentrism stems from critical thinking theory, but it has an obvious explanatory force in history and the social sciences. Polybius' famous notion on Fabius' and Philinus' bias is an example (1.14.1–3 = Fabius, *FRH* 1 F27 and Philinus, *FGrHist* 174 T2), in the sense that Polybius denies their cognitive intention to present a wrong or untrue report. Their accounts were based on the prevalent beliefs in their respective societies and hence “true” in and of themselves. See also below on the approach to Polybius' veracity.
8. Scardigli 1991, 254–96; Hoyos 1998, 150–73; Serrati 2006, 130–4.
9. Pol. 3.15.8; 3.21.3–8 and 29.1–6 (argument for an alliance represented as being put only in his own day); cf. Hoyos 1998, 175 on possible charges of Rome's envoys in 218. The assumption of too formal categories in Roman foreign affairs has been questioned, rightly so, by Gruen 1984, 54–95.
10. Cf. Serrati 2006, 120–129.
11. See the title of Hoyos 1985a, a review article on Schwarte 1983.
12. Pol. 1.62.7–63.3 and 3.21.2 = Scardigli 1991, 297–327; cf. Lazenby 1996, 156–9; Hoyos 1998, 118–23.
13. Hoyos 2007.
14. The Barcids in Spain: Barceló 1989a, and 2008, 263–268; Hoyos 1994; 1998, 144–173, and 2003, 55–86. Hasdrubal's coinage: Jenkins and Lewis 1963, Group XII; Geus 1994, 134; cf. R. Miles in Chapter 15 below.
15. For labels of a democratic-demagogic tenor see, e.g., Appian, *Iber.* 4.16 and Livy 21.2. The most recent attempt to disclose the political and societal underpinnings of Carthage's ruling elite is that of Barceló 2008. He stresses how little is known.
16. Harris 1979; and 1984a.
17. Cf. Rich 1996, 19 (quote). Similar views include Kostial 1995 and Hoyos 1998.
18. Eckstein 2006, with review by Hölkeskamp, *CR* 59 (2009); cf. also Eckstein 2008.
19. *Elogia* of the Scipios: L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298): *CIL* 1² 6/7 = *CIL* 6.8.3 1284/5 Add. = *ILS* 1/2. L. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 259): *CIL* 1² 8/9 = *CIL* 6.8.3 1286/7 Add. = *ILS* 3. Cf. Coarelli 1972; Flower 1996, 160–180.
20. Cf. *MRR* under each year and Beck 2005, 350–353 for more details.
21. See Bleckmann 2002, with review by H. Beck, *Gnomon* 77 (2005), 689–693.
22. The bearings of aristocratic prestige and honor on Roman political culture were highlighted in the recent debate on the rule of the nobility, most notably by Flaig 1995 and Hölkeskamp 2004b, 93–105; cf. also Beck 2005, 9–30.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Hannibal: Tactics, Strategy, and Geostrategy

Michael P. Fronda

Introduction

To analyze a military leader's war planning and the execution of those plans is to evaluate and assess his generalship. Thus, this chapter, which attempts to identify the salient features of Hannibal's tactics, strategy, and geostrategy, draws the reader to the question of his qualities and skills as a general — or as Dexter Hoyos once framed it, “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?” Despite the fact that Rome prevailed in the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian general has usually received high praise from both ancient and modern critics. Indeed, he is often considered one of military history's great tragic figures, like Robert E. Lee or Erwin Rommel, a brilliant commander who had the misfortune of fighting for the wrong side, destined to lose more because of factors beyond his control than his own shortcomings as a general.¹

The following essay takes a somewhat different line. This does not mean that I will argue Hannibal was a poor commander. He won more battles than he lost, striking fear in Italy for more than 15 years, and, despite steep odds, bringing Rome to brink of defeat. It is hard to imagine that he was anything less than a very good, perhaps even great general. Upon closer examination, however, it is more difficult to determine precisely *why* he was so successful. We see Hannibal largely through the eyes of the Romans, in whose interest it was to exaggerate his military genius in order to magnify their own victory over him. At the same time, the ancient sources provide surprisingly little detailed information about various aspects of his generalship. Finally, when Hannibal's tactics, strategy, and

geostrategy — as far as they can be known — are considered in context, they appear rather typical of military thinking and practice of the day. Indeed, it is striking how often Hannibal's war planning and methods seem conventional, given his fame and reputation.

Tactics: Military and Political

There is little argument that Hannibal was a fine tactician on the battlefield, though even this uncontroversial statement demands a caveat. Despite his fame as one of the great captains in military history, we actually know very little with certainty about how he conducted pitched battles. Much of our evaluation of Hannibal's tactical acumen derives from his string of victories over Roman armies in the first few years of the Second Punic War (Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae) and his most famous defeat, Zama, at the end of the war. This is because during the intervening years the Romans largely avoided confronting him. More importantly, Polybius' narrative of the Second Punic War after Cannae survives only in fragments, leaving us to rely on Livy, supplemented by later and/or fragmentary authors, for the descriptions of the few subsequent pitched battles. While Livy is a fine storyteller and, in my opinion, an underrated source for authentic historical material, he is a poor military historian and his descriptions of specific battlefield maneuvers are often suspect.² Despite this lack of evidence, however, a sense emerges of Hannibal's capabilities and preferred tactics.

The battle of Ticinus (218) was largely a cavalry clash. Hannibal sent his heavy cavalry against a combined force of Roman and Gallic cavalry supported by light-armed troops, but held back his lighter Numidian cavalry, stationed on the wings, in order to execute a flanking maneuver. The Romans held their own until they were outflanked and attacked from the rear by the Numidian cavalry, at which point they broke formation and scattered. The battle of Trebia (218) took place on a flat and treeless stretch on the eastern bank of the Trebia River. Despite the openness of the terrain, Hannibal managed masterfully to ambush the larger Roman army. He had learned that the Roman expected traps in wooded areas but tended to be careless on open ground (Pol. 3.71). Thus, prior to the battle he hid approximately one thousand cavalry and one thousand infantry in low brush and reeds along the banks of a stream that ran through the otherwise flat and open plain. Otherwise, both armies were arranged in typical fashion, with heavy infantry in the center, cavalry on the wings, and a covering force of light-armed troops in front. The battle also began typically, with a skirmish between light-armed troops followed by a cavalry charge (3.72–73). Hannibal's troops bested their counterparts in this phase, and the Roman heavy infantry

found itself pressed by enemy infantry in the front and by light-armed troops on the flanks. The hidden cavalry and infantry then sprang into action and charged the Roman army from the rear. The trap worked to perfection, and the Roman army, which hitherto had held its own, was thrown into “confusion and disarray” (3.74).

Hannibal again exploited topography, and his opponent’s aggressiveness, at the Battle of Trasimene. In 217, he marched into Etruria, where the Roman army under the consul C. Flaminius was encamped. He took pains to learn not only about the nature of the surrounding countryside, which was wealthy and a potential source of plunder, but also about Flaminius’ character: he was allegedly overconfident and easily provoked (Pol. 3.80). Thus, Hannibal began to devastate the surrounding countryside in an attempt to lure the Romans into battle. Flaminius obliged by closely pursuing the Carthaginian army, which is exactly what Hannibal had planned, for he had “already selected the ground which would best suit his purpose” (3.82). The Carthaginian proceeded past Arretium to Cortona to the northern shore of Lake Trasimene, along which rough hills create a defile that narrows into a cul-de-sac, where the hills draw close to the shore. Hannibal pitched camp with his Spanish and African infantry at the closed end of the defile, but placed his light-armed troops and cavalry along the hills. The Romans camped at the open end of the defile (3.83). At dawn Flaminius eagerly led the Roman army toward the Carthaginian camp and made contact with the Spanish and African infantry. At this point the troops along the hills descended on the Romans, taking them completely by surprise. Outflanked and surrounded, and now trapped between the Carthaginian forces and the lake, the Roman army suffered appalling casualties (3.84).

Hannibal’s tactical skill was perhaps best displayed at the battle of Cannae (216), fought on flat ground, on the south bank of the Aufidus River. In this case topography played a less critical role, though by lining up his forces near to the river, Hannibal constricted the movement of the vastly larger Roman army, taking away its tactical flexibility and partially nullifying its numerical advantage.³ On first glance, the tactical arrangement of troops on both sides was unremarkable. The Roman center was composed of heavy infantry, with the maniples packed more densely and deeper than usual. The Roman cavalry occupied the right wing, next to the river, and the allied cavalry the left wing. Light troops formed a forward screen. Hannibal likewise placed his cavalry on the wings and his infantry in the center, with light-armed troops in a forward position.

However, he employed two key tactical innovations. First, he placed his weakest infantry, his Gallic troops, in the very center of his main line, while positioning his better infantry in two columns behind them, with a gap between the columns. Second, his Gallic infantry advanced in a convex formation, with the very center closer to the Roman lines (Pol. 3.113). After an initial light-armed skirmish of little consequence, the battle was joined in

earnest. The superior Gallic and Spanish cavalry on one wing destroyed the Roman cavalry and then rode across the battlefield to help the Numidian cavalry, which had occupied the allied horse. In the meanwhile, the sheer weight of the Roman infantry charge began to push through the weaker, thinner Gallic line. This was Hannibal's plan, for the Romans in the center pressed too far forward, into the gap between his two main infantry columns, while those on the flanks pinched toward the fighting in the middle of the line. This allowed the African infantry to envelop the legions along their flanks (3.115), while the combined Carthaginian cavalry had driven off the allied cavalry and now turned to attack the Romans from the rear (3.116). The Romans were surrounded and again suffered staggering casualties (3.117).

These victories display Hannibal's qualities as a field general and highlight his tactical tendencies. He exploited his superior cavalry and light-armed troops to dictate the early stages of battle and to outflank his opponent. He made good use of advanced intelligence to select favorable terrain for his plans and especially to predict how the Romans would behave. He took advantage of the natural topography and the aggressive nature of Roman commanders to draw his opponents into a series of traps and encirclements, with savage results. His main strengths, it seems, involved positioning his troops and utilizing topography and intelligence, rather than tactical improvisation once the battle was joined. He was not inflexible: at the battle of Zama (202), when Hannibal's first two lines began to break, he refused to admit them to the rear ranks, going so far as to order his veteran soldiers in the third line to lower their spears to prevent a general retreat. The defeated first two lines of the Carthaginians were thus forced to the wings, and this allowed Hannibal to maintain the integrity of his veteran third line, which was poised to receive Scipio's fresh assault (Pol. 15.13–14; Livy 30.34). Still, despite this example of spontaneity, Polybius' adulatory summary of Hannibal's conduct of the battle (15.16) focuses almost exclusively on his foreplanning and initial arrangement of units.⁴ This is to say, his greatest attributes lay in tactical planning; he was not, like Caesar, a master of battlefield improvisation.

He was allegedly skilled at trickery and counterintelligence, however, including several ploys that he came up with on the fly. For example, he is reported to have worn wigs and various disguises to safeguard against assassination (Pol. 3.78; Livy 22.1). He famously escaped the *ager Falernus* by driving two thousand oxen, at night, with burning faggots tied to their horns, in the direction of the Roman camp. This fooled the Romans who were guarding the narrow pass out of the *ager Falernus* into thinking that he was making a sudden attack; they abandoned their position and he slipped through the pass (Pol. 3.93–94; Livy 22.16–17). He later set off from Gerunium for Cannae at night, leaving a fake camp — a few tents and burning campfires — to disguise the location of his army (Livy 22.43). He tried to ambush Fabius

Maximus by sending him forged letters from the leaders of Metapontum, which promised that the town would be handed over if the Roman general showed up on a fixed date; Fabius nearly fell for the trap (Livy 27.16; Plut. *Fab.* 19.5–6). In 208, Hannibal also obtained M. Claudius Marcellus' signet ring and used it to forge letters in his name, in order to deceive the citizens in towns still loyal to Rome (Livy 27.28). This plot too was foiled. So Hannibal appears to have been a master of deception, though even this conclusion must not go unqualified. The image of Hannibal-as-trickster fits the Roman stereotype of Carthaginian faithlessness (Livy 21.4.9), and even Polybius describes his use of disguises as a “typically Punic deception” (Pol. 3.78.1). It served the Romans' purposes to exaggerate Hannibal's attempts at guile and cunning, which, as we have seen with the failed plots mentioned above, were not always successful.

Finally, Hannibal engaged in a number of “diplomatic tactics,” activities not strictly limited to the battlefield designed to strike terror into his enemies and weaken their resolve, to discredit the Romans, and to drive a wedge between them and their subordinate allies. For example, early in the war Hannibal dealt with captives differently, depending on whether they were Roman citizens. After the battles of Trebia and Trasimene, he freed non-Roman prisoners but treated Romans badly, to emphasize that his quarrel was with Rome rather than the allies (Pol. 3.77.3–7, 85.1–4). After Trebia he also offered the Italians friendship and freedom, and promised to restore the cities and the land the Romans had taken from them (Pol. 3.76.6). Livy (23.6.1–2) reports that during negotiations with the people of Capua, he similarly vowed to restore all the lands that the Romans had unjustly taken from them, referring presumably to the stretches of the *ager Falernus*, which Rome had confiscated from the Capuans in the fourth century. The mulcting of territory from the defeated had been a typical Roman policy in Italy, and the loss of territory must surely have remained a sore spot for many conquered Italian communities that had reconciled themselves only grudgingly to Roman hegemony. Hannibal figured that he could play on this grievance.⁵

Land was not the only potential inducement. To the Capuans he pledged 300 Roman hostages as collateral against the same number of Capuan aristocrats already serving in the Roman army in Sicily (who therefore might be used as hostages themselves). He also promised to make Capua the “master of Italy” (Livy 23.10.1–2), appealing to the Capuans' own hegemonic aspirations. The terms of several treaties between Hannibal and Italian communities are known: Capua (Livy 23.7), Locri (Livy 24.1.9), Tarentum (Pol. 8.25.2; Livy 25.8.8), and the Lucanians (25.16.7). In each, he promised that his new allies would be free, live under their own laws, and enjoy friendship with the Carthaginians. His treaty with the Locrians vowed that they would retain control of their port, and both sides agreed to help each other in peace

and war. The Capuan-Hannibalic treaty stipulated as well that the Capuans were neither to be obliged to perform military service nor to serve under foreign magistrates.

The treaties echo the language of Hannibal's speech to the Italians after the battle of Trasimene, mentioned above. Although the exact formula varied from treaty to treaty, it is clear that Hannibal invoked language that was typical of Hellenistic liberation propaganda, in order to woo the Italian allies away from Rome.⁶ That the precise terms of his negotiations varied from city to city also suggests that he modified his promises to meet the specific demands and expectations of local contexts. If his dealings with the aforementioned communities are representative, his diplomatic tactics included general promises of freedom and autonomy, coupled with additional offers meant to appeal in individual cases.

Hannibal also exploited political factionalism and competition, cutting deals with "parties" or individual local aristocrats to secure their loyalty. Thus, for example, Statius Trebius, a leading aristocrat from the Samnite town of Compsa, contacted Hannibal after the battle of Cannae and promised to turn over his city (Livy 23.1.1–3). Livy's account makes it clear that Trebius saw in Hannibal an opportunity to drive out a rival aristocratic family, the Mopsii, who were powerful because of Roman favor. Upon Hannibal's approach, the Mopsii fled and Compsa was handed over, while Statius Trebius presumably was rewarded in exchange. Similar is the case of Salapia, in Apulia. Two leading citizens, Blattius and Dasius, were bitter political opponents. During the war, Blattius remained loyal to Rome, while Dasius sided with Hannibal and helped betray Salapia to the Carthaginians (Livy 26.38.6–14; Appian, *Hann.* 45. 191–47.205). The sources do not preserve as much detail as we would like concerning Hannibal's interaction with specific members of local ruling aristocracies, but these two cases are suggestive, and we may reasonably assume that his diplomatic tactics typically included the manipulation of local political competition. Finally, "negotiations" might be more straightforward: Clastidium and its grain stores were betrayed to Hannibal when he bribed the town's garrison commander Dasius, a Latin citizen from Brundisium (Pol. 3.69; Livy 21.48).

So much for seduction. Hannibal was not averse to employing what we might term "terror tactics" to wear down allied resolve. We repeatedly hear of Hannibal's troops devastating Italian farmland, and driving off livestock and other plunder. A few examples will suffice: after the battle of Trasimene, Hannibal marched from Etruria, through Umbria and Picenum, until he reached the Adriatic coast, then turned south and made his way to northern Apulia. His army laid waste to the lands along the way, including the territories of Luceria, Vibinum, and Arpi, allegedly accumulating so much booty that his men could not drive it or carry it (Pol. 3.86.8–10, 88.3–6, 100.1; cf. Livy 22.9.1–5; Zon. 8.25). Later, the Carthaginians plundered Samnium, including

the territory of Beneventum (Pol. 3.90.7–9). In the following year, he ordered his men to plunder the territory of Naples and display the booty beneath the walls of the city, the sight of which compelled the Neapolitans to sally out of their city walls into an ambush that he had prepared (Livy 23.1.5–8). At times the Carthaginian's tactics were even harsher, if we can trust ancient literary sources that are admittedly hostile. For example, according to Polybius (3.86.11), Hannibal ordered his troops to massacre any adult men whom they seized along the way on their slow march from Trasimene to Apulia. He occasionally made examples of intransigent cities that repeatedly withstood his overtures. Thus Livy (23.15.2–6) states that Hannibal starved Nuceria into submission after its citizens resisted his attempts to win them over peaceably. He ordered the city to be sacked and the booty handed over to his men. Acerrae was similarly plundered after its citizens fled rather than come over to the Carthaginians (Livy 23.17.1–7). Traitors faced grim rewards: when Hannibal found out that a certain local elite member, Dasius Altinius of Arpi, had abandoned the Carthaginian cause and fled to the Roman camp, he ordered the man's family burned alive (Livy 24.45).

Hannibal at times used both seduction and compulsion in combination, wielding both the carrot and the stick to win over a community's ruling class or break down their resolve. He sometimes refrained from more brutal practices, at least at first, giving a community the chance to defect willingly before he applied more pressure. By juxtaposing harsher actions with more seductive behavior, he could highlight the contrast between the benefits of cooperation and the painful repercussions of resistance. For example, he initially did not devastate the territory of Nola because he wished to win over the town voluntarily. Only later, when Nola failed to defect, did Hannibal have his men begin plundering the city's territory. Marcellus again acted quickly to head off disaffection, ordering his own troops to attack the raiding parties (Livy 23.14.5–7, 44.3–8; Plut. *Marc.* 12.2–3; Zon. 9.3). Similarly, in 214, when Hannibal led his army in the direction of Tarentum, he ordered his men to devastate the lands along the way, presumably including neighboring towns, until he entered Tarentine territory, which he refrained from plundering in order to win local goodwill (Livy 24.13.1–6, 17.8, 20.9–11). He also made raids into the nearby Salentine peninsula, but continued to avoid plundering Tarentine territory, again to win local favor (24.20.12–15).

Taken as a whole, it is difficult to identify a coherent method to Hannibal's diplomatic activities, except that he was willing to vary his tactics as circumstances dictated. It has been argued that this hurt his war effort, because his use of "terror tactics" contradicted his self-portrayal as a liberator, and thus undermined his credibility with the Italians.⁷ This criticism is exaggerated, I think. It is possible that some Italians were turned off by the harsher tactics, yet others were no doubt overawed and began to question the Romans'

willingness or ability to protect their allies. The Italian military-political landscape was complex: an array of polities of different size and resources, with varying degrees of loyalty to Rome, and motivated by their own sometimes competing interests. In addition, the Italian allies were not the only audience for his diplomatic tactics; these were also aimed at the Romans themselves, to compel them to fight a decisive pitched battle (e.g. Pol. 3.90.11–13). No one-size-fits-all diplomatic approach could be expected to have worked in every case, so it is not surprising that Hannibal tried different combinations of promises, bribes and other inducements, devastation, threats, and “terror” as the situation dictated. This was standard operating procedure in Hellenistic warfare and diplomacy, where liberation propaganda was not infrequently employed in conjunction with seemingly incongruous, even brutal methods.⁸ It served the Romans to portray Hannibal as exceptionally cruel (e.g. Livy 21.4.9; 24.45), but there is little to indicate that he behaved outside the harsh standards of the day. Indeed, Polybius dismisses those who accuse Hannibal of excessive cruelty and committing atrocities on the grounds that great leaders *must* adapt their conduct to the situation, even if that means occasional brutality (9.16, 23–29). The Romans themselves were not above grisly acts (e.g. Livy 27.16). In other words, Hannibal’s use of both seductive and compulsive diplomatic tactics, which may trouble a modern observer as contradictory, fits squarely within the norms of contemporary practice.

Strategy

What was Hannibal’s strategy? The extant sources again tell us less than we would like, for they preserve no detailed articulation of it. A reasonable deduction can be drawn, however, both from scattered references and specific decisions that Hannibal made in prosecuting the war. It is best to begin in negative terms, focusing on what his strategy did not entail.

There is consensus that Hannibal did not envision attacking, besieging, capturing, or razing the city of Rome.⁹ Thus, in a famous episode recounted by Livy (22.51.1–4) among others — the story goes back at least to Cato the Elder (Beck and Walter, *FRH* 4 F.13–14) — Hannibal was supposedly approached by his cavalry commander Maharbal after the battle of Cannae, who advised that the war could be won with an immediate attack on Rome. Hannibal declined the advice, earning Maharbal’s criticism that he knew how to win battles but not how to win wars. Regardless of the historicity of this dramatic conversation, Hannibal did not, in fact, try to invest Rome even after his smashing victory at Cannae. Polybius (3.86.8) claims that he dismissed the idea of marching against Rome after the battle of Trasimene. Only once, in 211, did he march on Rome, but this was not a legitimate effort to capture or

destroy the city. Rather, it was a desperate attempt to draw the Romans away from their siege of Capua.

We can conclude that his strategic objective was not the destruction of Rome, or even to dismantle completely the Roman state. Hannibal's actions immediately following the battle of Cannae support this position. First, he allegedly made a speech to the Roman captives that he was not fighting a war of extermination, but rather for dignity and empire (Livy 22.58.3). After the speech, he released ten captured Romans to the Senate in order to discuss the ransom of prisoners, and, more importantly, he sent a Carthaginian representative to negotiate peace terms (Livy 22.58.4–7). The strongest evidence that the Roman state was expected to survive in some form after the war's conclusion comes from a treaty made in 215 between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon (Pol. 7.9.2–17).¹⁰ The lengthy and detailed pact contains provisions for future dealings with Rome, which indicates that the survival of the Roman state was assumed. Given the timing of the treaty, signed soon after Cannae when Hannibal's fortunes and perhaps also his ambitions would have been at their highest, it can be safely assumed that the dissolution of the Roman state was never part of his strategy. Instead, he appears to have expected the war to end by way of negotiation, with the Romans compelled to accept the terms that he dictated.

His strategic objective was, therefore, presumably of equally limited scope: a renegotiation of the arrangement between Rome and Carthage. To achieve this objective, he adopted a rather straightforward plan: invade Italy.¹¹ Once there he would defeat the Romans in battle, detach them from their subordinate Italian allies, and thus compel Rome to give in and accept terms. The core elements of this strategy are found in Hannibal's response to the so-called Fabian Strategy. In 217, he led his army into the *ager Falernus* and devastated this fertile region. According to Polybius (3.90.11–13), Hannibal figured this would bring about one of two responses: either the Romans would be compelled to fight a pitched battle, or he would demonstrate that they had surrendered the open field to him. This in turn would shock the Italians and encourage them to defect. This brief passage essentially summarizes both Hannibal's strategy and tactics. It sounds like a rather simple, even obvious strategy, and perhaps it was. Indeed, Adrian Goldsworthy (2000, 156) notes that this was an unremarkable approach for warfare between large states in this period: "Hannibal was not adopting a novel strategy. ... He was simply fighting a war in the normal way."

Yet this conventional strategy also offered the best hope to mitigate the Romans' most significant military advantage: manpower. Rome could draw on a vast reservoir of Roman and allied men of military age — over 770,000 according to Polybius (2.24; cf. Baronowski 1993; also Chapter 4 above). It is doubtful that Hannibal understood the precise workings of the Roman military system or knew the exact number of men that Rome could

call upon, but he must have had some idea. If he was acquainted with the Pyrrhic War, and I suspect that he was, he would have noted the Romans' ability to bounce back from devastating battles. The First Punic War, in which his father had fought, would certainly have hammered home Rome's military capacity. The Romans had suffered staggering losses of both men and material, and yet continued to outfit fleet after fleet, wearing down the Carthaginians, despite Hamilcar Barca's valiant efforts. To wait to fight the Romans in Spain would mean risking a replay of the First Punic War, with the Romans — now in a stronger position than they were in 264 — potentially able to send army after army against him. Hannibal's best hope was to fight the war in Italy and, through victories on the battlefield and various diplomatic tactics, encourage the Italian allies to defect, thus depriving the Romans of potential soldiers. He might also hope to reinforce his own army with Italian recruits. For this reason, Hannibal allegedly told Antiochus the Great that Rome could be defeated *only* in Italy, or so Livy (34.60) reports: "It was always his one and the same opinion, that the war should be waged in Italy. For Italy would offer both food supply and soldiers for a foreign invader, but if nothing there was disturbed and the Roman people was allowed to fight outside of Italy with the forces and the supplies of Italy, then no king nor any race would be a match for the Romans." We do not know, of course, if these were actually Hannibal's thoughts, or if they reflect Livy's (or his source's) opinions. Regardless, the strategic thinking is sound: Hannibal had little choice but to adopt the conventional strategy of invading the enemy's homeland.

The genius of this strategy lay not in its originality but rather in the audacity of its execution. Hannibal eschewed invading Italy by sea, embarking instead on a grueling march overland, from New Carthage to the Po valley, through rugged and sometimes hostile country. The journey consumed around half a year's time and a great deal of his initial manpower. He left New Carthage with perhaps 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and by the time he entered Italy, these figures had dwindled to 20,000 foot and 6,000 horse. Indeed, according to Polybius (3.34.4–5), Hannibal had anticipated that this route would be very costly, and the venture possibly doomed from the start lest unless he received support from the Gauls in Italy. He adopted this risky plan because he probably figured that to invade Italy by sea was even less feasible, given that he lacked friendly harbors along the way, while the Romans possessed a powerful navy.¹² Or perhaps he figured that an overland invasion would surprise his opponents, allowing him to seize military initiative and dictate the early course of the war.

Whatever his reasoning, the Romans were caught off guard, for their preparations in 218 indicate clearly that they did not expect to fight in Italy (cf. Chapter 17). One consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, was commanded to

cross over to Sicily and thence invade Africa with a large fleet (160 ships), two legions and nearly 18,000 allied infantry and cavalry allies. The other consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, was to confront Hannibal in Spain. He was given a smaller fleet (60 ships), two legions, and nearly 16,000 allied foot and horse (Livy 21.17). His fleet departed from Pisa and began to sail along the coast of Liguria on the way to the Iberian peninsula. Meanwhile, Hannibal had moved with surprising speed and nearly slipped undetected past Scipio as the latter cruised the coast of Gaul. In fact, Scipio only discovered Hannibal's location by chance: when the Roman fleet put in at Massilia, he learned from the locals that Hannibal was already in the process of crossing the Rhône River. Polybius states explicitly that Scipio was amazed at the speed of his march (3.41.8) and, later, the audacity of his decision to cross the Alps (3.61.1–6).

Scipio immediately headed back to Italy to take command of a third army that had been stationed in the Po valley, originally to deal with the Gallic revolt there. News of Hannibal's rapid approach also took the political leaders in Rome by surprise, and they recalled Sempronius' army from Sicily, dashing immediate plans for a Roman invasion of the Carthaginian heartland (Pol. 3.61.7–10). The decision to take the war to Italy, though costly, paid off, at least in the short run.

In the long run, however, his strategy broke down. It was designed with a relatively short war in mind, in the expectation that the Romans could be brought to the bargaining table after a couple of major battles. Thus, Polybius (3.90.10–13) implies that Hannibal decided to march into the *ager Falernus* because he was frustrated that his victories at the Trebia and Trasimene had yet to yield allied revolts, intimating that he figured two victories should have brought about more results. More telling are his actions after Cannae: sending Carthalo to Rome shows clearly that he expected the Romans to negotiate. He also for the first time addressed Roman prisoners in congenial terms (Livy 22.58.2), whereas previously he had freed non-Romans but treated Romans badly (see above). The change in approach may indicate further frustration at Rome's refusal to seek terms, again implying that he expected a short war. Hannibal also sent his brother Mago to report the victory in the Carthaginian senate, which responded by sending a small reinforcement to help finish off the war (Livy 22.11–13). In the following year, Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon negotiated a mutual defense treaty whose terms lay the groundwork for setting up Italy as a sort of Carthaginian protectorate (see below). In other words, in the aftermath of Cannae, Hannibal felt the end of the war was at hand and began planning for the post-war settlement. This all points to the conclusion that Hannibal anticipated a short war if the Romans suffered major defeats and allied defections.

It was not inconceivable that Hannibal could have won a long war of attrition. In theory, he could have continued to reinforce his army sufficiently from local levies and supply it adequately from the riches of Italy — that is,

essentially fight Rome with Rome's own resources, as he allegedly advised Antiochus.¹³ However, given the tremendous disparity in military resources between the two sides, Hannibal needed to elicit allied defections on a far wider scale in order to hope to outlast Rome. That the Romans survived the loss of most of their southern allies indicates the enormity of Hannibal's task. Or, he could hope to lure the Romans into another major, possibly decisive battle. Indeed, he continued to try to elicit pitched battles. In 212, when both consuls were stationed near Capua, Hannibal marched there and quickly offered battle (Livy 25.19). Later that year, Hannibal lured the praetor Cn. Fulvius Flaccus' army into a disastrous ambush at Herdonea in Apulia (Livy 25.21).¹⁴ Again, in 208, Hannibal tried to lure the Romans into a major trap in Apulia, where both consuls were again operating in tandem. A pitched battle was never fought, but one consul was killed and the other mortally wounded in an ambush, and Livy (27.28) reports that Hannibal expected that news of the ambush would strike terror into his enemy. However, the Romans generally managed to avoid confronting Hannibal after 216, thus depriving him of many chances to strike a decisive blow.

Finally, it must be recognized that Hannibal's partial success in the first few years radically altered the military landscape. By encouraging numerous Italian communities to defect, he essentially created targets for his opponents. Meanwhile, the Romans concentrated on punishing rebel communities. Hannibal was now compelled to defend his new allies from Roman reprisals, lest he lose credibility (e.g., Livy 26.5). Thus, his strategy after 216 shifted to supporting these new allies by using his field army to drive off Roman threats or leaving garrisons to protect the cities. Unfortunately, he lacked the resources to apply sustained military pressure against the Romans and shield all of his allies at the same time (Pol. 9.26). Thus, his strategy in these years often amounted to marching from city to city trying, and many times failing, to keep hold of his Italian possessions. This is not meant as a fatal criticism. The longer the war dragged on, the more it favored the Romans, and it is hard to imagine what different strategy Hannibal could have employed to turn the tide once the conflict outlasted his initial expectation of a short war.

Was Hannibal foolish to expect a short war, given the display of Roman resources, resiliency and even stubbornness in the Pyrrhic and First Punic Wars?¹⁵ We have the benefit of hindsight, but I am not so sure that the lessons of those wars would have been unambiguous at the time. Consider the Pyrrhic War from the Carthaginian perspective: Pyrrhus organized a large number of southern Italian communities against Rome, and this, combined with victory in a single pitched battle (near Heraclea), brought the Romans to the bargaining table. According to Roman tradition, the majority of senators were anxious to accept a treaty proposed by Pyrrhus' adviser Cineas, rejecting it only after the venerable Ap. Claudius Caecus made an impassioned speech

against it (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 18–19; Livy, *Per.* 13; Appian, *Samn.* 2–3; cf. Cic. *Brutus* 61, *Senect.* 16). Later, the Senate sent an embassy to Pyrrhus to negotiate the ransom of Roman captives (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20). After Pyrrhus' second battlefield triumph, at Asculum, the Romans agreed to a mutual defense treaty with Carthage (Pol. 3.25.3–5). Meanwhile, Pyrrhus lost interest in Italy and sailed to Sicily in 278. He returned to Italy in 276 with 110 warships, the bulk of which were destroyed by a Carthaginian fleet (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 24; Livy, *Per.* 14; Appian, *Samn.* 12.1). If Hannibal had examined this war, he might reasonably have concluded that the Romans could be brought to the brink of defeat after one or two pitched battles, and that Carthaginian military assistance was instrumental in their ultimate victory.

So too the lessons of the First Punic War were potentially ambiguous. Hiero's resistance collapsed when his army was defeated once in pitched battle and, subsequently, Syracuse's subordinate allies defected to Rome (Pol. 1.16). Carthage nearly surrendered when Regulus invaded Africa in 256, captured Aspis and Tunis, plundered the surrounding countryside, and defeated a Carthaginian relief force.¹⁶ The Romans were fortunate that that war was fought largely in Sicily, so they never faced a major invasion of their homeland. Hamilcar Barca's first operation after assuming command of the Carthaginian war effort was a raid on Bruttium and the territory of Locri. Over the next few years he continued to harass the Italian coast, reportedly as far as Cumae (Pol. 1.56.2–11). Hamilcar recognized, perhaps, the need to bring the war to Italy, but he was not in a position to mount a serious invasion. Hannibal might reasonably have concluded that Rome, just like Carthage, Syracuse, or any other contemporary state, *could* be defeated, but only if he invaded Italy, won battles, and stirred up serious allied rebellions, and if he did not leave the peninsula or allow the Romans to make an alliance with a third party before the war was concluded. This may further explain his keenness to make a treaty with Philip V: to prevent the Macedonians from helping Rome, more than because he desired their assistance.

In the end, perhaps Hannibal did misread the lessons of the Pyrrhic and First Punic Wars, assuming he studied these historical precedents. In any case, given what was discussed above — his conventional strategic approach and the constraints under which he had to fight the war — his misreading probably did not bear significantly on his war planning at the strategic level.

Geostrategy

“Geostrategy” is a nebulous term lacking a universally accepted definition. In general, however, it describes the intersection of strategy and geopolitics, often emphasizing geographic factors in shaping, limiting, or informing

foreign policy and military planning. The notion that its geographic setting influences a state's foreign policy and military strategy has been around since antiquity. For example, Caesar (*BGall.* 1.2) claimed that the Helvetians decided to leave their homeland (modern Switzerland) because its unique topography limited their ability to move around and wage war on their neighbors. Modern geostrategy, however, is very much the product of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is characterized by an almost scientific attempt to correlate optimum state policies with specific geographic circumstances.¹⁷ It is doubtful that we can speak of a "Hannibalic geostrategy," in this modern, scientific sense of the word.

This being said, Hannibal must have given some thought to geography when drawing up his war plans. Although there is little evidence for a Carthaginian cartographic or geographic tradition, their wide maritime connections assume a body of geographic knowledge. The Carthaginians were presumably exposed as well to Hellenistic maps and other geographic works.¹⁸ Hannibal himself seems to have had a good grasp of the lay of the land in Italy, even though some of this information was gathered from scouts, locals, or deserters as the campaign unfolded after the planning stage (e.g. Pol. 3.100; Livy 22.13). Before leaving New Carthage, he was informed about the human and physical geography of northern Italy (Pol. 3.34, 48). He knew the location of Tarentum and recognized its strategic importance in relation to Macedon (Livy 24.23). He acquainted himself with the terrain and roads of Etruria (Pol. 3.78–79; Livy 22.2). He specifically targeted several Latin colonies (e.g. Pol. 3.88, 3.90, Livy 25.22), suggesting that he knew their location and their political and/or strategic importance. We can assume that Hannibal consulted whatever geographic information he had to work with when he formulated, and subsequently modified, his war plans. Thus we might take geostrategy in a looser sense, and consider the broad geographic parameters of his strategy and his larger policies beyond the war with Rome, such as they were.

Hannibal's ambitions were limited to the western Mediterranean (see Beck, Chapter 13). On this point we turn again to his treaty with Philip V. Its first term (Pol. 7.9.5–6) stipulates that Philip defend Hannibal, Carthage and those living under Carthaginian laws, Utica and all cities and tribes subject to Carthage, and all cities and tribes in Italy, Cisalpine Gaul, and Liguria who were allied with Hannibal at the time of the treaty, as well as those who would subsequently ally with him. The second term (7.9.7) stipulates in return that all of the same peoples, including those who would enter into alliance with Hannibal "in Italy and the *adjacent regions*," would protect Philip, the Macedonians, and the Greeks who were his allies. The sixth term (7.9.12–13) promises that should Hannibal make peace with the Romans, such a treaty would require that they give up control of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, and Atintania, and restore to Demetrius of Pharos

all his friends now under the dominion of Rome. In other words, the treaty left open the possibility for future Carthaginian expansion under Hannibal's leadership, but apparently restricted to west of the Adriatic Sea. Greece, Macedon, and Illyria were reserved largely for Philip and his ally Demetrius. The treaty does not mention the rest of the eastern Mediterranean (e.g. Egypt), but Hannibal's limited aims are clearly implicit.

In the western Mediterranean, Hannibal hoped to reorder the balance of power between Rome and Carthage by firmly establishing the latter as the dominant state, or at least to set up conditions much more favorable to the Carthaginians than those dictated by the treaties Rome had imposed in 241 and 237. The so-called Ebro treaty, if historical, had been rendered irrelevant by his invasion of Italy, and Carthaginian sovereignty over Spain, including the former Roman ally Saguntum, was a given expectation. The Roman invasion of Sicily and their demand, stipulated in the treaty of 241, that the Carthaginians evacuate the island (Pol. 3.26) was surely a major grievance. Even more angering was Rome's opportunistic seizure of Sardinia, an act that Polybius describes as "against all justice" (3.28; cf. 3.10; Livy 23.34). It can be assumed that Hannibal planned to restore these islands in some way as Carthaginian possessions.

Hannibal's frequent use of liberation propaganda, and the surviving treaties that he made with Italian communities, which promised their autonomy, both suggest that he did not anticipate reducing Italy into the equivalent of a province. Rather, the Italian communities that defected would be styled friends or allies, effectively protectorates. This much is made clear in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip. Of course, we do not know for sure whether Hannibal envisioned such an arrangement ahead of time, when he was devising his strategy. However, Polybius claims that he laid the groundwork for alliances with the Cisalpine Gauls in advance of his Italian campaign (3.34). It is also intriguing that after he demonstrated his military superiority in 218 and 217, Hannibal largely avoided Roman territory and marched instead into southern Italy. Perhaps he had planned all along to establish a bridgehead in the south. Indeed, if he had studied the Pyrrhic War, he might have figured to find the communities there particularly receptive to his overtures. Such a plan also made good geostrategic sense. The proximity of southern Italy to Sicily and thence Africa was surely attractive, as ports along the Ionian coast could be used to connect his Italian enterprise to Carthage and thus facilitate resupply by sea. After the war's successful conclusion, southern Italy would make a natural extension to Carthage's restored maritime empire.

If Hannibal had devised ahead of time to make alliances with both the Gauls in the north and the various peoples in the south (including Greeks, Samnites, Bruttians, and Lucanians), then he may have been looking not only

for a way to defeat Rome in the present war, but also to establish a framework for limiting future Roman threats. It was argued earlier in this chapter that he expected the Roman state to survive the war, albeit with its capacities greatly reduced. Presumably he did not plan to remain in Italy indefinitely, and we may speculate that he thought about how to safeguard against the reestablishment of Roman power once he left. Recall that Hannibal promised the people of Capua that their city would become the master of Italy, in effect replacing Rome as the regional hegemonic state. I have argued elsewhere that the Capuans were in fact strongly motivated by expansionistic aspirations.¹⁹ Several of the cities to defect were local powers with a history of expansionism, including Capua, Arpi, Tarentum, and Locri. It is possible — and this is speculative — that Hannibal hoped to create a balance of power within Italy, with Rome perhaps dominant in the central peninsula, but surrounded by Carthaginian allies: to the north formidable Gallic tribes and to the south a few hegemonic states.²⁰ If so, then Hannibal's geostrategy included a sort of Roman containment policy.

Conclusion

Events in recent years have created several popular and celebrated generals, while generalship and strategic planning are hot topics of conversation. What makes a great general? Does Norman Schwarzkopf merit high praise for exploiting the vastly superior military resources at his disposal? Should David Petraeus' strategic insight be credited for stabilizing Iraq, or is the apparent success of "the Surge" (at least at the time this chapter was written) the result of other factors? How will history treat these men after the passage of time, viewed from greater chronological and emotional distance?

That Hannibal's generalship is still considered worthy of discussion more than two millennia after his death suggests that there *was* something great about him. Yet, as this chapter has demonstrated, it is hard to find greatness in his tactics, strategy, and geostrategy. Both his virtues and vices have been exaggerated and distorted by a Roman tradition interested in painting him as their most formidable and fiendish opponent, but a more balanced analysis reveals a rather conventional military practitioner. Hannibal appears equal to his grand reputation when it comes to tactical planning, but less can be said about his tactical flexibility once a battle started. None of his diplomatic tactics — from liberation propaganda to "terror tactics" — are remarkable when compared to contemporary practice. Similarly, his strategy of invading Italy was a fairly typical war plan for the day. His geostrategy — to defeat and, possibly, isolate Rome so that Carthaginian power could be restored in the western Mediterranean — was not particularly innovative.

This sober assessment is not, however, the final word on Hannibal's greatness. Polybius commends Hannibal for being informed about his opponent's guiding principles and motivations, and thus anticipating his reactions — indeed, he says this is the most important skill a general can possess (3.80–81). He later praises Hannibal for commanding a multicultural and polyglot army for years, through the ups and downs of war, without any serious disaffection on their part (11.19; cf. Livy 28.12). In other words, Hannibal was blessed with two much sought-after qualities: leadership and to know men. Both of these intangible qualities are difficult to define and analyze historically. They are perhaps even harder to learn or acquire. Yet it may be that these charismatic attributes are what really separated great generals in antiquity, such as Hannibal, from lesser contemporaries. What lessons twenty-first-century generals, strategists and policy-makers — and their critics — might take from this conclusion I will leave for the reader to ponder.

NOTES

1. Praise of Hannibal: Polybius 3.47–48, 81, 9.22, 15.16; Livy 21.4.2–8, 28.12; Nepos: *Hann.* 1; Bonaparte 1823, 2.338; Dodge 1995 [1891]: 613–641; Delbrück 1975 [1920]: 355–357, 384–385; Lamb 1958, 286–292; Lazenby 1996a; Lazenby 1998, 255–257 (comparisons to Lee and Bonaparte); Lancel 2000, 211–224; Gabriel 2001, 111–145 (claiming no ancient or modern field general is his equal). For criticism: Hoyos 1983 (though praising Hannibal's ability at leading troops and winning battles); Strauss and Ober 1990, 158–161.
2. Burck 1971, 36–38; Daly 2002, 23–25.
3. Walbank 1979, 3.435–438; Lazenby 1998, 77–79; Lancel 2001; Daly 2002, 32–36; *contra* de Sanctis 1968, 3.2.131–138.
4. Polybius does, however, say that Hannibal observed the battle from afar so that he could deploy units “at the appropriate time” (15.6.4).
5. Thus Hannibal seems to have been informed about some Roman policies, but this does not mean that he necessarily had a particular appreciation or detailed understanding of Rome's network of alliances: Goldsworthy 2000, 156. Hannibal's promises recall Pyrrhus' demands that the Romans restore whatever they had taken from the Daunii, Bruttii, Lucanians, and Samnites: Appian, *Samn.* 10.1.
6. Hellenistic liberation propaganda: Gruen 1984, 1.132–157.
7. Errington 1972, 69–71, 76–77; see also Erskine 1993 (doubting that the Italians would have understood Hellenistic liberation propaganda).
8. For example, Philip V first devastated the territory of Elis, then offered the Eleans freedom if they joined him (Pol. 4.83.5–84.6). “Freed” cities were often garrisoned by their liberators: Gruen 1984, 1.135–137.
9. Delbrück 1975 [1920], 337–338, Briscoe 1989, 46; Lazenby 1996a, 41–42, and 1998, 85–86; Lancel 1996a, 109; Goldsworthy 2000, 155–156; Daly 2002, 10–12.

10. On the treaty and its authenticity: Bickermann 1944 and 1952; Walbank 1967, 2.42–56; Barré 1983; Goldsworthy 2000, 255–256.
11. Invading Italy was central to his strategy from an early stage of planning: Pol. 3.34.
12. Briscoe 1989, 65; Lazenby 1998, 29–32; Goldsworthy 2000, 153; Daly 2002, 10–12; see also Rankov 1996.
13. Lazenby 1996, 43–45.
14. Historicity of this battle: Broughton 1951–52, *MRR*: 1.271 n. 2; Lazenby 1998, 114; *contra* de Sanctis 1968, 3.2.444–447.
15. Dorey and Dudley 1972, xv–xvi.
16. The Roman invasion of Africa in 256–255: Pol. 1.25–36; Livy, *Per.* 17–18; Diod. 23.11–15; Flor. 1.18.21–24; Dio 11.22–23; Zon. 8.12–13; Eutr. 2.21; Oros. 4.8.6–9; Walbank 1957, 1. 89–92; Goldsworthy 2001, 84–92.
17. Mahan (1900 [2003]) formulated perhaps the first modern geostrategy, which called for the great sea powers of Britain, the United States, and Japan to work to deny Russia warm-water ports (among other goals). Gyorgy 1943, 347: “A science named ‘geo-strategy’ would be unimaginable in any other period of history but ours. It is the characteristic product of twentieth-century world politics.” Various definitions of geostrategy: Joo-Jock 1979, 4; Dolman 1999, 83; Grygiel 2006, 23.
18. Hellenistic cartography and geography: Dilke 1985, 130–133; Aujac 1987, 161–176. A Carthaginian explorer named Hanno supposedly explored around the west coast of Africa and wrote an account of his travels, the so-called *Periplus of Hanno* (Pliny, *NH* 2.169; 5.8; 6.200; Arrian, *Indica* 43.11–12). A later Greek translation survives, which claims that the original was transcribed on tablets and hung in the “temple of Cronus,” probably the Greek rendering for “temple of Baal.”
19. Fronda 2007.
20. Groag 1929, 79–96.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Hannibal and Propaganda

Richard Miles

What Might Be Meant by Hannibalic Propaganda?

The term “propaganda,” with its apparent emphasis on the production and dissemination of a strictly controlled message, often appears out of place in the context of the ancient world. Nevertheless, despite such limitations, later, retrospective accounts of the Second Punic War do display a remarkable consistency in their presentation of Hannibal and his army. During that war, a body of stories developed around Hannibal that had been produced by individuals who were broadly sympathetic to his cause or, at least, who saw the Carthaginian general as a viable or necessary bulwark against the growing power of Rome. The uniformity that one finds in the stories suggests a studied Carthaginian interest in image and opinion.

Because only brief excerpts and extracts of the work of pro-Hannibalic writers have survived, often out of their original context or represented in a hostile light, in the work of later Greek and Latin authors, the best guide to how Hannibal and his supporters wished to promote his cause comes from the reaction of those that it was aimed against, the Romans themselves. Both during and after the Second Punic War, the Roman authorities instigated an extraordinary series of mainly religious initiatives that were clearly aimed at countering a Carthaginian threat that went far beyond mere military might. These measures, coupled with the specific rebuttals levelled by later Greek and Roman authors against Hannibal, strongly suggest that his message centered on the divine approval that his cause enjoyed from gods that the Romans had increasingly come to see as their own.

That these particular representations of Hannibal and his campaign against Rome were written up *after* his defeat is a theory that has certainly found acceptance with a number of influential scholars, although it is impossible to prove conclusively (Meyer 1924, 268–371; Walbank 1985, 129–130). However, regardless of when these stories were actually finally published, all the remaining evidence seems to point to their being in circulation whilst Hannibal and his forces were still active in Italy.

The Legacy of Alexander and the Development of Military Propaganda in the Hellenistic World

It was Alexander the Great who had first really developed propaganda as an integral aspect of ancient warfare as he traveled across the lands of the east, not only with his military forces but also with a coterie of special advisers, writers, and intellectuals. Although a number of their accounts of Alexander's campaigns were written up after his death, many of the stories about Alexander, particularly in regard to the divine favor shown to him, were circulated during the war, as a way of encouraging friends and potential allies and demoralizing enemies (Spencer 2002, 7–9).

Then, during the late fourth and third centuries BC, the central Mediterranean region played host to a series of military adventurers who closely followed Alexander's propagandistic blueprint. Of these the most significant were Agathocles, tyrant and then king of Syracuse, and Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (invited by the hard-pressed cities of Magna Graecia to protect them from the growing power of Rome in the 280s before moving on to Sicily). Both men consistently sought to present themselves as the western heirs to Alexander in their propaganda (Zambon 2006, 82–83). Significantly the Carthaginians, who were a major political and military presence in Sicily, found themselves embroiled in a series of hard-fought military campaigns against both men.

Hannibal, to a great extent, fitted into this post-Alexander mold. Not only did his ethnically diverse army resemble others across the Hellenistic world, but Hannibal also seems to have used similar methods to other Hellenistic generals in order to engender some cohesion amongst these diverse groups. As has been recently pointed out, "Hellenistic armies apparently developed their *esprit de corps* based on the mystique of their leaders who could be seen as having almost 'supernatural powers' as they were granted triumphs by the gods" (Daly 2002, 135). Certainly, Cassius Dio explicitly equated Hannibal's successful leadership and his claim to divine sanction, particularly his purported ability to predict future events: "he understood divination by the inspection of entrails" (Dio 13, frg. 54.4). At those critical moments when confidence had begun to ebb away from his troops, Hannibal seems to have ensured that

some evidence of divine favor was presented by which his soldiery's self-belief was replenished.

Besides rallying the morale of his own troops and dispiriting the Romans, Hannibal's propaganda was also clearly aimed at enlisting further allies to his cause. In particular, the long and arduous march to Italy, as well as the fierce resistance that the Romans would undoubtedly put up, meant that reinforcements, supplies and bases would be sorely needed on the peninsula and Sicily, if a new front was to be opened up on that island.

One important target was the Greeks of southern Italy and Sicily. The cities of Magna Graecia might have been Roman "allies" for the past half-century but the actions of some sections of their citizenry during the war clearly show that resentments had persisted. In Sicily, the Greek cities might now have looked back with nostalgia to the days when it was they who had vied for supremacy in the central Mediterranean with Carthage. The decades after the First Punic War had shown that there was to be no renaissance of Greek Sicily. Hiero's Syracuse, although both prosperous and powerful, and nominally an independent realm, was in reality little more than a Roman client state. Moreover, after years of relatively light Roman government, in which Sicilian cities appear to have been effectively left to their own devices in the rest of the island, 227 BC witnessed an apparent strengthening of Roman control, with two new praetorships appointed with authority over Sicily and Sardinia (Broughton, *MRR* 1.229; Badian 1958, 36–43; A. Astin, *CAH* 7.570–572).

Polybius' trenchant criticism of Rome's later annexation of Sardinia from the Carthaginians (an act he described as being "contrary to all justice" for which the Romans had no "reasonable pretext or cause") demonstrates that it was not well received by some Greeks, who must have seen it as a sign of Roman intentions to take the whole of the central Mediterranean under direct control (Pol. 3.28.1–2; 3.15.9–11). Even in Syracuse (supposedly a staunch Roman ally), the subsequent realignment of Hiero's successor Hieronymus with Carthage demonstrates a good deal of disillusionment with Rome amongst Sicilian Greeks. (Pol. 7.4.1–2; Livy 24.6). Besides the western Greeks, it was important that Hannibal show himself to be a viable force to the eastern kings, of whom the most important for Carthaginian purposes was Philip V of Macedon, who had already clashed with Rome over the strategically important area of Illyria.

Then there were the Italians. Despite the fact that they made up an increasingly significant part of Rome's military strength, events after Hannibal's first successes clearly shows that the loyalty of a significant number of their elites was questionable. Although we should be wary of assuming that all Italians came to view Hannibal as their liberator, there is little doubt that, as his military successes mounted, the Carthaginian general increasingly came to be seen as a viable challenge to Roman hegemony (Erskine 1993; Fronda 2007).

Support from the Celtic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul was also extremely important, particularly as the Carthaginian army would be passing through their territory. Although not directly ruled by Rome, it appears that they were increasingly aware of the threat that the Romans might present to their freedoms in the future (Livy 21.20.6).

Hannibal also needed to guarantee the support of the Punic world, whose enthusiasm for his venture was far from assured. Punic communities in Sicily and Sardinia needed the confidence to rebel against their new Roman masters, especially considering the high price of defeat. In Carthage, also, continued support from the Council of Elders was vital, for Hannibal required not only troops and money from there, but also authority. To attract the support of others required that he be seen as the representative of the Carthaginian state, not just another rootless military adventurer. Indeed, the growing influence of the Council of Elders (the senate) on the campaign was reflected by the presence of their representatives in Hannibal's camp. These officials, referred to in Greek as *synedroi*, accompanied the Carthaginian army in Spain and Italy and were co-signatories to the treaty that Hannibal eventually struck with Philip in 215 BC (Pol. 3.20.8; 7.9.1; Walbank 1957, 1.334–5; 1967, 2.44–5).

The Sicilian Connection

The Carthaginian general had gathered a small group of trusted confidants including Sosylus of Sparta, his old teacher, and the Sicilian Silenus of Cale Acte, who both “lived with him as long as fortune allowed” (Nepos, *Hann.* 13.3). That Greeks should be such close associates is unsurprising, given the long-standing and close contacts between Carthage and the Greek world, particularly in Sicily. From the end of the fourth century considerable numbers of Greek mercenaries had fought in Carthage's armies, and there were close cultural connections (Brizzi 1995, 309; Galvagno 2005).

Members of the Carthaginian elite had long been educated in Greek literature, and Hannibal's father Hamilcar had ensured that Greek tutors carefully schooled Hannibal, who later authored several books in the language (Nepos, *ibid.*). Hannibal's knowledge of Greek was recognized by later historians as one of his great strengths. According to Cassius Dio, “He was able to manage matters thus because in addition to his natural capacity he was versed in much Punic learning common to his country, and likewise in much Greek learning” (frg. 54.3).

Mistakenly identified by one late Roman military writer as a military tactician (Vegetius, *Preface* 3), little of Sosylus' work has survived beyond an account of an unidentified naval defeat that the Massilians and their Roman allies had inflicted on the Carthaginians (*P. Wurzburg* in Krings 1998, 217–260).

Yet even this brief fragment appears to show an anti-Roman inclination, for Sosylus gives all the credit to the Massilians. Moreover, by ascribing the defeat to Massilian tactical genius, Sosylus perhaps also hoped to deflect criticism of Carthaginian tactics. Sosylus' work is dismissed by Polybius as nothing more than "the common gossip of a barber's shop" (3.20.1–5). Sosylus and a fellow historian Chaereas appear to have stirred Polybius' indignation by reporting that after the fall of Saguntum, the Roman Senate had long debated and procrastinated over courses of action, even allowing their young sons to attend if they swore not to divulge what had taken place. The report again reveals Sosylus' pro-Hannibalic stance, for it clearly aimed to demonstrate that some Roman senators were deeply unsure of the rectitude of their position with regard to Saguntum.

More is known about Silenus, the historian of Hannibal's long campaign against Rome who was used by several Roman and Greek authors (Cicero, *Div.* 1.24.48; Walbank 1957, 1.316). Like the four-volume study that Silenus wrote about his home island of Sicily, nuggets of topographical and encyclopedic information seem to have been interspersed throughout his account of Hannibal (Spada 2002, 239–240).

The Greek cities of Sicily, particularly Syracuse, had produced a considerable number of well-regarded historians. Although most, notably the celebrated Timaeus of Tauromenium, took an anti-Carthaginian line because of Carthage's long military involvement in the island, some took the opposite position.

The most important, Philinus of Acragas in his history of the First Punic War, was sympathetic to Carthage and also well respected by his peers including Polybius (Pol. 1.14.1; Walbank 1957, 1.63–130; Scuderi 2002, 277–84). One of Philinus' main themes was that Roman acquisitiveness and greed had caused their assistance to the Mamertines and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities, rather than any noble desire to protect the underdog. Indeed this may have been a commonly held view amongst Sicilian Greeks, who must have looked with some cynicism towards the intentions of both Carthaginians and Romans. Diodorus reports that Hiero, king of Syracuse, said that by helping the Mamertines "it would be clear to all of mankind that they [the Romans] were using pity for the endangered as a cloak for their own advantage" (Diod. 23.1.4). Silenus, therefore, was no renegade but part of a long established western Greek intellectual tradition.

Heracles-Melqart

Although very few fragments of Silenus' study have survived, a number of scholars have noted the relatively frequent references to the Greek hero Heracles within this admittedly scanty corpus (Briquel 2000, 2003, 2004; Miles 2010).

Within the context of the Sicilian-Greek literary/historiographical tradition this emphasis on Heracles was unsurprising. The hero had long been viewed by the Greeks as one of the most important figureheads of their colonial expansion into the central and western Mediterranean, protector of their interests and the actual founder of a large number of their settlements (Fabre 1981, 274–295; Jourdain Annequin 1989, 221–300; cf. Malkin 1998).

By the sixth century BC western Greek writers, most notably the Sicilian poet Stesichorus in his epic poem the *Geryoneis*, had associated Heracles' presence in the West with the tenth and eleventh of his famous labors, the theft of the red cattle of the monstrous ogre Geryon and the golden apples from the garden of the Hesperides (see D. Campbell's Loeb edition, 1991). Of these stories, the most significant for the Greeks of Sicily and Italy was Heracles' driving Geryon's cattle from southern Spain to Greece. By the fifth century this legend had crystallized into the Heracleian Way, an extraordinary journey that took the hero and his lowing charges through Spain, Gaul, over the Alps into Italy, a detour to Sicily before eventually reaching Greece. Yet, because Heracles in the West had become so tied to ongoing Greek colonization, the Heracleian Way itself was always a "work in progress," forever taking new eccentric detours and doubling back on itself as new settlements and authors staked a claim to this seductive inheritance (Piccaluga 1974; Knapp 1986).

The similarities between Hannibal's great march from Spain to Italy and the Heracleian Way were, it appears, obvious to contemporaries and the existing fragments from Silenus, as well as other sources, show that Hannibal and his advisers were keen to exploit an association that might resonate with potential Greek and Italian allies. This self-conscious connection has to be partly placed within the context of the Hellenistic martial tradition first established by Alexander. His familial connections with both Heracles and the Homeric hero Achilles had been heavily promoted both during and after his lifetime. The advantages of such claims had not been lost on the rulers and warlords who carved up his vast domain after his demise, particularly the link with Heracles *Soter*, the Saviour (Rawlings 2005). In the 270s Pyrrhus had strongly promoted himself as the savior of western Hellas against both Rome and Carthage (Franke 1989, 456). Self-identification with both Achilles and Heracles had been major themes, with Heracles being utilized to mobilize the Sicilian Greeks against the Carthaginians (Pausanias 12.3.4).

Yet, Hannibal's association with Heracles had deeper roots than a mere desire to be accepted as a Hellenistic hegemon. From at least the seventh century, Heracles was increasingly associated with the Tyrian god, Melqart, also an important deity in the Carthaginian pantheon. A bilingual inscription from Malta, dedicated by two Phoenician brothers in the third/second century is addressed to "Melqart, Lord of Tyre" in Phoenician, and "Heracles *archegetes*"

in Greek (*KAI* 47). The Greek title *archegetes*, commonly used for a founder or progenitor, highlights one of the synergies between the two deities. Melqart was strongly associated within the Punic community as the protector of the mother city, Tyre, and the colonial foundations of which Carthage and Gades were the most important. As we have seen, Heracles traditionally performed a similar role in the Greek world.

There were other similarities. Both transcended the boundaries between humanity and divinity: Heracles, the son of Zeus and a human mother, had to earn the right to become a god himself through his heroic feats; Melqart, although a god, was also the first mythical king of Tyre and ancestor of its royal lineage (Bonnet 1988, 399–415). Other striking connections included the crucial regenerative role that fire played, for Melqart at the *egersis* (Ceremony of Awakening) and for Heracles during his apotheosis, when he ascended to heaven and took his place amongst the gods. Each year after the ritual burning of his effigy, Melqart was symbolically reborn thereby making the same journey between humanity and divinity (Bonnet 1986, 214–215).

In Sicily where Greek, Punic, and indigenous communities had long intermarried and worshipped each other's gods and goddesses, as well as trading and making war and alliances with one another, the religious syncretism that existed between Heracles and Melqart was very strong, particularly in the borderlands that separated ethnic blocs (Malkin 2005). This symbiosis not only had an effect on the folklore that sprang up on the island, with Phoenician and Greek religious traditions becoming intertwined, but also had a direct impact on the development of sacred art and architecture. A recent study of the temple of Heracles in the Greek city of Acragas, built around 500 BC, argues that the twin staircases that led up to its attic, a very unusual architectural feature, were originally associated with the ritual celestial ascent of deities in Phoenician-Punic religion, as in the *egersis*. Indeed, this was just one of several archaic-era temples with these staircases found in Sicily and southern Italy (M. Miles 1998/1999, 1–2, 21–25).

Heracles' long association with Melqart also had an impact on the intellectual development of Sicily, particularly when Euhemerism emerged in the late fourth century, which maintained that gods were deified human beings and mythology was based on traditional accounts of real people and events. Heracles was pivotal in this euhemeristic tradition, not only because he transcended the boundary between humanity and divinity but also as a powerful syncretistic figure who, through his association with Melqart and Sicilian deities, brought the island's diverse constituencies together. Indeed Euhemerism's emphasis on the permeability between the temporal and celestial worlds would surely have been attractive to Punic as well as Greek populations, particularly in relation to the religious rites connected with Melqart (De Angelis and Garstad 2006).

The syncretistic Heracles-Melqart was increasingly not confined to Sicily. By the third century BC it had also become popular in Carthage. Of particular significance are a series of engraved bronze hatchet-razors, a traditional part of Punic funerary assemblage, dating to this period and found in the city's cemeteries. Although the images that were engraved on their blades show traditional Levantine representations of Melqart dressed in a long tunic and headdress with double-sided axe resting on his shoulder, new representations of the god had also begun to appear (Bonnet 1986, 182–186). Indeed, one particular example shows him with a lionskin, club, and hunting dog at his feet, in the classic iconography of the hero that had developed in the Greek cities of southern Italy. Yet as Serge Lancel has rightly observed, this was really only an “Italianate veneer” on Punic Melqart (Lancel 1995b, 207). For on the reverse side of the blade was an image of Iolaos, Heracles' nephew and companion, holding a branch from the *kolokasion* plant in one hand and a quail in the other. This was a Greek interpretation of the Phoenician-Punic rite of *egersis*. The story, preserved in several later Greek writers, told how the dying “Tyrian” Heracles was soothed by his faithful companion with the leaves from the plant, before being brought back to life by the smoke from roasting quail meat (Bonnet 1986, 220–222).

Hannibal's own Barcid clan had certainly embraced Heracles-Melqart. When his father Hamilcar Barca undertook the great territorial expansion into southern Spain in the 230s, Heracles-Melqart appeared on high-value coinage minted to pay his mercenary troops (Villaronga 1973, 98–101). As well as the clear associations with the Hellenistic martial tradition, the Barcid motif may also have been influenced by the fact that Melqart was the patron god of Gades, with which Hamilcar needed good relations (Villaronga 1973, 49–50; Chaves Tristán and Marín Ceballos 1992, 173–175). Redeployed in Spain, Melqart-Heracles' multivalent image of had thus proved an excellent and enduring emblem of Barcid power (Piccaluga 1974, 111–122).

Another great strength of utilizing Heracles as a symbol was that the cult of Hercules, his Italian interpretation, was particularly strong in the central Apennines and Samnium; the Samnites had a notoriously difficult relationship with Rome and might become useful allies (Bradley 2005).

Hannibal's appropriation of the Heraclean image thus had a long and multifarious provenance, but within a Carthaginian context that image was rather different, perhaps more potent, for Hannibal could appeal both to the specific qualities of Heracles in the Greek tradition, and his syncretism and associations with Melqart in the alternative, central Mediterranean tradition. Indeed Silenus' skilful portrayal of Heracles-Melqart as Hannibal's divine companion thus sent out a message to the western Greeks that the Carthaginian commander represented their last opportunity to restore those diminished freedoms.

Rome and Hercules *Invictus*

As well as a potentially attractive emblem for western Greek, Italian, and Punic populations, the Hannibalic Heracles-Melqart also served as a way of undermining Roman claims to a Heraclean heritage, and by association their growing domination over the Central Mediterranean. Hercules had become an increasingly central figure in Rome's religious folklore and national identity.

By 399 BC the cult of Hercules had been accepted into the Roman religious calendar and then, in 312, it received the ultimate sanction of becoming an official cult. The first official temple to Hercules *Invictus* was built around this time. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who was using earlier sources, after crossing the Alps Heracles made his way down the Italian peninsula until eventually pitching camp on the left bank of the Tiber at the settlement of Pallanthium, the future site of Rome. There, an ogre named Cacus, who lived in a cave on the Palatine Hill, had attempted to steal a number of the cattle and had been murdered by Heracles. In honor of the hero, the indigenous and Greek inhabitants of Pallanthium had erected an altar. This altar was supposedly the forerunner of the *Ara Maxima*, located in the Forum Boarium, Rome's ancient cattle market where Hercules was still sacrificed to (Dionysius 1.40.1).

Although the story of Hercules' association with Rome was a very old one, the myth of his visit to the Pallanthium and killing of Cacus might have been finessed as late as the last decades of the fourth or the early third centuries BC, which suggests that this association was very closely linked to Roman political aspirations in Italy (Cornell 1995, 68–69). The claim that the Pallanthium was the location for the slaying of Cacus certainly lent the city some prestige amongst its Latin counterparts. Indeed, in some versions of the story, Heracles fathered Latinus, the eponymous founder of the Latin people, at the site of Rome (Fabre 1981, 287). The Herculean legacy had also seeped into the private familial histories of its aristocratic elite, with one of the major senatorial families, the Fabii, claiming him as their progenitor (Ovid, *Fasti* 2.237; Juvenal 8.14).

Armed with their own Herculean legacy, the Romans could not only claim a distinguished Greek pedigree, they could also legitimize their political ambitions over the rest of Italy as a Herculean commonwealth. Then there were the obvious connections with the venerable cities of Magna Graecia, many of whom claimed the great hero as their founder. Not only could the Romans claim to enjoy ancestry as distinguished as their Greek counterparts but this also promoted Rome's political ambitions in the region. This is well represented in some of the first coinage produced by the Romans in 270, commemorating their victory over Tarentum. Whilst the obverse showed the famous image of Romulus and Remus suckling from the she-wolf, the reverse featured Hercules in the Greek iconographical tradition wearing a lionskin.

The city-states of southern Italy had a long and proud tradition of putting Heracles on their coins and the hero had long epitomized the success of Greek colonization; now Roman coinage proclaimed Rome's membership of the Heracleian tradition (Ritter 1995, 27–29).

The Rout of Cacus

Intriguingly, Hannibal's march to Italy possibly had still closer links to contemporary myths about the Heracleian Way. Dionysius also supplies a euhemeristic treatment of Heracles' tenth labor and return to Greece: Heracles was transformed from super-hero into "the greatest commander of his age" who marched from Spain to Italy liberating the oppressed, destroying despots, and establishing well-ordered governance, lawful monarchies, and humane and sociable modes of life (Dionysius 1.41.1–2; Fox 1993, 144–145).

In Italy, Heracles clashed with Cacus who, in Dionysius' story, was "an exceedingly barbarous chieftain reigning over a savage people, who had set himself to oppose Heracles... and on that account was a pest to his neighbors." Cacus' forts were stormed by Heracles' army and demolished before he himself was killed; his land was given to Greek and indigenous inhabitants of the area under their kings (1.42.2–3).

There are some immediately obvious correspondences with Hannibal's Italian expedition. First, the heavy emphasis on Heracles' role in defending and indeed saving states under attack by tyrannical neighbors, a situation analogous to Rome's subjugation of Magna Graecia and the rest of Italy. Second, the reference to uniting Greeks and barbarians under the banner of the hero, which reflects a central tenet of Hannibal's appeal to Greeks and Carthaginians. Third, there is the focus on Heracles crossing vast rivers and cutting a route through seemingly impenetrable mountains, both themes in the narrative of Hannibal's march. Finally, the confrontation with Cacus, the robber chief, becomes a far more conventional ground war in the euhemeristic account, with battles and sieges, and is followed by Heracles' release of prisoners of war and their resettlement on recently conquered land (Dionysius 1.42.4). Heracles' generosity to his captives mirrors similar methods by Hannibal to attempt to detach Italians from Rome (cast here as the evil Cacus).

These numerous correspondences would surely have resonated with contemporaries. While the precise origin of Dionysius' story is unfortunately unknown, a similar account told by Diodorus (4.17.1–2) points tantalizingly towards a Sicilian origin, most probably from the period of the Second Punic War, when contemporary Sicilian writers and Carthaginian coin-makers made similar associations.

Hannibal was intent on setting out a clear alternative not only to Roman political hegemony but also to the Roman mythology by which that hegemony was justified. The Romans' own promotion of the cult of Hercules had provided a much needed mythical and historical affirmation for the huge territorial gains in Italy and Carthage's old possessions in the central Mediterranean. Hannibal placed a large question mark over such claims. The Carthaginian general appears to have been determined to wrest from Rome not only the military, but also the propagandistic, initiative. The Romans found themselves recast by Hannibal's literary entourage in a new role as a tyranny from which the hero was destined to liberate Italy. Rome, it appeared, was the new Cacus.

Hannibal and Heracles

It is clear from the Barcid coinage from this period that Hannibal was keen to promote his familial links with Hamilcar. A series of silver issues appeared showing Heracles-Melqart portrayed like the Greek Heracles, with a club resting on his shoulder and a laurel wreath (Villaronga 1973, 121). The figure is a clean-shaven young man and on the reverse is an African elephant. At roughly the same time a new silver double shekel showed a similar figure with laureate and club. Although this Melqart displays very similar characteristics, he sports a beard and is clearly older. On the reverse there is again an African elephant but here with a driver on its back. These coins are a progression from earlier coins depicting Melqart in that they attempt to associate the Barcids and the god (Villaronga 1973, 45–47). The war elephant was also a symbol that came to be increasingly linked with the Barcids during this period.

The other strong indication that Hannibal was deliberately associating himself with Heracles-Melqart comes from what remains of Silenus' work.

The first of these is a description of the Heracleium, a sacred spring, located at the sanctuary of Heracles-Melqart at Gades, the very place where Hannibal went to sacrifice before setting off on his epic march (Strabo 2.145; Livy 21.21.9). The Heracleian association is also in evidence in another famous anecdote from Silenus. Cicero (*Div.* 1.49) recounts how

the following too is found in the Greek history of Silenus, whom Coelius follows and who gave a most thorough account of Hannibal's career. Hannibal (he says), after taking Saguntum, dreamt that he was being called away by Jupiter into a council of gods; when he arrived, Jupiter ordered him to invade Italy, and gave him one of the assembly as his guide. He had begun the march together with his army, under the guide's leadership; then that guide told him not to look behind him. He could not carry that through, and borne away by desire, he had

turned to look back, and saw a vast monstrous wild beast, intertwined with snakes, destroying all of the trees and shrubs and buildings wherever it went. Staggered, he had asked the god, what such a monstrous thing could be. "The devastation of Italy", answered the god; "go forward and do not worry about what is happening behind your back."

There are three other surviving versions of the story (Livy 21.22.5–9; Silius Italicus 3.163–213; Zonaras 8.22). These versions appear to have adapted the story into a far more sinister and indeed more hostile light. Modern commentators have understandably focused on the differences between these versions in the context of the role that dreams played in Roman historiography. For Levene the crucial transformation between the Ciceronian and Livian accounts is that whereas in the former it is the dream that convinces Hannibal to undertake the invasion of Italy, Livy has it that he had already decided on this course of action, meaning that the Carthaginian general's campaign might be temporally supported by the gods but was not divinely ordained (Levene 1993, 45–46). Pelling sees the Livian account being even more clearly signposted by the ominous ambiguity of the explanation given by the divine guide ("He must ask no more questions. He should allow destiny to remain in darkness"), in which the reader who already knows what fate has in store for Hannibal is complicit (Pelling 1997, 202–204). Stübler takes this idea even further, describing Hannibal's joy at what he is told as a form of blindness (Stübler 1941, 95–96).

Despite these adaptations that placed the Carthaginian general in a sinister and ultimately flawed light, the original pro-Hannibalic tint is confirmed by the hostile reaction of the Roman writer Valerius Maximus, who describes it as a "definite prediction, hateful to any person of Roman blood" (1.7 ext. 1). It is also generally accepted that Hannibal's unnamed guide was Heracles (Briquel 2004).

An interesting new interpretation argues that Coelius deliberately doctored Silenus' account, omitting a terrible storm that appears in the versions given by Livy and Dio. Coelius' intention, therefore, was to change the location of the dream from its original place, as Hannibal's army crossed the Alps, to earlier just after the final fissure with Rome. This would mean that in its proper context, the point of the dream was to encourage the Carthaginian army in their efforts to keep moving forward and to master the difficult conditions and terrain that faced them (D'Arco 2002, 160–161).

The fact that the dream was so widely reported and discussed would suggest that it had a considerable impact. Whatever its detailed interpretation, the main message must have been that Hannibal had divine sanction to pursue a war with Rome, as by the approval of Jupiter/J Zeus and his provision of a divine guide. The beast that Hannibal sees wreaking the "devastation of Italy" is interpreted most plausibly as a Hydra, the many-headed serpent that

Heracles was commanded to kill. His problem, so it proved, was that the beast's heads would spontaneously reappear once severed, a problem eventually overcome by cauterizing the wounds.

In Silenus' tale, therefore, as Hannibal is represented by Heracles so Rome is represented by the Hydra, the self-perpetuating monster. Indeed, one of Pyrrhus' advisors had likened Rome to a Hydra precisely for her extraordinary capacity for self-renewal. The original story, therefore, signified not only the divine sanction and Heracleian quality of Hannibal, but also Rome's monstrous nature and destruction of her allies' territory (Rawlings 2005, 158–161).

The next important incident that suggests a carefully constructed relationship between Hannibal and Heracles is that in 211 Hannibal, in a desperate bid to relieve the Roman siege of Capua, finally marched on Rome. His arrival created widespread panic within the city, especially when Hannibal himself rode up and inspected the walls of the city at the Colline gate. The aftermath of this show of strength — Hannibal's retreat — was portrayed by both Polybius and Livy as an anticlimactic failure (Pol. 9.6.6–7.1; Livy 26.11.1–7). In reality, however, it is extremely doubtful that capturing Rome was on Hannibal's mind. Strategically, the operation had been a success, because 15,000 Roman troops had been summoned back from the siege of Capua, a key Carthaginian ally, in order to defend the city (Livy 26.9.10).

Even more importantly, however, Hannibal's presence at the walls of Rome served a crucial propagandistic function. In another fragment, Silenus gives an account of Heracles' sojourn in Rome which is markedly at variance with other versions. In the Silenian version, Rome's famous Palatine Hill was named after Palantho, daughter of Hyperboreos, the eponymous leader of the Hyperboreans, a mythical Northern people. She had enjoyed a romantic liaison with Heracles on that very spot, and hence the hill had gained its name (Silenus in Solinus 1.14–15). Latinus' Heracleian paternity mentioned earlier, another tale also thought to derive from Silenus, was the product of that same union (Dionysius 1.43; Briquel 2000, 126).

In the charged atmosphere of the Hannibalic war, this seemingly obscure point had very serious propagandistic implications. Silenus' version of the pre-history of Rome directly contradicted the generally accepted Roman version, which told that Latinus' mother was Fauna the wife of Faunus, the indigenous king of the region. In Silenus' account, furthermore, the Hyperboreans appear as a metaphor for the Gauls, the barbarous people whom Heracles himself had supposedly tamed on his journey across the Alps. Now Hannibal had crossed that great mountain chain with an army full of Gauls. It therefore looked like "history" would repeat itself, as Heracles and his Hyperboreans returned to the Palatine to claim what was rightfully theirs (Briquel 2000, 126–127).

Part of that Heracleian patrimony included the Latins, the product of the ancient union between the hero and his Hyperborean lover. Silenus' reconception

of Roman prehistory and the display of power which the destructive march to Rome represented were therefore part of the same determined campaign to detach the Latins from Rome. It was no coincidence that as he approached the walls of Rome, Hannibal had first stopped at the Temple of Hercules by the Colline gate (Livy 26.10.3). He wanted those who looked on to know that a new Heracles had journeyed there once more, with a divine mandate to free its people from the heirs of Cacus who had terrorized the region for so long.

At the Temple of Hera Lacinia

Heracles-Melqart was not the only deity targeted by Hannibal and his advisors. Six miles from the Bruttian town of Croton, Hannibal's last base on the peninsula, was a famous temple dedicated to the goddess Hera Lacinia. Perhaps mindful that his time in Italy was coming to a disappointing end, Hannibal in 207 had sought to secure his Italian legacy by erecting a bronze tablet, listing his achievements on the peninsula, in both Punic and Greek. Polybius, a visitor to the temple, proclaimed his trust in the accuracy of the troop and animal numbers that it presented. However he also intimated that other information it contained which he did not include was of a more dubious nature (Pol. 3.33.18; Livy 28.46.16).

This monument, however, did not alone associate Hannibal and this particular sanctuary in the minds of later writers. A story, attributed to the Roman historian Coelius but probably originating from Silenus, told how Hannibal had wanted to carry off a gold column from the sanctuary, having bored a small hole to ascertain that it was solid gold. Hera (given her Roman name Juno in this context), however, had warned him in a dream that she would blind him in his one good eye if he carried out the theft. On waking not only did Hannibal heed the warning but he also had a statuette of a heifer fashioned out of the filings from the drilling which was then set upon the top of the column (Cicero, *Div.* 1.48).

Like the other stories detailing Hannibal's dialogue with the gods, it is almost impossible to separate the original sense and aim of this tale from the hostile interpretations by Roman and Greek historians (Levene 1993, 68; Jaeger 2006, 408–409). However, again it is most likely that its purpose was to highlight Hannibal's duty and devotion to the gods, in this case Juno/Hera. The original point was most likely that once the Carthaginian general realized the grave sacrilege that he was about to commit, he not only desisted but also sought to make good his slight to the goddess (Wardle 2006, 229). It was only subsequently that Roman historians turned it into a parable of supposed impiety.

That the goddess involved was Hera/Juno, already reputed to be hostile towards the Romans, was also clearly an important feature. In 208 the Temple

of Juno Regina on the Aventine Hill was struck by lightning. In propitiation for her apparent anger, the goddess was presented with a solid-gold basin, paid for out of matrons' dowries, and celebrated with solemn sacrifices (Livy 27.37.1–15). Juno's implacable hostility to the Romans (and favour for the Carthaginians) became a very familiar theme in later Roman literature, but this nevertheless was the first public acknowledgment of that supposed enmity (Feeney 1991, 116–117). Contemporary evidence suggests that Hannibal was at least partly responsible for the tradition.

While Romans would later identify Juno and Tanit, in this period an association had already been drawn in central Italy between Iuni, the Etruscan Juno, and the Punic goddess Astarte (Dumézil 1970, 680–682). On at least two occasions, Hannibal performed sacred rites at Lake Avernus, a volcanic crater lake in Campania, widely thought to be the gateway to the underworld and sacred to Avernus god of death, the husband of the goddess Juno Aversa (Huss 1986, 235–236). While it thus seems likely that Hannibal was worshipping Astarte at Avernus (or perhaps her divine consort Melqart), the Romans perhaps perceived him as attempting to win over Juno to the Carthaginian cause. The religious rituals conducted at the Temple of Juno Regina, therefore, once again point to the success of Hannibal's assault upon the sacred landscape of Italy. That one tradition had it that the temple of Hera Lacinia had been built by none other than Heracles might, like Avernus, explain Hannibal's particular interest in it (Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.552).

The column in the tale also holds other clues to a Hannibalic provenance. Scholars have long recognized the close parallels between this tale and the claim made by the Greek philosopher Euhemerus, whose ideas had been such a key element of Hannibal's association with Heracles-Melqart, that he had discovered a golden column on an island in the Indian Ocean, inscribed with the most ancient history of the world and particularly of the origins of humankind, through the earliest Greek gods (Brizzi 1983, 246–251; Lancel 1998, 155–256). The story of the golden heifer, as a final evocation of the euhemeristic creed, was as much a testament to Hannibal's legacy as the inscription that detailed his troop numbers and military campaigns.

Roman Responses to Hannibalic Propaganda

The effectiveness of his claims of celestial patronage are perhaps best gauged by the extreme reactions that they provoked. Certainly both Polybius and Livy acknowledged a Hannibalic propaganda campaign which attempted to surround him with divine associations. Polybius condemned certain anonymous writers who,

while on the other hand introducing Hannibal as a commander of unequalled courage and foresight, incontestably represent him to us as entirely lacking in prudence, and again being unable to bring their series of fabrications to any conclusion or issue they introduce gods and the sons of gods into the sober history of the facts. By representing the Alps as being so steep and rugged that not only horses and troops accompanied by elephants, but even active men on foot would have difficulty in passing, and at the same time picturing to us the desolation of the country as being such, that unless some god or hero had met Hannibal and showed him the way, his whole army would have gone astray and perished utterly, they unquestionably fall into both the above vices (3.47.7–9).

Livy, in turn, has a Roman commander exhort his troops before battle against the Carthaginian general to discover

whether this Hannibal is, as he gives out, the rival of Hercules in his journeys, or whether he has been left by his father to pay tax and tribute and to be the slave of the Roman people (21.41.7).

Another indication of the disquiet that Hannibal's claims to divine favor had engendered is Livy's strong emphasis on his supposed impiety (21.21.9, 40.11; Levene 1993, 43–47). Livy portrayed Hannibal's early victories as the result of temporary acts of piety on his part and, more importantly, a simultaneous failure of the Romans to provide due honor to their own gods. By setting out the essential impiety of Hannibal's mission at the beginning of his account, furthermore, Livy ensured that his audience understood that any Carthaginian success would be short-lived. Indeed, Carthage's final defeat would eventually be justified as nothing less than divine retribution (Livy 30.31.5, 42.20–1).

Elsewhere in his history, however, Livy does spell out the psychological damage inflicted on the Romans by Hannibal's propaganda campaign:

The longer the war continued, and the more men's minds as well as their fortunes were affected by the alternations of success and failure, so much the more did the citizens become the victims of superstitions, and those for the most part foreign ones. It seemed as though either the characters of men or the nature of the gods had undergone a sudden change (25.1.6–9).

By 217, at least some members of the Roman elite recognized the potentially disastrous consequences of the assault on Roman morale, and started to make plans to strike back. The vastly experienced Q. Fabius Maximus was the first Roman general to understand the importance of countering the propaganda onslaught. He had Roman priests consult the Sibylline books, a collection of oracular utterances, to find out how the Romans might regain divine favor,

and received three recommendations: first, the Romans should publicly renew their vows to Mars, the god of war; second, Fabius should dedicate a temple to Venus Erycina, a Sicilian goddess, and to the divine quality of *Mens*, “composure” or “resolution”; finally, the Romans should pledge a “sacred spring,” an ancient rite whereby the entire produce of the next spring was promised to the gods if victory was achieved within a certain time (Livy 22.9.7–11).

The new temple to Venus Erycina on the Capitol, completed in 215, is immediately notable for its links with the Trojan prince Aeneas, represented in Roman myth as the son of Venus and by this period widely accepted as the forefather of Romulus and Remus. It was thought that Aeneas had married the daughter of Latinus king of Latium, upon whose death he had ruled over the Latins and his own Trojan settlers. By this time, the Aeneas story had become a keystone in the ideological edifice that legitimized Roman domination of Italy, for it located the origins of that domination within a consensual agreement of the shared, mythological past (Gruen 1992: 22–29; Galinsky 1969, 160–163).

The Romans’ interest in 215, however, was not simply in a cult of Venus, but more specifically in a cult of Venus *Erycina*. That cult was a relatively recent invention, created after the capture of Sicilian Eryx from the Carthaginians in 248 (Pol. 1.55.6). Although the lower town had soon been retaken by Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal’s father, the Roman defenders had withstood several furious assaults and retained the citadel and its sanctuary (Pol. 1.58.2 and 7–8; Diod. 24.8). The cult was thus an important symbol of successful Roman resistance against a Carthaginian, and more specifically Barcid, enemy, and its foundation in Rome provided the city with a focal point for resistance to the new Barcid onslaught.

At the same time, Eryx had long been sacred to the Punic goddess Astarte and the Greek Aphrodite (Schilling 1954, 235–9). The rebranding of Aphrodite/Astarte as her Roman equivalent Venus, therefore, represented an attempt not only to “Romanize” the cult, but simultaneously to integrate Sicily within the Roman foundational myth associated with Aeneas. Conveniently, the indigenous Elymians, whose capital was Eryx, also claimed a Trojan ancestry, and their city of Segesta had previously appealed to Rome for intervention precisely on that basis. The Roman promotion of the multi-valent cult of Venus Erycina thus emphasized resistance to the Carthaginians while simultaneously incorporating the contested island of Sicily within a Roman vision of history. Eryx and its goddess were now as much disputed as Hercules/Heracles/Melqart.

The religious activities of Fabius vividly highlight the growing concern at Rome that the gods were turning against her. This new sense of insecurity also explains why the Romans willingly carried out the priests’ final recommendation to Fabius, the “sacred spring” (Livy 22.10.2–6). One of the oldest and

most original elements of Roman religion, its selection was clearly no coincidence at a time when aspects of Roman cultural identity which Rome shared or contested with other Mediterranean peoples were being so effectively reframed by her enemies. The “sacred spring,” by contrast, was undisputedly a *Roman* religious rite.

Further catastrophic military defeats in 217–216 and reports of a series of menacing religious portents led to more attempts to assuage the gods. First the senator (and future historian) Quintus Fabius Pictor was sent to the famous sanctuary of Delphi to discover what prayers and supplications might appease the anger of the gods. The instructions with which Fabius Pictor returned from the Oracle specified offerings to particular deities and stipulated that upon final victory the Romans should dedicate a portion of the war booty to Delphic Apollo (Livy 22.57.5–6; 23.11.1–6). This was a clever move on the part of the Senate: not only did it publicly affirm Rome’s cultural links with the Greek world (in the face of a Carthaginian attempt to undermine such links); it also made that affirmation at a time when Hannibal was menacing the cities of Magna Graecia. It therefore sought to re-establish firmly Rome’s Greek credentials.

At the same time, however, the Romans now performed a religious rite which was unmistakably their own. Turning to their Books of Fate they revived the terrible ritual whereby a Gallic man and woman and a Greek man and woman were buried alive in the Forum Boarium, in what Livy disapprovingly described as “a sacrifice wholly alien to the Roman spirit” (22.57.6). Roman human sacrifice was, however, not a crass anachronism but something first recorded just a few years previously in 228, when the city was faced by Gallic invasion (Bellen 1985, 13–23). Its instigation now was surely a measure of the panic that Hannibal’s success had engendered in the city.

Later, in 209/208, Fabius Maximus ordered that the Temple of Hercules which Hannibal had visited at the Colline gate be moved to safety on the Capitol, strongly suggesting that Hannibal’s visit had been something of a propaganda coup (Pliny, *NH* 34.40). This was followed by more ominous portents across Italy. At Veii showers of stones were reported; at Minturnae the temple of Jupiter had been struck by lightning; and at Capua a wolf had stolen into the city and savaged one of the sentries. Most dramatically, at Frusino a hermaphrodite child was born the size of a four-year-old. Diviners summoned from Etruria announced that the monstrous infant should be banished from Roman territory without any contact with the earth. After being placed in a box, therefore, the unfortunate child was taken out to sea and thrown overboard.

The priests also decreed that three bands of nine virgins should process through the city chanting a hymn written for the occasion by the Tarentine poet Livius Andronicus. Andronicus was a shrewd choice for two reasons. As

the author of the first ever Roman play, in 240, which had been publicly commissioned to celebrate victory in the First Punic War, Andronicus and his work stood as a symbol of Roman triumph over Carthage. As a Tarentine who wrote in Greek, furthermore, he represented Rome's strong links with the western Greek world, links put under great strain, and in some cases completely poisoned, during the course of the war with Hannibal (Gruen 1990, 80–92; Goldberg 1995, 28–30). For the Romans, re-establishing proper relations with the gods also demanded recapturing the propagandistic initiative.

Later, in 205 when the Senate sensed that the fragile alliance of Carthaginians, Italians, and Greeks that Hannibal had constructed was poised to dissolve, it therefore undertook two ideologically charged missions that brilliantly emphasized the cultural links between Rome, Italy, and Greece. The Senate now decided to fulfil the promise, made over 10 years previously, of a share in the booty for the oracle at Delphi. Two ambassadors were sent over to Greece with a golden wreath weighing 200 pounds, and silver trophies from the spoils of the victory over Hasdrubal (Livy 28.45.12). Around the same time, a high-ranking delegation was making its way eastwards to receive a religious relic from Attalus, king of Pergamum. The object which they were to bring back was a sacred stone of the earth-goddess Cybele (whom the Romans called *Magna Mater*, “the Great Mother”). Earlier in 205, continued religious portents had led to the finding, in the sacred Sibylline Books, of a prophecy that foretold Hannibal's final defeat if *Magna Mater* was brought to Rome (Livy 29.10.4–11.8, 14.5–14; Ovid, *Fasti* 4.247–348). Some have puzzled at the timing of this prophecy, particularly as Hannibal was by now a spent force (Gruen 1990, 6–7). But great unease still lingered at Rome long after final victory on the battlefield seemed assured.

Hannibal's lasting impact on Rome consisted of not just the bloody defeats that he inflicted on her legions at Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae but also his successful appropriation of much of the mythological legacy (particularly the Heracleian legacy) that had acted as the keystone in Rome's cultural and political affiliations with the Greek world, and in her subsequent claims to the leadership of the central and western Mediterranean. The missions both to Delphi and, particularly, to Pergamum therefore marked the beginnings of a protracted exorcism of the doubts and insecurities that Hannibal and his advisers had so skilfully planted in the collective consciousness of the Roman elite. The original home of *Magna Mater* had been Mount Ida near Troy, and later myth would claim that Aeneas and his followers had taken refuge there at the beginning of the journey to Rome (Gruen 1990, 17–19). The journey to Pergamum and the negotiations for the sacred stone were thus a very public re-entrenchment of Rome's heritage within the wider Hellenistic world, and by extension a reiteration of the historical and cultural connections that Hannibal had worked so hard to dismantle.

Yet vestiges of the insecurity that Hannibal had engendered in the Roman people remained long after the end of the Second Punic War. In the latter decades of the first century AD Statius and Silius Italicus made much of the enmity that Hercules supposedly felt towards the Carthaginian general (Statius, *Silvae* 4.6.75–81; Silius, *Punica* 1.508–14). When the censor Fulvius Flaccus removed the tiles from the roof of Juno's temple in 174/173 for use on a temple to Fortune that he was building in Rome, the senate quickly moved to counter this impiety. During a severe reprimand Flaccus was caustically asked:

Had he considered insufficiently violated the temple, the most revered in that region, one which neither Pyrrhus nor Hannibal had violated, unless he had foully removed its roof and almost torn it down? (Livy 42.3.4).

Clearly long after his enforced departure from Italy, the specter of Hannibal and his divine companions still loomed large over the religious landscape of the peninsula.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Roman Strategy and Aims in the Second Punic War

Klaus Zimmermann

How could the Romans win a war which they plainly seemed to have lost on the battlefield? If Charles de Gaulle's famous exhortation of July 1940 ("La France a perdu une bataille! Mais la France n'a pas perdu la guerre") fits a situation in ancient history, it is that of the evening of 2 August, 216 BC, when eight legions had fallen at Cannae as sacrifice to the tactical superiority of Hannibal, and on Italian soil no Roman army any longer existed.¹ Instead of accepting the result of the defeat, Rome carried on the struggle and gradually recovered. Roman successes in Iberia forced Carthage in the end to retreat to her North African territories, and 14 years after Cannae Scipio's victory at Zama led to a peace that condemned Carthage to political insignificance. Rome's power monopoly in the western Mediterranean was the result, and simultaneously the prerequisite for its ensuing advance into the East. The Second Punic War, therefore, constitutes a turning-point that has decisively influenced the course of history in our cultural world from antiquity onwards.

Yet even viewed on its own "Hannibal's War," as it is often called from a Roman perspective, is much more than the sum of impressive battle events and leading personalities: rather, its distinctive fascination lies in the spectacular transformation of a destructive defeat into a splendid victory. Moreover, the years from Saguntum to Zama were anything but a straight line to Cannae and back. More than once situations and opponents demanded delicate and fundamental decisions from the Senate, and it ranks among the crucial questions in the history of the middle Republic how far did better strategic concepts contribute — along with individual generals' ability, superior resources, and "the gods" in the form of good fortune — to Roman success in this war.

The key to the answer lies — as so often — in the details: a look at Rome's conduct at decisive moments of the Second Punic War will show us what the Romans wanted and in what ways they achieved their aims.

Rome's Aims in the Saguntum Crisis

An analysis of Roman strategy during the Second Punic War cannot avoid discussing first the aims for which the Romans entered on this war. At first glance the situation seems to be clear: when the Iberian coastal city of Saguntum came within the pull of Carthaginian expansion, its politicians turned to Rome for help. Roman envoys thereupon warned the Carthaginian general Hannibal against an attack, as the city stood under Roman protection. That Hannibal nonetheless besieged and destroyed Saguntum forced the Senate in 218 to react. So Roman, or Roman-influenced, tradition depicts the proceedings: the punishment of injustice against *amici populi Romani* and therefore the safeguarding of its own credibility was allegedly the purpose of Rome's military intervention, which is presented to us as the unavoidable reaction to a deliberate Carthaginian provocation.

Our chief authority is the historian Polybius, who does constantly strive for neutrality within the frame of his possibilities,² but draws his information from the annalist Fabius Pictor, whose concern, now especially, was not authentic documentation but a justification of senatorial policy. The alert reader of the account (Pol. 3.13.1–33.4) is struck too by various absurdities and contradictions, which can scarcely be explained except by inferring intentional manipulation.³ Of central importance is the question of the legal basis of Rome's friendly relations with Saguntum: a few years before the outbreak of the conflict (226/225) a Roman embassy obtained from Hasdrubal, Hannibal's predecessor in the Iberian command, the treaty-promise "not to cross the Ebro with military intent," as Polybius mentions in another passage in his work (2.13.7 = *SVF* 3.503). Even if the text of the treaty is not recorded, nonetheless such a stipulation implies that Rome conceded to its partner military operations south of the Ebro.⁴ Saguntum however lay far to the south of the Ebro⁵ and thus within the Carthaginian sphere of interest. Everything in these circumstances depends on when the fateful friendship between Rome and the Iberian city came about (cf. Chapters 11, 12, and 13). If it was of older date than the Ebro treaty, Rome may have felt that the call to protect the Saguntines was fully justified; if it occurred later, it ranks as nothing but an illegal interference by Rome in the affairs of the Carthaginian province.

The tradition on the Ebro treaty itself delivers the decisive argument: Roman contacts with a city lying south of the Ebro would definitely have been dealt with, and Pictor would in no way have neglected to cite a corresponding

stipulation (and its breach by Hannibal). Yet Polybius knows nothing of the sort — rather, he stresses in connection with the Ebro clause that in the agreement there was “no mention of the rest of Iberia”;⁶ plainly his source intended with this statement to confront an appeal to the Ebro treaty on the Carthaginian side. Precisely here, it seems, lay the tender spot in Roman efforts at justification: Rome’s interest in Saguntum was aroused at a moment when the Carthaginian leadership could regard the territories south of the Ebro as its sanctioned area of interest. Hannibal’s “illegal” action against Saguntum appears, with this background, in another light, and we must ask the reasons for Rome’s sudden interest in the Iberian state.

It cannot have been sympathy for the Saguntine state and people that caused the Senate’s intervention: during the eight-month siege of the city by Hannibal the Romans literally did not lift a finger to rescue their protégés, something for which historians ancient and modern have long sought explanations in vain. Rather, we see a threadbare excuse for a plausible reason in Polybius’ assertion that the expedition to punish the faithless Demetrius of Pharos in summer 219 preoccupied Rome’s legions at the decisive moment (3.15.13–16.6); a construction of modern scholarship is involved in the constantly repeated thesis that differences of opinion within the Senate had obstructed a timely military intervention.⁷ The decision to accept the Saguntines into friendship with the Roman People and to warn Hannibal against an attack presupposes that a majority was united over further action in case of an escalation; when Saguntum was destroyed, Rome did not hesitate a moment to demand in an ultimatum the handover of Hannibal. The idea that, in the months in between, fundamental debates on the pros and cons of an offensive global policy paralysed Rome’s leadership lacks any basis. Rome would have been able to rescue — or at least try to rescue — Saguntum; if nothing of the sort happened, obviously therefore the survival of Saguntum did not matter to the Romans, so that the question of Roman interests in the Saguntum crisis remains as open as before.

Once more it is Polybius to whom we owe the decisive information: as the motive for the Ebro treaty the historian states that the Romans, in view of the “ever greater and more frightening power (*sc.* of Hasdrubal), had decided to intervene in Iberian affairs. Convinced that they had long been asleep and thus enabled the Carthaginians to acquire greater might, they now made haste to correct this development as best they could” (Pol. 2.13.3–4). Only the threat of the Celtic danger in North Italy caused them to concentrate first on this problem and enter a course of understanding with Hasdrubal. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this passing remark — it should, on the contrary, have more worth than the statements in Book 3, which takes the pro-Roman line of presenting Hannibal and the Carthaginians as sole begetters of the conflict. According to this, around the mid 220s a forceful move against the Carthaginian province had already been discussed in the Senate; the Ebro

treaty served for the moment to avert a two-front war; after the victory over the Gauls, the Saguntines' appeal for help constituted a welcome opportunity for intervening beyond the agreed demarcation line.

So far so good. But why did Rome, during all the months of the siege of Saguntum, undertake not the slightest effort to rescue the city and thus equally provide themselves with a basis for further operations? The answer must, in view of the lack of explicit evidence in the sources, remain hypothetical, but is obvious: what if Hannibal, at the arrival of a Roman relief army, had raised the siege and renounced future claims against Saguntum, and perhaps declared himself ready even to fulfil demands for reparations? Rome's aim was not to rescue Saguntum but a *bellum iustum* against the overmighty dominion of the Barcids in Iberia. Nothing was more desirable to this end than an escalation that permitted neither Hannibal nor the Romans a retreat, and the destruction of Saguntum met this criterion in ideal fashion. It was irreversible, and it offered the pretext for a demand which the Carthaginian council could only reject: the handover of Hannibal.⁸ That the Senate more seriously intended to weaken Carthaginian power in Iberia than was bound up with claiming Saguntum as a Roman base, is (so to speak) the minimum result of Roman diplomacy. There is considerable probability that nothing less than the expulsion of Carthage from Iberia was the aim that the Roman leadership envisaged before the outbreak of war.

Rome's Reaction to Hannibal's Invasion

How the Romans intended to wage the war emerges clearly from the division of *provinciae*: of the two consuls of 218 one, Ti. Sempronius Longus, received Africa as his area of responsibility; the other, P. Cornelius Scipio, Spain (Pol. 3.40.2). Two consular armies were to force a two-front war on the enemy and so split up his forces; while Scipio frontally, so to speak, advanced against the Iberian province, operations in the homeland of the enemy were to destabilize his system of alliances, prevent support for the Iberian war theater, if possible even force Carthaginian leaders, by directly threatening the capital militarily, to abandon Iberia. The Romans still held fast to this concept when they learned of Hannibal's unexpectedly swift departure for Italy and crossing of the Ebro (Pol. 3.40.2), even if the original plan to keep the enemy in his province was thus foiled. On the route along the southern French coast Scipio now was to intercept and defeat the enemy, thereby frustrating the advance toward Italy and finally accomplishing his Iberian task.

The first fundamental change in the situation occurred when Scipio in August 218 anchored with his fleet at the mouth of the Rhône, to learn to his surprise that Hannibal had already crossed the river four days' march upriver.

A second surprise followed after a skirmish between the two armies' cavalry patrols: Hannibal departed northwards. Realizing apparently only now that he intended to cross the Alps, and with no time to consult Rome, Scipio reacted with independent flexibility, sending his forces on to Iberia under his brother Gnaeus' command while he returned alone to North Italy to intercept Hannibal with the legions there. While the Roman defense of North Italy enjoyed no luck, the initial successes in Iberia confirmed the correctness of this decision.

The Bitter Lessons of 218 to 216

With the evasion maneuver at the Rhône Hannibal had not been able to prevent the Roman invasion of Iberia, but instead of that his Alpine crossing did compel the Romans to abandon the other half of their war plan: at the news of the Carthaginian army's arrival in North Italy the Senate instructed Longus to break off his preparations for a landing in Africa and hasten with his army to help Scipio. Protection of the homeland enjoyed precedence over the planned offensive against the enemy's center. And the reinforcement in the north was soon indeed to prove bitterly necessary. In an effort to forestall Hannibal's junction with the Celtic Insubres and Boii, Scipio's cavalry suffered severe losses at the Ticinus, which left the consul no choice but to take a fortified position near the Trebia and await his colleague's arrival. But no less noteworthy than what the Senate did in this precarious situation, is what it did not do: recalling the Iberian army plainly came into question neither now nor under the impact of ensuing defeats. Expulsion of the Carthaginians from the peninsula was the declared war aim, which no catastrophe could motivate the Romans to give up.

United as the Senate seems to have been on the maintenance of the Iberian front, Roman leaders still had difficulty during the first years of war to reach a strategic agreement on the Italian war theater. Over and over, the credo of cautious waiting collided with the aggressive hope of being able to force the enemy here and now to a decision in Rome's favor, and the blood toll that the Romans had to pay for this lack of agreement was extraordinarily high. As early as 218, they had to suffer a heavy defeat when Longus reached the Trebia and, trusting in his numerical superiority, let himself be drawn by Hannibal into battle. In vain did Scipio, who had already become acquainted with the enemy, urge restraint. In blind ardor for combat Longus walked straight into an ambush set during the night — the tactical details are not part of this chapter — and lost a large part of his army (Pol. 3.71–74). Celtic North Italy was firmly in enemy hands; instead of punishing their faithless allies, Rome now had to take steps to bar the Carthaginian army from a further

advance into central Italy. Since it was not known which route Hannibal would take, both consuls of 217 adopted different positions: while Cn. Servilius Geminus awaited the enemy at Ariminum (Rimini), C. Flaminius from Arretium (Arezzo) guarded the harder but shorter road through Etruria. Maintaining contact until either one encountered the enemy must have been the stated duty of both, but again ambition and excessive self-confidence played an evil trick on the Roman side. Hannibal needed only to march, ravaging and burning, past Arretium towards the southeast — in Rome's direction — to draw Flaminius into an overhasty pursuit; on the east shore of Lake Trasimene the trap snapped shut, before Geminus could bring help to his colleague (Pol. 3.83–84). The consul's hope of solely winning the glory of victory had cost 15,000 Romans and allies their lives and given Hannibal a further brilliant victory.

Insight and exhaustion together may have contributed to the change in strategy which, after the disaster at Lake Trasimene, at least temporarily characterized Roman military operations. In its concern — unfounded, as it was to prove — over a direct enemy attack on Rome the People elected as dictator Q. Fabius Maximus, who had plainly learned from the painful experiences of the past: since there was no counter to Hannibal's superior tactics and the fighting vigor of his cavalry, he must be given no opportunity at all to deploy these strengths. In the absence of further victories time was not on Hannibal's side. Maximus followed his army at a distance, harassing small detachments but avoiding battle even when Hannibal crossed the Apennines to ravage the fertile plain of Capua. Nor did any of the Italian *socii* accept Hannibal's call to freedom. Denying him battle in these circumstances was equivalent to a victory.

But not all Romans shared the view of the "Delayer" (*cunctator*), as the levelheaded dictator was soon named (Ennius, *Ann.* 370–1). Under the impact of Hannibal's operations in Campania the voices increased that pressed for a decision, and when Maximus instead let the enemy army, rich with booty and laden with winter supplies, retire unhindered to Apulia,⁹ opinion turned around. In the absence of his superior, the enterprising *magister equitum* M. Minucius Rufus achieved some successes against Carthaginian foragers; under pressure from the army the People now provided him likewise with full dictatorial power. Two equally legitimate supreme commanders with fundamentally differing strategic viewpoints — that could not go well. In view of the disunion in their attitudes nothing was left to Maximus but to give his colleague the choice either of alternating the command day by day or dividing the army. Rufus opted for the latter proposal, and both moved into separate camps. The consequences were not slow to follow. An independent command for the hot-headed Rufus over half the Roman levies brought Hannibal the long-sought opportunity to put an end to the stagnation. Just as at the Trebia, the Carthaginian general challenged the Romans to battle after he had placed some

troops in ambush during the night, and like Longus the year before Rufus managed to maneuver himself between the enemy detachments. The freshly minted dictator had only the intervention of his colleague to thank for the fact that his army was not annihilated. Roman leaders were one experience richer in how dangerous it was to take on the tactically superior Hannibal in battle.

In Rome meanwhile it was still not possible to come to a consistent approval of Maximus' strategy of delay. When Hannibal at the start of the campaigning season of 216 scored a coup against Roman supplies with the capture of the provisions depot of Cannae, the Senate decided to risk battle anew: an overwhelmingly strong force — eight legions: with the levies of the allies, over 80,000 men — this time was to force a decision in Rome's favor. As is well known, Roman hopes all the same remained unfulfilled; and to this outcome — alongside Hannibal's brilliant battle plan — the disunity of Roman leaders seems once again to have contributed. While one of the consuls in office, L. Aemilius Paullus, wished to entice the enemy into country favorable to infantry, the other, C. Terentius Varro, trusting in the numerical strength of the Roman army, pressed for battle. Dividing the army because of this was very wisely avoided, after the experiences of the previous year. But the alternative of a daily alternating supreme command proved no less disastrous. On the day of his command Varro maneuvered the army into the immediate neighborhood of the enemy, and thus confronted the advocates of a more wait-and-see posture with *faits accomplis*. To deny the enemy battle on the next day of his own supreme command was all that Paullus could now do. The defeat of the army led by Varro a few days later marked the absolute nadir of the war and equally marked a fundamental change in Roman strategy: for the last time in Italy the Romans had sought a decision against Hannibal on the open battlefield. As a result of the losses of the years 218–216 a majority of senators at last became prudent.

No Compromise after Cannae

By avoiding Hannibal on the battlefield in future, the Romans reacted to the tactical superiority of the Carthaginian general; to draw a political conclusion from the defeats and losses, by contrast, did not occur to them — and in this lies Cannae's unique significance: no contemporary observer would have doubted that the total destruction of their army on their own territory would bring Roman leaders to the negotiating table. In confident expectation of Roman readiness for talks, Hannibal sent to Rome one of his officers, named Carthalo, who, "should those in Rome be inclined to peace, was to present the terms" (Livy 22.58.7). But instead of even listening to these terms, the dictator M. Iunius Pera had the spokesman informed by messenger that he

was to depart from Roman territory before nightfall (22.58.9). Under his direction 17-year-old conscripted but willing slaves were bought and freed, even criminals were amnestied and equipped with weapons from earlier wars' booty (22.57.9–11; 23.14.3–4) — all measures that attested that Rome was at the end of its strength and equally was committed to the utmost. How is this uncompromising stand, contradicting every ancient norm, to be explained, if we disregard the retrospective interpretation of Roman inflexibility after Cannae as a precondition of the later victory? Rome — unlike Carthage in the Third Punic War — was not forced into a struggle for its physical existence; contrary to later Roman propaganda, Hannibal in no way envisaged the destruction of the city. That is shown by his despatch of peace terms after Cannae just as by the text of the treaty with Philip V of Macedon the following year (Pol. 7.9). Even without Carthago addressing the Senate, one could nevertheless infer that Hannibal's offer to Rome imposed nothing less than the renunciation of its hegemony in North and South Italy as well as of its possession of Sicily and Sardinia, and consequently the provisional end of its great-power policy in the western Mediterranean. And Rome's leadership even after the losses of Cannae was not prepared for so decisive a revision of its own claims. Let us recall the end phase of the First Punic War when Rome's millionaires, instead of pleading for a compromise peace, risked their private means without hesitation in order to attain at last their ambitious war aim — the acquisition of Sicily — through building one final fleet. What links both situations is the absolute priority of maintaining and developing power in the self-consciousness of at least a leading section of the Roman population — a readiness for "total war" *avant la lettre*, something alien to all other ancient societies.

The Struggle for the Italian Allies

Strategy consists, among other things, of the art of conducting the struggle where you hold the advantage and avoiding it on ground where the enemy can play to his strengths. Rome's notorious weakness in this war was its hopelessness against Hannibal's strength in cavalry and wealth of ideas on the battlefield; at the latest after Cannae, no approach could ignore this perception. A motive for optimism, even after the serious defeats of the recent past, was given meanwhile by the overall stability of the Roman system of alliances. To be sure, the only briefly conquered Celts of the Po valley followed Hannibal's freedom slogan with complete enthusiasm, but among the *socii* of Central Italy the situation was otherwise: too much already bound them existentially and ideologically to Rome for a few setbacks to move them to change sides. But as long as a solid core of Italians believed in a common destiny under

Roman leadership, Rome's power to resist was unbreakable¹⁰ — in this lay Rome's great strength, and this strength it needed to use consistently.

At its core was the strategy of the "Delayer" that was the basis of Rome's operations in Italy during the following years: Roman armies were through their presence to strengthen the remaining allies in their loyalty, recover lost territory if possible, and make a frightening example by punishing defectors, while, however, risking no direct confrontation with Hannibal. Spectacular military successes were indeed not to be sought by this means, but — more importantly — they remained henceforth denied to the enemy as well, whose struggle for allies in South Italy looks not unlike the proverbial jousting with windmills. At first, admittedly, things did appear as though Hannibal's calculation after Cannae was succeeding: the first to open its gates to the enemy was Compsa in Samnium; encouraged by this, Hannibal entrusted his brother Mago with part of the army to enlist more allies. He himself marched again to Campania, where he succeeded in bringing Capua to his side. The desertion of the second most important city of Italy after Rome was a heavy blow to Rome's cause. Yet already in 216, even in South Italy, desertions to Hannibal were not automatic. Cumae and Naples were among the important cities remaining loyal to Rome, and Hannibal found it costly to bring much of the south under control: for his "freed" allies could not have conscription imposed on them, but rather required garrisons to protect them, thus further weakening his army.

To this were added losses through death, wounds, and illness, which were scarcely ever compensated for by replacements of personnel, whereas the Senate year after year had new recruits available. Slowly but surely the balance of strength shifted in Rome's favor. The war in Italy was for a long time not won but was winnable, if the adopted course of the *Stellvertreterkrieg* against Hannibal's allies was consistently pursued and if the Carthaginian army obtained no substantial reinforcement.

That success and failure depended essentially on these two requirements seems to have been well understood by Roman leaders. To them no cost was too great in order to win back faithless Syracuse and thereby control over Sicily, which was of inestimable value to the enemy's war effort as "stepping-stone" between Carthage and South Italy; with the capture of the metropolis by M. Claudius Marcellus in 212 came the decisive moment in this struggle. An emphatic sign of Rome's readiness to learn is given by the conduct of the two proconsuls Ap. Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who in 211 were given the task of completing the siege of Capua and refused either to be provoked into battle by Hannibal's attacks or to abandon their task because of his famous feint attack on Rome (Pol. 9.3–7; Livy 26.7–12).¹¹ The reconquest of the Campanian metropolis enjoyed absolute priority over the risk of a clash with Hannibal; the fall of the city very soon rewarded this correct

strategic decision. The fearful punishment, too, that now befell Capua — a majority of its senators was executed, the remaining population depending on personal “guilt” was enslaved, deported, stripped of their rights, or of their property — is seen to be an expression of Roman strategy: precisely because everything in this war depended on the loyalty of the Italian allies and Rome’s position continued to be precarious, a striking propaganda significance accrued to the punishment of defectors. The harsher the action and the more prominent the victims, the greater the effect the Senate hoped from such a measure.

The reconquest of Capua in 211 is commonly viewed as a sort of *peripeteia* of the Italian war theater.¹² Wealthy Campania was lost to Hannibal, belief among the Italians in the success of the Carthaginian cause shaken. Nothing could make clearer the recovered self-confidence of Roman leaders than the fact that once again they engaged in trials of strength with Hannibal — and thereby showed their limits: in 210 the proconsul Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and the consul M. Claudius Marcellus suffered defeats; the latter was defeated anew the following year and in a clash in 208 lost his life. Yet even such reverses caused the success of Rome’s strategy of exhaustion to be no longer fundamentally questioned. The élan of the Carthaginian offensive was broken; Hannibal limited himself increasingly to holding his already won positions — and even that did not always happen: in 209 the former dictator and five-times consul Q. Fabius Maximus recovered Tarentum, a defector in 212 to the enemy and thus achieved another important success in the *Stellvertreterkrieg* over allies. The direct peril seemed averted. But soon after this there came a development in the situation that threatened to nullify all the gains so far.

To bring reinforcements to his brother Hannibal, Hasdrubal the Carthaginian commander in Iberia departed from his province in summer 208, crossed the Alps in spring 207 and with his army of some 35,000 men arrived in the Po valley. After severe defeats in Iberia the Carthaginians now evidently wished to force a decision in the Italian war theater, and the moment for a major offensive was also, in another regard, not unfavorable: the Roman allies in Central Italy were weary of the long war. No fewer than 12 of the 30 Latin colonies declared in 209 that they could no longer supply soldiers and make contributions, and spoke out for peace with Hannibal (Livy 27.9.2–6). Yet Rome, unable to use force against this desertion (as it was judged), ignored it for the present, although war-weary unrest in Etruria was met by deploying extra forces there (Livy 27.21.6–8, 24.1–9, 38.6). But could Hannibal yet succeed in convincing the Italians of a political future without Roman domination? At all events a union of both armies under his command offered conceivably the best conditions to overcome the stalemate and give the struggle for the freedom of the *socii* new impetus.

That the couriers who were to inform Hannibal of Hasdrubal's arrival, and propose to him a rendezvous in Umbria, fell into the Romans' hands near Tarentum while searching for him (Livy 27.43) was one of those strokes of luck which at times decide wars. The decisive reaction to this information by the consul commanding in South Italy, C. Claudius Nero, can by contrast be counted as one of the high points of Roman strategy in the Second Punic War, with the readiness of two rival Roman colleagues in office to cooperate¹³ no less impressive than the singlemindedness of the measures taken. Nero recognized clearly that there was only one way to avert the lethal danger: to concentrate and repel the new enemy as long as Hannibal waited for news in Apulia in ignorance of the matter. The need of the hour was to stop and strike down Hasdrubal with all available forces before Hannibal became aware of the situation. And the venture succeeded: unnoticed by Hannibal, Nero with the elite of his troops moved by forced marches to the north, where the other consul, M. Livius Salinator, kept closely in contact with Hasdrubal. The latter vainly sought to elude the superior enemy forces; near the Metaurus the consuls forced him into a battle which thanks to Nero's encircling maneuver ended with a total Roman victory. It was thanks to the insight and vigor of this consul that Hannibal could no longer become a serious threat to Rome and its alliance system, but finally retired to his South Italian positions where, until his recall in 203, he tied down some Roman forces. And though the Carthaginians sought to reinvigorate the war in Italy by sending his youngest brother Mago to raise fresh forces in North Italy to reinforce him (Livy 28.36.1–2), the Romans were on the alert, and Mago was not Hannibal. Unable to force a breakthrough, the latter was left with no choice but to hold his position, until in 203 he was recalled to Africa to defend his homeland. The Italian war theater had lost its strategic importance with Hasdrubal's end.

The Struggle for Iberia

If we have so far been concerned chiefly with the war in Italy, that is simultaneously misleading and justified: justified because the costly struggle in their own country naturally was the focus of attention for Roman contemporaries and historians; misleading because, despite this observation, the Italian theater did not play the decisive role in this war. In Hannibal's plan of operations the invasion of Italy was simply the means to the goal of keeping enemy offensives away from his own key territories. Rome's goal in the war was the personal and material resources of the Carthaginian province of Iberia; not to lose sight of this primary goal despite the threat to the homeland, but to force the war precisely to where Carthaginian interests could be vitally endangered, without

again and again clashing with the tactically superior Hannibal — in this lay the great strategic achievement that Rome essentially had to thank for victory.¹⁴

The start of Roman operations is already symptomatic. When he realized that Hannibal's crossing of the Alps could no longer be prevented, the consul P. Cornelius Scipio did not redirect his army to North Italy but turned on his own to fulfill his new task, after he had taken care to arrange an immediate beginning of the Iberian offensive (see above). And still in the same year his brother was able to gain a respectable success. Landing at Ampurias, he brought the northeastern coast under his control, and near a city named Cissa defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian commander in the region. This brought the tribes there over to Scipio and broke the land link to Italy that Hannibal had taken much effort to establish. And when Gnaeus in the following spring, advised by Massiliot captains (cf. *FGrH* 176 F1: Sosylus), achieved a naval victory near the mouth of the Ebro in which he captured some 25 enemy ships, all Rome looked hopefully to Iberia. Despite the strained situation in Italy the proconsul P. Scipio was sent with 20 ships to take reinforcements to his brother.

How correct the decision had been to intensify involvement in the Iberian peninsula was to be shown the year after. Since Hannibal's deputy Hasdrubal was given the task of leading his army to Italy to reinforce his brother, the Scipios bent every effort to preventing him. Near a city named Ibera, south of the Ebro, they forced him into a battle in which they were victorious (Livy 23.29.3–15) and inflicted losses serious enough both to end his proposed march to Italy and to cause reinforcements intended for Hannibal to be redirected to Iberia under his brother Mago's command (23.32.5–11). What might have happened had both brothers been able to join Hannibal with forces from Iberia and Carthage cannot be known, but the Scipios' victory near the Ebro may well have been the decisive battle of the war.

Promising as the start of the war in Iberia had been, it was not yet won. Rather, it seems that the Carthaginians from 214 succeeded in counteracting the centrifugal tendency among the allied native tribes. And in 211 they were able to inflict a defeat on the Romans that put into question all that had been previously been achieved in Iberia. The brothers Scipio had hoped to defeat the Carthaginian generals in Iberia (the Barcid brothers Hasdrubal and Mago, and Hasdrubal son of Gisgo) but seem to have been overconfident. Gnaeus advanced against the nearby Barcid Hasdrubal, Publius to confront the others five days' march away; but the desertion of Gnaeus' Celtiberian allies forced him to retreat, while Publius was surrounded by enemy divisions and lost both his army and his own life. Gnaeus too was surrounded and suffered a similar fate (Livy 25.33–36).¹⁵ Carthaginian mastery south of the Ebro was re-established, Rome's position in Iberia thrown back to the situation of 218.

That the succession in the Iberian command was entrusted in the same year to the like-named son of P. Cornelius Scipio was an especially fortunate

choice: with the promotion of this young man, who offered neither the required minimum age nor the prescribed career qualifications, there came into view on the Roman side the leading actor in the Second Punic War, who was to drive the Carthaginians out of Spain and end the war with a victory over Hannibal in Africa. Of course all this was not foreseeable; not only Scipio's popularity and his family's prestige but the importance in Iberia of personal ties to native aristocrats certainly contributed to his being chosen. The Barcids' continuous supremacy had achieved such ties for Carthage; the selection of Scipio showed that the Romans too could learn the importance of an Iberian "clientele."

While his selection still depended in good part on premature renown, the new commander revealed himself in his very first spectacular action as a brilliant strategist who was fully and entirely equal to his task. His assault on New Carthage, the capital of the Carthaginian province of Iberia, represented a stroke of genius that was in no way inferior in originality to Hannibal's march over the Alps.¹⁶ Scipio himself later explained his calculations in a letter to Philip V (Pol. 10.9.3): it was too risky to advance against the three separate Carthaginian armies that so greatly outnumbered his, while the alternative was to strike unexpectedly at a sensitive spot where for a limited time he would enjoy numerical superiority. New Carthage was of major strategic importance, the enemy's war treasury and Iberian hostages were there, and its garrison numbered only 1,000 men, with the nearest Carthaginian army ten days' march away (Pol. 10.7.4–8.4).

As is well known, a brilliant success attended the venture. Army and fleet required seven days for the advance from the mouth of the Ebro to New Carthage (Pol. 10.9.7; Livy 26.42.6); on the fourth day after his arrival Scipio opened the attack; a strike force through the lagoon gained the wall at an unguarded point and soon after the city found itself in Roman hands. Without significant losses Scipio had inflicted a blow on the enemy which represented a sort of advance decision in the struggle for Iberia. The entire Mediterranean coast was now under Roman control, the Carthaginian war-treasury relieved the Romans' financial strains, New Carthage's artisans now worked for Scipio, and the hostages' release influenced their tribes to join his side (Pol. 10.18.3–5).

The years till 206 show us Scipio as a no less gifted tactician, who earned the fruits of his strategic success over New Carthage on the battlefield. After several Iberian princes joined the Romans in the winter of 209/8 in order to win freedom for their hostages, it was necessary to strengthen the new allies in their attitude and excite the hesitant into imitating them. For the Carthaginians too it was important to have a clash of arms before Scipio acquired still more appeal. Indeed the recent defections had weakened Hasdrubal's army to the point that the latter not only wished to confront Scipio but near Baecula

occupied a defensive position to await the arrival of his opponent. Against enemy expectations and despite the difficulties of the terrain Scipio attacked; instead of prolonging the pointless struggle Hasdrubal moved away northward and a little later entered on the march to Italy. It is an academic question why Scipio did not pursue the enemy in order to avert the threat to his homeland.¹⁷ We have no reason to assume that Scipio knew of Hasdrubal's plans. Rather he had to assume that the Carthaginian generals were concerned to unite their armies — and precisely for that reason it was important to be on guard. Instead of chasing after the enemy into the unknown, the general directed his attention to exploiting his latest victory politically: following the example of Hannibal, he released the Iberian prisoners without ransom; he set free with rich gifts a relative of the Numidian Masinissa, still allied with the Carthaginians. Here again his propaganda would not lack effect. In the following year Scipio gained more ground with the tribes of central Iberia; in 206 the two Carthaginian generals positioned themselves for decisive combat near Ilipa. Despite numerical inferiority Scipio was able to crush the enemy, whose positions in Iberia were now no longer tenable. The aim for which the initial "friendship" with Saguntum had been concluded — the expulsion of the Carthaginians from the Iberian peninsula — was achieved.

Rome's Aims at the End of the War

The question of what aims the Romans pursued after the conquest of Iberia can not be answered sweepingly. Once again the Carthaginian leaders sought to transform the war in Italy by sending Mago over. Averting this threat and expelling Hannibal from South Italy were to some extent the minimum aims that the situation presented to the Senate. Far more ambitious plans were envisaged by the victor over the Carthaginian province: from Iberia Scipio had already sought to win over the Numidian king Syphax as an ally for an offensive on North African territory that he had in mind for the year of his consulship (205). Not a continuation of the grinding war of position in South Italy, but a blow against the center itself was to force the enemy to his knees — once more we clearly recognize the strategic signature of the conqueror of New Carthage. A majority of the Senate at first refused its approval of Scipio's wishes in this matter. Did people shy away from the risk — or begrudge the shooting star of the Iberian war a further brilliant success?¹⁸ Neither motive, incidentally, can in any way be excluded. Scipio first obtained the task as pro-consul in 204 to take the war to Africa — and still his plans were almost frustrated by a case brought against his legate Q. Pleminius for abuse of office. It almost seems as if the old petty jealousies of domestic politics were demanding their rights back in proportion as the awareness of a substantial threat faded

from people's heads. The war was no longer going to be lost; the time of fearful hope of rescue was past; instead minds were preoccupied more and more with the imminent distribution of glory and booty. Amid this the strategic aim was not a blank starting point as many a senator claimed.

An important element of Scipio's plan of operations for the war in Africa was, from the start, to isolate Carthage from its Numidian allies, who provided a large part of the feared cavalry of the Carthaginian army. The change of sides by the east Numidian Masinissa after the battle of Ilipa had seemed to bring Scipio a decisive step nearer this goal; nonetheless Masinissa's enemy, the west Numidian Syphax who for long had had an agreement with Rome, now went over to the Carthaginian camp. The king saw his real mission as to keep the war away from Africa or else mediate a compromise peace: so as not to force him to undertake a joint defense of the African homeland on the Carthaginians' side, Scipio should abstain from invasion, so averred Syphax to the Roman before the latter's departure from Sicily (Livy 29.23.10); to the general after his landing, in winter quarters in 204/3, he proposed a peace on the basis of the evacuation of both Italy and Africa by the hostile armies (30.3.5).¹⁹ That Scipio concealed the first message and used the later one merely for sham negotiations to reconnoiter for an attack at least shows what the general did not want to risk under any circumstance: a renewed discussion in Rome of the question of the prolongation or conclusion of the war, at the end of which he would possibly be recalled. Scipio's aim was not to bring the militarily won war for Iberia to as rapid a conclusion as possible, but to derive the maximum benefit from the command entrusted to him (cf. Livy 30.16.8: "victoriam se, non pacem domum reportaturum esse").

The impression that the war in this final phase was waged rather for personal than for strategic aims is confirmed by a look at the following events. If Scipio was receptive to a renewed peace initiative by the Carthaginians in late summer 203, it was not so much because with the victories at Utica, the Great Plains, and Cirta Rome's war aims had been achieved, but because his command was nearing its end and it was time to ensure that the longed-for triumph came to him and not to a successor. Correspondingly great was the opposition in the Senate (Livy 30.23.8): only the People's support enabled the general to have his way, for Polybius reports that Scipio was first informed that "the Roman People have ratified the peace treaty" (15.1.3) and only afterwards did he receive the official news that "Senate and People had willingly approved his treaty with the Carthaginians" (15.4.8); apparently the Senate chose to avoid a real test.

Whether a reversal of attitude because of Hannibal's arrival in North Africa or a sharpening of the Roman conditions moved the Carthaginians to reject the peace is just as obscure as the circumstances in which the change of course occurred. The seizure of a beached Roman transport fleet in the Gulf of Tunis

is reported, yet the tradition of an ensuing Carthaginian attack on a Roman protest embassy suffers from obvious improbability; according to a fragment of text by an unknown Greek historian of the 2nd Century BC (*PRyl.* 3.491) it appears that the rejection of the peace by the Carthaginians followed a diplomatically correct path. However that may be, after his command was once prolonged this development must thoroughly have fitted in with Scipio's interests — it offered him the longed-for opportunity to cross swords with the arch-enemy of Cannae. That on the eve of the battle of Zama he did not engage in peace negotiations with Hannibal but, by demanding an unconditional capitulation, forced battle (*Pol.* 15.8.14) cannot come as a surprise. The reason why Scipio was still prepared to hold a colloquy with the Carthaginian general may have been of a strategic nature: both armies had marched westwards, from where Masinissa came up to reinforce the Romans. Perhaps the brief delay served to make a safe junction possible for the allies. At all events Scipio on the battlefield of Zama enjoyed a clear cavalry superiority, while a largely mounted contingent of reinforcements for the Carthaginians, led by Syphax's son Vermina, arrived some weeks too late. Scipio had understood that he must maneuver the enemy into a situation where ground, time, and balance of strength offered him good chances of success; tactically skilful leadership in combat and the fortune of battle (in the form of communications problems among the enemy) added to the Roman victory in this final great confrontation.

With Zama a satisfying conclusion of the war was attained for the great majority of senators. The shame of Cannae was wiped away, the Carthaginians were forced to an unconditional capitulation, the popular and successful protagonist of the past years could hope for a splendid triumph. The consul designate Cn. Cornelius Lentulus alone, who would readily have set out even now as general, spoke out against the peace, but could not prevail against the unanimous vote of the People (*Livy* 30.43.1–4). The struggle for mastery in the western Mediterranean was ended; the new dispensation after this victory represented the greatest formal achievement so far that their expansion plans demanded of Roman politicians. Along with the acquisition of Iberia, where together with its wealth they inherited an equal quantity of troubles, after the experiences of the long and costly war senators had achieved the lasting destruction of Carthaginian power, to exclude once and for all any renewed threat to Roman interests by the defeated rival. Reduction to its North African territories, prohibition of any overseas intervention or the launching of a fleet, requirement of approval for war waged on African soil, dependence through annual reparations payments and provision of hostages for a period of 50 years: these were the instruments which for the future guaranteed Carthage's political and military insignificance (*Pol.* 15.18 = *SVF* 3.548). Fatally, the Romans neglected to offer the defeated enemy security of their rights — a

mistake for which the Carthaginians would pay some years later with their own existence. But that is the theme of another study.

Balance Sheet

The better strategy wins; the victor therefore had the better strategy. This circular argument is not infrequently the outcome of historical judgments through hindsight by modern historians. That such a broad verdict is not justified for an occurrence like the Second Punic War in its complexity should become evident from a glance at its different phases²⁰ and theaters. Individual decisions stand alongside consensual processes, brilliant actions alongside blatant mistakes. If finally we wish to systematize our observations on the aims and strategy of the Romans in the Second Punic War, we must thus contrast three levels: individual generals' ability, senatorial strategy, and systemic features that characterized Roman leaders independently of the situation in the war. Generals of the format of a Fabius Maximus, whose cautious war leadership in Italy was the sole promising method against Hannibal, of a Claudius Pulcher who refused to break off the siege of Capua because of Hannibal's march on Rome, of a Claudius Nero who with his decisive action averted the fatal peril of a union between Hannibal and Hasdrubal, or of a Scipio who with his coup against New Carthage forced through the initial achievement in the war for Iberia, contributed importantly through their successes — or through preventing enemy successes — to victory; their skill stands in emphatic contrast to the hotheaded overconfidence of a Sempronius Longus, Flaminius, Minucius Rufus, or Terentius Varro, who inflicted heavy losses on Rome and its allies in the early years. Equally responsible for such failures, of course, besides personal inexperience were the features of the system that imposed on an ambitious Roman aristocrat a virtual compulsion to achieve a victory in the year of his command.²¹ Competition and the need for personal renown of the men who should have cooperated as colleagues in command were the inner enemies that again and again threatened Rome in this stressful situation.

Beyond the achievements of individuals, what is impressive is the unwavering resolve with which Rome for twelve years — from 218 to 206 — pursued its original war aim. From the decision of the consul of 218 to send his army to Iberia despite the threatening invasion, through the years of gravest distress in Italy and the end of the brothers Scipio in 211, until the final operations of the later Africanus against the Carthaginian province, the Senate retreated not for a moment from this commitment, but rather put everything into depriving Hannibal's conduct of the war in Italy of its foundations by attacking his Iberian base and by every means interdicted support from Sicily. The long years of war on many fronts imposed on the *socii* a harsh test of their capacity

and willingness to serve,²² yet a majority of Central Italians shouldered the burden and *nolens volens* supported Rome's strategy. No less noteworthy than the stability of their dominance in this extremity is certainly the ruthlessness with which the Romans themselves categorically rejected every compromise. The fact that after Cannae the Senate did not once listen to a Carthaginian embassy with terms for peace is singular²³ and symptomatic of the mentality of a society and its ruling elite: for victory and expansion they were ready to pay any price — in this as in other wars.

NOTES

1. Cf. Le Bohec 1996, 193.
2. On this: Schepens 1989.
3. An exhaustive discussion would here be too broad; cf. Hoyos 1998, 150–259 (with overall assessment of others); Zimmermann 2009, 45–68.
4. The onesidedness of the Carthaginian obligation is by contrast stressed by Bringmann 2001a, 370 with n. 7.
5. Different modern interpretations of the “Iber” named in the Ebro-treaty as being other rivers south of Saguntum do not convince: cf. for example Seibert 1993b, 129–130, whose thesis that the Ebro-treaty was a Roman fiction (130–135) probably however goes too far.
6. Later historians (Livy 21.2.7; Appian, *Iber.* 7.27) first inserted a guarantee of Saguntum's independence.
7. Strikingly refuted by Welwei 1977, 157–9.
8. Thus convincingly Hampl 1972, 433; so too Huss 1985, 293. The constraints of the consular year overestimated by Goldsworthy 2000, 150.
9. Recently Seibert 1993b, 224 judges as an intentional disparagement of Maximus, lacking historical basis, the tradition of Hannibal's spectacular deception maneuver (Pol. 3.92.10–94.6).
10. On good grounds Hannibal abstained from the option of a direct attack on Rome; cf. for example Lazenby 1978, 85–6; Shean 1996 (investigation of the logistical problems); most recently Zimmermann 2008, 49–60.
11. On the details see Walbank 1967, 118–127; on Capua's role, Ungern-Sternberg 1975.
12. Thus e.g. Huss 1985, 370.
13. Cf. Huss 1985, 391 n. 146.
14. Similarly J. Briscoe in *CAH*², 8.56.
15. A sequence of events diverging from Livy's is proposed by Seibert 1993a, 319 n. 106.
16. Cf. (e.g.) the assessment by Bengtson 1982, 102–103.
17. On this e.g. Seibert 1993a, 372.
18. On details and on political groupings: Briscoe 1988, 73–74.
19. On Syphax' political concepts: Huss 1989.

20. J. Briscoe divides Roman strategy into three phases (1989, 68): “First, the period of meeting Hannibal in open conflict with the three disasters of the Trebbia, Trasimene, and Cannae. Secondly, the period from Cannae until 205, when Roman policy was fundamentally defensive, and thirdly, the final period of the invasion of Africa, first planned ... in 218.”
21. On the importance of military glory cf. Kostial 1995, 101–109.
22. All the same the broader front in the Balkan peninsula resulting from Hannibal’s alliance with Philip V could have been eased through the alliance with the Aetolians: cf. Errington 1989, 99–106.
23. Or — as Shean (1996, 186) convincingly formulates it — “Livy’s famous dictum on Cannae: ‘No other nation could have suffered such tremendous disasters and not been defeated’ [22.54.11] could better read ‘Nobody but the Romans would have been too stubborn to admit defeat’.”

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The War in Italy, 218–203

Louis Rawlings

Hannibal's war in Italy was a pan-Italian conflict. For 15 years (218–203 BC) it raged from the Gallic north to the Bruttian south. The majority of Roman forces raised during the war were deployed in this theater and it was the scene of some of Rome's greatest ever defeats. It appears to have been a central element of Hannibal's strategy to break up the Roman alliance and to use its own resources against itself, or at least to try to deny Rome access to the wealth of manpower and other resources of the allies.¹ The Romans were forced to deal not only with Hannibal's army, but also with the many communities in Italy that sided with the Carthaginians. Consequently, simultaneous operations were regularly conducted in different parts of Italy, although, in broad terms, the war can be divided into several phases that exhibit some regional progression in the focus of the fighting.

The early campaigns appear to have gone mostly Hannibal's way. A major victory at Trebia (December 218) allowed Hannibal to pass from the already anti-Roman tribes of Cisalpine Gaul, into Etruria, where he won another victory at Trasimene (June 217), thence through the Apennines into Picenum, on the Adriatic coast. In the next few months he encountered the delaying tactics of Q. Fabius Maximus. Nevertheless, Hannibal was able to crisscross the Apennines, plundering Campania and evading the Romans to winter at Gerunium in Apulia. Despite his successes, however, there had been no defections in Italy since he was joined by the Gauls in 218. The crushing victory over the vast Roman army at Cannae (August 216), however, prompted large-scale revolts across much of southern and central Italy.

The Roman fightback in Campania and Samnium can be viewed as the next phase of the war. Intense Roman campaigning from 215 to 213 involved much devastation of rebel territories. This was followed by the tremendous efforts of 212–211, when six of the 14 legions in Italy concentrated on

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reducing Capua by siege, despite Hannibal's diversionary march on Rome in 211. By 210, Samnium had also been forced to submit, after major and systematic operations to devastate and reduce its communities. Hannibal had been dividing his energies between these central Italian allies and the chance of further gains in the south. An early attempt to gain Tarentum in 214 failed, but in 212 he succeeded in winning it over, although ultimately perhaps at the cost of losing Capua. Roman pressure shifted to Lucania and Apulia, where armies led by generals such as Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and M. Claudius Marcellus regularly took on Hannibal. Gracchus defeated an allied Bruttian army led by the Carthaginian officer Hanno at Beneventum (212). Despite Hannibal's victories at Herdonea (212, 210), bruising engagements at Numistro (210), Canusium (209), and Grumentum (207) limited Punic opportunities; indeed, in 209, Tarentum was recaptured.

The final phase can be characterized as the failure of Hannibal to break out of his southern territories. Two Punic armies in the north were unable to make a significant impact. Firstly, Hasdrubal's march from Spain to rendezvous with his brother Hannibal was intercepted by three Roman armies and defeated at the River Metaurus (207). Secondly, Mago's inability to progress beyond Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul (205–203), did not improve the strategic situation facing the Carthaginians in Italy. Roman campaigning in the south gradually prized territory from Hannibal's grip; indeed, he was forced to evacuate the inhabitants of communities he could no longer defend. Roman armies ended the resistance of Lucania and Apulia (circa 206), and gained control of the key cities of Locri (205), and Clamptia and Consentia (204). On Hannibal's recall to Africa in 203, he had been reduced to rather limited territories in Bruttium.

Warfare in Italy

Hannibal often sought out Roman armies to engage and, for the most part, the Romans were keen to meet him. The great defeats of Trebia and Trasimene led to a period of avoidance under Fabius' six-month dictatorship, but soon the Romans were eager to march against Hannibal (Pol. 3.107–8). Even after Cannae, their most disastrous defeat, and in spite of the general wariness of Roman forces thereafter, numerous attempts were made to confront the Carthaginians. Between 218 and 203 the sources report as many as 22 engagements involving Hannibal's army in Italy (see Table 17.1). Hannibal won at least five of these outright (Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae, and twice at Herdonea). Other contests were minor successes or setbacks, some of them probably little more than skirmishes grown in the telling; but they should not undermine the basic point about the willingness of both sides to risk engagement. Other

Table 17.1 Major engagements involving Hannibal's army

<i>Year</i>	<i>Battle</i>	<i>Roman Commander</i>	<i>Reference</i>
218	Ticinus	P. Cornelius Scipio (cos.)	Pol. 3.64–5, 10.3; Livy 21.45–6
218	Trebbia	P. Cornelius Scipio (cos.), Ti. Sempronius Longus (cos.)	Pol. 3.71–4; Livy 21.54–56; App. <i>Hann.</i> 24; Zon. 8.24
217	Trasimene	C. Flaminius (cos.)	Pol. 3.83–5; Livy 22.4
217	Gerunium (1)	M. Minucius Rufus (mag. eq.)	Pol. 3.100–2; Livy 22.23–4, Plut. <i>Fab.</i> 7–8; Zon. 8.26
217	Gerunium (2)	M. Minucius Rufus (mag. eq.), Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (dict.)	Pol. 3.104–5; Livy 22.28–30; App. <i>Hann.</i> 13
216	Cannae	C. Terentius Varro (cos.), L. Aemilius Paullus (cos.)	Pol. 3.110–18, Livy 22.45–52; App. <i>Hann.</i> 19–26; Front. <i>Strat.</i> 2.2.7, 3.7, 5.27, 4.5.5–7; Polyæn. 6.38.3–4; Flor. 1.22.15–19; Dio Cass. frg. 57.26; Zon 9.1
216	Nola (1)	M. Claudius Marcellus (praet.)	Livy 23.16; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 11
216	near Casilinum	M. Junius Pera, (dict.)	Front. <i>Strat.</i> 2.5.25; Polyæn. 6.38.5–6; Zon. 9.3
215	Nola (2)	M. Claudius Marcellus (imp. procos.)	Livy 23.44–6; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 12
214	Nola (3)	M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.)	Livy 24.17
212	Capua	Q. Fulvius Flaccus (cos.), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos.)	Pol. 9.3–5; Livy 25.19; App. <i>Hann.</i> 38
212	Lucania	M. Centenius Paenula	Livy 25.19
212	Herdonea (1)	Cn. Fulvius Flaccus (praet.)	Livy 25.21
211	Volturnus (Capua)	Cn. Fulvius Centumalus (cos.), P. Sulpicius Galba	Pol. 9.3–5; Livy 26.5–6; App. <i>Hann.</i> 38
211	Anio	Q. Fulvius Flaccus (procos.)	Pol. 9.7; Livy 26.10–11; App. <i>Hann.</i> 41–43; Zon 9.6
210	Herdonea (2)	Cn. Fulvius Centumalus (procos.)	Livy 27.1; Front. <i>Strat.</i> 2.5.21; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 24; App. <i>Hann.</i> 48
210	Numistro	M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.)	Livy 27.2; Front. <i>Strat.</i> 2.2.6; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 24

Continued

Table 17.1 Cont'd

<i>Year</i>	<i>Battle</i>	<i>Roman Commander</i>	<i>Reference</i>
210	Venusia	M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.)	Livy 27.2
209	Canusium	M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.)	Livy 27.12–14, cf. 21; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 25–6
207	Grumentum	C. Claudius Nero (cos.)	Livy 27.40–2
204	Croton (1)	P. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos.), P. Licinius Crassus (procos.)	Livy 29.36
203	Croton (2)	Cn. Servilius Caepio (cos.)	Livy 30.19

Included are all examples where a large part of Hannibal's army is reported to have engaged substantial Roman forces. Not included are assaults on cities or examples where Hannibal caught smaller forces (see n. 8). The multiple engagements at Herdonea and Croton have sometimes been viewed as doublets, but there seems no strong reason to dismiss them as such. The "first" battle at Gerunium may have been a skirmish, but this was not how Minucius Rufus or his supporters viewed it; indeed both Polybius and Livy attest the seriousness of the encounter. Some sources report a defeat by Junius Pera in 216, apparently near Casilinum; however Livy's omission of the engagement casts doubt on its historicity. The battle at Anio and the first day of "second" Nola were apparently ended by bad weather, while the protagonists separated on the approach of a third Roman army at Capua (212). Numistro was followed by a pursuit of Hannibal to Venusia, where a further encounter took place. Canusium appears to have been a series of engagements lasting several days, Livy claims Marcellus ultimately won it, but later appears to contradict this statement.

Punic or pro-Punic armies were tackled at Hamae (215: Livy 23.35), Grumentum (215: Livy 23.37), the River Calor near Beneventum (214: Livy 24.14–16; Zon. 9.4d), Beneventum (212: Livy 25.13–15; Appian, *Hann.* 37.157–8), Metaurus (207: Livy 27.46–49; Pol. 11.1–3; Appian, *Hann.* 52.221–53.224), and on at least three occasions in Cisalpine Gaul.²

Hannibal sometimes declined battle or withdrew after an initial encounter. Although this is often represented in our sources as a tactical or strategic defeat, Hannibal was canny enough not to risk his army if the conditions were unfavorable. Even if there had been a chance of winning, an inopportune battle might interfere with broader objectives, for ancient armies often needed time to recover even from victories. After a "success" at Canusium (209), too many of Marcellus' men were wounded to venture a pursuit of Hannibal (Livy 27.14; Plut. *Marc.* 25–26). The three-day engagement was probably considered a Roman defeat at the time, since Marcellus was criticized for remaining passive in its wake (Livy 27.21; Plut. *Marc.* 27). It is worth noting that even Hannibal's great victory at Cannae appears to have constrained his strategic options. His losses were heavy: at least 5,700 killed out of his 50,000, and

probably many more wounded (Pol. 3.117; Livy 22.52; Daly 2002, 202). Regardless of how many enemy lay on the field (and there were probably around 50,000, plus up to 20,000 captured), Hannibal's victory had been Pyrrhic in scale (Appian, *Hann.* 26.111–12); his casualty ratio was around 12%, close to that suffered by many defeated armies in antiquity (Krentz 1985; Sabin 1996, 67). It is then, perhaps, understandable why Hannibal preferred to rest his decimated army rather than take the advice, as legend has it, of his officer Maharbal to march on Rome.³

Nevertheless, battle offered Hannibal the opportunity to deliver a short sharp shock, inflicting losses, demonstrating his generalship and the prowess of his army, contributing to the impression of Carthaginian military dominance, and prompting defections amongst the allies. The Romans too preferred battle since, if Hannibal could be decisively defeated, the threat to Italy would be substantially diminished. Furthermore, the militarism of Roman society was such that elite and common citizens alike were keen to demonstrate their *virtus* and patriotism on the field of battle.⁴ The frequency of battles, however, shows that neither side could deliver a knockout blow in this form of warfare.

Beyond the Battlefield

Of course, warfare was not confined to pitched battles. The Romans claimed that Hannibal had destroyed “400 towns” in Italy (Appian, *Lib.* 63.280, 134.635), a total that, if not an exaggeration, probably includes many small communities. The Carthaginians and their allies conducted assaults and sieges throughout the war and had notable successes at Victumulae (218), Gerunium (217), Nuceria, Acerrae (216), Casilinum, Petelia, and Consentia (215). Yet other places such as Placentia (218, 207), Nola (216, 215, 214), Naples (216), Cumae, Rhegium (215), and Puteoli (214) successfully resisted. The Romans were no less active: their most significant successes came at Casilinum (retaken in 214 and exposing Campania to invasion from Latium), Syracuse (212), Capua (212–11), Agrigentum (210), Tarentum (209), and Locri (205), along with many smaller towns.

Cities offered resources and security, and their armed forces could limit enemy operations and successes. Besieging them was difficult and not only tied up forces for long periods of time, but also consumed supplies and money. Some sieges, such as that of Capua, lasted a whole campaigning season or more, indicating the strategic importance of the community and its commitment to resist. Assaults, with or without siege equipment constructed in the vicinity, may have offered a quick resolution for the attackers, but were often very costly in men.⁵ Blockade might be the most or only effective direct measure. In this type of warfare the Romans gradually gained the upper hand. This

was because they possessed the men and logistical organization to undertake protracted sieges. Latium and most of Etruria remained in Roman hands throughout the war, giving a solid core of territory from which to strike out, while Hannibal found it almost impossible to operate in these regions for long. The colonies that Rome had planted throughout Italy also acted as fortresses and bases of operation that Hannibal never managed to capture. Many other cities, including vital coastal allies such as Naples and Cumae, remained in Roman hands and were used as centers for supply, muster, and defence (e.g. Livy 23.46). At the siege of Capua the Romans drew supplies from their depots at Casilinum and Puteoli (Livy 25.20, 22; Erdkamp 1998, 48, 68; see below).

After Cannae, Hannibal was regularly harried by Roman forces who shadowed and, at times, restricted his moves, but were generally prudent enough to avoid engaging him on ground where his strength in cavalry might prove decisive. Indeed, throughout the war much of the campaigning appears to have taken the form of skirmishes and raids, as well as devastations of enemy territory. We ought not to underestimate the frequency or impact of such activities. They had important ramifications for the morale and experience of armies, the confidence of commanders, and the attitudes of allies in the immediate and broader Italian theater. Hannibal sometimes used ravaging to try to provoke battle, a policy that was successful in Etruria when it led to a rash pursuit by the ill-starred Flaminius to Lake Trasimene (217: Pol. 3.82; Livy 22.4). Hannibal employed the policy again during his operations in Campania later that year (Pol. 3.90; Livy 22.13–14). This time Fabius Maximus pursued, but would not fight. Polybius suggests, however, that the Carthaginians turned this plain into a kind of theater, surely aimed at making a deep impression on all by showing unequivocally that it was they who now ruled the land (Pol. 3.91).

Polybius further reports that Hannibal hoped this display would encourage the nearby Campanian cities to join him (3.90). Yet Fabius' policy of harrying Hannibal's army, especially stragglers and foragers, may have helped to restore the low morale of his own forces (Pol. 3.90.4; Livy 22.12). Polybius states that a significant success against Hannibal's foragers emboldened Minucius to risk a general engagement at Gerunium (Pol. 3.102–104; Livy 22.24, 28; Plut. *Fab.* 8, 11). Prior to Cannae, the Romans pursued a policy of skirmishing, in order to train and embolden troops (Pol. 3.106). Indeed so frequent was such activity that Polybius expressly refuses to discuss it further.

Foraging was essential for armies living off the land, so much so that the talented commander Hasdrubal, trusted with executing the complex maneuvers required of the Spanish and Gallic cavalry at Cannae, also acted as "officer of supplies" (*ho epi ton leitourgion tetagmenos*, Pol. 3.93.4). This is a logical combination of roles, since cavalry were essential for providing cover for foragers (Erdkamp 1998, 126). He is likely to have been responsible for aggressive revictualling and skirmishing operations. At Gerunium, for example, he

rallied 4,000 foragers to reinforce Hannibal during a battle at the Carthaginian camp.⁶ It is claimed that, at times, up to two-thirds of the army were involved in gathering supplies for this winter base, the other third acting as a covering force (Pol. 3.100, 102; Livy 22.23; Erdkamp 1998, 125–8). The autumn and winter of 217–216 appears to have been filled with hard-fought hit and run encounters and ambushes, since two Roman armies were camped near Gerunium and constantly targeted Carthaginian foragers (Pol. 3.106).

The search for supplies influenced Hannibal's strategy on many occasions, for instance drawing him to the Adriatic coast in 217. Hannibal's forces had suffered severely during the exertions of the winter of 218–217, partly because of the cold, but also because of the difficulties of obtaining forage. Hannibal needed to revitalize many of his men and horses, who were suffering with "hunger-mange" (*limopsōros*, possibly chronic squamous eczema or scurvy). In the rich region of Picenum he was also able to acquire enough old wine to bathe his horses and improve their coats, and to heal his wounded men (Pol. 3.87–8, Shean 1996). We are also told that it was here that he re-equipped his Libyans in select Roman armor from the vast amount of equipment he had captured (Pol. 3.87). In response to Hannibal's operations, the dictator Fabius Maximus ordered the removal or destruction of any assets that lay in Hannibal's path (Livy 22.11). In 215, Fabius threatened to take by force any crops that had not been gathered into secure Roman bases by June 1 (Livy 23.32), possibly because the policy of 217 had not been wholly successful (Lazenby 1978, 68; Cornell 1996, 102–3; Erdkamp 1998, 164–5).

Friendly cities and bases dotted across the Italian landscape meant that Roman forces were able to draw on provisions with relative ease (Pol. 3.90). Indeed Erdkamp (1998, 48, 166, 174) has argued that from the fourth century, the Romans had usually prepared for campaign by creating supply depots in and around the area in which they intended to fight, and that this allowed them to conduct prolonged operations. The strength of this approach is evident in the grinding warfare conducted by the Romans in Campania for the five years from the defection of Capua in 216 to its capitulation through siege. The Romans used strongholds such as Nola and Naples to collect provisions, and after they had retaken Casilinum they turned it into a fortified depot. Because of his tactical superiority in foraging, guaranteed by his cavalry, but also because he never really developed a similar nodal system of close logistical support, Hannibal shifted his army around in order to avoid exhausting local forage. This helped to keep his enemies off balance and often allowed him to choose his battlefields. He regularly wintered in areas in which he had not spent the summer campaigning, so as to spread the army's impact and ensure that he could obtain provisions relatively easily (Erdkamp 1998, 181–182). Where possible, he seized supplies collected by the Romans, for instance at Gerunium (Appian, *Hann.* 15.66), where he created a corn magazine for the

winter (Pol. 3.100, Livy 22.23), and at Cannae (Pol. 3.107). The importance of such depots is indicated by the fact that, in both cases, Roman armies marched to dispute them. Similarly, Hanno's army was gathering supplies into its camp near Beneventum for transport to the beleaguered city of Capua when it was targeted by Fulvius Flaccus (212: Livy 25.13–14; Appian, *Hann.* 37.157–8). Seasonal limitations meant that, for the most part, large-scale campaigning had to be conducted during the summer, with winter being relatively inactive. In 216, despite eventually running short of supplies, Hannibal waited until he could gather food from the fields before moving from Gerunium towards Cannae (Pol. 3.107; Livy 22.32, 40, 43; Hoyos 2003, 261 n.7). The “hunger-mange” affecting Hannibal's army in the first half of 217 probably came from his problems with gathering supplies, despite the provisions he had accessed in Cisalpine Gaul. Later in the war (205–204), an epidemic affecting south Italy appears to have checked the operations of both sides. The illness among the Carthaginians was probably exacerbated by food shortages (Livy 28.46), but the contagion was so bad among Roman forces that one army was disbanded in order to save its men, and a replacement force had to be raised at Rome (204: Livy 29.10). Undoubtedly armies regularly lost men to disease, either temporarily or permanently, and Hannibal, while crossing the Arno, himself suffered ophthalmia that destroyed an eye (Pol. 3.79; Livy 22.2; Nepos, *Hann.* 4.3; Hoyos 2003, 260 n.2). Wounds might also become infected and cause death: the consul Crispinus (208, Livy 27.33) and, by some reports, Hannibal's brother Mago (203: Livy 30.19) eventually succumbed to wounds. Good generals, then, took measures to avoid aggravating such attrition if they could. This is indicated by the consideration paid to their wounded by Hannibal after Cannae and Marcellus at Canusium, to the detriment of strategic maneuver. Polybius praised Hannibal for doing his utmost to restore his men in body and spirit after the struggles of the Alpine passage (Pol. 3.60.6–7).

The Many-Headed Beast

An advisor to King Pyrrhus, after his great victory at Heraclea (280), had warned that “the Roman people may become like the Lernaean Hydra to fight against; the consuls have already gathered twice as many soldiers as those who had faced us before” (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19; cf. Flor. 1.13). Hannibal, who admired the career of Pyrrhus (Livy 35.14; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8), may have appreciated the aptness of this observation for his own war (Rawlings 2005, 157–161), for it reveals two fundamental features of the Roman military: the seemingly never-diminishing manpower of the Romans, and also the hydra-headed multiplicity of armies they would deploy despite their overseas commitments in Spain and elsewhere. In every year between 215 and 205 there were between four and

seven two-legion armies in Italy (Goldsworthy 2000, 226). In contrast, Hannibal and his allies rarely operated with more than three large armies, if that (the high point being 215 with perhaps four led by Hannibal, Hanno, Himilco, and the Campanian Marius Alfius). In 208, for example, besides the two consular armies in Lucania and Tarentum, each of two legions, there were others of similar size based in Cisalpine Gaul, Etruria, and at Venusia, as well as a legion at Capua (Livy 27.22). All were accompanied by similar-sized contingents of *socii*, while there were also many smaller forces stationed in garrisons, such as at Rhegium. In that year there may have been as many as 80,000 men ranged against the Carthaginians in Italy.⁷ According to Livy, besides his main field army, still perhaps 40,000 strong, Hannibal had a division commanded by Mago at Locri (Livy 27.25, 28). Clearly the disparity between the numbers of armies in the field gave the Romans the strategic advantage, since Hannibal might regularly have to face substantial armies while others waged war on his allies; a common situation in the latter stages of the war. Armies numbering less than 10,000 men frequently operated independently; though some occasionally fell foul of Hannibal's forces,⁸ for the most part they functioned successfully in support of the major armies, which also exhibited a high level of cooperation and coordination, as demonstrated in the operations across Campania and Samnium by Gracchus, Fabius, and Marcellus in 215 (Livy 23.39; 24.19; Goldsworthy 2000, 225). The celebrated march of C. Claudius Nero with a picked force to join Livius Salinator and Porcius Licinus at Metaurus, while demonstrating Nero's vision and the discipline and endurance of his men, obeyed a well-established principle of strategic cooperation (Livy 27.43–5; Zon. 9.9). In 217 the consul Servilius had attempted to send 4,000 cavalry to join his colleague Flaminius, although these were caught and crushed in Umbria (Pol. 3.86; Livy 22.8). According to Livy (22.24, cf. Zon. 8.26) a force of 8,500 *socii* sent by Fabius to Gerunium arrived during Minucius Rufus' first engagement with Hannibal (217), while in a second battle the rest of Fabius' army managed to intervene to save Minucius' legions (Pol. 3.104–105; Livy 22.28–30; Appian, *Hann.* 13.54–5).

Hannibal's detached divisions and allies posed problems for the Romans and their satellites, although ultimately with less effect. Independent detachments led by Hanno and Mago (probably "the Samnite," Pol. 9.25), combined to seize Thurii (212: Livy 25.15) and a force led by Himilco reduced Petelia (215: Livy 22.30). After Cannae, Mago (Hannibal's brother or, perhaps, "the Samnite") had been given a division of the army in order to encourage or compel the secession of the upland Samnite communities around Compsa.⁹ Hanno inflicted very heavy casualties on Lucanian cohorts in 213 (Livy 24.20, cf. 25.1, 3–4). Indeed, Hanno's campaigning in 215–212 ensured that many communities in southern Italy declared for Hannibal (e.g. Livy 24.1, 3). After 212 we rarely hear of him, but like Mago "the Samnite" (Livy

27.28; Front. *Strat.* 4.7.26), he appears to have continued to operate independently of Hannibal's main force (Livy 27.42).

We learn of one major reinforcement of Hannibal in 215–214 (Livy 23.13, 41, 43, 46), but there may have been other attempts, such as at Pisae in 217 (Pol. 3.96) and perhaps in 206–205 (Livy 28.46; Appian, *Hann.* 54.225–6), while a Punic fleet operated from Tarentum for a while before sailing to Corcyra in support of Philip V's fleet (Livy 26.20, 39; 27.15). More serious attempts to join the Italian theater came from Hasdrubal (in 207) and Mago (205–203) who arrived in the north with major armies. Support from Carthage was often indirect, for most troops were sent to other theaters, particularly Spain. However, when Sicilian cities revolted in 214 a Punic army of 28,000 was shipped over to the island from Africa (Livy 24.35). Carthaginian success there might have provided a springboard for further operations in southern Italy. However, it was a failure and, though the war in Sicily tied up four legions for several years, it hardly impacted on the operational capacity of Rome in Italy.

The War for Italy: A Social War

It had been carnage. The field of Cannae was sown with the dead and dying. The river Aufidus was choked with corpses and blood flowed down into the Adriatic Sea. Lucius Bantius of Nola lay wounded among a pile of men and horses, some of whom he had killed himself. Hannibal was impressed at his prowess and restored his health; indeed he made him his friend and sent him home to Nola with gifts (Livy 23.15). Hannibal frequently acted with generosity towards Roman allies (*socii*) who fell into his hands, presenting himself as a liberator from Roman oppression.¹⁰ He hoped that such magnanimity, combined with his evident success against Roman armies, would draw the Italian communities to his cause. Five Tarentines released after Trasimene and Cannae tried to trigger a revolt at home in 214 (Livy 24.13, 20), but the Roman garrison was alert to the danger. In Nola, Bantius became an ardent advocate of Hannibal and a danger to the pro-Roman status quo. He was, however, lured back to his former allegiance by a direct approach and offer of friendship by Marcellus (Livy 23.16; Plut. *Marc.* 10). Similarly, when Fabius Maximus learned that a certain Marsian soldier was planning to desert, he showered him with recognition and reward for his past loyal service (Plut. *Fab.* 20).

In ultimately choosing the Roman cause, such men were not unique. When 300 Campanian cavalymen serving in Sicily were offered the opportunity to return to Capua as part of a hostage exchange, they preferred to remain with the Roman army than join in the revolt of their home city. They were later awarded Roman citizenship (Livy 23.7, 31). There may have been cultural and ethnic differences between Romans and some Italians, but there was often

a long familiarity and interchange, stretching back decades or centuries. On the other hand, the Carthaginians might seem culturally more distant, their language and ideology less familiar.¹¹ Certainly, the Iberians and Numidians would have seemed foreign, even barbarous, while the large numbers of Gauls who joined Hannibal in 218 and Hasdrubal in 207 had a fearsome reputation and may have alienated some of those who were discontented with Roman rule (Williams 2001, 175–182).

The consequences of joining Hannibal or advocating his cause could be severe. At Nola, Marcellus had seventy of the leading agitators beheaded and their property confiscated (Livy 23.17). Similarly, in 204, the consul Cornelius Cethegus executed pro-Punic sympathizers in Etruria who had been accused of looking to Mago's army in nearby Liguria (Livy 29.36). More extreme was the massacre of Casilinum's townsfolk on Hannibal's approach (216: Livy 23.17). This was perpetrated by a garrison of *socii*, mainly from Praeneste, who subsequently gained double pay and were offered Roman citizenship for their services (Livy 23.20). Another massacre of a suspected population occurred in Enna in Sicily (214: Livy 24.37–9, Front. *Strat.* 4.7.22; Polyaeus 8.21), where Marcellus also allowed the garrison to plunder the town.

Rome took active measures to overawe communities whose loyalty seemed to waver: two legions were stationed in Etruria throughout much of the war (Livy 23.5; 26.28; 27.24; 30.41; Harris 1971, 136–143). Rome held hostages to ensure loyalty among the Italian elites, taking, for instance, 120 children of the senators of Arretium in 208 (Livy 27.24). Any hostages who tried to escape to their homes could face execution if recaptured, although such a measure risked alienating their home communities (e.g. Tarentum and Thurii in 212: Livy 25.7–8). For those cities that the Romans reconquered, the situation was bleak. The leaders of Capua and other Campanian towns were executed and Capuan territory was declared *ager publicus* (Livy 26.15–16, 33–4; Appian, *Hann.* 43.186–7; Zon 9.6). Other towns such as Vercellium, Viscellium, and Sicilinum were stormed and plundered; their inhabitants were sold at auction (215: Livy 23.37).

Like the Romans, Hannibal was not above using terror tactics against his enemies. When Gerunium refused his offer of alliance, he stormed the city and put the inhabitants to the sword (Pol. 3.100; but cf. Livy 22.18). On his march to the Adriatic coast after Trasimene, he ordered the killing of all adults in his army's path "just as if it were the moment when cities are captured by assault" (Pol. 3.86). Polybius suggests the reason was his "unrelenting hatred of the Romans." It might also have something to do with festering resentment from the Gauls in his army towards the Roman citizens who had been recently been settled across this formerly Gallic territory (Pol. 2.21). Nevertheless, the bloodletting may have alienated potential allies; Picenum remained loyal (although at times heavily garrisoned) for the rest of the war

(Reid 1915, 93; Rawlings 2007a, 24). Hannibal also had a reputation for being cruel to captives. Stories circulated about how he made prisoners fight one another (Pol. 3.62–3; Livy 21.42; Diod. 26.14.1–2; Zon. 9.2d-f), or maimed the feet and abandoned any captives who could not keep up with the march of his army (Val. Max. 9.2 ext. 2; Rawlings 2007a, 22–25). As we have seen, however, there are also reports that he treated Italian prisoners leniently to curry favor with their communities.

Both sides willingly received enemy deserters. The Romans employed Numidians and Spaniards who came to them (e.g. at Nola 215, Livy 23.46; and Arpi 213, Livy 24.47), as well as Italians, such as the Bruttians who had gathered at Rhegium in 209 (Livy 27.12; Plut. *Fab.* 22.1). Hannibal also had deserters in his force; he deployed 600 Romans in an unsuccessful attempt to get inside Salapia (Livy 27.28, cf. Appian, *Hann.* 51.218–20; Front. *Strat.*, 3.2.3). Such men were evidently an embarrassment to the Senate who demanded their return in the peace imposed in 202 (Livy 30.37, 31.11): Latin deserters were beheaded and Romans crucified (Livy 30.43, cf. 24.20). Their treatment is in stark contrast to those who, like Lucius Bantius, had flirted with Hannibal before voluntarily returning to the fold.

Roman Allies

Only once did Hannibal penetrate Latium Vetus and into the original core of the *ager Romanus*, and then only for a few days in 211 (Pol. 9.6; Livy 26.9–11, 26; Zon. 9.6). For the most part, the war was fought on and over the allies' territory. *Socii* were sometimes forced to act without Roman support, particularly when Hannibal's forces suddenly arrived in their territory. The envoys from Petelia reportedly wept when the Senate informed them that the Romans could do nothing to help them (216: Livy 23.20). There are stories of resistance to Hannibal's forces by various communities, but generally limited information survives of independent military initiatives taking allied forces beyond their own territories. It is often unclear what happened along or across the borders of communities who chose to be on opposite sides of the conflict, though it is likely that, as between Rhegium and nearby Bruttian communities, raids and counter-raids of plunder and agricultural devastation were common (Livy 26.40, 27.12, cf. 25.1). The impact of Hannibal's war on the people and landscape of Italy has been the subject of much modern debate. Toynbee argued for a serious destruction of the land and its fertility, while Brunt downplayed the longer-term problems.¹² It is clear that permanent agricultural destruction was hard to achieve (Hanson 1998, 42–76, 174–184; Erdkamp 1998, 210–22), but it is equally clear that the impact on agricultural production of marauding armies could last beyond the campaign, since the despoiling of farms might lead

to debt, ruination, and starvation (Cornell 1996, 108–110, Erdkamp 1998, 222–240). Livy (28.11) claimed that by 206 “many free farmers had been killed in the war, slaves were few, cattle rustled and farms burned and destroyed”; others had fled to the cities (Livy 25.1). In that year many of the colonists driven from their allotments around Placentia and Cremona by the raids of Gauls had to be compelled to return by the consuls. Livy implies that this was part of a general edict forcing the return of rural refugees.

The control of agricultural production was vital. Substantial forces garrisoned the relatively undisturbed and agriculturally rich areas of Etruria and Picenum precisely to ensure that the grain would keep coming (Erdkamp 1998, 175). However, we occasionally see indications of food shortages in Rome, from which we might infer that other communities also suffered (Appian, *Hann.* 38.163; Garnsey 1988, 192). According to Polybius (9.11a), circa 211–210 the price of Sicilian grain rose very high; there was scarcity in the city of Rome since “armies had obliterated,” or consumed, “all of the crops in Italy up to the gates of Rome.” While this was probably a rhetorical exaggeration, shortages were undoubtedly a problem, for Polybius continues that the Romans sent envoys to procure grain from Egypt (Cornell 1996, 104–105). Furthermore, Livy (26.40) notes that in 211/210, once the revolt of Sicily had been put down, the consul Laevinus made efforts to get Sicilian farms producing again. He was able to send supplies to Rome in 209 (Livy 27.8.18). At about this time, grain was exacted from Capua’s confiscated land (Livy 27.3) and purchased from Etruria.¹³ Such notices make it probable that there had been a general scarcity in southern-central Italy, created or exacerbated by military activity. The year 212/211, the apogee of Roman military commitment in Italy, had been preceded by several years of destructive campaigning particularly in Samnium and Campania.

The strength of the Roman alliance system lay in its organization for war. Every allied state was obliged to support the Romans should they be attacked; therefore secessionists not only had to face Rome, but, through Rome, the rest of its allies. The Romans had developed and extended this particular form of pan-Roman pan-Italianism in the fourth century, and it had enabled them to overcome a string of enemies, including the large anti-Roman alliance of Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and Umbrians in the 290s and 280s, and Pyrrhus and his Italian allies in the 270s (Burns 2003, 62–63; Rawlings 2007b).

All allied, Latin, and “citizen” communities were obliged to supply the Romans with troops whenever they went to war (Momigliano 1975, 45–46; Cornell 1995, 364–368). We are fortunate that Polybius (2.24) recorded a list of Rome’s allies and their military manpower in 225, which suggests that the numbers of Roman citizens and Campanians available for service numbered around 250,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry, while the rest of the allies brought the numbers up to a grand total of over 700,000 foot and

70,000 horse (Walbank 1957, 196–203). Clearly, not all of these were expected to serve at the same time, but a proportion could be called up according to the *formula togatorum*, a list of military obligations and resources kept in Rome (Pol. 2.24; Toynbee 1965, 2.424–427; Brunt 1971, 545–548). At the beginning of each campaign the consuls appear to have ordered the allied forces to assemble at a certain place and time (Pol. 6.21). While individual contingents may have had their own commanders (Livy 22.24), they were generally grouped together into *alae*, and the consuls appointed Roman *praefecti sociorum* to command these divisions (Pol. 6.26; Livy 25.1). This may have given these allies a sense of common identity under Roman arms, but it also ensured that they lacked the experience necessary for high command should they revolt.

One must not forget that perhaps rather more than half of the men killed at Cannae were *socii*. Although we lack secure figures for allies in any Roman army of this period, it seems that Roman citizens in the field were usually matched and probably exceeded by the *socii* (Brunt 1971, 677–681). Of course, this still meant that the burden on Roman citizens was usually heavier than on any single allied community. Nevertheless, the pressure of conflict for the allies was still intense: from 209 to 205 twelve Latin cities refused to contribute troops (Livy 27.9). Rome at the time was in no position to force the issue, but in 204 the Romans felt the time had come to punish these colonies — they demanded double the number of soldiers prescribed by the *formula togatorum*, to be drawn specifically from the wealthiest members of the communities (Livy 29.15).

Despite breaking off most of southern Italy, and parts of Campania and Samnium, Hannibal was never able to raise a revolt in Etruria or Umbria, nor, despite the betrayal of Clastidium by a certain Dasius, a Latin citizen of Brundisium (Livy 21.48), did he force the surrender or defection of any Latin community (Livy 23.12). Even in towns that had gone over to Hannibal, there was always the possibility of counterrevolution. Arpi was betrayed to Fabius by Dasius Altinius (213, Livy 24.45), while the pro-Roman Locrian exiles residing in Rhegium provided a link with Locri, to its ultimate downfall (205, Livy 29.6). Although severely tested by the Carthaginian invasion, the core of the alliance system remained intact to provide the Romans with essential resources in men and supplies.

Hannibal's Allies

The following peoples joined the Carthaginians: the Atellani, Calatini, Hirpini, some of the Apulians, all of the Samnites except the Pentri, the Bruttii, the Lucanians, the Uzentini, and nearly all of the Greek settlements on the coast,

namely Tarentum, Metapontum, Croton, and Locri, and all of the Gauls on the Italian side of the Alps. (Livy 22.61)

Livy's list of defections is placed after Cannae in order to illustrate the great effect of this defeat on the allies. However, it is clear that these communities did not all join Hannibal at once, but over the course of the war. The Boii and Insubres rallied to Hannibal very soon after his arrival in northern Italy; indeed, he had already been in negotiation with them before setting out from Spain (Pol. 3.34.1–6). By contrast, Tarentum and Metapontum did not defect until 212–211.

As a summary of war defections Livy's list is not complete. Most importantly, it glosses over the revolt of Capua.¹⁴ Nor does it reveal the complex nature of the defections. Hannibal exploited internal rivalries to win supporters and build factions who might persuade their communities to side with the Carthaginians or betray the cities. Thus, at Compsa, the dominant and pro-Roman family, the Mopsii, fled the town when they realized that Hannibal would back their rivals (216: Livy 23.1). In some cities, there may have been appeals to popular opinion, since Livy portrays democratic elements as favoring Hannibal (Livy 23.2, 14, 24, 24.2), yet it appears that in a significant number of cases it was the local aristocracies who pursued the Carthaginian cause.¹⁵

Even after Cannae, the switch away from Rome often had to be prompted by the approach of Carthaginian forces. Nor did these usually persuade all of the communities in the vicinity to defect. In the aftermath of Cannae, Hannibal headed for Campania where he received the alliance of Capua, but Nola, Naples, and Nuceria rebuffed his overtures and threats, and he was forced to resort to violence (Livy 23.14–15). In the meantime, detachments of his army led by Mago and Hanno, through a similar combination of inducements, won over many, but not all, of the communities in Samnium, Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium (Livy 23.1, 11; 24.1–4).

With a diverse range of allies Hannibal appears to have entertained an equally diverse set of relationships. The Gauls were encouraged by the prospect of booty (Pol. 3.78.5; Livy 22.1.2) and by what Polybius claims were Hannibal's "unlimited promises" made prior to his march from Spain (3.34.3–4). The tribal authorities, however, appear also to have wanted an end to Roman aggression and occupation, since the recent incursions into their territory and the establishment of Cremona and Placentia were uppermost in their minds (Pol. 2.21.9, 2.31.7–8, 3.40.6, 3.67.6, Livy 21.25.2). These defensive concerns may explain the limited help they offered to Hannibal after his departure, and their failure to take an active part in the war from the defeat of Postumius in 216 to the arrival of Hasdrubal in northern Italy in 207 (Eckstein 1987, 36–43). Gallic resentment at Roman colonization along the

Po may explain why Hasdrubal felt obliged to make an attempt on Placentia prior to his march south (Livy 27.39.10–13; cf. 28.11.10). The colony was again attacked, and this time destroyed, by a Gallic army led by a Carthaginian “general” named Hamilcar in 200, two years after the effective end of the war (Livy 31.10–11, 19, 21; 32.30; 33.23). This success, and the fact that the Gauls had mounted their own invasion of Italy in 225, suggest that their inactivity after 216 was deliberate and, perhaps, shortsighted. After the war, the Romans set about reducing the tribes who had allied with the Carthaginians, a process that would take nearly two decades for the Gauls and almost half a century in Liguria (Harris 1989, 107–118).

Hannibal’s treaty with Capua appears to have reflected its rather different concerns about the progress of the war in Italy and also, perhaps, the aftermath. It is unclear whether its government was induced by hopes of “ruling” Italy after Hannibal’s victory (Livy 23.6, Zon. 9.2), or through apprehension of being on the losing side (Diod. 26.10; Frederiksen 1984, 238–41). Nevertheless, Capua appears to have struck a very favorable deal, at least as Livy (23.7) preserves it. The treaty stipulated that no Carthaginian magistrate or officer had jurisdiction over any Campanian citizen, nor could any citizen be compelled to serve in the army, or in any other capacity, against his will. This, of course, would not have precluded Hannibal from recruiting volunteers, but apparently there was to be no Roman-style *formula togatorum* in the treaty. Capua retained its own laws and magistrates, and thus its local autonomy. Furthermore, Campanian contingents appear to have been commanded by their own officers, since a *meddix tuticus* led the army at Hamae (Livy 23.35) and another appointed the garrison commander at Casilinum, a force that consisted of 2,000 Campanians and 700 Carthaginians (Livy 24.19). Hannibal’s posture of liberator from Roman rule evidently required such concessions, and these terms may have eased the fears of other communities as to his intentions.

It is unclear what status other pro-Punic communities enjoyed, although it seems Locri was granted “an equal treaty,” which guaranteed its autonomy but gave the Carthaginians right of entry. It further obliged each party to assist the other in peace and war (Livy 24.1–2). Tarentum also enjoyed mild terms. During secret negotiations prior to the betrayal of the city, it was promised that it could retain its laws and possessions, pay no tribute, nor accept a garrison against its will (Livy 25.8). These terms apparently were honored when the city fell, although a Roman force holding out in the citadel necessitated a Punic garrison from the outset (Livy 25.11).

The commitment of the Bruttians to the Punic war effort was notable, though their motives are hard to discern. Some, at least, expected to be able to obtain booty (although we should be wary of a national stereotype), or to settle old disputes such as with the people of Locri and Croton (Livy 24.1–4). Rome was relatively distant and it is possible that, given the early successes of Hannibal,

many may have initially believed that they might never face retribution. As the war turned against them, however, the regular presence of Hannibal and his officers made a return to Rome difficult (Reid 1915, 104). It was only with the fall of the strategic town of Clamptia in 204/203 (Livy 29.36), that Bruttian resistance seems to have waned and Consentia, the chief city of the Bruttian League, as well as other Bruttian towns went over to Rome (Livy 30.19).

We hear of Punic garrisons at Arpi, Casilinum, Locri, Marmoreae, Meles, Metapontum, Salapia, Tarentum, and Tisia; in Lucania and Hirpinum, and even at Capua itself (Hoyos 2003, 128, 264 n. 13). Coinage at Tarentum suggests that Punic officials were in place, if Klm Shrambos and Sōkanas named on the coins were magistrates or commanders.¹⁶ Certainly the half and quarter shekel weights of some of their issues show the influence of Punic military administration, and were, perhaps, minted to pay the garrison. It is generally unclear whether garrisons were welcomed or resented by the majority of inhabitants. Some proved to be overbearing, if the complaints in 205 of the Locrians against the tyranny and greed of the Carthaginian garrison are genuine (Livy 29.6, 8, 17). Their offenses, however, were contrasted with the greater abuses of the Roman garrison commander, Pleminius, after the city had changed hands (29.8–9). As Hannibal's strategic situation deteriorated, he was forced to withdraw forces from some positions. This appears to have been accompanied by some transplantation of allies to safer cities, which sometimes caused deep offence and, it seems, contributed to his reputation as an oath-breaker (e.g. Herdonea, Livy 27.1; Pol. 9.26; Rawlings 2007a, 21–22).

The military contribution of the rebel states varied according to circumstances. At times, their forces took the field against the Romans (e.g. Livy 23.46). The Gauls destroyed the 25,000-strong army of Postumius when it campaigned against them, but this was a rare success. An army of 14,000 Campanians assembling at Hamae, with the aim of launching a surprise attempt on Cumae, was itself defeated by Gracchus (215: Livy 23.35). This appears typical of the rebels' inability to defeat large Roman forces that they encountered. Nevertheless, pro-Punic forces sometimes linked up with elements of Hannibal's army. Hanno operated with a Bruttian army in Lucania as far north as Beneventum, while later in the war Bruttians and Numidians harried the withdrawal of the two consular armies from a raid on Consentia (206: Livy 28.11). Such collaborations perhaps involved some delicate negotiations and, while the Barcid officers may have held overall command of the armies, they may have operated through the identification of common strategic interests. When, however, the Bruttians disagreed with Hanno's generous treatment of Locri, an army of 15,000 marched away with the desire to pillage Croton before it too made peace with the Carthaginians (Livy 24.1–2).

Hannibal had to draw on allied manpower to augment his main force. The Gauls had provided numerous warriors to sustain Hannibal's army at the

beginning: probably at least 20,000 joined him for his invasion of Italy. Many were killed at Trasimene and Cannae, but he still had substantial numbers at Tarentum in 212 (Livy 25.9). Although no more Gauls were to join Hannibal, his brothers also recruited in northern Italy. Hasdrubal probably brought Gauls from both sides of the Alps south along the Adriatic coast in 207, while Mago received Gallic support and campaigned with a large Ligurian contingent; he embarked many of them for the return to Africa (205–203, Livy 29.5, 30.18).

Once Hannibal had moved into southern Italy and, particularly after Cannae, he must have drawn extensively on Italians to replace his casualties and enhance his military capacity (Hoyos 2003, 128–129, 264–265 nn. 13–14). Judging from the figures supplied by Polybius (2.24), the regions that went over to him could provide about 40% of the total military manpower of Italy. Though he does not appear to have imposed the same conditions on the allies that the Romans had, he probably could raise or hire enough Italians for his army so that he did not need to receive troops from Africa or Spain (Hoyos 2003, 128–30). The Samnites in 215 even complained that so many of their men were serving with Hannibal that there were not enough left to protect their territory (Livy 23.42). In 207, Hanno recruited several thousand troops from around Metapontum to replace the losses of Grumentum (Livy 27.42), whilst Livy (28.12) suggests that most Bruttians of military age were actively serving in the last years of the war. Italians were evidently a significant element in the force that Hannibal took with him on his recall to Carthage.¹⁷

Hannibal had accumulated a substantial power base in the years immediately following Cannae. The alliances that he forged, however, did not promote a coherent and unified set of war aims, since most arrangements not only overstretched the capacity of pro-Punic cliques to deliver support or maintain their rule, but also had to accommodate local vested interests and concerns. Moreover his allies formed an incomplete patchwork across the landscape of Italy. While Hannibal's army was an extremely potent force, his lesser divisions and autonomous allied contingents performed poorly on their own. This was not necessarily from any lack of commitment, but because the rebels had little experience in the command of large armies, which, when they had been members of the Roman commonwealth, had been monopolized by the Roman elite (Goldsworthy 2000, 226). Furthermore, while the Romans possessed a tested method of concentrating their resources into focused and prolonged efforts in specific regions, Hannibal's allies were unable to cooperate in any grand strategic sense. In 212, for example, when the Bruttians and Lucanians under Hanno attempted to organize supplies for Capua, the Campanians were so disorganized in their provision of transportation that their delay allowed Flaccus to seize the collection center near Beneventum (Livy 25.13).

On sailing for Africa, Hannibal probably left a considerable number of troops in Italy. Roman tales of him massacring up to 20,000 of those he could

not embark should probably be dismissed as hostile propaganda, but they suggest that troops under arms were in excess of those 10–15,000 or so who could be transported (Diod. 27.9, Livy 30.26; Appian, *Hann.* 59.248–9; Hoyos 2003, 171). Along with the veterans and allies who could not be accommodated, there were likely to have still been a few garrisons in the south (Livy 30.20; Appian, *Hann.* 60.250). In the year after Zama, the stationing of a praetor, Valerius Falto, with two legions in the toe of Italy (Livy 30.41), suggests there was considerable mopping up to do. The Romans garrisoned Bruttium from 203 to 200; indeed there had been major annual campaigning directed at pacifying the region since 208. In 200 extra colonists were sent to Venusia in Apulia to bring it up to strength (Livy 31.49). In 194–193, the Romans created maritime citizen colonies at Salernum and Sipontum in Apulia, and at Thurii (Copia), Croton, Buxentum, and Tempsa in Bruttium.¹⁸ Latin colonies at Vibo Valentia (Hipponium) and “Castrum” (probably Frentinum) placed in 192 consolidated their grip on Bruttium (Livy 34.53, 35.40). These may also have been measures that looked towards the potentially destabilizing war in Greece, since Antiochus III had Hannibal in his entourage, urging the king, it seems, to invade Italy (Livy 34.60, 36.7; Seibert 1993a, 508–509; Hoyos 2003, 204–205), and Roman armies were stationed in Bruttium every year between 192 and 188.

Rome had also to deal with several slave revolts in the postwar period, some of which may have had a pro-Punic character. The first in 197 involved African slaves led by Punic hostages who seized Setia (32.26). It threatened to engulf Norba, Circeii, and Praeneste; even the streets of Rome had to be patrolled, and all war slaves were transferred to public prisons. The following year, there was another slave uprising in Etruria (196, Livy 33.36); the Latin colony of Cosa had to be reinforced by colonists drawn from those “who had not been an enemy of Rome” since 218 (Livy 33.24). Taken with the revolt of Apulian shepherds and slaves, suppressed in 185 (Livy 39.29), these examples suggest that hostility to Rome persisted in the fields and hills of Italy for some time after Hannibal’s departure.

Conclusion

The campaigns of Hannibal pushed the Roman alliance system to its military and political limits. This was a war in which the loyalty of many allied communities wavered and in which large parts of Italy joined or fell to Hannibal. In this respect it was a pan-Italian conflict in which the Romans were forced to draw heavily on their own resources and those of their remaining allies. It is fair to say that the war did not come with flame and sword to every community and that the intensity of conflict varied from year to year and territory to territory.

Nevertheless, the impact of warfare in Italy was profound. Protracted campaigning occurred on multiple fronts, ranging in scale and intensity from hit and run raids by handfuls of marauders targeting farms to great engagements involving tens of thousands of humans and animals. Both sides were willing to commit to pitched battle and there were nearly 30 in Italy during the war, two-thirds involving Hannibal's main army. Similarly, both sides undertook sieges in which the consequences for the besieged were potentially disastrous.

However, the protagonists differed in their approach to the regions in which the war took place. Hannibal's war of maneuver left him seeking local supplies. This did not necessarily constrain his movements since he enjoyed an advantage in foraging because of the types and quality of the troops he commanded. However, once he acquired allies, and had the opportunity to draw supplies and recruits from them, their territories and towns provided static targets for the Romans to raid, occupy, and besiege. This was a type of warfare better suited to Roman military traditions. Their strategic strength rested on the ability to draw supplies from well-prepared positions, and on the integrated operations of multiple commands, of which only some were detailed to keep Hannibal busy. The Romans ground out a victory, not by defeating Hannibal in battle, but by enduring him while pulverizing his allies. The war demonstrated how even such a military genius as Hannibal could not prevail in the type of conflict that the Romans bent the war into. The mismatch came not so much from the vast resources of the Romans, for Hannibal did draw upon his Italian allies and even on his homeland, but in their approach to warfare in Italy.

FURTHER READING

For military narratives of the war see Lazenby 1978 and Goldsworthy 2000. Hoyos provides a critical and balanced account of Hannibal's campaigns (2003), while Seibert's (1993a) is a thorough treatment. Cannae has been thoroughly studied in recent years, in particular see Daly 2002, battles in general by Sabin (1996). On the logistical aspects see Shean 1996, Erdkamp 1998, and further in this volume. Reid 1915 remains an important and critical discussion of the revolts of the allies (by region); for the "hearts and minds" policies of the protagonists see Erskine 1993.

NOTES

1. Salmon 1960; Briscoe 1989, 46; Seibert 1993a, 63–69, 541–543; Lazenby 1996; Hoyos 2003, 101–102, 257 n.8.
2. Battles in Cisalpine Gaul: Tannetum (218), prior to Hannibal's arrival: Pol. 3.40; Livy 21.25; Appian, *Hann.* 8. Litana forest (216): Pol. 3.118; Livy 23.24; Front. *Strat.* 1.6.4. "In Insubrian territory" (203): Livy 30.18.

3. Maharbal's advice and reaction: Livy 22.51; Plut. *Fab.* 17; Val. Max 9.5 ext 3. Useful discussions: Lazenby 1996; Shean 1996; Hoyos 2000.
4. Harris 1979, part 1. Eckstein 2006, 181–243, considers Roman militarism in a broader Mediterranean context.
5. e.g. Livy 23.36–37, 29.7; Lazenby 1978, 87.
6. Hasdrubal was probably one commissariat commander overseeing collection of forage at Gerunium: Pol. 3.100. Role in the “first” battle: 3.102.6; oversees crossing of the river Po: 3.66; role at Cannae: 3.114.7, 116; Livy 22.46. Geus 1994, Hasdrubal (9).
7. In general see Brunt 1971, 416–422, with estimates likely to be on the low side since they appear to overlook garrisons in allied and Latin cities; his Table x (418) relates only to citizens serving in legions. For the allies to citizens ratio: Brunt, 677–681. On numbers of legions in Italy throughout the war: Toynbee 1965, 2.650; Erdkamp 1998, 168–169. The size of any legion is likely to have varied due to recruitment problems in the year it was raised and attrition thereafter.
8. Small armies intercepted by Hannibal: in Umbria (217): Pol. 3.86; Livy 22.8; Appian, *Hann.* 11.45–48. In Lucania (212): Livy 25.19. Caulonia (209): Livy 27.12, 15–16; Plut. *Fab.* 22; Zon. 9.8a. Petelia (208): Livy 27.26.
9. Livy 23.1. At 23.11 Livy claims that soon after Cannae Hannibal's brother, Mago, was detailed to obtain the surrender of “Bruttian communities and others”: seemingly part of the same campaign as 23.1, which might rule out “the Samnite” for operations in Samnium at this time. Mago Barca, however, departed for Carthage and thence to Spain sometime in 216 after Cannae, and it is clearly the other Mago who campaigns in Bruttium from 215. So perhaps there is some confusion in Livy (or his source) as to who received overall command.
10. Release of allies after Trebia: Pol. 3.77.3–7; and Trasimene: Pol. 3.85.1–5; Livy 22.7; Appian, *Hann.* 2.10. On Hannibal as liberator see Reid 1915, 92–93; Erskine 1993; Rawlings 2005, 168–170.
11. Thus Lazenby 1978, 234; Goldsworthy 2000, 223; but note the Punic influences in Italy identified by Palmer 1997.
12. Toynbee 1965, Brunt 1971. For an overview of the issues: Cornell 1996.
13. For the debate over grain shortages: Brunt 1971, 269–277, and the critique of Cornell 1996, 104–105.
14. Reid 1915, 94–5. Livy omits Capua at 22.61 probably for stylistic reasons since the revolt was to form the subject of 23.2–10; cf. Pol. 3.118.
15. E.g. Livy 24.47; 25.8; 29.8, 36. Reid 1915, 97–98; Lazenby 1978, 88; Goldsworthy 2000, 222–223; Hoyos 2003, 123–124.
16. “Klm Shrambos”: Vlasto 971; *SNG France* 2062; *SNG ANS* 1263; *SNG Copenhagen* 948; *Historia Numorum Italy* 1078. Sökanas: Vlasto 984 (*SNG ANS* 1272), 989 (*HN* 1083). On Punic and rebel coinage in S. Italy: Robinson 1964.
17. Pol. 15.11–12; Livy 30.33, 35; Appian, *Hann.* 59.247–8; *Lib.* 40.170; Hoyos 2003, 265 n.14 for reference to modern scholarship.
18. Livy 34.45; Salmon 1936, 51–53; Erdkamp 1998, 292.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

War Abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa

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Any analysis of Hannibal's war with Rome requires an understanding of the conflict between the two powers throughout the whole of the western Mediterranean. As well as a struggle for Roman survival in Italy, the Second Punic War was, in a broader sense, a contest for dominance over the western Mediterranean. An understanding of the war in Italy is not possible without consideration of events in the other theaters. Indeed, as a contest for power over the western Mediterranean, the war gave Rome its first taste of operating across a number of distinct yet related theaters — an important step on the road to developing an empire, whether deliberate or not. An important element in this was the relatively centralized decision-making made by the Senate in Rome (Goldsworthy 2000, 246). The Carthaginians, on the other hand, fought their conflicts in more singular fashion, with individual commanders such as Hannibal answerable more to themselves. The Carthaginian Senate and political system did not operate with the level of centralized rigor that the Roman system possessed and this became an increasingly important factor as the war progressed.

The War in Spain: 218–205

Following the capture of Saguntum and Rome's declaration of war, Hannibal put his brother Hasdrubal in charge of the Carthaginian administration in Spain, posting soldiers from Spain to Africa and *vice versa* as a way of guaranteeing loyalty from both (Pol. 3.33.17–18). In early 218 Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, crossing

the Ebro, subduing all of the tribes as far as the Pyrenees, and leaving 11,000 cavalry and infantry to hold this territory (Pol. 3.35.1–8; Livy 21.23.1–3).

Gnaeus and Publius Scipio confront Hasdrubal

One consul for 218, P. Cornelius Scipio, was allotted Spain as his field of operation (Pol. 3.41.1–2) and set sail, along with his brother Gnaeus. Failing to intercept Hannibal as planned at the mouth of the Rhône, he turned back to Italy to deal with a possible Carthaginian invasion but sent his brother on to Spain with the army of two legions and allies: approximately 25,000 men (Pol. 3.49.4; Livy 21.32.3). The overall Roman strategy in Spain at this time, as it was later in Sicily, was to keep the Carthaginians from gaining unfettered access to invasion routes to the Italian peninsula (Briscoe 1990, 56). An important feature, in this and other theaters, would be proconsular commands prolonged over a number of years to allow commanders to develop long-term strategies (Vervaeke and Naco del Hoyo 2007, 22–29).

Gnaeus Scipio won early success over the Carthaginians north of the Ebro (Livy 21.60.5–9). Hasdrubal, who according to Livy had also crossed the Ebro, withdrew (21.61.1–11); Scipio garrisoned Tarraco, which from this time became the main Roman base north of the Ebro. Early in 217 Hasdrubal's enlarged forces, including 40 ships under Himilco, established themselves just inside the mouth of the Ebro. Scipio had based himself 10 miles north, and launched a surprise attack. The battle was, once again, a Roman victory, followed up by naval attacks even south of New Carthage and against the island of Ebusus (22.19.1–20.12). Victories by either Carthaginian or Roman commanders gained loyalty from Spanish tribes and this was important in establishing long-term authority in Spain. Livy claimed that more than 120 tribes now made themselves formal subjects to Rome's authority (22.20.11–12). This proved significant soon afterwards when Hasdrubal attempted to reassert Carthaginian power north of the Ebro at the news of the Ilergetes attacking Roman positions. At Cn. Scipio's request, the Celtiberians invaded south of the Ebro, captured three towns (22.21.1–8), and engaged Hasdrubal twice, killing 15,000 enemy soldiers and taking 4,000 captive.

Rome was keen to take advantage of these gains and of Hasdrubal's increasing difficulties. To this end, P. Scipio was now sent with proconsular *imperium* to join Gnaeus. Publius arrived with 20 ships, 8,000 men, and fresh supplies, assuming command of the navy while his brother commanded on land (Pol. 3.97.1–2; Livy 22.22.1–2; 23.26.1–2). Hasdrubal in southwestern Spain was dealing with the rebellious Tartessii, then received orders from Carthage to join Hannibal in Italy (Livy 23. 26.5–27.9). He warned that this would further diminish Carthaginian authority in the Spaniards' eyes, and

indeed when his replacement Himilco arrived he discovered how much authority the Carthaginians had lost (23.27.10–28.4).

The Scipios' primary aim was now to thwart Hasdrubal's venture. In early 215 they put under siege the town of Ibera, a Punic ally described by Livy as the most important town in the region of the Ebro. When Hasdrubal attacked a pro-Roman town, the Scipios abandoned the siege and attacked him (Livy 23.28.7–29.17). In the battle of Ibera, Hasdrubal's Spanish allied infantry in the center were flanked by Libyan and mercenary infantry on the left while his Carthaginians were on the right, with the cavalry on both flanks and also a number of war elephants. The deployment is often compared with Hannibal's at Cannae, but there is no certainty as to whether it was a deliberate attempt at copying Hannibal's organization (Goldsworthy 2000, 250). The Roman legions broke through Hasdrubal's center, enveloping the left and right flanks of the Carthaginian army. Hasdrubal was in no position to join his brother in Italy following this resounding Roman victory. Rome's hold on northern Spain was now especially strong and the Senate kept extending the Scipios' *imperium* to take full advantage of their success. For the following four years, however, the sources provide only limited information. We do know that a revolt by Syphax in Numidia in 214/213 saw some Carthaginian forces withdrawn from Spain to deal with him, allowing the Romans to grow stronger in southern Spain. This culminated in the capture of Saguntum in 212 (Livy 23.49.5–14; Appian, *Iber.* 15.57–16.63).

Disaster and recovery

The situation was to change markedly in 211. The Scipios decided that it was time to bring the war to a conclusion, dividing their armies into two and attempting to take control of the whole of the peninsula. Publius was to take two-thirds of their forces and confront Hasdrubal son of Gisco and Mago, approximately five days' march from the Romans, while Gnaeus with the rest would confront Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal at Amtorgis. But Hasdrubal son of Gisco bought off the 20,000 Celtiberians hired by Gnaeus, leaving Gnaeus with no choice but to withdraw. Publius also ran into trouble. When he marched with part of his army to intercept reinforcements coming to join the enemy, he was cut off and killed with many of his men (Livy 25.32–34). When the victorious Carthaginians joined up with Hasdrubal, Gnaeus in turn was cut off and killed, again with many of his men (25.35–36). Only a small strip of coastline north of the Ebro remained under L. Marcius and the remnants of the Scipios' armies (25.37). In 210 Claudius Nero brought fresh troops and managed to consolidate some of Rome's now meager holdings there (26.17.1–2).

P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the consul of 218, despite being only 24 years old received charge of the Roman army in Spain in the autumn of 210. He arrived with proconsular *imperium* and further reinforcements that increased the size of the army to 28,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry (26.18.1–19.10; Goldsworthy 2000, 271) — thought to have been only a third of that of the Carthaginians' three armies (Goldsworthy 2000, 271). Scipio made a strategic decision significantly different to that of his father and uncle. The Roman force would attack the most important city in Carthaginian Spain, New Carthage, rather than directly taking on the separate Carthaginian armies.

The attack demonstrated some of the qualities Scipio possessed as a successful commander. One was the art of deceiving the enemy. Giving out suggestions that he would attack all three Carthaginian armies, Scipio secretly planned a quick march to New Carthage to put the city under siege, sharing the plan only with his trusted friend and fleet commander, C. Laelius (Pol. 10.9.1; Livy 26.42.3–5). With 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, Scipio marched to New Carthage and with army and fleet blockaded the city, defended by only 1,000 soldiers and 2,000 armed citizens. Aware that the beach on one side of the city was exposed at low tide, Scipio sent 500 men with scaling ladders to gain easy access from it to the tops of the walls (Pol. 10.12.1–15.3; Livy 26.44.1–46.10). The Roman army quickly occupied the city, capturing a large amount of booty and 10,000 male citizens (Livy 26.47.1–2). According to Livy, the citizens were released soon after along with Spanish hostages being held at New Carthage. This assisted Scipio in gaining the trust of Spanish tribes and cities and of some key Spanish leaders, such as Andobales and Mandonius of the Ilergetes, two of the most powerful tribal leaders in Spain according to Polybius and, up to this point, among the most loyal to the Carthaginians (Pol. 10.34.1–35.8; 38.1–6). They would prove treacherous later but their preparedness to desert the Carthaginians at this time is indicative of Scipio's strength.

Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal and Scipio were equally keen to engage early in the campaign season of 208. Hasdrubal was in a well-chosen position near the town of Baecula and Scipio, after waiting two days, became concerned that Mago and Hasdrubal Gisgo might arrive; he delivered an attack that was an overwhelming success, partly due to the considerable training he had given his soldiers. Hasdrubal made for the Pyrenees where he crossed into Gaul (Pol. 10.39.1–9). With Hasdrubal's departure, Hanno was sent to replace him in 207. The Carthaginian forces still outnumbered the Roman army, for 50–70,000 infantry, 4,500 cavalry and 32 elephants confronted Scipio's 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry early in 206 (Pol. 11.20.1) at the town of Ilipa in the last major battle between Rome and Carthage in Spain (Goldsworthy 2000, 279–285). Of Scipio's army only around half comprised Italians, the balance being Spanish allies, but Scipio's complex maneuvering gave him a

considerable advantage and is indicative of the level of training his army had been given. Significantly, the tactics employed by Scipio demonstrated considerably better discipline in the Roman army than there had been earlier in the war with Hannibal.

While Carthaginian rule in Spain was effectively at an end, Carthage was still able to exercise influence among a number of the tribes after 205. This would be demonstrated during Scipio's campaign in North Africa over the following three years, especially at the battle of the Great Plains when 4,000 Celtiberians played a crucial role on the Carthaginian side. The war in Spain had mirrored, in some senses, the war in Italy, but the victories of Publius Scipio, later Africanus, from 209 to 205 were perhaps the most critical in deciding the overall outcome. Rome had not only scored a major victory over Carthage; it had produced a commander of the skill and stature to now take on Hannibal himself. Rome had also developed an army disciplined and experienced enough to defeat an enemy that had caused it such problems on Italian soil.

Macedon: 215–205

The war between Rome and Macedon (215–205) was only partly related to its struggle with Carthage. Even though Rome had been involved in the affairs of Greece and the Balkans for over a decade before the war with Hannibal began, mostly over the situation in Illyria, it was only when Philip V of Macedon negotiated a treaty with Hannibal that the conflict over Illyria and Greece became an element in the Second Punic War. Even then, direct Roman conflict with Macedonia and its allies in Greece was limited. The same could be said of the Carthaginian presence in the Adriatic and involvement in Philip's wars. Rome's wars in Illyria and Greece from 215 to 205 were largely fought by its allies. Other fronts proved more important despite Philip's pact with Carthage.

Rome had intervened in affairs in Illyria first in 229–228, then in 219, establishing a network of alliances subject to Roman influence. Rome's military involvement there in 219 had nothing to do with the looming conflict with Carthage, but the Macedonian rulers Antigonos III Doson followed by Philip V had backed the parties in Greece and Illyria who were opposed to Rome's allies there. Philip's conclusion of his war with the Aetolian League soon after the battle of Lake Trasimene was seen as too much of a coincidence for the nervous Romans (Errington 1989, 94), especially given his large fleet in the Adriatic and with Rome's recent enemy Demetrius of Pharos advising him. Rome became increasingly concerned about Philip's motives and ambitions (Errington 1989, 94–95).

Nonetheless, we need to allow for the sources, especially Polybius, exaggerating the concern with hindsight. Rome was much more preoccupied at this

time with events in Italy and Spain. The Senate's reaction to Philip launching 100 small warships (*lemboi*) in the Adriatic in 216 was to send only ten ships from Lilybaeum in Sicily. Philip appears not to have desired Roman provocation at this stage as he beat a hasty retreat at first sight of them (Pol. 5.110.1–11; Errington 1989, 96). It was not until clear evidence emerged the following year that Philip might seek to inject Macedon into the conflict between Rome and Carthage that Roman interest in Philip's activities heightened.

Treaty between Philip V and Hannibal, and Rome's response

In 215, a Macedonian ship carrying an Athenian envoy acting on behalf of Philip and three Carthaginians on Hannibal's staff was captured (Livy 23.34.1–10) and, with them, the draft of a treaty between Philip and Hannibal, the text of which is preserved by Polybius (Pol. 7.9.1–17). Such a treaty might have initially appeared ominous for Rome, and Livy certainly interpreted it this way. Modern commentators, however, tend to downplay the implications of the treaty, suggesting that it represented “merely a framework within which friendly co-operation could take place” and that Philip was more concerned about positioning Macedon favorably for a likely Carthaginian victory in Italy (Errington 1989, 97; Goldsworthy 2000, 256). The praetor M. Valerius Laevinus, commanding two legions together with a fleet of 55 ships at Brundisium, was instructed to get information on Philip's preparations and, if these were hostile, to cross the Adriatic (Livy 23.38.8–12). When in 214 Philip with 120 *lemboi* captured Oricum, a Roman ally, Laevinus responded by recapturing Oricum and relieving the siege of Apollonia, another Roman ally (24.40.1–17). Philip once again panicked, aware that his small ships were no match for the Roman fleet; he fled to Macedonia, burning his entire fleet beforehand, and Laevinus returned to winter at Oricum (24.40.17).

Rome and the Aetolian League

Rome remained concerned about the potential threat from Philip V, but was too preoccupied with events in Spain and Italy to send a force large enough to effectively deal with him at this time. The only practical course of action was to form an alliance with one of Philip's enemies and support them in doing the bulk of the fighting. To this end a treaty was struck between Rome and the Aetolian League, the old enemy of Macedon, in 211 (Livy 24.24.1–16; Errington 1989, 99–100). The treaty provisions were quite generous to the Aetolians, but they were expected to wage a land war immediately on Philip. The Romans provided 25 quinqueremes, being interested only in containing

Philip and taking portable booty, leaving any territorial gains to the Aetolians (24.24.1–16). The following two years saw a number of victories for the new alliance, not only in the Adriatic but even in the Aegean where Aegina was captured (24.24.15–16; 26.26.1–4). The Aetolians sold Aegina to Attalus of Pergamum who joined the war also. The treaty effectively kept Philip occupied by the military activity that proceeded from it. Hampered also by the continuing lack of a navy, he called on the Carthaginians for support.

The war with Philip brought to a conclusion

In 209/8, Bomilcar was sent with a fleet but its activity did not amount to much (Livy 27.15.7). The Carthaginians themselves were probably nervous about opening a war with Rome on another front. Over the following two years, as Scipio's success in Spain became more pronounced, Rome became less committed to its war with Macedon. Philip recaptured Zacynthos and even began threatening Aetolia itself (Errington 1989, 103). In 206, against Rome's wishes, the Aetolians agreed to peace with Philip as urged by a number of concerned Greek states (29.12.1–4). This was a breach of the treaty of 211 but Rome was not in a position to enforce the provision. Instead, in 205, the Senate sent troops and warships under P. Sempronius Tuditanus ostensibly to encourage Aetolia back into the war (29.12.5). The Aetolians were unmoved. A Roman war with Philip would have to wait until Hannibal and the Carthaginians had been dealt with once and for all. The peace conference at Phoenice was joined by a number of representatives of Greek and Illyrian city-states. The terms of peace were generally favorable to Philip, reflecting his recent successes in Greece and Illyria. He had only to cede some Illyrian towns to Rome, and was allowed to annex Atintania (29.12.13).

While the war against the Macedonians had absorbed some Roman resources, it was never on the scale of conflict in the other non-Italian theaters. Rome did what it practically could to keep Philip V at bay and especially to limit any possibility of him joining forces with Hannibal. This overall Roman strategy worked and it was enough to maintain a level of Roman prestige in the eyes of the enemy. The discovery of the treaty between Philip and Hannibal had to be dealt with but the practical Roman response of not overreacting to it served Rome well in the context of the broader conflict with Carthage and Hannibal.

Sicily 215–210

Sicily and Sardinia were the first possessions Rome obtained outside the Italian peninsula and they were taken as a result of the First Punic War (Briscoe 1989, 61; Hoyos 1998, 118–123). Sicily, and to a lesser extent Sardinia, were

strategically important due to their proximity to Italy and also for the provision of grain. In Sicily, the kingdom of Syracuse under King Hiero had retained control of parts of eastern Sicily and was on friendly terms with Rome. The Roman province was located in the west and north of the island. By the time of the beginning of the war, Hiero had been loyal to Rome for almost 50 years. The Carthaginians had long harbored resentment over the loss of Sicily and Sardinia to Rome and even Polybius thought that they had a legitimate grievance when it came to Sardinia (3.10.1–4).

For the Romans, Sicily was especially important as a likely base from which to mount attacks on North Africa. For these reasons, both islands were bound to become an issue in the Second Punic War. The war in Sicily did not last as long as the wars in Spain or with Macedon but considerable Roman resources were contributed to it. The importance of allies and alliances would also come to the fore. The war in Sicily was fought in a similar manner to the war in Spain, with direct confrontations between Roman and Carthaginian armies and the involvement of Sicilian and Numidian allies. This was a particularly acute issue at Syracuse where pro-Carthaginian and pro-Roman factions clashed on numerous occasions.

Syracusan loyalty comes into question

In 218, at the beginning of the war, the consul Ti. Sempronius Longus was allotted Africa as his theater of operation (Pol. 3.41.1–3; Livy 21.17.1). Longus went to Sicily to prepare the invasion of Africa and undertook some minor operations against a Carthaginian fleet that had been threatening Lilybaeum (Livy 21.49.1–51.7. The Roman administration in the province of Sicily was based at Lilybaeum under the command of a praetor (Pol. 7.3.1). The threat of Hannibal to northern Italy saw Longus recalled with much of his army, but from 218 to 216 Sicily's garrison was strengthened to two legions and the navy was strengthened as well (Goldsworthy 2000, 260). Late in 216, two legions formed from the survivors of Cannae were sent to replace the garrison in Sicily (Livy 23.31.4–6). The strengthening of the Roman military presence in Sicily made Carthaginian attempts at destabilizing the situation on the island more difficult but an even greater factor was the ongoing loyalty of King Hiero to Rome. However, when Hiero died towards the end of 216 and was replaced by his grandson Hieronymus, this event gave Carthage the opportunity it needed to gain greater influence with some of its old allies in Sicily and to coax Syracuse away from its loyalty to Rome.

In contrast to his grandfather, the young Hieronymus was more disposed to the Carthaginians and the period immediately following Hiero's death saw division and factionalism in Syracuse often over support for Rome or Carthage.

Hieronymus began negotiations with Carthage that would see the island divided between himself and the Carthaginians (Pol. 7.4.1–3; Livy 24.6.7–8). He was convinced by his advisors, however, that he should demand full control of Sicily in exchange for providing assistance to Hannibal (Pol. 7.4.4–7). The Carthaginians agreed, while Rome sent envoys to demand that Hieronymus respect his grandfather's treaty with Rome. Hieronymus refused and war with Rome became a distinct possibility.

Hieronymus' short reign — he was murdered in 214 at Leontini — heralded factional instability at Syracuse, which in turn threatened Rome's own presence in Sicily (Livy 24.7.1–9). While the pro-Carthaginian factions had become much stronger, there were still many among the aristocracy who wanted to remain loyal to Rome. Rome was very much aware of this and continued to observe Hiero's old treaty in the hope that the pro-Carthaginian factions would eventually be overcome. Two important players in this factionalism were Hippocrates and Epicydes. They were born at Carthage, but their grandfather was a Syracusan exile and they originally formed part of the embassy from Hannibal to Hieronymus agreeing to the treaty on Hieronymus' terms. Allowed by Hannibal to remain with Hieronymus, they would eventually play significant roles in turning Syracuse and much of Sicily in the direction of Carthage (Livy 24.6.1–4). Having been elected to magistracies in Syracuse (Livy refers to Hippocrates as a "praetor") in the wake of the murder of Hieronymus, Hippocrates and Epicydes were in an even stronger position. At Leontini he and Epicydes declared the city to be independent of Syracuse and began mounting attacks on farms and towns in the Roman province (24.29.1–12). When the newly arrived consul, M. Claudius Marcellus, attacked and captured Leontini, Hippocrates and Epicydes in an extraordinary feat of survival and resistance escaped to Herbesus (24.30.1–3), won over a force of 8,000 soldiers sent from Syracuse to assist Leontini, and persuaded its commanders by argument and trickery to march back to Syracuse where they easily took control of the city (Pol. 8.3.1; Livy 24.30.2–32.9).

The siege of Syracuse begins

The Roman response was predictable. In early spring 213 Marcellus, now proconsul, began a full-scale siege of Syracuse. In Polybius's and Livy's accounts, focus is put on the role of the mathematician and inventor Archimedes in defending the city. The siege was a considerable undertaking because Syracuse was naturally well defended and had extensive fortifications. Marcellus from the sea and the propraeor Ap. Claudius Pulcher by land led the attacks. For eight months, however, Archimedes' many varieties of artillery and machines equipped with large grappling-hooks frustrated the warships' attacks, and so did his

artillery on the landward side (Pol. 8.3.1–7.12; Livy 24.33.9–34.12). Instead of assaults, a blockade was instituted while with part of the army Marcellus attacked other regions in Sicily that had also rebelled (Livy 24.35.1–2).

The Carthaginians took advantage of the situation by sending 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 12 elephants to Heraclea Minoa under Himilco, who then captured Agrigentum. Hippocrates attempted to join him from Syracuse but was intercepted by Marcellus; only Hippocrates with his 500 cavalry escaped (Livy 24.35.3–36.1). Although the Carthaginians moved to Syracuse, the arrival of another legion raised the Roman military presence to four legions and caused Himilco and Hippocrates to withdraw to winter at Agrigentum.

The capture of Syracuse by Rome

Early in 212, Marcellus devised plans to capture Syracuse by stealth. The pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian factionalism that had been a feature of the political situation in Syracuse now played its part again. Deserters from Syracuse were able to provide intelligence to Marcellus that a three days' festival to Artemis/Diana was being observed and that everyone was drinking to excess (Livy 25.23.14). Marcellus ordered a night assault that was a complete success with virtually no resistance. The Hexapylon gate was captured, flung open next morning, and Roman soldiers spilled out into Syracuse, leaving only the harbor foreshore area of Achradina still held by Epicydes (Pol. 8.37.1–12; Livy 25.24.1–15).

At this point, however, Himilco, Hippocrates, and the Carthaginian fleet under Bomilcar arrived and the Roman army was effectively surrounded. It was late autumn and the heat was excessive. A deadly epidemic that broke out in the Carthaginian army claimed many victims including both Himilco and Hippocrates (Livy 25.26.1–14), whereas the Roman army was less badly affected. The last credible hope for the Carthaginians in Sicily was the navy under Bomilcar, who late in 212 sailed from Carthage with 130 warships and 700 transports. But, stopped at Cape Pacyhnus by contrary winds and then confronted by a probably smaller Roman fleet, Bomilcar sent the fleet back to Africa while he sailed to Tarentum (25.27.4–13). Epicydes fled to Agrigentum and Syracuse finally fell to the Romans (25.28–31).

Muttines and the capture of Agrigentum

The war in Sicily was not over, however, with Hanno and Epicydes still holding Agrigentum. Muttines, a general said by Livy to have been of Libyphoenician origin, was sent by Hannibal to replace Hippocrates. He took command of the remaining Numidian cavalry, and scored a number of successes against

some of Rome's allies, encouraging Hanno and Epicydes to march to the Himera River in an attempt to engage Marcellus (Livy 25.40.5, 41.1–7). Acting against the advice of Muttines, Epicydes and Hanno crossed the river and attacked Marcellus's army. The battle turned into a complete rout with thousands of soldiers killed or captured.

Despite this Roman victory, the Carthaginians landed 8,000 infantry and 3,000 Numidian cavalry and a number of towns revolted again in favor of Carthage (26.21.14–17). In late 211, M. Valerius Laevinus, who had managed the Macedonian conflict so successfully, was sent to Sicily (26.40.1) in place of Marcellus. Muttines' continued success had become a problem in the eyes of Hanno who replaced him as commander of the Numidian cavalry with his own son (26.40.5). The result was disastrous as it led Muttines to betray Agrigentum to the Romans. Epicydes and Hanno fled to Africa, and Laevinus treated the city's leading citizens brutally in the aftermath. Laevinus then received voluntary surrender from 40 other Sicilian towns, with a further 26 taken due to betrayal or force (26.40.9–12).

The war in Sicily was finally over, but the Roman military presence on the island would remain strong for many years. Any projected Roman assault on Carthaginian North Africa would be entirely reliant on Sicily but, at the time of the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily, Rome's position in Spain was precarious and the war with Hannibal in Italy had ground to a stalemate. The Roman victory in Sicily was thus timely indeed.

Africa, 204–202

The war in Africa represented the war's final chapter. A Roman attack on Africa had been envisaged as early as 218 but never eventuated, as the consul Ti. Sempronius Longus was forced to turn back to Italy in the wake of Hannibal's invasion. Until 204 there was no serious attempt at organizing a Roman attack on Africa, mostly due to the situation in Spain and in Italy itself. The war in Sicily had come to an end in 210, providing Rome with the ideal channel through which to make such an attack, but it was not until Scipio succeeded in driving the Carthaginians out of Spain that such an attack became a realistic notion.

Rome was indirectly involved, however, in events in Africa between 218 and 204 through its dealings with the Numidian princes Syphax and Masinissa. Carthage had long been involved in Numidian internal politics and Rome would now become similarly involved. Syphax struck an alliance with Rome as early as 214, which saw a large number of Numidian forces withdrawn from Spain. Rome even sent centurions to Syphax to help train the Numidian army (Livy 24.48.1–5). But in 206 he switched his allegiance to Carthage, marrying

Sophoniba, daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gisco (Livy 29.23.1–10). Masinissa had originally been a Carthaginian ally in Spain and had fought with effect against Rome, but switched allegiance to Rome toward the end of the war in Spain (28.16.12). He would prove a most valuable ally to Rome during the invasion of Africa.

Following Scipio's impressive victories in Spain, it might have seemed inevitable that the Roman Senate would willingly prosecute a campaign in Africa against Carthage itself and that Scipio would be its commander. Instead fierce opposition is reported to Scipio's plans for an invasion. Livy dedicates a lengthy section to the senatorial debate, with Fabius Maximus and Fulvius Flaccus opposing it on the grounds that Hannibal was still in Italy and an invasion of Africa presented many potential dangers (Livy 28.40–45). They were equally concerned at Scipio's growing power and prestige in the wake of his victories in Spain. In the end, Scipio won the day, but his opponents remained active, especially his quaestor, M. Porcius Cato.

Scipio had won the consulship for 205, and was allotted Sicily with power to cross to Africa if he believed it to be in Rome's best interest (28.45.8–10). Scipio's victories in Spain had made him immensely popular, so that no less than 7,000 men volunteered to join his army. A number of cities and regions also made significant contributions of weapons, food and other items for the army (28.45.13–46.1).

Scipio's campaign in Africa begins

Scipio crossed to Sicily in 205 but did not prosecute the invasion until 204. One of the reasons for his success in Spain had been the training he had given the army and this is one likely explanation for the delay. Another is that Scipio still faced opposition from Fabius Maximus and his supporters in the Senate, meaning that he needed to find the right occasion for crossing to Africa. Goldsworthy points out that there was uncertainty in the sources as to the size of the army and that the bulk of the force was already in Sicily when he arrived there in 205 (Goldsworthy 2000, 287). This suggests that Sicily had remained garrisoned by at least two legions since the Carthaginians had been driven out five years earlier. The total size of Scipio's invading army is suggested to have been 25–30,000 with Livy claiming that the sources available to him ranged from 12,000 to 35,000 (29.25.1–4).

At some time early in the campaign season, Scipio's army departed Sicily on a fleet of 40 warships and 400 transport ships commanded by Scipio's trusted friend, C. Laelius (Livy 29.26.3). The crossing only took three days with Laelius successfully landing the fleet near the city of Utica (29.27.5–13). Scipio sent out advance parties that ravaged the nearby farms and easily defeated a

Carthaginian force of 500 cavalry (29.28.10–29.3). It was at this time that Masinissa arrived from Numidia with a cavalry force, following a battle he had lost with Syphax. Not long after, the Romans scored another victory over a Carthaginian cavalry force of 4,000 mostly composed of Numidians (29.34.6, 10–17). Masinissa played a key role in this victory.

The chances of a major engagement between Roman and Carthaginian forces began to grow as Carthage now marshaled an army of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry commanded by Hasdrubal son of Gisco. He was supported by Syphax reportedly commanding 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (Pol. 14.1.14; Livy 29.35.10–11). This army was designed to relieve the siege of Utica and put pressure on the newly arrived Roman force before it could become more firmly established. Scipio had already poured all of his resources into the siege of Utica when the Carthaginian army arrived. There was no quick engagement and the two armies remained at a distance from each other as the siege continued. The Carthaginian and Numidian forces built separate camps about eight miles from the Roman camp, and according to Polybius their camps included wooden huts, suggesting that they were preparing to be there for some time (Pol. 14.1.6–8; Goldsworthy 2000, 292–3). Scipio continued the siege of Utica for 40 days but in vain, according to Livy, and gave the siege up, focusing instead on building a winter camp (29.35.12–15). Polybius implies that the siege continued and that preparations were made in the spring of 203 to renew its intensity (14.2.1–4).

Scipio attacks Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisco

While Syphax had been loyal to Carthage for some time, Scipio attempted to negotiate with him over the winter, hoping to draw him over to the Roman side and turn the tide dramatically in Rome's favor. Syphax responded with a compromise by offering to negotiate a treaty between Rome and Carthage whereby Carthage would leave Italy and Rome leave Africa (Pol. 14.1.9; Livy 30.3.5–6). Scipio indicated interest in the arrangement, but it seems that he was buying time rather than making any genuine commitment. While still negotiating with Syphax, Scipio began preparations for a night attack on both the Carthaginian camp under Hasdrubal Gisco and the Numidian camp under Syphax (Pol. 14.2.9, 3.5–6). The negotiations also allowed Scipio to obtain detailed information on the layout of the enemy camps as some of the messengers sent by Scipio were actually centurions in disguise (Pol. 14.1.13; Livy 30.4.1–3). Polybius suggests that the ongoing siege of Utica was also designed to mask preparations for an attack on the Carthaginian and Numidian camps (14.3.4–6). Once again, the sources emphasize Scipio's careful planning, which had brought him such success in Spain.

The surprise night attack began with Laelius taking half of the Roman force along with Masinissa's Numidians and attacking the Numidian camp under Syphax (Pol. 14.4.1–6.5; Livy 30.4.4–6.9). The Numidians were caught so unawares that even after the Roman army had entered the town and set fire to some of the wooden huts, they believed the fire to be accidental. Many fled the growing fire only to be killed once they were outside the camp. Scipio had taken the remainder of the army to attack the Carthaginian camp and, as some of the Carthaginian soldiers began making their way to the Numidian camp to render assistance, Scipio attacked and quickly set fire to their camp as well. The attack on both camps had been so successful that Polybius claimed that Hasdrubal Gisgo only had 2,000 soldiers and 500 cavalry still with him (Pol. 14.6.3–4).

The battle of the Great Plains

Syphax was encouraged by his wife Sophoniba, Hasdrubal's daughter, to remain loyal to Carthage despite the serious setbacks both armies had suffered. While Syphax was at the town of Abba with what remained of his army, Hasdrubal arrived with a regrouped army and a newly raised contingent of 4,000 men from Celtiberia (Pol. 14.7.1–5). This offered further encouragement to Syphax to continue the fight. The fact that Hasdrubal had been able to raise troops from Celtiberia is indicative of the difficulties Rome still faced in controlling the Iberian peninsula despite Scipio's victories there a few years earlier (Goldsworthy 2000, 295). Thirty days later the Carthaginians with their contingent of Celtiberians, together with the Numidians under Syphax established a camp on the Great Plains, the army totalling 30,000 men. Scipio did not hesitate, leaving part of the army to continue the siege of Utica, and over five days marched with the rest of it to the vicinity of the encamped enemy. Scipio established camp approximately four miles from the enemy camp and the following day formed the army into battle order approximately one mile from Hasdrubal's and Syphax's army. Neither army made any move to engage in battle for another three days (Pol. 14.7.9–8.4; Livy 30. 7.13–8.5).

When the battle finally got under way on the fourth day, the battle order saw Hasdrubal's center comprising the Celtiberians and the remains of his own infantry, with the cavalry on the right. On the left were the Numidians under Syphax (Pol. 14.8.7–8; Livy 30.8.7). Scipio placed his legionaries in the center, the Italian cavalry on the right, and the Numidians under Masinissa on the left (Pol. 14.8.6–7; Livy 30.8.6; Goldsworthy 2000, 295). The cavalry on both flanks of the Roman army destroyed the opposing Carthaginian and Numidian cavalry in the first charge. Apart from the Celtiberians, the infantry almost immediately fled. The Celtiberians offered the only resistance but were ultimately no match for the legionaries (Polybius 14.8.1–14; Livy 30.8.5–9).

provide detailed accounts). Their resistance, however, at least allowed a considerable proportion of the rest of the army to flee. The battle had been another rout and now the city of Carthage itself was potentially under threat.

Laelius and Masinissa in Numidia

In the wake of this victory, Scipio went on a number of plundering raids of cities and farms in the region of the Great Plains while also receiving the surrender of a number of Libyan communities who had tired of Carthaginian rule. The most significant development was to send Laelius with Masinissa to Numidia in an attempt to establish Masinissa on the Numidian throne and destroy Syphax's power base there. There was considerable risk attached to this undertaking and it was one of the most daring initiatives of the entire war (Livy 30.11.1–15.14). It took Masinissa and Laelius 15 days to reach the territory of the Massyli, the Numidian tribe from which Masinissa came (30.11.1). Syphax had hastily organized another army and set out quickly from his capital at Cirta to confront them. The initial stages of the battle were fought mostly by the cavalry and Livy claims that Syphax had the best of the fighting due to superior numbers (30.11.4–9). The tide began to turn, however, when the Roman light infantry began to stabilize the lines and this allowed the legionaries to advance. Livy claims that at the sight of the legionaries approaching, Syphax's men all but fled (30.11.9–11). Syphax himself was captured and taken to Laelius, while Masinissa rode on to Cirta and captured the city easily (30.12.1–3). Syphax's wife, Sophoniba surrendered to him. Livy portrays Sophoniba as so irresistibly beautiful that Masinissa himself now married her, much to the disapproval of Laelius (30.12.19–22). Scipio took the decision to declare both Syphax and Sophoniba as Roman captives, not Masinissa's, and this resulted in Sophoniba taking poison sent to her by her new husband (30.14.10–11).

The return of Hannibal and the final showdown at Zama

The Carthaginians responded to the disaster of the Great Plains in a number of ways. Firstly, they prepared Carthage itself for a siege and secondly they continued to strengthen their naval capacity with a view to lifting the Roman siege of Utica. The most important decision was to recall Hannibal from Italy and this, more than any other action, reflects the dire situation that the Carthaginians believed they were in (Pol. 14.9.6; Livy 30.9.3–9). Scipio had taken control of Tunis, which lay only 10 miles from Carthage, but as his army began to move closer to Carthage they witnessed the fleet being put to sea (Pol. 14.10.2–12; Livy 30.9.10–10.1). Scipio surmised that the Carthaginian

fleet was on its way to Utica and quickly made his way back to the city to defend his besieging army against such an attack. The Carthaginian fleet appears to have moved too slowly to take advantage of the lack of Roman preparation. By the time it arrived at Utica, Scipio had organized a flotilla of boats armed with 1,000 hand-picked men preventing the Carthaginian fleet from sailing into Utica's harbour (Livy 30.10.8–21).

Realizing that the situation was increasingly desperate, the Carthaginian Senate sought peace towards the end of 203. The peace agreement that Scipio sought to impose on the Carthaginians was comprehensive and demanding, but according to Livy there was no attempt by Carthage to negotiate, again reflecting the desperate situation the Carthaginians believed themselves to be in (30.16.3–14). Polybius and Livy differ on the Roman Senate's ratification of the treaty. Polybius claims the Senate agreed to it, but Livy claims that a Carthaginian delegation to the Senate attempted to water down the terms of the treaty but was expelled as a result (Pol. 15.1.2–4; Livy 30.21.1–23.8). Livy believed that from the Carthaginian perspective the peace proposal and negotiations were designed simply to buy time (30.16.15). This was proved by the Carthaginians' treatment of a fleet of Roman transport ships when it was blown off course by a storm in early spring 202 on the crossing from Sicily. Many of the ships were abandoned by their crews and some of them drifted into the bay adjacent to Carthage itself (Pol. 15.1.1; Livy 30.24.5–12). The Carthaginian Senate sent Hasdrubal out to trophy the ships and take their contents to much popular acclaim in Carthage. Scipio was livid and sent an embassy demanding the return of the ships and their cargo but the embassy barely escaped Carthage alive. The war had been reignited and it now progressed to what would be the final showdown.

The departure of Hannibal from Italy late in 203 and the possibility of a glorious Roman victory in Africa in 202 saw intense rivalry for senatorial backing to prosecute the war. Scipio had enough friends in the Senate to ensure the continuation of his proconsular *imperium* until the war was concluded. One of the consuls, Ti. Claudius Nero, was sent to Africa with a fleet of 50 warships but his role in the campaign of 202 to defeat Hannibal was confined to naval operations. Any major battle between Scipio and Hannibal would require the services of the Numidian cavalry, just as in most of the battles since 218 between Rome and Carthage in Spain and Sicily. Hannibal succeeded in enlisting the support of a Numidian called Tychaeus who arrived with 2,000 cavalry (Pol. 15.3.4–5). Scipio sent repeated messages to Masinissa whose cavalry and infantry he knew would be required (Pol. 15.4.3–4). Encamped at Hadrumentum since his return from Italy, Hannibal received information that Scipio's army was creating havoc in the towns and villages around Carthage (Pol. 15.5.1; Livy 30.29.1). Soon afterwards, Hannibal made his first move to confront Scipio by marching his army over five days past a place

called Zama which lay southwest of Carthage. Hannibal had sent out spies in an effort to locate Scipio's army but they were captured. Rather than executing or torturing them, Scipio encouraged the spies to return to Hannibal and report everything that they had seen. Scipio's intention was probably an expression of confidence and it seems to have worked as Hannibal now asked to meet Scipio in person (Polybius 15.5.7–9; Livy 30.29.1–4). Masinissa arrived either the day after the spies departed, according to Polybius, or just before according to Livy (Pol. 15.5.7–9; Livy 30.29.1–4). Masinissa had 6,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry with him and was warmly received by Scipio.

A meeting between Hannibal and Scipio would inevitably form a centerpiece for any ancient historian of the Second Punic War. Both Polybius and Livy provide lengthy accounts of the meeting, mostly comprised of re-created speeches (Pol. 15.6.4–9.1; Livy 30.30.1–31.10). The two met at a point approximately four miles from the Roman lines and Hannibal attempted to have the treaty under negotiation some months earlier reinstated. Scipio declared that that treaty had been irreparably violated when the lost Roman transport ships were captured. There was clearly no satisfactory outcome for either side and the conference broke up. Battle was inevitable.

There is no clear reference in either Polybius or Livy as to the numbers each army comprised. It is generally accepted that Scipio's army was smaller than Hannibal's, although Appian's claim that Hannibal's army numbered 50,000 and Scipio's 24,500 is generally discounted (Appian, *Lib.* 40–41; Goldsworthy 2000, 302). The order in which both armies were drawn up was predictable, although Hannibal had clearly learned from the Romans by keeping the majority of his infantry in reserve. The Roman cavalry was placed on the left wing with Laelius in command, Masinissa's cavalry force of 4,000 on the right. The legionaries were placed in the center, the *hastati* first, the *principes* second, and the *triarii* at the rear (Pol. 15.9.6–10; Livy 30.32.11–33.3; Goldsworthy 2000, 300–307 provides a detailed account of the battle based mostly on Polybius and Livy). Hannibal placed the Carthaginian cavalry on his right flank facing the Roman cavalry, while the Numidian cavalry under Tychaeus faced Masinissa's Numidians on the left. In the center and at the front was a force of 12,000 Ligurian, Gallic, and Balearic infantry, described by Polybius as mercenaries. A contingent of Libyans and Carthaginians were placed behind them. Hannibal's veterans were placed at the rear and at the very front of the Carthaginian force were 80 war elephants. The elephants proved to be one of the decisive weapons of the battle and very much to the detriment of the Carthaginians. They proved difficult to control and, just after all of the preparations for battle had been concluded, they stampeded prematurely due to the sound of trumpets, bugles, and shouting marking the beginning of the battle (Pol. 15.12.2; Livy 30.33.12–13). Initially they surged back through the Numidian cavalry on the Carthaginian left and Masinissa took

the chance to charge, routing Tychaeus' cavalry in one thrust. Some of the elephants then stampeded through the Roman infantry but Scipio had deliberately left open lanes in the lines of the legionaries and most of the elephants passed harmlessly through (Pol. 15.9.7, 12.3). The remainder, still out of control, turned back causing havoc through the Carthaginian cavalry on the right, and, like Masinissa, Laelius attacked causing the Carthaginian cavalry to flee. The elephants were now all but lost and both of the Carthaginian cavalry wings were in full flight with Laelius and Masinissa close behind them.

The infantry battle was more hard-fought. The first two lines of the Roman legions, the *hastati* and the *principes*, had considerable success against the Carthaginian mercenaries but they suffered significant casualties (Pol. 15.13.1–10; Livy 30.34.1–8). Hannibal kept his veterans at the rear in order and prevented them from advancing. Indeed, they played an important role in stopping the front lines from fleeing. Scipio's *hastati* and *principes* reformed after routing both the mercenaries and the Libyan and Carthaginian infantry as well. Along with the *triarii*, the Roman reserve troops, they now took on Hannibal's veterans (Pol. 15.14.1–6). The battle was hard-fought and appeared to be at a deadlock, when Laelius' and Masinissa's cavalry returned to the battlefield. Hannibal's veterans were cut down by them from the rear. The losses were considerable. Twenty thousand of the Carthaginian force lay dead and the Roman casualties numbered 1,500, an unusually high number for a victorious army (Pol. 15.14.8–9; Livy 30.35.1–4).

The result of the Roman victory was a harsh settlement. Scipio seems not to have seriously entertained the idea of a siege of Carthage given all of the risks that such a siege entailed. In territorial terms, Carthage retained its territory in Africa but lost all claims to possessions outside (Pol. 15.18.1–8; Livy 30.37.1–6). The Carthaginian navy was all but eliminated with only 10 triremes allowed, and the most devastating of the conditions was the requirement to indemnify Rome with 10,000 talents of silver annually for 50 years. While the harshness of the treaty was fiercely rejected by some in Carthage, Hannibal himself saw no option but to accept it.

Conclusion

Rome's struggle with Carthage on the other fronts during the Second Punic War was an integral counterpart to the war waged in Italy by Hannibal. There were many similarities in the conduct of warfare across Spain and Sicily especially. The employment of Numidian allies together with alliances with local tribes and cities played an important part and the same can be said of the conflict in Africa, especially with reference to the role of the Numidians. Rome's preparedness to compromise on the strict conventions of appointments to

military commands was also important. The extension of proconsular commands in Spain and Sicily is an example, as is the appointment of Scipio Africanus to a command in Spain despite his young age. This effectively dealt with the Carthaginian ability to appoint commanders such as Hannibal and Hasdrubal to extended commands regardless of their age and political experience. The war with Philip V was different to the other theaters in a number of ways, but did bear some similarities to them, especially in terms of the use of allies. The Second Punic War was Rome's first fought on a number of fronts simultaneously, and in this sense it prepared Rome for the expansion of empire which would follow in the centuries to come.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Rome, Latins, and Italians in the Second Punic War

Kathryn Lomas

Introduction

The Second Punic War was a watershed in the relationship between Rome and the other peoples of Italy. By 264 Rome had become the dominant power throughout the whole of Italy, either by means of negotiated alliances or, more frequently, by means of military conquest. At the time of Hannibal's invasion in 218, the entire peninsula was connected to Rome by a network of alliances, colonization, or grants of Roman citizenship. Italians were bound by the terms of their alliances to offer support, giving Rome access to vast reserves of military manpower and economic and political assistance. They were, therefore, central to the conduct and outcome of the war. Hannibal appears to have realized this, and breaking Roman control of Italy was a central part of his strategy.

Sources for the Second Punic War in Italy are plentiful, but not without problems. The narrative of Livy for this period is intact, but that of Polybius has gaps and those of Appian and Dio are scattered or fragmentary. Polybius, our earliest source, dates to the mid second century, considerably earlier than our other accounts, but is problematic. His purpose in writing his history is to explain Roman history and institutions to a Greek audience, and in some cases it is clear that he is producing oversimplified or anachronistic descriptions of Roman actions and institutions. Other sources are all substantially later in date and reflect later preoccupations. These accounts of the Italian aspects of the war are almost inevitably coloured by the later Italian war of 90–89, and were written for literary effect and for moral purposes rather than historical accuracy. Nevertheless, these writers had access to earlier histories of the war, as well as family records and genealogies, and the state archives, and much accurate

information may underlie their accounts. The survival of two extended narratives of the war, as well as archaeological and epigraphic evidence for the development of Italian communities in the late third century, gives us a unique opportunity to examine the operation of the Roman alliance in action. The factors that determined the decision-making processes of Italian states, and their relations with both Rome and Hannibal, give an invaluable insight into the nature of Italian communities at this date, and into their relationships with both their immediate neighbours and with more distant allies and adversaries.

Italy and Rome in the Third Century: Citizens, Latins and Allies

At the time of Hannibal's invasion in 218/217, all of Italy south of the river Po was in some form of relationship with Rome, either as the result of voluntary negotiation or military conquest. During the course of the fourth century, Rome had expanded rapidly from a power base in Latium and adjacent areas to domination of the whole of Italy. However, Italy was a region of considerable ethnic and cultural diversity, and the various ethnic/cultural groups retained their own languages, forms of socio-political organization, and economic, material, and ritual cultures long after the Roman conquest.

The cultures of the various regions of Italy varied widely. Many regions began to develop urbanized social structures and settlement patterns in the seventh/sixth centuries. By the time of the Roman conquest, in the fourth-third centuries, many Italian states were urbanized city-states, although sometimes rather different in character from Rome or from the *poleis* of Greece (Barker and Rassmussen 2000; Cornell 1995, 96–118; Bradley 2000, 100–105; Lamboley 1996, 334–373). In upland Italy, by contrast, the indigenous form of state organization was primarily non-urban. Complex state societies had evolved in the Apennines, and large parts of Lucania and Calabria, but these were not based on nucleated urban settlements, and maintained a separation between settlements and the focus of various forms of communal activity. The population lived in small settlements (Livy 9.13.7), but each locality (*pagus*) had a hill fort for defensive purposes and a religious sanctuary that acted as a focus not just for sacrifices and festivals, but also for markets, law-hearings, and assemblies of the local people (Salmon 1965, 78–81, 95–101; Dench 1995; Isayev 2007, 55–140).¹ Third-century Italy was, therefore, composed largely of self-governing complex states with their own political and cultural identities, although Roman cultural influence was beginning to be significant in areas of Roman colonization.

Rome's relations with Italy at this period were based on a complex mosaic of alliances, alongside areas of directly controlled territory. Rome had only

limited administrative machinery and, by the end of the fifth century, directly incorporating conquered territory was no longer an option. In 338, the settlement imposed on Latium and parts of Campania and Etruria at the end of the Latin War provided the basis for a more arm's-length form of control.² As Roman power expanded after 338, conquered Italians were organized into three categories — Roman citizens, Latins, or allies. Roman citizenship was imposed on some states, either in the form of full citizenship or the more limited *civitas sine suffragio*, which consisted of the civil rights of a citizen but not the right to vote, thus disbarring holders from participation in the political process (Sherwin-White 1973, 38–58). Both types of Roman citizenship involved surrender of independence and absorption into the Roman state, although these communities retained local administrative autonomy. These communities of full or partial Roman citizens (*municipia*) were viewed by Rome in terms of obligations, which largely consisted of giving Rome access to Italian manpower and military support (Sherwin-White, 1973; Lomas 1996, 20–22; Bispham 2007, 13–31).³ Communities with Latin status, in contrast, remained independent and self-governing states, but with special economic and civil rights which gave them a closer relationship with Rome than other states (Sherwin-White 1973, 97–118).

The majority of Italian states were independent allies (*socii*). Most modern scholarship interprets alliance as a relationship with Rome governed by a treaty (*foedus*), either freely negotiated or imposed after a war (Sherwin-White 1973, 119–33; Bispham 2007, 53–55). These bilateral agreements created a web of alliances with Rome at the center, but their terms, and even the frequency with which they were made, are poorly documented. The Cassian Treaty (*foedus Cassianum*) of 495, which is said to have formed the basis of later treaties, is purportedly quoted by two sources (Dion. Hal. 6.95, Cic. *Balb.* 53). Epigraphic evidence of treaties is of later date and relates to alliances outside Italy (Callatis, *ILLRP* 2.516; Astypalaia, *IGRR* 4.1028, Mytilene, Sherk 1969, no. 26d). All of these examples are very unspecific. On the basis of this evidence, treaties established peace between the Romans and the other signatory, and stipulated that each should assist the other with armed force if attacked. Some states undoubtedly obtained more favorable terms than others, depending on the circumstances in which the treaty was made. The treaty with Naples, for instance, is often described as a ‘most equal treaty’ (*foedus aequissimum*: Livy 8.26.6–7; Cic. *Balb.* 21), but nothing is known about the nature of it.

The relative scarcity of evidence for treaties raises the question of whether or not all alliances were based on a formal treaty. Only 14 Italian states are securely attested as having *foedera* before 265, and it is possible that there is a greater variation in the formalities of relations with Rome than previously recognized (Lomas 1989, 82–109; 1993, 77–84; Rich 2008). It is possible

that many alliances were less formalized arrangements, based on the formal act of *deditio* or surrender which occurred at the end of a war (Rich 2008, 66–75). Whether the relationship was based on a formal treaty with Rome or not, all allies were, in most respects, self-governing independent states, but all had a duty to provide military assistance to Rome. Roman relations with the rest of Italy were, therefore, a hegemonial alliance that was based on military obligations.

Rome also engaged in a program of colonization, that had a significant impact on the demography of Italy, its urbanization, and the society and culture of the areas colonized. Colonies were founded on land confiscated from defeated enemies, but there were variations in the size, organization, and status of settlements. All had a close connection with Rome, having either Latin or Roman citizen status. Many were existing communities that had a number of Roman colonists added to them, although others were founded as completely new settlements. Their civic organization, set out in a colonial charter, was modeled on that of Rome, consisting of a local senate and annually elected magistrates (Salmon 1969, 80–81; Sherwin-White 1973, 80–94, 108–16; Bispham 2006). Typically, a citizen colony was small in size, often comprising no more than 300 settlers and their families, and remained part of the Roman state, although with its own local administration. Latin colonies might consist of 2,000–5,000 settlers and their families, and larger examples are known from northern Italy (Brunt 1971, 85–7, 278–84), and were self-governing.

In some parts of Italy, extensive Roman colonization had begun to make a significant cultural and political impact by the time of the Punic wars. By 264, around 26,805 sq. km. or around 20% of Italian land (Cornell 1995, 380–383) — mainly concentrated in central Italy — was legally Roman territory, either by direct annexation or by foundation of Roman colonies. The colonial relationship created a stronger bond with Rome. Colonies adopted elements of Roman administrative and legal frameworks and, although most colonies included a significant proportion of indigenous population as well as settlers, they also adopted aspects of Roman culture. Latin was as the official language of colonies, and some Roman cults (especially that of Jupiter Capitolinus, the central cult of the Roman state) were established. Territories were reorganized as land was surveyed and allocated to Roman settlers, and the public areas of cities underwent extensive reconstruction to reflect the new status. In many colonies, new city walls were built, temples were constructed to house new cults, and the forum was reconstructed and formalized, often with the addition of *curia* or *comitium* buildings to house the new colonial magistrates and senate (Bispham 2006; Bradley 2000; Mouritsen 2004).

At the time of Hannibal's invasion, therefore, the communities of Italy were all linked to Rome by some form of treaty or alliance, and more direct Roman control was spreading via grants of Roman citizenship or the founding

of colonies. The actual level of contact and control may have been relatively slight, especially for areas that were geographically remote from Rome, but the existence of such an alliance gave Rome access to major resources of military manpower and potential political support.

The war in Italy: Rome, Hannibal and the Italians

Rome's Italian allies were central to Hannibal's strategy in Italy. It seems unlikely that Carthage's aim was to destroy Rome, as a treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon clearly envisages its continued existence (Pol. 7.9; Briscoe 1989, 45–47; Lazenby 1978, 29–66). Instead, Hannibal's strategy was to destroy Rome's power by undermining control of Italy, either by capturing allied states or persuading Italian communities to break their alliances with Rome (Pol. 3.77.2–7; Livy 22.58). Polybius depicts him as portraying himself as the liberator of Italy from the Romans. It has been argued that this indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Roman alliance, mistaking the allies for subject communities which might welcome the chance to revolt. However, the language of freedom (*eleutheria*) — especially the freedom of the Greeks (*eleutheria ton Hellenon*) — was a commonplace of political and diplomatic rhetoric in the Hellenistic period, and it may simply be an appeal couched in terms common in the Hellenistic world at this date. Although it is clear that Italians did not immediately respond to him as a liberator, and that he used force just as much as persuasion, his strategy also had some measure of success. The fact that Rome garrisoned some allied cities and took hostages from others at the beginning of the war also suggests Italian support for Rome was not taken for granted.⁴

Following the battles of Trebia (218) and Trasimene (217), Hannibal is said to have made a distinction between Roman and Italian prisoners. The latter were treated notably better than the Romans and were urged to switch sides (Pol. 3.77.4–7, 85.1–4; Livy 22.58.1–2; Appian, *Hann.* 10.43). Campanian captives are said to have been sent home with gifts in the hope that they would persuade their home states to change sides. Hannibal is said to have been given indications by some captured Capuans after Trasimene that the city might be willing to defect, suggesting that loyalty to Rome was wavering in some areas even before Cannae (Livy 22.13.2–3, 13.14).⁵ The converse of this process of persuasion was a program of devastation of the territories of those Italians who did not oblige. During his march south through Umbria and Etruria in 217, Hannibal systematically ravaged the territories of many Italian states (Livy 22.3). Since Umbria, in particular, had high levels of

Roman colonization, this scorched earth policy may have focused on communities that were colonies or that had Roman citizenship (Harris 1971, 33; Bradley 2000, 150–151), but it seems unlikely that allied communities escaped entirely. He also ravaged the territories of a number of Latin, Campanian, and Samnite states in 217–215 (Livy 22.13; Pol. 3.88–9, 92, 100), possibly with the aim of demonstrating Rome's failure to protect her allies, or to try to provoke the Roman army — which by this point had adopted a strategy of avoiding pitched battles — into an attack on him (Briscoe 1989, 49–51). Hannibal's policy towards the Italians, therefore, seems to have been very much one of carrot and stick.

Initially, most allies seem to have been resistant to him but, after the crushing Roman defeat at Cannae in 216, large areas of Campania and southern Italy either defected or were captured by him. Capua, the most powerful city outside Rome, defected shortly after Cannae, along with Atella, Calatia, and the Sabatini, while Casilinum, Nuceria, and Acerrae were captured (Pol. 3.118.3; Livy 23.1–10; Briscoe 1989, 53). Much of Lucania and Bruttium revolted, along with the Greek cities of Croton and Locri (Livy 24.1.1–3). During this period, the Carthaginian armies were based principally at various locations in Campania, Apulia, and Bruttium, and Hannibal's strategy focused on eroding Rome's support base, thus denying her manpower and supplies, and seeking to control land communications routes and ports.⁶

Whether he actively tried to build up a counternetwork of alliances with Italian states, or simply aimed to deny manpower and resources to Rome, is less clear (Briscoe, 1989; Lazenby 1996b, 42–43). Initially, this strategy seemed to be relatively effective, but a number of key communities, notably Nola and Luceria, held out, and Hannibal suffered reverses in 215–214. Rome recaptured some of the rebel Campanian, Apulian, and Samnite states, and Hannibal failed to capture Naples and Cumae despite repeated attempts (Livy 23.10–15, 35–37). There was a further wave of defections in 212, mainly amongst the Greek cities of southern Italy, notably Heraklea, Thurii, Tarentum, and Metapontum, although the Roman garrison at Tarentum retained control of the acropolis, and consequently the harbor, there (Livy 24.13.1–9, 24.20.9–16; Pol. 8.32–33; Appian, *Hann.* 32.133–6). By the end of 211, however, Hannibal's control of southern Italy was under threat. Although one of the consuls, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, was killed near Luceria, Capua was besieged and captured by Rome (Appian, *Hann.* 37.158–43.188), and Hannibal was forced to retreat into Bruttium by the end of the year.

Both sides had mixed fortunes in 210–208. Rome recaptured Salapia and some Samnite settlements but also suffered several defeats, and there are signs of wavering in areas that had remained loyal to Rome. The refusal of 12 Latin colonies to provide troops in 209 (Livy 27.10) illustrates the

extent to which Roman control of Italy was eroded. In addition, there were problems elsewhere in Italy. Etruria was under the control of a praetor (later a consul or proconsul) from 212 onwards, which may indicate that the region's loyalty was suspect. There were reports of unrest in 209/8 and an inquiry in 207 by Livius Salinator into reports that some Etruscan and Umbrian communities had assisted Hannibal, or had planned to defect (Livy 27.21–24, 28.10.4–5; Lazenby 1996, 44). In 207 Rome won a decisive victory over a new Carthaginian army near the river Metaurus in Umbria, and over the following four years, the remaining areas of resistance in Italy returned to Roman control (Briscoe 1989, 54–56; Lazenby 1978, 184–192). Carthaginian forces landed at Genua in 205 and made an alliance with the Ligurians, but both were defeated by Rome in 203. Hannibal continued to suffer reverses, and when in 203 he was recalled to Carthage, Rome regained control of the remainder of Bruttium (Pol. 11.1.3–6, Livy 27.38–51).

The precise extent of Hannibal's support in Italy is not easy to establish with any certainty, thanks to the inconsistencies of our sources. Livy, in particular, habitually refers to the defection of entire ethnic groups. In his list of secessions after Cannae, he states that the Apulians, Bruttians, Lucanians, and most of the Samnites defected, along with named Campanian, Greek, and Messapic cities (Livy 22.61.10–13), but there is reason to suspect that the situation was more complicated. There is little evidence that ethnic or tribal groupings had any political significance in Italy — the basic unit of socio-political organization was the individual state — and Livy's own narrative undermines his assertion that the peoples of these regions acted *en masse*. Not all of these regions revolted immediately after Cannae — some, such as Tarentum, did so considerably later in the war — and some of the individual states within these areas were captured by force rather than defecting voluntarily. Bruttium, for instance, was a region in which Hannibal had strong support right until the end of the war in Italy, but the two important Bruttian states — Petelia and Consentia — both remained loyal to Rome (Livy 23.20–21, 30.5; Appian, *Hann.* 29.123–6) until their capture in 215.

There was also a lot of variation in the strength of the revolt. Some of the rebels, particularly some of the smaller communities in Samnium, were recaptured by Rome fairly quickly (Livy 23.37–39), but others held out until the later stages of the war. Patterns of defection were, therefore, complex, as were the motives of the states which rebelled (see below).

Hannibal's strategy of undermining the Roman alliance in Italy achieved only mixed success. There is little doubt that he inflicted considerable damage on Rome's control of southern Italy, in particular, although he had rather less impact in central Italy. Nevertheless, he managed to exploit some significant weaknesses in Rome's control of Italy.

The Military Contribution: Italian Manpower in the Second Punic War

The military role of the Italians was undoubtedly an important feature of the war, for both Rome and Hannibal. As discussed above, the alliances that Rome negotiated with, or imposed on, her allies were essentially military in nature. The core duty of an ally was to assist Rome with military manpower on request, in return for Roman protection when required, and levies of troops from allies and from Latin colonies became an annual event. Whether this was a significant burden on allies before the Punic wars is unclear, as are the mechanisms by which Rome requested troops from specific allied states, but there is no doubt that allies were required to provide troops on a regular basis.

Polybius (2.24.9–16) states that in 225, a Gallic invasion of Italy prompted Rome to hold an emergency census of Italian manpower, in order to establish how many troops her allies could field if necessary. The precise figures offered by Polybius, amounting to around 750,000 men, have been vigorously debated by historians (see especially Brunt 1971, 44–60; Ilari 1974; Boronowsky 1984), and possibly should be adjusted down to around 580,000 infantry and 54,000 cavalry. We are, however, much less well informed about the normal level of military demands made by Rome on her allies in the third century. The ratio of allied troops to Roman soldiers varies between 1:1 and 2:1 according to our sources (Pol. 3.107.12, 6.26.7, 6.30.2; Appian, *Hann.* 8.31; Vell. Pat. 2.15.1; Brunt 1971, 676–682). The variations in these figures may be explained by a gradual increase in the ratio of allies to Romans over time, and on any calculation it adds up to a significant number of Italians serving with Roman forces every year.

Troops were usually demanded from allies by an annual levy, at which the consuls raised a specified number of Roman legions and an additional quota of allied troops, which served in their own units alongside the Roman forces. Livy regularly cites the allocations of duties and areas of responsibility to each magistrate for each year from 200 onwards, along with numbers of troops they were allowed to levy and, in some cases, which social and geographical groups they were allowed to recruit from. This gives an impression of a very structured system, but in practice, and especially under the emergency conditions prevailing, this may represent an oversimplification. It is also unclear whether all allies provided troops each year, or whether demands varied.⁷

Whatever the precise mechanisms of the levy, there is no doubt that the Italians were important to Rome's war effort in the early years of the war. The estimated size of the Roman army in 218, for instance, is 40,000 allied infantry and 4,400 cavalry, as against 24,000 Roman infantry and 1,800 cavalry (Livy 21.17; Pol. 3.40, 14; Brunt 1971, 678). Unfortunately, Livy does not

regularly give figures of troop levies for the period 218–200, but, where he does include this information, his figures suggest a significant drop in the number of allies serving in the Roman army after Cannae. It is possible that the mass defections in 216 reduced the allied manpower available to Rome by around 40%,⁸ representing an important diminution in the number of troops available. Given that the Roman armies suffered heavy casualties, particularly in the early years of the war, and that the Latin and Italian prisoners held by Hannibal further reduced the available manpower, the impact of his strategy of undermining the allies seems to have significantly damaged Rome's military resources.

The impact of both casualties and allied defections can be seen in the recruitment of slaves into the Roman army in 216 (Livy 22.57.7–12), and also in the steps taken to reward allied troops who had remained loyal. Units recruited from Praeneste and Perugia that were garrisoning Casilinum in 216 were commended for their loyalty and their commanders were honored (Livy 23.17–19). Campanian cavalry units that were serving with the Roman army in Sicily at the time of the Campanian defections were offered land in cities which had remained loyal to Rome, and also Roman citizenship (23.32). Whether this reduction in available manpower resulted in heavier military demands on the allies that remained loyal is unclear. Livy (22.57.7–12) makes reference to additional levies from the remaining allies immediately after Cannae, but many allies are likely to have had limited resources to spare (Brunt 1971, 680). This was demonstrated in 209: twelve Latin colonies refused to honor their obligation to provide troops, saying that their military resources were exhausted (Livy 27.10). Since the Latins were regarded as the inner core of the alliance, this was interpreted by the Senate as a sign of wavering loyalty and greeted with horror. The significance of this act of defiance is further underlined by the heavy punishment inflicted on these colonies in 205, when the balance of the war had tilted in Rome's favour (Livy 29.15).⁹

The military significance of the allies cannot be estimated only on the basis of their service under direct Roman command. Many allied states fought against Hannibal on their own account. In 215, for instance, Petelia resisted Hannibal and was only captured after a lengthy siege (Livy 23.20). In 216, Naples successfully fought off attempts by Hannibal to capture it, and the Neapolitan cavalry seems to have defended the city effectively (23.14–16). Cumae was also under attack from Campanians who supported Hannibal, and was forced to defend itself (23.35–39). The figures for allies in the Roman army do not, therefore, tell the whole story about the Italian role in the war. Rome may have had reduced access to allied manpower, but still benefited from the military efforts of Italians who opposed Hannibal.

Conversely, some of the allies who defected fought for Hannibal, although there is a lot of variation in this. The terms negotiated by Capua when it

defected to Hannibal in 216 included the stipulation that no Carthaginian officers would have command over Capuans, and that any Capuan troops who joined him would do so on a voluntary basis and not as an obligation (Livy 23.7.1–2). This suggests that defections from Rome did not automatically translate into access to Italian manpower for Hannibal's army, although it is unclear whether the terms offered to Capua were replicated elsewhere. Some Italians did actively assist Hannibal. Lucanian and Bruttian infantry served in his army (Livy 24.15). But other Italians mounted their own operations against Roman forces or pro-Roman Italians. In some cases, these were less than helpful. In 215, for instance, a group of Bruttians used the wider conflict as an excuse to besiege Croton, a long-standing enemy, and in doing so, drew the Carthaginian force commanded by Hanno into the conflict (Livy 24.2–3). In addition, we have some corroborating evidence for Italians fighting for Carthage. A second-century Etruscan epitaph from Tarquinia commemorates Felsnas Larth, who is described as a soldier of Hannibal (Rix 1991).

The Italian military contributions to the war were not, therefore, a straightforward question of providing additional manpower for either army, or restricted to fighting as part of a single coordinated military strategy on one side or the other. Rather, Italians frequently undertook military action on their own initiative, which could be directed at the Roman or Carthaginian armies or at various local enemies of their own, under cover of assisting the two main powers. The fact that Rome had access to significant reserves of Italian manpower under the terms of alliances, despite suffering a significant reduction in this after 216, was undoubtedly an important factor, but not the only way in which Italians contributed to the conduct of the war. Hannibal's strategy of undermining the alliance by a mixture of threats and rewards was effective up to a point, but he seems to have lacked a strategy for creating a stable network of alliances within Italy which could provide an effective power-base.

Italian Defections: Reasons and Motives

The patterns of secession from Rome, and the factors that determined which side to support, provide some valuable insights into interstate relationships in Italy. One factor may be the circumstances in which states came into alliance with Rome and also the length and closeness of the connection. Many areas of Italy in which there were mass defections to Hannibal were relatively recent conquests, with a long history of resistance to Rome and a powerful sense of regional, non-Latin identity. The Samnites, for instance, had fought several long and bitter wars against Rome and many parts of the region had been part of the Roman alliance for less than a century. Large parts of Lucania, Bruttium,

and Apulia were only absorbed during the Pyrrhic war, which ended in 270. As a result, there was relatively little Roman colonization in these regions and ties with Rome may have been relatively tenuous.¹⁰ In addition, almost all the rebels had a relationship with Rome based on alliance. The Roman and Latin colonies, and areas such as Umbria which had a high level of Roman colonization, remained loyal. There are references to fears at Rome that some Umbrians were wavering in 209/8 (Livy 27.21–24, 28.10.4–5), and in 209, as just mentioned, 12 Latin colonies refused to supply further troops, but for the most part, colonies remained loyal to Rome.

However, these factors cannot explain the defection of significant numbers of Campanians. Many Campanian cities had long-standing relationships with Rome. Some were *cives sine suffragio* and therefore were Roman citizens, albeit without the vote. Complex networks of personal and family connections between the elites of different cities were commonplace in ancient Italy, and were significant in interstate relations. Many leading families of Campania enjoyed close connections with the Roman elite, a factor that caused hesitation about defecting (Livy 23.4.6–8). For example, Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of the Capuan revolt, was the son-in-law of Appius Claudius and the father-in-law of M. Livius Drusus (Livy 23.2.6). Others had ties of guest-friendship (*hospitium*) with members of the Roman nobility. However, these personal connections did not prevent revolts against Rome, and Livy (25.18) illustrates the personalized nature of the conflict by describing a series of single combats between Roman and Campanian *hospites*.

An important factor is that many Italians may have resented the loss of autonomy inherent in their relationship with Rome. This was most acute for those with *civitas sine suffragio*, since this status removed independence without giving political rights at Rome, but all Italians had suffered some loss of autonomy, particularly if (as Rich suggests) many were not protected by a treaty. Unfortunately, we do not know how burdensome Roman demands on the allies were. Wars in Italy were endemic in the fourth–third centuries, and Rome may have made significant military demands, but since few details of levies have survived, it is difficult to be certain.¹¹ Other forms of Roman interference, such as meddling in internal affairs of allied states, are not attested until the second century, but there is little evidence for non-military contact in the third century. However, autonomy and self-determination were an important aspect of the ancient state, and it is not at all impossible that the allies resented the limitations placed on them by Rome, whether these resulted in direct limits on their freedom or not. The sources emphasize the foreignness and ethnically heterogeneous nature of Hannibal's army, in comparison with the ties of blood and kinship that united the Roman alliance (Pol. 3.61.5, 11.19.3–4; Livy 25.12.5–9, 26.13.7, 29.10.4; Russo 2007), but Italy was itself divided into many different cultural and ethnic

groups, and this may not necessarily have undermined the appeal of Hannibal's rhetoric of liberation, particularly for states such as Capua and Tarentum, which had been powerful states in their own right in the fourth century.

The factors that drove Italians to revolt obviously varied according to individual circumstance, but some of the instances described by Livy give an insight. In his description of the defections of Capua, Locri, Croton, and Tarentum, he highlights the importance of local contacts and alliances, independent of Rome, and also political conflict and instability (Livy 24.1.1–3.15, 25.8.3–13.10, 25.15.2–5, Pol. 8.24.7). Italian states at this date were mostly controlled, politically and socially, by groups of aristocrats who were in constant competition against their peers for power and dominance. The Campanian town of Compsa defected when the pro-Roman elite, led by the Mopsii, lost power to their political rivals, led by Statius Trebius (Livy 23.1), while Nola was evenly split between two political factions, one of which wished to remain allied with Rome while the other saw defection to Hannibal as a possible means to take power (Livy 23.17–19), and similar scenarios are found elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, a group of Campanian nobles approached Hannibal after Trasimene and offered to defect from Rome if they could gain power at Capua (Livy 22.13.10). When the city finally did defect in 216, Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of the revolt, negotiated with Hannibal as a means of gaining power and undermining his political rivals, and also to secure treaty terms more advantageous than those granted by Rome (Livy 23.2–4). Personal relations and struggles for power between individuals were also a factor in defections back to Rome later in the war. Both Salapia and Arpi, for example, were taken back into alliance with Rome when the pro-Hannibal faction was deposed (Livy 24.45–47; Appian, *Hann.* 45–47).

The importance of personal political rivalries within states as a factor in patterns of alliance and defection are common to all accounts of the war. Livy, in particular, describes these in terms of a power struggle between the elite and the lower social classes, contrasting the pro-Roman elites of Italy with the Hannibalic sympathies of the masses and demagogic politicians who sought to stir them up against Rome (Livy 24.1–3).¹² In many cases the factional politics described do not fit this model of elites versus the lower orders, but are clearly power struggles within the elite. However, this does not undermine the general point that there was fierce and often violent political rivalry in many Italian states, and the decision whether to support Rome or secede from the alliance may have been driven by political opportunism as much as by wider concerns.

Elsewhere, the question of whether to support Rome or Hannibal seems to have been influenced by long-standing local conflicts and rivalries. At Croton

and Locri, for instance, defection was the result of long-standing animosities between the Greeks and their Bruttian neighbours, as well as political strife. The Bruttians took advantage of the war to attack some of the Greek cities in Calabria. They failed to capture Rhegium, but Hannibal was able to exploit fears of a Bruttian attack at both Croton and Locri to persuade these cities to secede to him (Livy 24.1.1–3; Lomas 1993, 68–70).

Further light may be shed by the nature of relations between Hannibal and the various Italian states that supported him. The terms offered by him varied. Those cities that resisted him but were forced to surrender frequently suffered significant damage. Nuceria, which surrendered in 216 following a siege, was sacked, but the citizens were allowed to leave unharmed, and similar terms were imposed on Acerrae (Livy 23.15–16, 19). Those that defected voluntarily received preferential treatment. The agreement reached with Capua stated that “no Carthaginian general or magistrate should have jurisdiction over any Campanian citizen and no Campanian citizen should be forced to serve in the army or perform another duty against his will; and that Capua was to have its own laws and magistrates...” (23.7.1–2). The Locrians, in contrast, were allowed their independence but with the proviso that they should provide military help to Hannibal (24.1.13), while the Tarentines were guaranteed independence and exempted from paying tribute (25.8.8).¹³

Whether Hannibal ever required his new Italian allies to fight as part of his army, rather than defending themselves against Rome, is difficult to establish. There are some known joint operations, such as the unsuccessful attempts by Tarentine and Carthaginian forces to eject the Roman garrison from the acropolis at Tarentum (Livy, 25.11.1–13.10, 25.15.2–5, 25.22.14–16, 26.5.1, 26.39; Pol. 8.32–33; Appian, *Hann.* 34.142; Zon. 9.5), and the epitaph of the Etruscan who fought for Hannibal suggests that there was some military cooperation, but the evidence is limited.

The war in southern Italy was far from a binary conflict between Rome and her allies on the one hand and Hannibal and the rebel Italians on the other. It fragmented into a mosaic of local conflicts, in which support for Rome or for Hannibal was often a pretext for, or secondary to, the pursuit of ongoing local grievances. One of the weaknesses of Hannibal’s strategy was that he failed to create a network of alliances to rival that of Rome. His aim appears to have been to deny Rome Italian resources and support rather than to systematically make use of them himself. The global issue of whether to remain loyal to Rome or to support Hannibal was not necessarily the central point for some cities, but was merely the issue around which local considerations and internal political divisions crystallized. The evidence seems to point to local factors, both interstate contacts or conflicts and domestic politics, as being one of the most influential factors in decisions on whether to remain in alliance with Rome.

The Post-Secession Settlement: Italy and Rome in 200

The aftermath of Hannibal's invasion was a period of considerable disruption for Italy. In the immediate term, the peace settlements reached by Rome with allies who had defected varied, but many suffered considerable losses. The most severely treated was Capua. The leaders of the revolt were executed and 300 other leading Campanians were imprisoned, while many other Capuans were enslaved. The city itself lost its status as an independent state. It was declared to be property of the Roman people and its civic organization was dismantled. All local administration was thereafter carried out by magistrates elected by the various *pagi* or regions of the city, but there was no central political authority (Livy 26.16.5–8). This was exceptionally harsh, and was intended to make an example of Rome's most powerful Italian rival, but it was not the only rebel area to suffer. The Bruttians may have lost a lot of territory and also been disarmed (Appian, *Hann.* 61.252–3) as a punishment for supporting Hannibal to the very end of his Italian campaign, and Tarentum was harshly treated (Livy 27.21.8, 25.1–5; Appian, *Hann.* 49; Plut. *Fab.* 22). Other cities simply had the terms of their prewar alliance reimposed, along with measures such as the execution, exile, or enslavement of the pro-Hannibal elements of the population, provision for the return of exiled pro-Roman leaders, and confiscation of territory or other wealth.¹⁴

In some areas of Italy, direct control via a Roman commissioner was maintained for some considerable time after the war. Tarentum and Locri were placed under the control of Roman *praefecti* (Livy 27.25.1–5, 31.29.9–10, 38.42.5–6; 39.39.8–10, 41.6–7; Appian, *Syr.* 15.64; Plut. *Flamininus* 1.4), and a commissioner was in charge of Tarentum and Apulia as late as 186 (Livy 31.29.9–10, 38.42.5–6, 39.39.8–10). In addition to the penalties for states that had revolted, the senate also punished allies that had failed to support Rome actively throughout the war. Senatorial commissions to examine the loyalty of individuals were set up in Etruria in 203 (Livy 29.36.10–12), partly due to a fear that many Etruscans were negotiating with Mago. The twelve Latin colonies which had ceased to fulfill their military obligations after 209 were also dealt with harshly.¹⁵ A tax was imposed on them and their troop quotas were doubled, with the additional proviso that the elite were to be fully liable for all forms of military service, and that these troops should serve outside Italy wherever required.

A large amount of land was confiscated from secessionist allies as part of the post-war settlement, and became Roman *ager publicus*, and much of this was used for an extensive program of colonial foundations. A total of four new Latin colonies and 16 Roman colonies were established in the period between

195 and 177, most of which were in the areas of southern Italy that had been badly affected by the war.¹⁶ The sites seem to have been partly selected to secure some of the more vulnerable areas of Italy, and especially to guard coastal areas. However, they also had administrative, demographic, and cultural implications. The settlement of colonists in these regions introduced new population, as well as changing the legal status and administrative structures of communities, along with elements of Roman culture. Archaeological investigation of one of these colonies, Buxentum, suggests that it had a dramatic impact on the settlement patterns of the area, and also disproves Livy's assertion that many of these colonies failed (Livy 39.23.3–4; de Polignac and Gualtieri 1991).

The events of 218–200 also had a fundamental and far-reaching impact on the relations between Rome and her Italian allies. Although peace was made with Carthage in 200, Rome was still facing numerous wars overseas, in Spain, Greece, and Macedon, which placed a heavy military burden on the allies, particularly as military service increasingly involved longer terms of service, service outside Italy, and lesser rewards than those given to Roman troops. The expansion of Rome as a Mediterranean power also tilted the balance of power in Italy decisively in favor of Rome, and in the years after the Hannibalic war, Roman dominance of her allies became increasingly overt.

The social and economic impact of the war on Italy, particularly southern Italy, has been a controversial issue, with some historians arguing that it fatally and permanently undermined the agrarian economy of the region (cf. especially Toynbee 1965; Brunt 1971; Hopkins 1978; Cornell 1996). This is far from clear-cut, but it seems evident that it caused a lot of short-term disruption and hardship. Some communities never recovered from the devastation caused by both sides in the war, and from the impoverishment and loss of population caused by the war and the subsequent settlements imposed by Rome. Many cities of southern Italy continued to function as urban centers but never regained their former size and prosperity. However, estimates of the damage done by Hannibal, and the length of time it took to recover, vary widely. Some crops, especially olives, take a long time to recover, but others become viable much more quickly, and the recovery of Italian agriculture may have been quicker than sometimes suggested (Brunt 1971, 269–277).

The depopulation question is more difficult to address thanks to lack of reliable statistics. There were certainly problems, due both to high casualties during the war and to the continued need for military manpower after it, and there is no doubt that terms of service were becoming longer as a citizen militia designed for fighting local and seasonal campaigns struggled to cope with the demands of distant and long-term warfare. However, the level of colonization, particularly in northern Italy, suggests that there was still a considerable level of surplus population (Brunt 1971, 168–70). What was involved

was not so much depopulation in the absolute sense as a redistribution of population from the rebellious areas of southern Italy to the newly colonized north, and from rural to urban areas. The longer-term economic impact, and whether the war caused permanent damage to the agrarian economy of Italy, is more debatable and is outside the scope of this chapter. Although archaeological evidence suggests that the economic damage was less far-reaching and fundamental than some scholars, notably Toynbee, believed, there is no doubt that the Hannibalic War had an important and lasting impact on Italy and its relationship with Rome.

In conclusion, Hannibal's policy of weakening Rome by undermining her alliance in Italy correctly identified domination of Italy as an important source of Rome's power. However, his strategy of encouraging defections met with only partial and short-term success. Most Italians were inclined to remain in alliance with Rome until a series of major defeats cast doubt on her ability to sustain her role as military leader. However, the battle of Cannae, and the arrival of Hannibal in southern Italy, revealed some significant stresses in Rome's relations with Italy. Powerful potential rivals to Rome, such as Capua and Tarentum, saw an opportunity to re-establish their independence, as did some of the other recently conquered areas such as Bruttium. The fact that some of these states continued to support Hannibal until a late stage in the war suggests that although he may have overestimated Italian dissatisfaction with Rome, the notion of regaining independence had a considerable appeal to a significant part of southern Italy.

Ultimately, however, Hannibal's inability to build a network of alliances of his own, or to make inroads in the areas where Roman colonization was high, undermined his strategy. In addition, much of his Italian support derived not from a positive desire to support him, but from local issues that had little to do with the wider conflict between Rome and Carthage. Some Italian states saw an opportunity to break away from Rome and establish their own areas of influence, while others were driven by internal political considerations. Despite testing Roman control of Italy severely, Hannibal did not manage to undermine it fatally. Paradoxically, however, the legacy of the war and of Rome's rise to Mediterranean-wide power was an important factor in the later breakdown of the alliance and ultimately, the outbreak of the Social War.

FURTHER READING

There are a number of good general accounts of the Second Punic War, including Lazenby 1978, Bagnall 1990, and Goldsworthy 2000, but none concentrate exclusively on Italy. Brunt 1971 and Sherwin-White 1973 are authoritative works on the demography of Italy and on military and political organization. Lomas 1996 includes

a selection of sources for Italy in the Hannibalic War. Two volumes of papers on Italy, Herring and Lomas 2000 and G. Bradley, E. Isayev, and C. Riva (eds), *Ancient Italy: Regions without Boundaries* (Exeter, 2007), provide a wide range of information about the regions and peoples of Italy. Cornell 1995 is an excellent introduction to early Rome, up to the period of the Punic wars.

NOTES

1. The Apennine peoples seem to have been governed by elected magistrates in much the same way as a city, and to have banded together into larger political units, each known as a *touto*. Religious sanctuaries probably served as the meeting points, and a particularly impressive example at Pietrabbondante has been identified as a possible meeting place for the whole region.
2. Cities in central Latium were given full Roman citizenship, while those of S. Latium and N. Campania became *cives sine suffragio*, with the exception of Praeneste, Cora, Signia, Norba, Setia, and Circeii, which were given Latin status.
3. Roman citizenship became more sought-after in the second century, but in earlier times it was viewed as a punishment and was greatly resented. In 304, for instance, the Aequi were willing to go to war because they feared that Rome would try to force them to take Roman citizenship if they accepted peace (Livy 9.45; Lomas 1996, 35, 48). Autonomy was highly valued and Roman citizenship could be seen as a gross imposition, and fiercely opposed.
4. Hostages were taken from Thurii and Tarentum (Livy 25.10.1–3).
5. Livy's narrative is, however, deeply hostile to the Capuans, so this may also be also be an attempt to depict them as unreliable and treacherous from an early point in the war.
6. Livy (22.51.1–4) presents a debate after Cannae in which Hannibal's officers urge him to march on Rome, but it has been argued that he never intended this, and deliberately avoided taking on the areas that had high proportions of Roman citizens and colonists, instead focusing on building up a block of support in Campania and southern Italy (Lazenby 1996, 44–45; cf. Chapters 14, 17).
7. Our sources make reference to a list, the *formula togatorum*, which determined the annual levies of allied troops (Pol. 6.21.4–5, Livy 22.57.9, 27.9–10, 34.56.3–7, *CIL* 1², 2.585, lines 21 and 50), but the exact nature of this is unclear. It has variously been described as the maximum number of men that Rome was permitted to demand from each ally under the terms of a treaty (Beloch 1880, 210ff.; Toynbee 1965, 263–265), or the specific number demanded for each particular year (Brunt 1971, 545–548; Boronowsky 1984).
8. Brunt 1971, 680; Lazenby 1996, 44. Brunt's estimates are based on Polybius' figures for the levy of 225, and give a figure of 330,000 allied infantry as the overall total available in Italy, of which 150,000 came from areas where there were a high number of secessions.
9. See note 15 and text.

10. The colonies founded in these areas were: Luceria (314), Venusia (291), Paestum (273), Beneventum (268), and Brundisium (264). All of these had Latin status and, with the exception of Brundisium, were concentrated in the northern part of Lucania and Apulia, and on the borders of Campania.
11. It has been suggested that demands for military support fell more heavily on the Roman and Latin colonies than on the *socii* (Brunt 1971). Other scholars have taken the view that levies of troops from all allies were likely to have been set at significant levels (Rich 1993, 43).
12. Livy states that all cities of southern Italy suffered from endemic civil strife between the elite and the people. He presents this in the language of late Republican Roman politics, contrasting the sound pro-Roman *optimates* with the demagogic and unreliable anti-Roman *populares*.
13. Some of these terms look suspiciously similar to those of Roman treaties, but they are not out of line with what is known of third and second century treaties in general, and are not inherently implausible.
14. For instance, at Atella and Calatia, the leaders of the rebellion were executed (Livy 26.16.5–8), and at Tarentum, a sum of 3,000 talents was removed from the city's treasury and 30,000 people were enslaved (Livy 27.16.7–9; Plut. *Fab.* 8, 21–23; Suet. *Gramm.* 18.1–3).
15. The colonies concerned were Nepete, Sutrium, Ardea, Cales, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Setia, Circeii, Narnia, and Interamna (Livy 29.15.2–5).
16. These were: the Roman colonies of Volturnum, Liternum, Puteoli, Salernum, Buxentum, Sipontum, Tempa, Croton (all 194), Pyrgi (191), Potentia, Pisaurum (184), Mutina, Parma, Saturnia (183), Gravisca (181), Luna (177); the Latin colonies of Thurii (193), Vibo Valentia (192), Bononia (189), Aquileia (181).

CHAPTER TWENTY

Punic Politics, Economy, and Alliances, 218–201

Pedro Barceló

The controversy surrounding the responsibility for the Second Punic War, one of the problem areas most discussed in ancient history, is crucially affected by the assessment made of the Carthaginian politicians involved. The interest that this controversy has aroused has less to do with contemporary relevance than with the heated disputes that have attended it. A dispute over the blame for the outbreak of World War I has gripped the attention of, in the main, German, English, French, and Italian scholars. These scholars believe they have discovered a similarly laid-out test arena in the situation at the beginning of the Second Punic War, and thereby opened a broader front for intellectual discussion in order to engage in a kind of surrogate war. Such inadmissible confusions of disparate presuppositions have not only clouded the view of the events of the third century BC, but have also extensively influenced the parameters of interpretation of the ancient sources. Only by revising this confused situation is it possible to reach a more adequate assessment of the role of the Carthaginian leadership, its economic interests, and the system of alliances it built up during the Second Punic War.

In contrast to the Roman author Fabius Pictor (cf. Pol. 3.8–11), who considered Hasdrubal's lust for power to be the cause of the escalating conflict, the Greek historian Polybius (3.10) pointed to Hamilcar, when he said in this connection: "As soon as Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage [the rape of Sardinia] added to his old indignation, had secured calm and peace for his country, he at once directed his efforts to Iberia, in order to use its resources for the war against the Romans. And this is to be considered the third cause; I refer to the successes of Carthaginian politics in Iberia. For on the basis of the power they acquired there, they went confidently to war."

Such reflections are colored by politics, despite the effort at a factual interpretation of the dispute. Their fundamental logic makes it seem that the initiative to wage war was a direct consequence of Carthaginian policy in Hispania, while Rome's role is correspondingly minimized. Yet the beginnings of the conflict were connected with the Romans meddling in the Carthaginians' Iberian affairs. In reality the matter in contention (in 218) was the resolution of a power dispute: how much room to maneuver were the Romans prepared to give Hannibal and Carthage? In analogy to the First Punic War, when Sicily was the apple of discord, the dispute was again about land to which both parties laid claim — the Carthaginian side conscious of having acquired legitimate spoils, the Roman side striving to be a great power. The root of this tug-of-war was Hispania, its resources, and its strategic significance for Carthage, which had regained its strength.

In accordance with the focus of our ancient sources on individuals, the Roman author Livy (21.10.11–13) caught the escalation of the situation that led to war in a monologue of dramatic tension, when he has the leading Carthaginian politician Hanno the Great make the following speech to the council of his home city:

This young man I hate and abhor as the fury that is firing this conflict. Nor is it simply a matter of his having to be surrendered to atone for the broken treaty. No, even if no one were demanding his punishment, he should be hauled off to the remotest limits of sea and land — banished to some place from which his name or news of him could not reach us, and where he could not upset the tranquility our nation now enjoys. I vote that we immediately send one set of ambassadors to Rome to make amends to the Senate, and then send others to tell Hannibal to withdraw his army from Saguntum, and then to surrender Hannibal himself to the Romans as the treaty requires. [translated by J.C. Yardley]

The scene is tendentious, like the source items commented on above which put the blame on particular Punic politicians. The idea that internal political rivalries in Carthage could go so far as high treason — handing over Hannibal would have meant nothing less — is a grotesque distortion of reality. Even when Hannibal came back from Italy without having achieved his aim and lost the battle of Zama (202), which entailed the capitulation of Carthage, there was no question of surrendering him. Why should a Carthaginian faction have demanded this, of all things, before the beginning of the war? With the emergence of two warring parties within Carthage, the pro-Roman authors spun a clever legend about the origin of the war, which could thus be ascribed exclusively to Hannibal.

Probably the setting up of a dualism between the Barcids and Carthage goes back to Fabius Pictor, who was at pains to free Rome of all guilt in the outbreak of war. If, as the authors friendly to Rome claim, public opinion in

Carthage was divided, this means only that a significant part of the Carthaginian citizenry thought like the Romans themselves and, in order to defuse the crisis, was even prepared to hand over the real warmonger, namely Hannibal. In statements of this kind we hear the voice of undisguised Roman war propaganda. The actual situation was different, as is shown in the development of the conflict, in the course of which Hannibal was able to count for two decades on the support of his home city (Pol. 3.8.9–11; 3.21; 9.22). In reality there was outrage against Rome in Carthage. The never-assuaged resentments at the rape of Sardinia must have escalated with the Roman interference in the Carthaginians' Iberian affairs. In addition, the Romans were despised for their brusque behavior, which was seen as deliberate provocation. Therefore the Carthaginians were highly motivated on entering the war; they blamed its outbreak on Roman *perfidia*.

As the cited examples show, any assessment of the historical role that is attributed to the Carthaginian leaders must take into account the use made of them later by authors friendly to Rome, who in view of the lack of Punic sources successfully asserted their authority to interpret them. Only if we give due weight to this fact may we approach correctly the question of the intention of their actions and their political aims.

Like the Carthaginian republic, Rome's was governed by a ruling class that defined itself by its political and military achievements. Yet, in contrast to the relatively well-documented networks of Roman politicians, knowledge of Punic prosopography is lacking.¹ The relevant Greek and Roman authors like Polybius, Diodorus, Livy, Cornelius Nepos, or Appian altogether give only a few pointers, some concise, some distorted, for forming an image of the leading Carthaginian statesmen.² The most important figures of this time are to be found amongst the Barcid clan, which contributed significantly to the shaping of Carthage's destiny during the third century BC. Its most prominent representatives Hamilcar (Geus 1994, 50–58) and his sons Hannibal (Geus, 75–94) Hasdrubal (Geus, 136–142) and Mago (Geus, 181–187) received political support from powerful allies, of whom the most prominent were Hasdrubal (Geus, 133–136) who was married to one of Hamilcar's daughters, and Hasdrubal son of Gisco (Geus, 143–148).

Confronting them was a cluster of rivals, with the above-mentioned Hanno the Great (Geus, 116–118) at their head, as well as Hasdrubal "the Ram" (Geus, 150). Of Hanno we know that while the First Punic War was raging he undertook an expedition to make conquests in Africa, which went as far as the region of Theveste, and afterwards during the Mercenaries' Revolt he emerged as the antagonist of Hamilcar Barca (cf. Chapter 12). Hanno was active as the representative of the landed gentry who had an interest in the extension of Carthage's *chora* and the increase of tributes from Libyan tribes that would follow. The kingdom of the Ptolemies, which rewarded the ruling classes with

legendary riches by exploiting the labor of the Egyptian population, was most likely the model for the efforts of the Carthaginian aristocracy to extend its power base at the expense of the Numidian population.

Hamilcar Barca's circle pursued an aim different from this African policy. Their interest was directed towards overseas territories, and sought compensation for the possessions in Sicily and Sardinia, ceded after the defeat in the First Punic War, by establishing a new *epikrateia* in Iberia. This was achieved through an expedition starting from the city of Gades, allied with Carthage, which brought large parts of the valley of the Guadalquivir under Punic control (from 237 on). Hamilcar's successor Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, founded a "New City" (Cartagena) in Iberia, which gave concrete form to the concept of a political and economic base for Carthage's expansion of power outside Africa. Roman demands for reparations were to be met and the foundations for the renewal of Carthage laid by the conquest of southern Hispania. At the same time this ambitious project opened new perspectives for commercial interests allied with the Barcids (shipbuilders, traders, artisans, etc.) who had suffered under the Mercenaries' Revolt.

Little is known about the territorial administration of the new *epikrateia*. Probably the Iberian peninsula was divided, like Carthaginian territory in North Africa, into several units of administration (*pagi*), which took into account not only military but also economic considerations.³ Possibly the dispersal of troops in the year 210, when Scipio Africanus set out on his first Iberian campaign, serves as a useful clue. At that time the land was divided into three military districts: the westernmost, that is, the Atlantic coast as far as the mouth of the Tagus, was under the command of Hasdrubal son of Gisco; the southernmost, comprising the region around Huelva and Gades as well as southern Andalusia, was overseen by Hannibal's youngest brother, Mago Barca, while the easternmost region from Carpetania to the Mediterranean coast with Cartagena as its center was administered by Hannibal's other brother Hasdrubal Barca.

The sudden death of Hamilcar Barca's son-in-law Hasdrubal (around 221) created a power vacuum.⁴ As it had done at the death of Hamilcar Barca, the colonial army took the initiative, which was subsequently approved by Carthage. The army opted for a man of promising talent who could bring to bear his origin as the son of Hamilcar Barca and the brother-in-law of Hasdrubal: Hannibal Barca. The successes achieved in Hispania gave weight to his family's claim to leadership, which is confirmed by the new issue of coins — which are, by the way, the only contemporary documents that are available to us. Scholars have long disagreed about whether the male heads depicted represent gods (such as Melqart/Hercules) or the Barcids themselves.⁵ Quite apart from the fact that in Hellenistic times only a vague distinction was made between prominent personalities and gods, it is entirely

thinkable that the minting programme of the Barcids, influenced as it was by the Greeks, consciously played with this ambiguity, which may be the meaning of the political statement made by these coin portraits. By comparing themselves with Melqart/Hercules, the Punic politicians stressed their power. In this context, the conquest of Hispania appears as a Herculean deed. It was a high priority to assert and defend this. The cult of Melqart/Hercules, exploited by Carthaginian propaganda as a synonym of victory, was to be transformed into the most effective weapon in the Barcid policy of expansion; we have at the same time an eloquent testimony to the widespread tendency toward Hellenization in the Carthaginian ruling classes.

Despite the supremacy of the Barcids, the republican character of the Carthaginian state remained unchanged. Notwithstanding their wide-ranging powers, Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal Barca were officials who acted in the name of Carthage as its representatives. Their power depended on the assent of the army, they exercised the charisma of rulers over the Hispanic peoples, success and prestige became the measure of their legitimacy, and in the manner of the *Diadochi* they founded cities and minted coins. For these reasons, the image of power exercised by the Barcids independently of their mother-city Carthage has established itself in scholarship.⁶

Yet despite the tensions that certainly arose (such as hostility from the followers of Hanno the Great — though not in the form suggested by Livy, 21.10.11–13), as was normal in an aristocratic society based on competition like that of Carthage, nevertheless there were repeated instances of a compromise of interests between the territorial military command and the central government. The mother-city was constantly asked for confirmation of the measures taken in Hispania and later in Italy. Members of the Carthaginian Senate, who had an important say, could be found in Hannibal's camp. Around him there developed an entourage like a court, of Hellenistic proportions. Punic officers, Greek intellectuals and politicians, as well as representatives of North African, Hispanic, Celtic, and Italian peoples constituted the heterogeneous band of Carthaginian dependents. It was multi-ethnic, selected on the basis of achievement and merit, and buoyed by the ambition to reshape the power-political conditions in the western Mediterranean according to Alexander's example.

The famous inscription that Hannibal had engraved in 205 on Cape Lacinium, shows a highly developed self-confidence (Pol. 3.33–36). His leadership of a mixture of peoples recalls the expeditions of the *Diadochi*. The other members of the Barcid house also acted within these parameters. Hasdrubal Barca defended the Hispanic possessions of Carthage from Roman attacks and in competing with the deeds of his brother Hannibal, he set in train an "Alexander-style" campaign from Hispania to Italy that receives little attention only because it failed (207). In view of the threatening defeat, Mago

Barca, Hannibal's youngest brother and his last hope, acted in a similar way. His efforts in southern Hispania during the last phase of the war, his Balearic and Ligurian expeditions, and his attempt to recruit a new army of mercenaries (205) may also be seen as part of this.

After Hannibal took the supreme command in Hispania, Carthage's power base constantly grew. The number of allies rose considerably (Edetani, Ilergetes, Turboletes, Carpetani etc.) and the army reached a high level of efficiency. Vigorous trade in Hispanic products (oil, grain, cord grass, preserved fish, wood, wool) filled the Carthaginians' coffers. The large reserves of precious metals in the treasury in Cartagena, the arsenal of weapons and the shipyards, the storehouses filled with all kinds of provisions and raw materials, and the many hostages that guaranteed the compliance of the Iberian tribes with the dominance of the Carthaginians, were the most visible proof of the growing prosperity of the Hispanic *epikrateia*. In addition, there was the systematic exploitation of the mineral wealth of southern Hispania (silver, copper, iron ore, lead), with deposits in the regions of Río Tinto, Huelva, Sierra Morena, Castulo, Cartagena, and Sierra Almagrera. The mine at Baebelo on its own produced 300 pounds of silver a day. The rules governing ownership of the mines remain unclear. It is possible that the native people received periodic payments for their use, but perhaps they were also annexed. In any case it appears that under the Barcids — in contrast to Roman times when private investors participated in the mining — the working of the mines appeared to be organized as a state monopoly, as the profits went into the Carthaginian state coffers.⁷ Owing to the immense productivity of these mines, more than anything else, Carthage rose once more to be a power to be reckoned with in the western Mediterranean region.

Of course the leading Punic politicians wanted to avert the looming armed conflict with Rome: the painful memory of the difficult suppression of the Mercenaries' Revolt weighed too heavily on them. But the uncompromising attitude of Rome to Hannibal strengthened solidarity within the Carthaginian camp, and welded the two centers of power, the mother-city and Barcid Hispania, firmly together against the common enemy. This did not mean, however, that no differences existed among the different leadership circles in Carthage.

The differing interests of the Punic elite were reflected in the setting of war aims. The highest priority in Carthaginian strategy was given to avoiding any operations on African soil, in order to respect the needs of the aristocratic landowners who wanted to protect their highly productive agricultural estates around the valley of the Mejerda and on the peninsula of Cape Bon. In addition, the Hispanic possessions were to be protected at all costs, guaranteeing the continuation of the business activities of the economic groups allied with the Barcid clan: they made considerable profits from the marketing and

processing of Hispanic raw materials and minerals. Finally, there was considerable interest in reconquering the lost territories in Sicily and Sardinia, in order to rally those groups who profited from maritime trade. These were the postulates that underlay the ensuing planning, which envisaged waging the war in Italy and pursuing a broadly based drive for alliance partners.⁸ How closely Hannibal adhered to this is underlined by the journey he undertook before the beginning of conflict (218) to the temple of Melqart, the equivalent of Hercules, in Gades, in order to seek his help in the impending expedition (Livy 21.21.9). Among the 12 labors of Hercules there was one that was particularly suited for use against the Romans: when Hercules drove the oxen of his defeated foe Geryon through Hispania and Gaul over the Alps as far as Italy — so the legend relates — the giant Cacus, who dwelt on the Aventine, tried to steal the animals as they went past, which Hercules, however, noticed in time. The thieving Cacus was then brought to account and punished. This episode from mythology was universally known and lent itself to making the antagonism between Rome and Carthage more graphic.

The mobilization of a symbolic figure like Melqart/Hercules, extremely popular in the western Mediterranean region, was for contemporaries linked with a clear message reaching out beyond the Iberian peninsula. The evocation of the divinity was, of course, not enough in itself, but had to be tied in with a current political program. From a consideration of ensuing events, it appears that at the heart of the religious-political appeal there was a call to liberation.⁹ The attractiveness of the offer made by Hannibal is seen in the fact that during the military engagements, states of some substance were to answer his call. Hannibal called all those who had unresolved disputes with Rome to join him. By offering the possibility of identifying themselves with a religious figure, he set in train a complex political initiative that seemed suited to gather under one roof all the opponents of Rome, though some were on bad terms with one another. For a man like Hannibal, who was distinguished, according to Livy, by his lack of piety (Livy 21.4.9 reproaches Hannibal with *nulla religio*), the foundation of an association of common interests against Rome represented a considerable political achievement.

Hannibal began the war with extensive military and logistical maneuvers, and brought into action the followers that he had acquired during the previous years. Along with a strong land army and capable officers, the mainstay of his power was the nurturing of his connections with the most important Iberian noble families. Little is known about the conditions of his treaties with the Hispanic peoples. We may assume that Carthage took on the payment of the troops they put at his disposal, and the troops pledged to serve under Punic officers. As Hasdrubal had done before him, Hannibal married a Spanish noblewoman. Gestures of this kind made it easier for the Barcids to obtain recognition by the Hispanic peoples of their claim to leadership. An extensive

network of alliances had been achieved by means of force, treaties, and connections through marriage, which under Hannibal Barca ultimately encompassed a considerable part of the Iberian peninsula. Admittedly, we know few of the allies of Carthage by name, like the Iberian princes Edeco, Indibilis, and Mandonius. It was possible to levy considerable numbers of troops amongst the Hispanic population. Till the last phase of the war Iberian cavalry and infantrymen were to play a decisive role in Carthage's army.

Apart from the recruiting of allies, Carthaginian war strategy stood on two further foundations: on the one hand, it was essential that military advances be made on Italian soil in order to direct the Roman war effort primarily to that region and, on the other hand, the flow of money and supplies from Hispanic bases had to function smoothly if the army in Italy was to be kept in a fighting state. For the latter to occur, the working of the Hispanic mines could on no account be interrupted, and for this reason Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal remained in Iberia with sufficient troops to organize the supply lines.

From a conspectus of the scattered information in the relevant ancient authors like Polybius, Strabo, Livy, and Pliny about Iberian resources, it is possible to estimate what war materials Carthage had at its disposal to wage war against Rome. The mining districts of southern Hispania alone, the regions round Cartagena and Baebelo, produced about 46 tonnes of silver a year, which was the equivalent of about 10 million *denarii*. The total cost of stationing the 60,000-strong Carthaginian army (weapons, ships, war materials, provisions, pay) at the height of mobilization just before the beginning of the war was about 9.5 million *denarii* per year, the equivalent of 44 tonnes of silver. It follows that the production by Hispanic mines was sufficient to guarantee not only the maintenance of Hannibal's Italian army but also the maintenance of the troops remaining in Iberia. Any surplus was probably transferred to Carthage as a contribution to the overall financing of the war.¹⁰ It is clear from this that the continuation of military operations by the Carthaginians depended on the uninterrupted working of the Hispanic mines: they represented the main support of the Punic war economy.

The other supply base, the city of Carthage, was responsible for coordinating the military operations in the various theaters of war, and logistical support was provided by sea for the armies operating outside North Africa. To meet these requirements Carthage could use the surplus from the Hispanic mines and the rich agricultural resources of Northern Africa. The latter must not on any account be underestimated, as is made clear by the situation that arose at the end of the Second Punic War, which Carthage lost: although at that time the economic sphere of the Carthaginians remained restricted to North Africa, they were able, in a short time, to pay out the very high Roman indemnity. This amounted to the considerable sum of 10,000 silver talents, which is convincing proof of the economic power of the North African region (Livy 33.47.2).

The mobilization of Carthaginian resources went relatively smoothly in the first phase, although Roman forces under the brothers Scipio could be positioned in northern Hispania and despite the dissensions within the Carthaginian leadership: a commander named Hamilcar (Geus, 59f.) staged a revolt against Hasdrubal Barca, who was thus forced for a time to fight a war on two fronts, against the rebels in his own camp and against the Romans. In the Italian theater, Hannibal's victories at the Ticinus (218), at the Trebia (218), and at Lake Trasimene (217) made it possible to build up a front of new allies, who were mainly recruited from those parts of the Po valley settled by Celts. They were the first to fight alongside the Carthaginians outside Iberia and Africa.

Hannibal's main military support came from his loyal officers, who largely acted independently and through their initiative and their daring were able to achieve spectacular successes. Outstanding amongst these are, for instance, Hannibal's nephew Hanno (Geus, 121–124), an extraordinarily competent troop commander, Hamilcar (Geus, 60f.) whose skill forced the surrender of Locri (215), the experienced cavalry leader Maharbal (Geus, 194f.) and Hasdrubal (Geus, 148) the leader of the engineers. In addition a number of leading figures who had important independent commands, such as Hasdrubal the Bald (Geus, 148f.), who in 215 led extensive military action in Sardinia, Himilco (Geus, 170) who in 213 determined the course of the war in Sicily, his hapless successor Hanno (Geus, 124f.), who was unable to maintain the Carthaginian position on the island, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, who was to lead the defense of North Africa in the last phase of the war.

Since the reports that we have about the course of the Second Punic War, in so far as they record Punic action explicitly, are fixated completely on Hannibal's operations, we have an incomplete and probably distorted picture of the extremely complex measures undertaken from Carthage in order to meet the overall demands of the war. It is beyond doubt that Hannibal was the most important Carthaginian commander, but alongside him fought other troop commanders who also engaged in major battles, but are far less well known owing to the thinness of our sources. This limited view of events can lead us to consider all war planning to be inspired by Hannibal alone. This was by no means the case. To be sure, Hannibal was able to act according to his own lights in all aspects of warfare in the Italian theater; nevertheless, it was the Carthaginian government that was responsible for the overall conduct of the war. This applied particularly to the setting of war aims, the undertaking of foreign-policy efforts to win over allies, the ratifying of treaties, the coordination of troop operations in the various sectors of conflict, and the organization and distribution of supply.

There was a particular demand on Carthage's initiative after Cannae (216), when Hannibal, in the wake of this huge test of power, was forced to give up the war of movement, so successful till then, and apply himself to securing his

position in southern Italy. There was, in fact, a change of direction as a result of the battle of Cannae. To get a feeling of its significance, one must relativize the heavily ideologized way Cannae has been represented: Hannibal engaged the numerically very superior Roman troops with flexible tactics, characterized by agility and clever use of the terrain. Although there were small losses on the Carthaginian side compared to the huge Roman losses, Hannibal did not dare to exploit the favorable moment: by refraining from attacking Rome directly, he gave away the victory that was almost won. This, or something similar, is the quintessence of what emerges from the portrayal by Classical authors and modern interpreters (Liv 22.44–61).

The question is merely whether this was what really happened. The prevailing opinion sees in Cannae an overwhelming victory by Hannibal, which was then gambled away through his indecision. Hannibal, as the frequent reproach puts it, could have ended the war by taking Rome after the disaster suffered by the Romans. The conclusion is that his inability to rouse himself to this action proved he was a general with military competence, but in the end was defeated by his political blindness. Emblematic of this view is the now proverbial dictum that Livy puts in the mouth of the Carthaginian general Maharbal, hurled at Hannibal after the battle of Cannae: “You know how to win a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to make use of it.”

The other interpretation, which comes closer to historical reality, assesses the significance of the battle in a more sober way. Though Hannibal was able to dominate the field of battle and achieve a brilliant tactical victory, the defeat of the Roman army was at the expense of considerable losses on his own side. Hannibal’s losses were proportionally greater than is shown in a purely numerical comparison of the opposing sides’ resources. His army was much reduced after the violent clash. He was therefore no longer in a position to continue offensive warfare in his old style. The search for political solutions that Hannibal undertook assiduously after Cannae is not evidence of his ineptitude as a statesman; rather, it is evidence of the exact opposite, because the winning over of new allies gave him urgently needed breathing space to continue his offensive in Italy. Soon the Romans were forced to fight on several fronts simultaneously.

Hannibal had made a close study of Pyrrhus’ campaign in Italy, together with the reasons for his failure. In the end, the king of Epirus had, despite his military superiority to the Romans, suffered a political defeat because he had not managed to draw enough allies to join him. The situation for Carthage in the First Punic War was similar when it had been forced to carry the entire burden alone. To avoid this, Hannibal did everything he could to build up an Italian front directed against Rome, with its center in Campania, Apulia, and Bruttium.

Impressed by the victory at Cannae, a few cities in Samnium, Lucania, Bruttium, and Apulia did indeed join the Carthaginians; it was particularly significant that the wealthy Campanian city of Capua, the second-biggest in

Italy, situated in the middle of the most fertile lands of the peninsula, defected from Rome and went over to Hannibal. Capua obtained favourable conditions, kept complete internal autonomy, was not required to supply troops to the Carthaginians and obtained a promise of protection against Rome. With this circumspect treatment of its allies Carthage created a model for treaties that could be applied to other parties interested in an association with Carthage. The reasons for Capua's move are obvious: the ambitious city had the hope of playing a leading role in a protectorate dominated by Carthage, embracing major parts of Southern Italy, and thus determining the destiny of southern Italy without the tutelage of Rome (Livy 23.10.2).¹¹

Similar motives prompted the Macedonian king Philip V, who was not kindly disposed to the Romans after their repeated incursions into Illyria, to make approaches to Carthage. Therefore, under the impact of the overwhelming Carthaginian successes in Italy, Carthage and Macedonia struck an alliance that was cosigned by the councillors from Hannibal's entourage. The most important clause covered mutually guaranteed support in the war against Rome. The Carthaginian-Macedonian alliance, though not making any impact on Hannibal's plans, was not entirely worthless. It served Carthaginian ends in so far as it forced Rome to commit itself to action in the Adriatic region. The treaty as transmitted by Polybius, signed at the climax of Carthaginian power (215), is the only document available that gives any kind of insight into Carthage's political intentions. On the other hand, the version of events offered by Livy 23.33f. is completely distorted and must therefore be left out of account.¹² Polybius 7.9 transcribes the treaty as follows:¹³

Hannibal the general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and all Carthaginians serving with him, declare that, as it seems good to you and to us, we should bind ourselves by oath to be friends, kinsmen, and brothers, on these conditions. That King Philip and the Macedonians and the rest of the Greeks who are their allies shall protect the Carthaginians, as their sovereign treaty-partner, Hannibal their general, and those with him, and those under the dominion of Carthage who have the same laws as they; likewise the people of Utica and all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage, and our soldiers and allies, and all cities and peoples in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, with whom we make friendship and alliance.

King Philip and the Macedonians and the other Greeks who are their allies shall be protected and guarded by the Carthaginians who are serving with us, by the people of Utica and by all cities and peoples that are subject to Carthage, by our allies and soldiers and all peoples and cities in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, who are our allies, and by such others as may hereafter become our allies there.

We will enter into no plot against each other, nor lie in ambush for each other, but with all zeal and good fellowship, without deceit or secret design, we will be enemies of such as war against the Carthaginians, always excepting the kings,

cities, and peoples with whom we have sworn treaties of alliance. We, too, will be the enemies of such as war against King Philip, always excepting the kings, cities, and peoples with whom we have sworn treaties of alliance.

You will be our allies in the war in which we are engaged with the Romans until the gods vouchsafe the victory to us and to you, and you will give us such help as we have need of and as we agree upon. When the gods have given us the victory in the war against the Romans and their allies, if then the Romans request terms of peace, we will make it such that the same friendship will embrace you too, and on the condition that they will never be allowed to make war upon you; that the Romans shall no longer be masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, the Parthini and the Atitanians. that the Romans shall return to Demetrius of Pharos all his subjects who now are in the dominions of Rome.

If ever the Romans make war on you or on us, we will help each other in the war as may be required on either side.

The wording of this unique text makes clear that the Carthaginians were by no means counting on the destruction of Rome. Not once was Roman hegemony over large parts of Italy questioned. Carthage, having gained a strong position for the time being, had no objections to a powerful state, though it did object to an overpowerful Roman state. It was not the idea of world dominance, but rather the principle of the balance of power, as had been put into practice in the eastern Mediterranean under Hellenistic influence, that seemed to determine Carthage's plans for the future shaping of the political structure in the western Mediterranean.¹⁴ Carthage's political concepts are clearly free of the exuberance of the moment. Its vision was in no way clouded by the most recent successes on Italian soil. Rather, ideas visible in the text of the treaty are distinguished by a proper realistic assessment of its own and its opponent's power potential.

In the eyes of the Roman senators, however, foreign-policy aims were successful only if the enemy was crushed and Rome held the clear upper hand. The exercise of unshared hegemony was Rome's leading foreign-policy principle.¹⁵ In contrast, a Carthaginian model of power-sharing becomes clear, based on cooperation with selected allies who were offered privileged partnership, and this can be understood as a counter to Roman unilateralism.

Even more significant than the alliance with Macedonia was the upheaval which occurred after the death of King Hiero. He had been a loyal ally of the Romans since the beginning of the First Punic War. It was a master-stroke of Carthaginian diplomacy to have persuaded Syracuse to change sides. After the death of Hiero his grandson Hieronymus came to power. Carthage took careful note of this development in Syracuse and did everything to make the advantages of a change in alliance attractive to the new ruler. The decisive factor was the embassy of Hippocrates and Epicydes, two Syracusans who had

Carthaginian citizenship and served in Hannibal's army, who were sent to Syracuse to act for the Carthaginian cause. They played a decisive part in the creation of an anti-Roman front (Pol. 7.5.1–3, 7–9; Livy 24.6.1–3).¹⁶ After a series of uprisings and internal upheavals, Syracuse changed sides and joined Carthage (214). The alliance was made under similar conditions to those that had been granted to Capua. Hippocrates and Epikydes were elected *strategoi*. This new direction in Syracusan policy influenced the course of the war because the Romans now saw themselves constrained to strengthen their military presence in Sicily considerably. At the same time Syracuse's change of sides had a seriously adverse effect on the supply situation in Rome because the shipments of grain from Sicily came to a stop.

Yet at the highest point of its success Carthage was forced to recognize that the secession of Italian cities from Rome had reached its limits. The Latins, Etruscans, Sabines, Umbrians, and Picentines as well as the majority of the Campanians remained loyal to Rome, and the important port city of Naples withstood several attempts at capture by Hannibal. He had won many important victories since his arrival in Italy, and still Rome did not yield. In addition to this there were the operational problems of the army, encircled in southern Italy. The defection of Italian cities to Carthage was not entirely advantageous. In most cases the cities who took the risk of defection were isolated places surrounded by the enemy. This posed considerable supply bottlenecks for the Carthaginian army and made military operations more difficult. If Hannibal wanted to retain credibility, he had to protect these partners who had come over to his side, but this obligation was the very thing that limited his mobility. In order to increase the numbers of Italian allies he had to act offensively, and once he had won new allies, he needed to defend them. His army was not big enough to fulfill this double demand. This was the dilemma he faced after the Romans, having learnt from experience, avoided challenging him openly, and instead constantly increased their encirclement. As a consequence of these political and military constraints, Hannibal lost more and more of his initiative and sank deeper and deeper into hopeless guerrilla warfare.

For the sake of completeness we must mention the creation, still rightly debated among scholars, of a parallel currency for the Italian cities, using Roman monetary standards, supposedly done on Hannibal's initiative. By these means Hannibal is supposed to have attempted to free the Italian allies of Rome from economic dependency and the monetary paternalism of Rome, without taking from them the advantages of an extended area of economic activity.¹⁷

At the end of 213 Hannibal achieved a significant diplomatic success: Tarentum defected from Rome and went over to Carthage. Angered by the cruel treatment of their countrymen held hostage in Rome, a group of

Tarentine nobles, whom Hannibal had freed after the battle of Lake Trasimene, made contact with the Carthaginians. This occurred at the religious festival in honor of Melqart/Hercules at the Lake of Avernus (214), when Hannibal tried to gather the peoples of Italy around him. At this time the plan to win over the biggest Greek city in Italy was made (Livy 24.13.1–6). While Hannibal's agents were duping the Roman troops occupying Tarentum, they secretly prepared for the handing-over of the city to the Carthaginians, which then occurred (Pol. 8.24–34; Livy 35.7–11). Like Capua and Syracuse, Tarentum was a city of economic and strategic significance, indispensable for anyone who wanted to dominate Italy. Yet the citadel and thus the control of the harbor remained in Roman hands, which represented a serious obstacle for Hannibal because the harbor that he needed urgently remained blockaded.

What support did Hannibal receive from Carthage? Trouble-free cooperation was critically important in successful warfare. The largely unthreatened city had the task of obtaining material for the prosecution of the war and coordinating its distribution. In addition, it was constantly necessary to recruit new mercenaries and transport them by sea to their battle fronts. One of the biggest shipments took place immediately after the victory at Cannae. At that time Hannibal's brother Mago returned to Carthage, where he obtained a substantial body of troops, but it had to be sent not to Italy as intended, but to be diverted to Iberia (215) to stabilize Carthage's weakened position there (Livy 23.11.7–13.8).

Prosecuting the war brought great strain and expense to Carthage, and in the long view was only to be managed if the income from its own trade, the tributes and shipments from the surrounding lands in Africa, and the silver exports from Hispania arrived regularly. The superiority of the Roman fleet impeded this urgently needed inflow, and this raised tensions amongst the citizenry. The policies of the Barcids had always been controversial (Livy 23.12.6–13.6); although they were supported by the majority of the population. Hannibal's first spectacular successes had beyond doubt reinforced Carthaginian self-esteem, which had been damaged after the last war against Rome. It is easy to imagine how Hannibal's countrymen shared his fears and rejoiced in his victories. But the longer the war lasted and the more the prospect of an advantageous peace dwindled, the gloomier their mood became. In particular, the opening of new war fronts, the increased supplies and the larger troop reinforcements that this entailed caused additional difficulties.

In view of the sparse sources, it is difficult to establish the degree of dissent between Hannibal and a section of the political elite of Carthage. We can assume that it existed. Amongst those in the anti-Barcid faction must have been those who were to use Hannibal's return to Carthage in order to put him on trial for the way he had conducted the war. It is generally accepted that there was friction in establishing priorities in battle. For many Carthaginian

politicians, dominating Sicily and Sardinia was more important than Hannibal's successes in Italy, particularly after it became clear that the Romans maintained their unrelenting position against Carthage despite several defeats. Admittedly, the differences of opinion within the Carthaginian citizenry should not be interpreted, as they are by Cornelius Nepos (*Hann.* 1) as a stab-in-the-back legend, according to which Hannibal could easily have defeated the Romans if he had not been prevented from doing so by the disfavor of his fellow citizens. It was more probably the result of rivalries, like the rivalry between Hannibal and Mago the Samnite (Geus, 189f.), as Polybius relates (9.25): "These two men [Hannibal and Mago] had from their earliest youth loyally stood at each other's side in everything they did, had captured many cities in Iberia and Italy by force or through surrender, yet never had they undertaken action together...to prevent one being present when the other was conquering a city, so that they would never quarrel about it or be forced to share the prize."

Originally, the Carthaginian government had planned to send Hasdrubal Barca to Italy, in order to bring about the hoped-for turnaround in Hannibal's expedition that had started so promisingly. The gap that Hasdrubal would leave was to be filled by a certain Himilco (Geus, 169f.) at the head of a new contingent of troops. Yet the progress made by the brothers Scipio in Iberia, especially their victory at the battle of the Ebro (217), had thwarted this mission and forced Carthage to strengthen its involvement in Hispania. In the course of the year 213 the Carthaginian government, with Hannibal's agreement, concentrated its efforts on the Sicilian front. It sent an army of 25,000 men under the command of Himilco to Sicily to relieve Syracuse, which was under siege by Roman troops. Himilco did succeed in taking Agrigentum, but he was unable to make any impression on the Roman encirclement of Syracuse. A similar fate was suffered by an additional squadron under the leadership of Bomilcar (Geus, 18f.), which could bring no relief to Syracuse owing to the superiority of the Roman forces.

The aim of Carthaginian war strategy of avoiding any conflicts in North Africa while at the same time maintaining their power base in Hispania was valid for as long as the Hispanic and Italian armies of Carthage remained undefeated. By increasing pressure on Rome on Italian soil they hoped their opponents' strength would be crippled. Therefore they wagered all on a single card, and sent Hasdrubal Barca to Italy in order to force a decision. At the same time, well-aimed advances in Sicily and Sardinia were to divide the opposing forces and make it possible to regain these regions. All these projects were only possible, however, at the cost of huge effort: fleets needed to be equipped in order to reach their destinations in Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, and Hispania, which all lay across the Roman-controlled sea. This kind of ambitious plan meant that the various theaters of war had to be supplied

simultaneously, without allowing the territorial defense of North Africa to slacken. They required total mobilization of all human and material resources in Carthage, which, however, compared with the resources that Rome had available, were hopelessly inferior. This permanent overstretching was ultimately to cause the Carthaginians' failure, as they had neither the requisite density of population nor the commensurate reserves to stand up to these long-term stresses.

As long as the system of alliances forged by Hannibal's spectacular victories in the first phase of the war held up, these demands could largely be met by calling on every available resource. The loss of the cities of Syracuse (212), Capua (211), and Tarentum (209), which had all once sided with Carthage, but more especially Scipio's victories in Hispania which began with the fall of Cartagena (209), created huge cracks in the painstakingly erected structure of Carthaginian power policy, and signaled its erosion. The abandoning of Hispanic possessions after the battle of Ilipa (206) sealed the final collapse of the Carthaginian war economy. With Macedonia's desertion of Carthage (205) and the forced departure of Hannibal from Italy (203), a completely new situation arose.

The outcome of the war was now to be decided in North Africa. It did not take long for the struggles brought there by the Romans to become entangled with the tribal warfare of the Numidians. The differing interests of the parties involved made all sorts of coalitions thinkable.¹⁸ The Numidian princes Syphax and Masinissa had tense, ambiguous relations with the Punic capital. At times they fought for the Barcids against the Romans in Hispania, but often enough they made raids on Carthaginian territory. After the collapse of the Carthaginian hegemony in Hispania, Masinissa changed sides. He joined Scipio in the hope of enlarging his kingdom (Livy 28.35). Thus the Romans had an important ally in the Carthaginian hinterland. The Carthaginians did everything to ally themselves with Syphax who had constantly been sending out signals to Rome.

Hasdrubal son of Gisco, one of the most prominent army leaders in the last phase of the Second Punic War, was probably the driving force behind this new alliance. As commander of the Hispanic army he fought a fierce defensive battle against the Romans, which was continued in North Africa after he left the Iberian region. He was the father of Sophoniba (Geus, 200f.), the best-known lady of the Carthaginian upper class, who had once been promised to the Numidian king Masinissa but now, owing to the political situation, married the Numidian king Syphax and thus brought about a change in the policy of this opponent dangerous to Carthage. Hasdrubal son of Gisco was gaining prominence as the most important Carthaginian politician in North Africa; he had used his connections in Hispania to mobilize a considerable contingent of Celtic Iberians and, through the marriage of convenience of his daughter, brought about a *renversement des alliances* in Numidia to the advantage of his home city. He too had all the characteristics of a Hellenistic potentate who

spun his network over a broad territory and, like Hannibal, served his state with a very broad political vision.

Even more than in the other theaters of war Carthage was vulnerable in her immediate environs. The presence of enemy armies on North African soil hit the Carthaginians particularly hard, because they could not count on the support of the neighboring Libyan tribes, as these had always been squeezed dry and treated as compliant victims to be exploited. As the examples from the past show, they tried to make use of every opportunity to throw off the Carthaginian yoke. This kind of “ticking time bomb” could become a serious problem, especially in wartime, particularly as the Carthaginians had failed to defuse the explosive situation. Hasdrubal son of Gisco forestalled this trend by his success in tying a bond between Syphax and Carthage.¹⁹ The defense of the city depended on the cooperation of the Numidian tribes. Thanks to the energy and foresight of Hasdrubal son of Gisco, serious resistance could be offered to Scipio (204–202). Over time, however, as its territory was restricted to North Africa, Carthage’s resources proved to be too weak to hold out against its mighty opponent. Even the presence of the legendary Hannibal in the North African theater could not bring about any change in the situation. The battle of Zama, won by Scipio in 202, marks the limit to Carthage’s will to resist.

The Carthaginian council sent a deputation to Scipio to negotiate a peace. In addition to relinquishing Hispania and the Mediterranean islands, which had already taken place, there were to be further cessions of North African territories to Masinissa. Prisoners of war and deserters were to be handed over, and the Carthaginians were obliged to abstain from using war elephants. The fleet was further drastically reduced; the Carthaginians had to give up all except ten ships. Particularly trenchant was the incorporation of Carthage in the Roman confederation. Carthage was permitted to administer its internal affairs autonomously, but its rights of sovereignty in dealing with external affairs were greatly restricted. For example, it was required to assist Rome in case of war, and was not permitted to conduct military action outside Africa and inside Africa only with Rome’s permission. Finally, the indemnities were increased once more, and fixed at the enormous sum of 10,000 silver talents, and furthermore hostages were to be given till the debt was paid (Pol. 15.17–19; Livy 30.37.1–6; Appian, *Lib.* 54.234–8).²⁰

In view of these harsh peace conditions there was resistance in Carthage. Some groups wanted to break off negotiations at once and put up with a siege rather than giving in to the new Roman demands. Hannibal set the tone when he recommended the peace treaty be accepted (Livy 30.35.11, cf. Pol. 15.19). He knew exactly that it was hopeless to continue the war with the material that remained. The discussions were so tense, however, that there was physical violence between Hannibal and an otherwise unknown senator by the name

of Gisco (Geus, 35). Finally the leaders of Carthage agreed and reconciled themselves to the inevitable.

In 201 the peace treaty was solemnly signed in Carthage. Immediately after the ceremony, in a symbolic gesture the Carthaginians were shown in graphic fashion the military defeat and the loss of their former position of power: the Romans had the surrendered Carthaginian ships run out to sea and burned them before the eyes of the appalled and powerless citizens of Carthage (Livy 30.43.12). The once mighty Carthage, proud of its independence, had now become a Roman vassal. All Carthaginian dreams of greatness were now finally a thing of the past.

Though Carthage is popularly perceived as a mercantile republic, it was its military elite that determined the fate of the city till its demise. The feeling of being hemmed in by Rome oppressed the Carthaginian leadership, and in an effort to free themselves, they challenged the Italian great power, pushed it almost to the brink by military means, forged a system of alliances that covered the Mediterranean, mobilized immense human and material resources and finally over-extended themselves with this Herculean task. Less than two generations later, the Romans were to present a merciless account for the traumatic threat they had suffered to their own state. This is summarized in the dictum attributed to Cato the Elder: *Ceterum censeo Carthaginem delendam esse*.

NOTES

1. The best survey of Carthaginians mentioned in literature is Geus 1994.
2. On the Carthaginian aristocracy cf. Barceló 2008.
3. González Wagner 1983, 442–453; Lancel 1992, 279–283.
4. Hoyos 2003, 87.
5. Villaronga 1973, 143ff.; J. M. Blázquez 1976; Acquaro 1983/4.
6. Against an independent leadership position of the Barcids, postulated for instance by Wollner 1987, 106ff., or Lancel 1998b, 72–75, is the fact that the decisions were made in Carthage and Hannibal along with other Carthaginian generals carried them out. When the Barcid power base in Hispania was lost in 206, Hannibal in no way gave in. He first went to Carthage years later, when summoned from Italy, and placed himself at the service of the Carthaginian government until his exile. On the constitutional basis of the Carthaginian *strategia* cf. González Wagner, 454–456; Ameling 1993a, 99–119.
7. Barceló and Ferrer 2007, 376–383.
8. Hannibal's plan of campaign, to advance with his army to Italy to force the decision there, aimed at keeping the war far from Carthage (cf. Chapter 14). The Roman legions that were located in southern Italy or Sicily, ready for crossing over to North Africa, would thus be compelled to turn around for northern Italy to repel the threat posed by Hannibal's army: Barceló 2004, 119–135.

9. On Melqart as Hannibal's chief deity, cf. Huss 1986, 234ff. With reference to Hannibal's intention to win the Greeks to Carthage's side through the Herakles myth, Huss (237) states: "The Greeks were to see in Hannibal a second Herakles, who — like the first Herakles — had set out from Gades to make his impact on Italy; the political sympathies of the Greeks were to be gained; the Greeks' readiness for cooperative struggle against Rome was to be aroused."
10. Ferrer Maestro 2006, 107–126.
11. Lancel 1998b, 192. On the aims of Carthaginian policy in Italy, cf. Hoyos 2003, 126f.
12. Meister 1999, 58–67.
13. The treaty text here represents the Greek translation of the Punic version. On the significance of the treaty cf. Seibert 1993a, 240–246; Lancel 1998b, 196–198; Christ 2003, 102–106.
14. Fundamental on this: Schmitt 1974.
15. J. Rupke 1990, 246ff., rightly refers to the cultic dimension of war in Roman thought. Only victory counted, since this stood in harmony with the divine will. Setbacks and defeats, as the example of Cannae shows, had to be overcome since there existed no room for them in the Roman concept of a conflict.
16. Huss 1985, 351.
17. cf. Manfredi 1999, 77.
18. Lancel 1998b, 415–18.
19. Huss 1989.
20. On the provisions of the peace treaty cf. Schmitt 1969, 548; Huss 1985, 421ff.; Scardigli 1991, 297–345.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Roman Economy, Finance, and Politics in the Second Punic War

Toni Naco del Hoyo¹

In the year 217 BC, just after the serious Roman defeat at Lake Trasimene, the Senate denied the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator the money needed to accomplish the traditional ransom of the prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the enemy, some of whom belonged to great Roman families. The excuse proffered was that the dictator had not formally sought permission from the *patres* to start those conversations, as was otherwise normal in such cases, and instead initiated the negotiations with Hannibal personally. In spite of seeing his request turned down, Fabius did not give up on the problem. Instead, he entrusted Quintus, one of his sons, with selling, in Rome, some of the rural properties that his family owned in Italy and that as yet had not been damaged by the war, and ordered him to use those funds to finance the ransom privately (Livy 22.23.7–8; Val. Max. 3.8.2, 4.8.1).

This affair, seemingly only anecdotal, allows us to infer that the Second Punic War probably served to set off countless problems affecting the formation of a state like Rome, which in the final quarter of the third century was undergoing a profound transformation after the lengthy conquest of Italy. One of these problems was precisely that of the dichotomy between public and private elements at the moment when the Republic became a true central Mediterranean power. It encompassed the army, the public finances, the productive sectors and, in the final instance, the political dynamic of the Middle Republican state, with an aristocracy deeply divided and some social sectors beginning to engage in long-distance commerce or financial investments: all of them ready to participate in the risks, but also in the benefits, of Roman

foreign policy. Although it would be two centuries before the Republic entered its definitive crisis — military, financial, political, and constitutional — it is certain that the stress created at every level by the Second Punic War showed that the economy, politics, and also war itself were more intrinsically linked than ever and continued to be so at least until the era of the Civil Wars.²

The Wilderness Years: Economy and Politics in Times of “Global War”

It is no secret that the Republic's main budget expense was the army in a war characterized by the multiplicity of combat fronts, both in Italy and beyond, and by the state's need to finance military pay and supplies for its legionaries, compensating them for the time devoted to military service, which was still a legacy from the archaic republic. If the number of soldiers mobilized rose spectacularly because of the dimensions of the war with Carthage, so did that of officials and generals, increasing pressure on the aristocratic families — or rather, heightening the competition among them — to achieve greater pre-eminence in the political and military conduct of the war.

At the same time, the Republic could also not neglect the massive mobilization of auxiliary troops coming from those allies who had not gone over to the Carthaginian cause and whom, according to Polybius, it had at least to supply with the provisions of the regular army (Pol. 6.39.15). The *socii* or Latin allies fulfilled an essential function as tactical complements to the Roman legions from the fourth century on, and therefore the recruitment and logistics that accompanied these troops had to be secured at all times.

Nonetheless, all this was not enough to avoid the great military calamities at the beginning of the war (Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae), probably due not only to the unquestionable strategic skill of Hannibal but also to questionable tactical decisions on the Roman side, in which a decisive role was played by the initial improvisations made by the senatorial leaders before Hannibal's invasion. The Punic armies gambled on strategic mastery in battle on open terrain being in their favor, thanks to the high performance level of their mercenary troops and the fact that they could count from the very beginning on an organized supply capacity in the field, which in these first years brought them a great logistical advantage over an enemy disorganized at the outset and doubtless quickly demoralized. A good example is the depot that held the provisions gathered by the Romans in the city of Clastidium in 218, and that the Carthaginian forces took over once they had suborned the garrison commander; it served Hannibal as an important granary from then on (Livy 21.48.8–9).³

Little by little, the Roman strategy of struggle and resistance with the aim of regaining lost territory, thanks to the slowing down of the war and Rome's

refusal to offer battle on open ground, had an effect, although at a high cost to the Italians who had remained loyal to Rome and whose cities suffered great devastation throughout almost 15 years of occupation (Pol. 3.88ff.; Livy 22.12ff.). Once the surprise impact of the invasion was over, the Roman forces more effectively thwarted Hannibal's movements through Italy, above all when the number of allies genuinely changing sides was less than the Carthaginian general had expected; for this reason both armies waged a war of attrition which ended, almost 15 years later, in the transfer of the principal theater of war to North Africa.

Logistics can be seen as the decisive element that explains both Punic resistance in enemy territory and, in turn, Roman ability to recover ground lost at the start of the war and to end by expelling Hannibal's armies from Italy, though without ever being able to force their opponent definitively to yield. Of necessity, a little after the Roman disaster at Cannae (216), Neapolis, like other allied cities that had remained faithful to the Republic during Hannibal's invasion, requested the Senate to send a garrison; to this Rome finally agreed, dispatching M. Iunius Silanus as *praefectus praesidii* (garrison commandant) with a detachment of troops. Rome responded swiftly from strategic motives, fearing that Neapolis's port installations would fall into Hannibal's hands (Livy 23.15.2). The deployment of these military detachments in cities, which was quite alien to Roman military culture, had become general in Italy and beyond, doubtless to maximize the available resources at all times because of the kind of confrontation that Rome found it necessary to practice after what happened at Cannae. In spite of the case of Neapolis, garrisons in cities as a rule implied a certain limitation on local autonomy, including a burden on those who had to receive soldiers in fortresses or under a regime of billeting. Nonetheless, the risk of protests or even risings was compensated by the immense advantage from a military point of view and by the political control gained over these cities, as happened during the conquest of the rest of the Mediterranean.⁴

From the beginnings of the conflict, the multiplicity of active fronts and the important defeats in the north of Italy weakened the framework of high commands, for it was impossible to find replacements from among the ex-magistrates who completed office each year. In consequence the Senate had to devise constitutional formulas *ad hoc*, which did not always find unanimous approval among its own ranks because of the subterranean struggles between its separate factions; all of this postponed the taking of final decisions and put at risk the proper military waging of the war. Entrusting delicate missions to individuals of a certain rank who, however, did not exactly arouse consensus did not readily contribute to removing the tensions at the heart of the senatorial aristocracy itself. If circumstances required, it turned to conferring *imperium*, normally of proconsular rank, on individuals who came from

the Senate but would never, in ordinary circumstances, have attained similar honors at that time, because of their age or the position they held or had held in the *cursus honorum*.

An outstanding example of this is the election of P. Cornelius Scipio (the future Africanus) as proconsul with *summum imperium* in 210 with the *provincia* of Hispania as his destination, replacing C. Claudius Nero, who had been given the task of reorganizing the troops who had survived the military disaster of the previous year that had caused the defeat and death of the two Scipios, but otherwise had nothing really remarkable or worth emphasizing in his record (Appian, *Iber.* 17.66). The critical position of the Romans in the Iberian Peninsula forced the *patres* to a consensual, or even perhaps desperate, agreement in entrusting an important part of Roman options in the conflict with Carthage to an ambitious but at the same time youthful commander, who was seeking perhaps not so much vengeance for the death of his kinsmen as glory for his own political career. In this case, the Senate's gamble almost immediately paid off with the capture in the following year of Carthago Nova, the principal Punic military base in Spain, along with an enormous war booty; this, together with the fall of Syracuse in 211, marked a turning-point in the war of attrition that, as an emergency measure, Fabius Maximus had planned in 216.⁵

Despite the notable influence of some individuals who stood out thanks to their military qualities, like Fabius or Africanus himself, the center of political attention continued to reside in the Senate, which was required to meet frequently and make decisions of enormous significance for the future of the Republic. One of the most crucial problems that persisted for the public *aerarium*, especially, though not solely, during the first years of the war, was its constant lack of ready funds, or *inopia aerarii* (Livy 22.39.16; 23.5.5–6, 5.15; 24.18.11–13), due to which the Senate devoted great efforts to finding solutions that would ease various deficiencies directly affecting the course of the war. At desperate moments, desperate measures were imposed. In 217 the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus compelled those living in indefensible locations to move out, burning not only their harvests but also the barns and every other type of goods that they left behind, with the aim of conceding no advantage on the ground to the enemy (Livy 22.11.4–5).⁶ The same Fabius again, *consul suffectus* in 215, gave the order to cities under Roman control, not without previously consulting the Senate as Livy insists, to deliver all their agrarian produce before the Kalends of June of that year to the nearest Roman fortification, burning all the rest so that the enemy armies could not live off the land in Italy (Livy 23.32.14–15).

It was, however, the Romans with more resources who had to take responsibility in the difficult task of maintaining the *aerarium* in critical moments like these. In 216 certain magistrates with special functions, *triumviri mensarii*, and equally exceptional duration (216–210), formed a commission with

the explicit task of urgently seeking, and most probably from among some of the richest citizens who had not been mobilized, the funds necessary to guarantee minimal functionality to the state (Livy 23.21.6; 24.18.12; 26.36.8). In the next year (215) double the normal level of the citizen tribute (*tributum duplex*) was exacted, which, as we shall see below, was still wholly insufficient to cover the costs of war (Livy 23.31.1). At the end of one year, an edict of the consuls imposed on citizens some extraordinary liturgies, matched to their particular census registration, to pay the crews of the fleet (24.11.7–8). According to Livy, “it was the first time that a Roman fleet was manned with crews secured at private expense” (24.11.9).

In 210, due to the deplorable state of the public treasury, the consuls decreed a similar measure, also designed for the fleet, although this time there were strong protests from the contributors. The situation was so serious that in an extraordinary session of the Senate the consul M. Valerius Laevinus proposed that the senators themselves should be the ones to shoulder these costs, contributing jewels and other objects of gold, silver, and bronze; to this they finally agreed (Livy 26.35–36), mainly to set an example. Some years earlier (215) the *lex Oppia* had regulated the amount of jewelry and precious metals that Roman women could acquire, perhaps with the intention of preventing a buildup of wealth in a time of economic difficulties at every level (Livy 34.1.3). Later, however, the now ex-consul Laevinus put a motion to the Senate that these liturgies be refunded in three stages (Livy 29.16.1–3), though only the first (204) and second (202) were paid off. As to the third (200), its refund coincided with another period of monetary shortage for the state, so that, in exchange for the debt, parcels of *ager publicus* subject to rental (*trientabula*) were granted, but on the proviso that that they could be reclaimed in future (Livy 31.13.3–9) — something that ultimately never happened. What interested the state was to obtain immediately accessible funds, and for this it could sacrifice public patrimony at any time, as happened with the sale of parcels corresponding to the *ager Campanus*, the lands expropriated from the city of Capua after its capitulation (Livy 28.46.4–6). Finally, when the consul Scipio Africanus was arranging to leave for Africa in 205, he sought voluntary consignments of provisions and money for his troops, obtaining a generous amount (Livy 28.45.13–21).

The beginning of Rome’s intervention in the Hellenistic world, which began as soon as the Second Punic War ended, finally confirmed the demise of the fiscal system based on citizens’ contributions and originally intended to function in a city of moderate size like Rome at the start of the fourth century. Equally confirmed was the need to implement new public policies under which the true financial support of the state would rest on the material benefits that military successes produced. Thus the war economy ended by benefiting above all the social levels most directly involved in accomplishing those results. The

war against Carthage doubtless accelerated a process that probably began with the conquest of Italy and would only increase over the two ensuing centuries.⁷

War, Public Finances and Taxation in Mid Republican Rome

During the Middle Republic, in the *aerarium Saturni*, the seat of the Roman treasury, wealth was amassed that came from distinct sources of income that, in turn, made it possible to finance the main expenses of the Republic, basically those involving the army and public works. Among the oldest fiscal contributions there stood out the combination of indirect imposts and of reimbursements for the exploitation of state monopolies (*vectigalia*). Among other activities, the 5% tax was imposed on slave manumissions (*vicesima libertatis*), the collecting of which fed a special reserve fund in the treasury (*aerarium sanctius*), which in fact was used in 209 with the aim of easing the shortage of coined money to meet the expenses of the state (Livy 27.10.11). Other *vectigalia* taxed the import and export of merchandise at specified ports and frontier posts (the *portorium*), as well as leases by the censors to Roman citizens of parcels of *ager publicus populi Romani* with the aim of devoting them to farming activities or pastoral tasks (*scriptura*), together with levies on mining production and that of saltworks, among other monopolies.

Though irregular and very hard to forecast, war booty and the indemnities exacted after a formal surrender (*deditio*) formed a revenue of great relevance for the state in the aggregate of its finances, above all as and when the Republic succeeded in gaining a series of victories over richer and more powerful enemies. So Polybius recognized in describing the looting that followed the fall of Syracuse in 211: “There were indeed perhaps good reasons for appropriating all the gold and silver: for it was impossible for them to aim at a world empire without weakening the resources of other peoples and strengthening their own” (9.10.11).

Considered a true compensation for the effort of war, these exactions were intended in first place to pay the very troops involved in the victory, for which the historical literature also employed the term *stipendium*, the original sense of which, military salary, was assimilated to that of precise indemnification. Although at times it has equally been proposed to identify this *stipendium* with a hypothetical direct impost on the subject peoples, especially in provincial territories from the last quarter of the third century on, the fact is that no evidence exists to support this. In reality, the commonest practice was to establish in these indemnifications a fixed amortization period, which at times could extend through several annual periods, symbolizing in this era — and then only — the submission of the defeated. The Roman military authorities

could also require the loss of a part, or the entirety, of their enemies' lands, as well as the ritual delivery and burning of their weapons, the deployment of garrisons around or indeed within enemy cities, the taking of hostages, or the enslavement of all or some of the civilian population, above all in the case of those who had offered most resistance during a long siege (Livy 28.34.7).

At any rate, it was not until subsequent stages of Roman history that a peace was generally established that allowed contributors to be identified and their estimated taxes to be fixed, that is, when regular and permanent fiscal contributions were required from the conquered peoples. This, in turn, allowed adequate financing of the armies, which guaranteed simultaneous political and fiscal control, as Tacitus recognized during the Principate (*Hist.* 4.74).⁸

War offered another and final financial problem to the state. According to tradition, from the close of the fifth century and because of the prolonged siege of the city of Veii in Etruria (406–396), Rome found herself obliged to regulate her citizens' military service and the recompense that they received for it at the close of each campaign. This recompense was also known as *stipendium* and was the commonest sense of this term (Livy 4.59.11). There has been speculation about the historical reality of this measure. Nothing would be more logical than that military pay should correspond to its monetary equivalent and that both phenomena should exist at the same time. However, in Republican Rome the appearance of the monetary system is hard to place before the start of the third century, a date that scarcely fits the siege of Veii.

For the state, the establishment of the *stipendium* marked the pressing need to obtain supplementary revenue to cope with mobilizing a constantly increasing number of its citizens, just as military activity was also growing and transforming the "war economy" into a lucrative incentive for public finances. Despite that, the Republic likewise decided to establish a direct fiscal contribution (*tributum*), which in the words of C. Nicolet was converted into an impost paid by those liable to mobilization and to the advantage of those mobilized.⁹ Although this taxation was envisaged as extraordinary, the routine warlike activity of the state transformed the *tributum ex censu* into a customary, and in a way ordinary, contribution, collected until the year 167. The Senate decided at that moment to relieve the Roman citizen of a contribution which, according to the estimate made in 1933 by T. Frank, represented at the time 10% of the total revenues of the state on its own; for this reason, having been conceived as an extraordinary loan, it could easily be compensated by another type of revenue, like the enormous booty acquired with the conquest of Macedon the year before and, since antiquity, directly associated with the cancellation of *tributum*.¹⁰ From then on the *aerarium* gradually decided against once more demanding *tributum* as an emergency measure, and this policy remained in force until the year 43 when the Senate, on the urging of

Cicero, re-established its collection because of the acute financial problems weighing on the heirs of Caesar soon after his assassination. This last measure, nonetheless, was momentary and had no continuation beyond those tumultuous years of the Civil Wars.

Once the Senate confirmed the need to have recourse to this extraordinary fund to meet the costs caused by the war on a yearly basis, it was the treasury officials, or *tribuni aerarii*, who had the task of verifying the lists compiled quinquennially by the censors. In theory, the calculation of the estimate of Republican *tributum* corresponded to a percentage of the value of immovable properties declared in the census of the *adsidui*, those citizens included within the specific classes that corresponded to the traditional censorial system, who as a result were eligible for military service. In reality, the sparse evidence about the estimate and the exact forms of the collection of *tributum* (*simplex*) comes precisely from the period of Hannibal's invasion of Italy, when the famous financial crisis modified the percentage of 0.1% of the inherited incomes of *adsidui* to the extent of doubling or tripling them, when the state was most in need of revenues to finance the war.

For example, in 215 a double quota of citizen tax (*duplex tributum*) was levied as an extraordinary measure, and that revenue directly paid the *stipendium* that legionaries received in that year, except for those who had fled from the defeat at Cannae (Livy 23.31.1). Years later, the triumph of Cn. Manlius Vulso over the Aetolians (187) delivered revenues to the state enough to repay its citizens part of the sum levied for the same purpose during the previous year (Livy 39.7.4.5). In this context of the crisis of an established fiscal policy toward citizens, the Republic continued to require military contributions from those allies in Italy with whom it had formed stable agreements through the fourth and third centuries, set out in the so-called *formula togatorum*, which appears in the *lex agraria* of 111 BC. Thanks to those agreements, the allied cities would send auxiliary troops — whom Livy terms *socii* and *nomen Latinum* to distinguish them from the Roman citizens enrolled in the legions — when the military needs of the Republic required them (Livy 22.57.10), together with material revenues to meet the costs of the *salarium*, the provisions, and the weapons of those *auxilia* who joined up with the legions. The Latin sources describe this loan as *stipendium*, a term certainly endowed with multiple meanings but closely linked with the military *salarium*, collection of which in its cities of origin could have been similar to that of the *tributum* paid by Roman citizens.¹¹

As has already been mentioned, there exists a sizable discussion concerning the real extent of provincial fiscal policy in the Republican period, which is relevant in this case because it would imply the possibility that the *aerarium* during the Second Punic War had relied on regular and permanent fiscal revenues coming from the peoples subdued in the first provincial territories. As

is known, from the close of the first conflict with Carthage (241), Rome exercised direct control over the old Carthaginian *epikrateia* in Sicily, located in the northwest quadrant of the island, and (from 237) over the coastal cities of Sardinia and Corsica. Some years before the start of hostilities, the Republic decided to send magistrates *cum imperio* — praetors or propraetors — to both territories on a regular basis, which has generally been interpreted as an unmistakable gesture toward consolidation of Roman dominion and, perhaps, a sign of an intention to obtain regular fiscal incomes from both provinces. It is a fact that, until the end of the Republic, Sicily and Sardinia proved of vital importance as centers of production and suppliers of grain (*provinciae frumentariae*), destined for the city of Rome and its armies in Italy and the rest of the Mediterranean.

To go from there, however, to suggest that these revenues were obtained thanks to a permanent and regular fiscal bond is a large inference because, among other reasons, Rome could always in times of conflict choose mechanisms more direct and maybe more efficient in the context of war, such as immediate exactions when necessary. It is thus hard to accept that in just a few decades the Roman provincial administration could have efficiently organized the collection of an agrarian impost outside Italy, above all when Hiero II of Syracuse, in the non-Roman sector of Sicily, had turned into a loyal ally of Rome, which he supplied with constant deliveries of grain and also, in moments of difficulty for the Roman cause, with mercenary troops for her service.¹²

Indeed, the fiscal model that in the end was imposed on Roman Sicily, such as Cicero described a century and a half later in the *Verrines* (70 BC), was the Syracusan one — known as the *lex Hieronica* — although the siege and capture of that city did not occur until 211, only four years after Hiero's death and the changing of sides by his heir on the Syracusan throne. As to what happened in Sardinia and Corsica, the coastal cities producing grain, most of them of Punic origin, obeyed the immediate requirement of supplying the troops stationed in those islands and, at times, also of exporting their grain overseas. Nonetheless, those cities equally had to defend themselves against the attacks of the nomad peoples of the mountainous interior of both islands, which ultimately generated great instability that in practice made it difficult to inaugurate a fiscal regime for agricultural produce, at least until the much later stages of Roman rule. In fact, war continued to mark out the major lines of Roman political economy at all levels in Italy and in the provincial territories before, during, and after the Second Punic War.¹³

The available data seems to demonstrate this last assertion eloquently. Although the statistics at the “microeconomic” level offered in T. Frank's work (1933) can be discussed from various viewpoints, such as, for example, the monetary value of the raw metal or of the non-Roman coinage that appears

amid the war booty, it is no less certain that some of the trends shown in his statistics at the “microeconomic” level contain a greater degree of trustworthiness and a lesser risk for the modern historian, so that their use in the context of a historical interpretation of the finances of the Middle Republic brings out plausible general lines. Frank offers a suggested schema of expenses and revenues of a hypothetical Roman budget for the period 264–200, including the first two Punic Wars, rising to a total of 286 million *denarii* and logically equating both sectors. What alone interests us here, however, is to stress the table of revenues, in which six distinct calculable arrangements can be recognized.

In theory, the revenues from one or other type of regular taxation involve *tributum* (65 m.), the tithes from Sicily and Sardinia (24 m.), and the *vectigalia* (10 m.), totalling 99 million. Meanwhile, among the extraordinary revenues must be mentioned war booty (65 m.), the sacred treasury (5 m.), and the totality of one-off exactions and war indemnities (117 m.), all of which amount to 187 m. On the other hand, if we reckon the tithes not as agrarian imposts but as one-off exactions, as we believe is correct in this period, the extraordinary revenues sector would increase to 211 m.¹⁴

In any case, the grand totals are the ones relevant here, and thus it is significant that only 26.23% of these revenues came from the regular taxation previously established by the Middle Republic as the basis of its financial system. The remainder of the proceeds had their direct or indirect origin in the war and, more concretely, in some armies, like those mobilized during the exceptional conditions in which the Second Punic War developed; for their enormous costs in provisioning, maintenance, and salary depended for the most part on the proceeds obtained thanks to their own success or failure on the battlefield.

Due to the magnitude of the war, it was necessary to recruit the largest possible number of legionaries among the Roman citizens who appeared in the separate census categories eligible for military service. This same phenomenon in turn implied an effective diminution of the number of citizens dedicated to productive tasks, which in any case happened more and more during the economic crisis. By the logic of the system, a high percentage of Roman citizens with properties liable to be taxed had to turn themselves into legionaries. Suddenly, former net contributors to the *aerarium*, recruited precisely through fitting a minimum census requirement, ceased being part of those fiscally nourishing the financial system, as Livy explicitly recognizes: “necessary expenses were met only by the property tax; the number of those who paid that particular tax had been diminished by such great losses of troops at both Lake Trasimene and Cannae that if the few who survived should be burdened by a much greater levy, they would perish by another malady” (Livy 23.48.8).

A Permanent State of Crisis: Feeding the Armies with an Empty Treasury

Unlike the previous conflict between Rome and Carthage, the Second Punic War was transformed into a true “world war,” with multiple theaters in Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and finally North Africa, and, of course, in Italy where the armies of Hannibal established themselves virtually at the gates of Rome. It is a fact that, throughout the conflict, from a strategic and logistical viewpoint, it proved essential to maintain positions in each and every one of these theaters, because it depended on all of them whether or not reinforcements reached Hannibal in Italy, something that the Republic definitely could not allow.

Right at the start of hostilities, Spain was assigned as *provincia* to one of the consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 218). His mission was to prevent Hannibal’s advance along the Mediterranean coast and prevent the consolidation of an important Punic rearguard in the Iberian Peninsula, which had already had decades of Carthaginian rule thanks to Barcid foreign policy that aimed at consolidating over other regions the traditional Phoenician-Punic influence in the peninsular southeast. The strategy of the pro-Scipionic factions dominating the Senate at this time aimed, in first place, at preventing what finally proved unavoidable, Hannibal’s invasion; thus P. Scipio sent a legate to Spain in his place, his brother Gnaeus, while he himself sought to catch up with the Carthaginian general, first at the mouth of the Rhône and later in Italy. The following year, however, he did rejoin his brother as proconsul in Spain, seeking to undermine Carthaginian power in that territory of the Punic rearguard.

Successes and disasters alternated in Spain until the defeat and death of both Scipios in 211, and the dispatch in the following year of the young Scipio Africanus, who succeeded in finally expelling the last Carthaginian commander in 206, invading after that the African continent until the final defeat of Carthage at Zama (202). With regard to Sardinia and Sicily, the Senate preferred to maintain their positions as *provinciae*, sending out to them magistrates on a regular basis: in their case, with the mission of controlling possible Punic incursions into islands that turned out to be key to securing the supply of grain to its armies, along with the “voluntary” deliveries of corn from Hiero II of Syracuse (216: Livy 23.38.12–13). No doubt many of these options by one or other contender in this long war were played out not so much in Italy, where both armies did not again confront each other directly in open battle after Cannae (216) until the decision by Hannibal to abandon this scenario and return to Africa (203), but rather in the remainder of the extra-Italian territories, which functioned as a veritable rearguard for both contenders.

Right after the Roman defeats of Trasimene and Cannae, events accelerated in such a way that very quickly the *aerarium* began to notice an acute scarcity

of funds. The strategy of restraint and resistance in Italy, avoiding a direct confrontation with Hannibal, as designed by Fabius Maximus, ran the risk of self-defeat if the integrity of the Roman dominion in the territories outside Italy proved to be compromised. Nothing more eloquently reveals the magnitude of this financial crisis, and its repercussions at every level, than to observe the many complaints from the commanders stationed in Sicily, Sardinia-Corsica, and Spain in the years 216 and 215.

Livy has preserved the content of various letters to the Senate in which the lack of provisions and ready money to pay the troops stationed outside Italy was clearly stated (Livy 23.31.2–3). According to the *propraetor* of Sicily, T. Otacilius, the crews of the ships and the troops arriving in the island along with the new praetor, P. Furius, in 216, were owed pay and provisions, which as a result were urgently demanded from the Senate. And precisely the same was urged by the *propraetor* of Sardinia, A. Cornelius Mammula. Unfortunately, the Senate's response to both governors was an explicit acknowledgment that the treasury found itself in a precarious state, because in Livy's words, "to each the reply was that there was nothing on hand to send, and they were ordered to provide for their own fleets and armies" (23.21.4).

They did so in a different way in each case. First, Otacilius sent envoys to Hiero of Syracuse and the latter finally agreed to make wheat available for six months and also all the funds needed to pay the Roman armies in Sicily (Livy 23.31.5), probably as a loan if we note that later Livy makes reference to the payment of the debt previously contracted with the Syracusan tyrant (23.38.12). As regards Sardinia, Mammula turned to the "allied" cities, which "generously" offered him the same funds (23.21.6), no doubt a good example of Roman cynicism applied to its foreign policy. Despite this apparently condescending language, the fact is that the cities of both provinces were considered by the Romans as subjugated entities and, in theory, subject to every kind of exaction even before the outbreak of the war (23.48.7). In the case of the Sardinians, the pressure exercised by the provincial authorities on their cities in the form of immediate exactions, in money and specie, would end by provoking a general revolt the following year (23.32.9).¹⁵

More significant still was the Spanish example. In 215 the two Scipios sent a letter to the Senate in which they set out a similar list of claims, though on this occasion Livy takes time to recount the entire episode in some detail (Livy 23.48.4–49.4). The letter expressed the need of money to deal with the legionaries' salary (*stipendium*), together with corn (*frumentum*) and clothing (*vestimenta*), all intended for their armies and the fleet accompanying them. Both generals recognized, nonetheless, that the *aerarium* was probably empty, so that if the Senate guaranteed to act on the rest of their requests they would obtain pay for their legionaries *in situ* (Livy 23.48.5). After lengthy deliberations the Senate agreed to their appeals, though it had to exercise

ingenuity to obtain some monies that the state could not pay immediately because of its lack of ready funds.

Further on, Livy describes what for some authors is the first known example at Rome of the lease of some contracts for military supplies into the hands of companies of *publicani*, certainly a peculiar case, contrasting with the sources' constant mention of a lack of funds in the treasury preventing the office of the censors from proceeding to let out public works contracts, or with the insistence by the private contractors on assuming the risk until the *aerarium* could disburse those funds (Livy 24.18.1–3, 10–11). The praetor Fulvius sought support from the *comitia* for letting the supply contracts for the Scipios' armies to private citizens, on condition that these would be repaid their investment as soon as the treasury had greater revenues available (23.48.10–49.4). Finally, there were three *societates*, comprising 19 members, which advanced the necessary amounts to pay for the dispatch of the provisions. They imposed, with other conditions, an exemption from military service for the partners in these companies; from this it can readily be deduced that at this time an indubitably heavy burden for Roman citizens was involved and, in turn, that the adoption by the state of the theoretical risk posed for those private companies by maritime transport to Spain was due to storms or to the general war situation in the western Mediterranean. The Senate made no objection to any of these requests and the Scipios received the promised supplies at the end of a few months (Livy, *ibid.*).

The status of *publicani* of those who won the concession for the contracts for military provisions in Spain is not in fact very illuminating, because Livy does not use this term in this passage. On the other hand, in his account of the complaint of a supposed fraud in the performance of this same supply contract or one very similar, presented two years later to the Senate and afterwards to the *comitia*, the Roman historian uses those same terms to describe the two alleged defrauders, Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi and Titus Pomponius Veientanus. "These men, since the state assumed the risk from violent storms in the case of shipments to the armies, had falsely reported imaginary shipwrecks, and even those which had been correctly reported had been brought about by their own trickery, not by accident" (Livy 25.3.10). They were condemned solely to a fine – to avoid wounding the sensibilities of the *ordo publicanorum*.

Nonetheless, there exist reasonable doubts about the historicity of the entire episode in relation to the auction of contracts for provisioning the Scipios' armies, and about the sources that Livy employed to narrate it: among other reasons, because the use of credit for operating military supplies turns out to be too isolated a case in the historical context of the final quarter of the third century. Specifically, P. Erdkamp, who describes this whole episode as "a rather dubious story" (Erdkamp 1998, 114), considers the possibility that the Roman

historian projected into the past a contemporary practice, in this way confusing the reader. The fact is that until almost a century later there is no solid evidence for the employment of companies of *publicani* of Italian origin in business of similar caliber in the west. In the case of Spain these companies were linked to the silver mines of the Sierra Morena and Carthago Nova, whose systematic exploitation is documented archaeologically and epigraphically only after the close of the Celtiberian and Lusitanian wars, when the climate of general insecurity imposed by a slow war of conquest relaxed. In the same way the capacity for real influence by that *ordo publicanorum*, which emerges from Livy's account concerning the trial of the two defrauders, also probably needs to be qualified.¹⁶

In any case there exists no historical evidence of sufficient size to deduce how the Scipios obtained the *stipendium* that they had promised the Senate they would acquire in 215 if, as did in fact happen, they received delivery of at least the necessary provisions and clothing. In logical terms, it can be assumed that the percentage of the annual salary of the legionaries and auxiliary troops that they had to acquire at the end of this campaign must have been made up through funds obtained *in situ*, presumably as a product of war booty and direct exactions. Among items seized from the enemy, in this case the mercenary armies in the service of Carthage and the troops provided by the Spaniards who supported them, there will definitely have been jewels and items made of precious metal, which, as archaeology confirms, were abundant in pre-Roman Spain, along with precious metals in a raw state, perhaps from casual mining operations and also, finally, coined money of very diverse provenance. We must remember that before 218 a few mints regularly issued coinage in the Iberian Peninsula, both in bronze and in silver, following Greek (Emporion and Rhode), Phoenician-Punic (Gadir, Ebusus), or local models (Arse-Saguntum), as well as the Barcid coinage struck directly by Carthage between 237 and 218. However coin production in Spain underwent a veritable "boom" from the start of the Second Punic War, in a clear link with the need on both sides to finance the war, all of which indirectly encouraged some local communities hitherto outside the monetary circuit to enter it, especially through imitations — generally of poor quality — of already existing coins, such as, for example, the Ampuritan drachmas that the local mint of Saetabi soon began to strike.¹⁷

In this sense there has been speculation that, during the war's Spanish operations, the quantity of silver coined by the Greek colony of Emporion, Rome's ally and operations base from the disembarkation of Cn. Scipio in 218 onward, was utilized to meet the *stipendium* of the legions, all of which doubtless raises the question of the level of effective freedom that Rome left to this modest Greek enclave from that moment on. Certainly, both those drachmas and their native imitations could have been used as *stipendium* throughout the entire conflict, although its disappearance from the horizon of hoarding

or in sporadic finds outside the Iberian Peninsula probably indicates that, to be found in the pockets of legionaries and Italian auxiliaries, those coins would have to have been struck on the latter's arrival in Italy. Another possibility, which at all events has produced serious queries, would be that the Senate's response to the letter from the Scipios had signified, implicitly, the grant of a hypothetical permit to issue Roman coinage in Spain, as in the case of some *victoriati* dated circa 214 and perhaps struck not at Rome but *in situ*.¹⁸

The import of Roman coinage to Spain was not only practically nonexistent throughout the Second Punic War but continued to be so during the first period of the conquest and for a century at least. This differed from what happened for example in Sicily, in one of whose cities — Morgantina — hoards of the first Roman *denarii* known have been found. The continuous presence of Roman and Italian *negotiatores* in the island, which is certainly a contrast to what happened in Spain, would perhaps explain the need for Roman coinage to continue circulating once Syracuse had been captured in 212. In those very years the number of legions mobilized in Italy rose to 25, a total unknown until that date, and perhaps it was no accident that the republic then created a new silver coin, the *denarius*.

With it there appeared an entire monetary system, part of which was formed by the *victoriatus*, creating a representative iconography, together with a metrology, some denominations such as the *quinarius*, and a new ratio with the unit of bronze (1:10). This alone underwent significant changes in the modification of its value and perhaps the method of payment of legionary *stipendium*, in the retariffing of the *denarius* in the 140s. In any case, the prime function of the monetary system created around 211 was to finance the Roman legions, while the struggle against the Carthaginians continued in Italy itself where Rome had lost the control that she had previously exercised over some of her old allies and, most important of all, over their issues of coin. On finishing the war the Republic proceeded to the compulsory shutdown of all mints coining silver in Italy except, logically, in Rome itself. This seems to indicate that the Republic had viewed with great suspicion Hannibal's use of those financial resources for the benefit of his mercenaries in those cities where he obtained military support as they betrayed their old alliances with Rome.¹⁹

Coinage, in sum, not only put on show a policy of alliances or betrayals but had a much more concrete purpose: to assure the pay of the legionaries, Italian auxiliaries, and also, perhaps, native auxiliaries in the service of the Roman cause. Despite much that has been written about the function of coinage, the conflict with Carthage shows that both contenders, and Rome in particular, needed to provide greater liquidity than in previous conflicts, simply because the number of soldiers, together with the importance of the fleet in association with the Roman army, had increased spectacularly, as had the military supply organization that furnished them with logistic support.

There can be no doubt that the army and navy became the chief recipients of the financial efforts of the republic and, in turn, one of the main incentives for the issue and use of coinage; and in this case not only Roman coinage but also others of pre-Roman origin, in one form or other and for shorter or longer periods, survived the plans of the Republic's foreign policy. At the same time the unprecedented expansion of monetary culture over broad zones of the Mediterranean, especially as a result of the evidence supplied by the spectacular quantity of money coined — directly by the Republic or under its indirect influence — from the Second Punic War onwards, will have to be linked above all to military expenses and particularly to the financing and payment of salary to the armies involved. All this nevertheless forms a contrast with the limited homogeneity of monetary culture in the separate regions of the Mediterranean, at least until the beginnings of the imperial period.²⁰

FURTHER READING

There are classic works that still constitute obligatory reading even for specialists, stressing especially the treatment of politics of this period (Scullard 1951), and coinage and finance (Crawford 1974; Marchetti 1978). However, by far the best study overall, of Republican finances continues to be Crawford 1985, seamlessly incorporating numismatic documentation with historical discussion, as we also find in fuller thematic works (Howgego 1995; Hollander 2007; Harris 2008). It is possible that financial institutions that developed more fully during the last two centuries of the Republic, like banking, actually started in the Second Punic War: on this, J. Andreau, *Banking and Business in the Roman World*, Cambridge 1999, or K. Verboven, “54–44 BCE: financial or monetary crisis?” in E. Lo Cascio (ed.), *Credito e Moneta nel Mondo Romano. Atti degli incontri capresi di storia dell'economia antica (Capri 12–14 ottobre 2000)*, Bari, 2003, 49–68, could also prove relevant, as also C. Gabrielli, *Contributi alla storia economica di Roma repubblicana: Difficoltà politico-sociali, crisi finanziarie e debiti fra V e III sec. a.C.*, Como, 2003.

With respect to the study of the phenomenon of the *societates publicanorum*, the Spanish episode of 215 and the coinage, consult M.R. Cimma, *Ricerche sulle società di publicani*, Milano 1981; A. Mateo, *Manceps, redemptor, publicanus*, Santander 1999; C. Alfaro Asins et al., *Historia monetaria de Hispania antiqua*, Madrid, 1997. On Roman fiscal policy in the Republican period, the work of C. Nicolet (1976, 2000) and also the indispensable *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*, London 1980 (orig. edn., Paris 1976), and its chapter vi, “Aerarium”, remains even today an essential reference for everyone, along with the conference proceedings on *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique*, Paris 1977, and *Points de vue sur la fiscalité antique*, Paris, 1979; also P. Cerami, *Aspetti e problemi di diritto finanziario romano*, Palermo 1997. Very useful is the formulation of particular questions about provincial finance policy, put by J. France, “Tributum et stipendium. La politique fiscale de l'empereur romain”, *Revue Historique de Droit français et étranger* 84 (2006), 1–16, and by France 2007.

At a more general level: A. Storch Marino (ed.), *Economia, Amministrazione e Fiscalità nel Mondo Romano. Ricerche lessicali*, Bari 2004, and the very suggestive article by N. Purcell, "The Ancient Mediterranean: the view of the customs house", in W.V. Harris (ed.), *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, Oxford 2005, 200–232. Finally, it is in war and its military aspects, in both the Republic and particularly our period, that perhaps more and more interesting new ideas have been put forward in recent years, especially works like Eckstein 2006, Erdkamp 2007a, and Scheidel *et al.* 2007, together with L. Loreto 2006, and the two items fundamental for Roman military logistics: Erdkamp 1998 and Roth 1999.

NOTES

1. I want to thank Dexter Hoyos for his kind invitation to take part in this project, and for his translation of this chapter into English.
2. Scullard 1951, 39–88; Rich 1993, 38–68; Erdkamp 2007b; Morel 2007, 497ff.; Rosenstein 2007, 235–236.
3. Briscoe 1989, 74–75; Goldsworthy 2000, chaps. 6–13; Hoyos 2003, 122–133.
4. In Italy: Locri (215: Livy 24.1.9; and 205: 29.8.5), Brundisium (214: 24.40.5), Tarentum (210: 27.12.4), or also in Sicily, like the infamous prefect L. Pinarius exacting from the local elites the surrender of the keys to the walls of the city of Henna in 214 (Livy 27.12.4ff.). For Carthaginian garrisons: Petelia (216: Livy 23.30.1; 209: 27.15.9); Locri (207: 29.15.5); Roth 1999, 187–189; Cadiou 2003, 81–100; and 2008, 269–371.
5. Richardson 1986, 55–57; Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo 2007, 23–25.
6. Measures of this kind, together with the destruction caused by the same war, finished by ruining the land and population of Italy: Cornell 1996, 97–113.
7. Buraselis 1996, 149–172; Hollander 2007, 53.
8. France 2007, 169–184; Hollander 2007, 90–97; Ñaco del Hoyo 2007, 219–231.
9. Nicolet 2000, 94; Nicolet 1976.
10. Frank 1933, 145.
11. Brunt, 1971 [1987], 545–549; Pfeilschifter 2007, 27–42.
12. In 217 Hiero sent 500 Cretan mercenaries and 1,000 light infantry (Pol. 3.75.7) and in the following year, another 1,000 men (Livy 23.37.7); Eckstein 1980, 197–199.
13. Harris 1979, chap. 2; Eckstein 2006, 158ff.; Prag 2007.
14. Frank 1933, 95.
15. Crawford 1985, 60; Erdkamp 2000, 60–61; Rowland 2001, 91–93; Roth 2007, 380ff.
16. Badian 1972, 11–25; Garnsey 1994, 32–33; Erdkamp 1998, 114–118; Ñaco del Hoyo 2003, 115–126.
17. Ripollès 2005, 80–1.
18. Marchetti 1978, 345ff.; García-Bellido 1986, 76–84.
19. Crawford 1974; Crawford, 1985, 52–74; Marra 2001; King 2007, 1–19.
20. Howgego 1995, 56–61; von Reden 2002, 156ff.; Harris 2008, 174–207.

PART IV

THE LAST HALF-CENTURY
OF CARTHAGE

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Carthage and Numidia, 201–149 BC

Claudia Kunze

Carthage and Numidia between the Second and Third Punic Wars

When Carthage was defeated by the Romans in 201 the flourishing city was left with clipped wings. High reparation payments and the sanction not to take up arms without Rome's permission left it weak and vulnerable. However, hardly anybody could have foreseen that this was just the beginning of the end, the prelude to an even bigger humiliation, the total destruction of the Punic metropolis that would follow about half a century later. In the events between the Second and the Third Punic Wars lies the key to the fate of the city, and they have long been examined by historians. Research can be based on detailed Greek and Latin sources, although the Carthaginian point of view died with the city. The events during and between the wars are discussed in more detail in other places in this volume; this chapter will be devoted to a small topic within the field.

I wish to turn my attention to the relations between Carthage and her Numidian neighbours between 201 and 146 BC. The Numidian King Masinissa is often seen as a central figure in the development of the Roman — Carthaginian conflict and the outbreak of the Third Punic War; an assumption that will be discussed further in the following chapter. Nevertheless, all leaders, however great, are always also a product of their environment and therefore I also wish to shed some light on the broader background of the time.

Besides the political and military narrative we also need to look at the history of the common people, cultural exchange, trade, and economics. This will give a better idea of the factors Carthaginian generals, Roman senators, and Numidian kings had to base their decisions on. In addition to the literary sources I shall consider the information that archaeological research has brought to light.

The course and outcome of the Second Punic War were a clear reflection of Carthage's main problem, as already reported by Polybius, Livy, and Appian. According to the texts, the proud city neither lacked cunning generals to match the Roman commanders, nor was held back by economic problems. Carthage's main weakness was a shortage of loyal men willing to fight for their city at any cost. Instead, the Carthaginian commanders had to rely largely on the support of allies and mercenaries, often loyal to whoever promised them the prospect of the largest profits or best advancement of their own interests.¹

During the Second Punic War this had already brought Carthage the loss of the territories in Iberia, where Scipio not only through warfare but also with the help of clever propaganda had managed to win the locals over to the Roman side. This gave him enough resources as well as political support to embark on the invasion of North Africa in 204. Following the principle that attack is the best form of defense, he saw Rome's greatest chances for winning the war in attacking Carthage itself. If nothing else, his bold move forced Hannibal to leave Italy and return to Africa to protect Carthage, once the war was brought to Africa. It is hard to imagine what would have happened there without the involvement of Numidian troops, as they are usually seen as having played a key role in the outcome of the war. The frequency and detail with which the Numidians are mentioned in the ancient sources alone, compared to other Carthaginian and Roman allies, seems to underline this, although explicit facts are open for debate and have been questioned by modern scholars.

It is difficult to estimate in how far the Latin and Greek accounts are subject to propaganda, exaggeration, or simple ignorance, as we cannot consult the historiography of their opponents. It would also go beyond the scope of this chapter to try an assessment of the validity of those sources; with all historical narrative, one has to be aware of the fact that it is never objective. Livy, for example, reports that in the battle of Zama forces met that were fairly equal in numbers and that for a long time the outcome was far from clear. However, on the other hand he states that 20,000 Carthaginians and their allies died, while only 1,500 Romans lost their lives.² This seems a very large discrepancy in casualties for a supposedly evenly matched encounter fought mainly in single combat, which makes us assume that these numbers represent symbolic rather than accurate figures. However, the essence of this particular episode is

that Carthage experienced a crushing defeat: a historical fact that can be sufficiently verified by Carthage's obedient acceptance of the oppressive peace treaty that followed it. In the following I shall be mainly looking at more general statements like this one that are in less danger of being twisted in the telling of a naturally biased author.

The Numidian chieftain Masinissa had been a close ally of Carthage during the first part of the Second Punic War, fighting side by side with the Carthaginians in Spain. However, at some point during the war in Iberia it must have dawned on him that an alliance with Scipio would turn out to be more advantageous and he switched sides. When, on the other hand, the Numidian king Syphax refused to ratify his treaty with Rome and decided to support Carthage instead, some sort of balance was restored between Carthage and Rome. To seal the newly formed alliance and tighten his ties to Carthage, Syphax was even married to Sophoniba, the daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gisco. Whether Carthage or Rome had formed the better alliance became clear in the battle of Zama, which ended the war with a humiliating defeat for Carthage. It is believed that Masinissa's sought-after and dreaded cavalry played an important, if not decisive role in this. While Masinissa, according to the literary sources, supported Scipio with 10,000 men — 6,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry — Syphax had already been defeated and captured after the battle of the Great Plains near Utica in 203, and had been taken to Italy to die there, while Masinissa took over his kingdom. This left Carthage with much weaker Numidian support than it hoped for, although Syphax's friend Tychaeus came to support Hannibal with 2,000 of his horsemen. Syphax's son Vermina also set out to aid Hannibal, but arrived too late and was also defeated by the Romans in the aftermath of Zama.³

Although this chapter is mainly concerned with the relations between Carthage and Numidia after the Second Punic War, it is nevertheless necessary to have a brief look at some of the events that took place during the war. In these years of conflict the basis was established for what would follow. The detailed accounts of the alliances and politics during the war give a good idea of the position that the Numidian kingdoms had reached at this point in time within North Africa and the Hellenistic world. The fact that we are informed in considerable detail about the activities and operations of the Numidian kings in itself foreshadows the importance that one has to be prepared to grant these previously rather small nomadic tribes. Apart from the main adversaries in the war — Carthage and Rome — we do not hear of any other single ally as much as we hear about the Numidians. This is partly due to the legendary excellence of the Numidian cavalry, which made them valued allies. Several delegations, Roman as well as Carthaginian, were sent to Numidian chieftains and even such details as Masinissa being a lover of Greek music are reported.⁴

These are remarkable circumstances, not paralleled in what we know of any of the many other tribes involved. For example, we hear very little about the Ligurian leaders, although the Ligurians are said to have provided substantial support for the Carthaginian army, outnumbering the Numidian horsemen by thousands. This shows that the rate of recurrence and the detail with which the Numidians are mentioned cannot only be due to the military weight these allies added to the balance of power between Carthage and Rome. Looking at the texts in more detail, we find that Masinissa, for example, is named in the same breath as Hellenistic statesmen such as Eumenes of Pergamum, Antiochus III of the Seleucid empire, Ariarathes of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy of Egypt. We also hear that on different occasions Roman generals and consuls took it upon themselves to travel to Numidia to negotiate in person with different Numidian chieftains.⁵

All this shows the level of importance that the North African Berber tribes must have had acquired by the second century. Although they are often portrayed as partly nomadic tribes, and excellent and very elaborate in their fighting from horseback, very little else is known about their civilization and culture. Furthermore, here probably also lies the reason why the Numidians were long neglected by archaeologists, who in the early years of the discipline started their research from the well-known literary sources, setting out to prove or illustrate what they could read. In spite of this, approaches have changed in more recent years so we are increasingly able to fill in the gaps and come to a more rounded understanding of Carthage's neighbors.

From literary sources we learn that Numidian territory, which included the north of modern Algeria and the parts of Tunisia situated west and south of Carthagiinian territory, was split up amongst different tribes and chieftains at the time of the Second Punic War. The Masaesyli under Syphax, and the Massyli, of whom Masinissa became king during the course of the war, seem to have been the more important tribes; at least they get the most attention in the texts. We also hear that the Numidian kingdoms were engaged in more or less continuous quarrels amongst themselves about the supremacy over the whole of Numidia. As the end of the Second Punic War shows, the involvement of the Numidian kingdoms in the conflict between Carthage and Rome must also have had an impact on local politics. After the peace treaty Carthage's possessions were limited to their original territory as marked by the so-called Phoenician Trenches, a provision through which Masinissa gained a considerable amount of territory. Furthermore, Carthage was forced to restore all houses, land, and cities that had belonged to Masinissa or his ancestors. Through these major concessions and the fact that other Numidian chieftains who had joined Carthage during the war returned weak and beaten, Masinissa effectively emerged from the Second Punic war as the king of all Numidians.⁶

He capitalized on this position even further during the years to come. Much to his advantage, the peace treaty also restrained Carthage in its military actions, as the Carthaginians were not allowed even to defend their own land without the permission of the Romans. Masinissa used this situation to encroach on Carthaginian territory several times between the Second and Third Punic Wars, while the Carthaginians were unable to counteract it. Again and again Carthaginian envoys begged for Rome's permission to resist these attacks, but Rome remained committed to its ally and denied Carthage's requests. Finally, the Carthaginians could not hold back any longer, as at this rate they had to fear an attack on the city itself; they answered Masinissa's next assault with military action, without Roman consent. Carthage's independent stroke is often seen as a catalyst for the Third Punic War, giving Rome a valid reason to assemble forces for battle once again.⁷

This brief and selective summary of the written records shows that we are reasonably well informed about the political relations between Carthage and Numidia in the third and second centuries. Although we have to assume that Carthage was superior to its Numidian neighbours in many respects, the history of the Punic metropolis was nevertheless greatly influenced by relations with the adjacent kingdoms. The importance of these relations can be inferred from the large efforts that were made to win the Numidians over as allies. This even included marrying one of Carthage's noblewomen, Hasdrubal's daughter Sophoniba, to Syphax to seal the new alliance, a transaction that one would only expect to take place between parties of more or less equal rank.

However, no matter how hard the Carthaginians tried, Numidian kings were first and foremost loyal to their own ambitions and behind most their actions stood a strong will to expand their own sphere of influence, possibly even going as far as longing for supremacy in North Africa themselves. Livy mentions these great ambitions and the insecurity of the support one could hope to get from the Numidians. Furthermore, the disputes amongst the Numidian kings made them even less reliable than they already were. To sum things up, politically Carthage is mired in a debacle, which finally results in Masinissa rising to be the king of all Numidians and then doing everything to wear down Carthage as much as possible in its already vulnerable state after the Second Punic War.⁸

After this brief view of the political aspect of the relations between Carthage and Numidia I now turn from the historiography and toward the people who lived through those turbulent times. Unfortunately, the literary sources are very quiet about any details concerning daily life in Carthage or Numidia during the period in question. Therefore I want to investigate the archaeological material that has come to light in Numidian settlements as well as in Carthage itself to see whether we can find any indication as to the nature of the economical and cultural relations between the two during the first half of the second century.

Archaeological evidence

As already mentioned, while Carthage has been under the spotlight of archaeological studies for a long time, the pre-Roman Numidian settlements have only fairly recently moved into the focus of research. Earlier excavations were mainly concerned with the Roman period on these sites. A good example for this are the excavations at Dougga (ancient Thugga), a town situated about 130 km southwest of Carthage and only a stone's throw away from the so-called *fossa regia*, the border that separated Carthaginian territory from the Numidian lands. While it was previously assumed that Numidian houses of rather inferior quality must have been situated in the areas spared by the Roman settlement within the supposedly Hellenistic city wall, the picture changed completely after the modern German-Tunisian excavations published their results. We know now that the so-called Hellenistic wall actually dates to the Late Antique, possibly even Vandalic period, and that the Numidian settlement lies buried underneath the Roman city. The Roman city plan even carries on the old structures, in so far as the forum, temples, and other public areas remained in the same place.⁹

Although large parts of Numidian Dougga are still undiscovered, the new findings allow speculations about a Numidian town that did not rank behind other Hellenistic cities. Rich tombs of the Numidian era confirm this picture and testify to the existence of a wealthy urban elite. The most significant example is the so-called Mausoleum of Atban, which is also one of the few surviving structures of Numidian architecture. As only parts of the inscription from this monument have come down to us, we are left in the dark about who was actually buried here. The names on the one surviving slab refer to the dedicant (or the architect) Atban, a sculptor, a stonemason, a foreman, three craftsmen, two carpenters, and two blacksmiths. Without exception all names are of Numidian origin. This shows that Dougga was not only a city with a wealthy upper class, but also that they had people with the skills and know-how required to erect such an impressive monument. Another remarkable aspect is that this inscription is one of the fairly common examples of a bilingual text, displaying Numidian as well as Punic writing. According to the shape and alignment of the letters it can be dated to the middle of the second century and by itself offers an interesting insight into Numidian-Punic relationships after the Second Punic War. Although not very common, there are three more surviving examples of this type of grave monument in the Numidian world, all dating from the second century. One can be found in Sabratha, another in Siga, erected by Syphax, and the last one in Es Soumâa near Cirta (Constantine). They all show somewhat different outlines, but can be classed with the same basic type of grave monument, a tower-shaped multi-story

building capped by a pyramidal roof. These kinds of mausoleum are better known from necropoleis in Phoenicia, Syria, and Asia Minor, from where, supposedly, Punic people brought this type to North Africa.¹⁰

Finds from the Numidian period in Dougga show a very similar spectrum to what was excavated at other Numidian sites such as Cirta. In general, most of the objects come from graves, because the Numidian settlements themselves, as already discussed above, remain largely undiscovered. What was found indicates a material culture of a very diverse nature. Next to the local, mainly handmade pottery we find Punic, but also Greek and Roman, pottery as well as other finds familiar from Carthaginian sites, such as painted ostrich eggs, small glass vessels, and jewelry. These finds further confirm that at least during the period in question, the Numidian people were well integrated in the Hellenistic world. If we were to look at a finds ensemble of unknown provenance from this time, we would be hard pressed to decide whether it actually came from a Numidian town or a Carthaginian one.

After parts of the Numidian tribes had started to settle in cities, these seem to have developed quickly into flourishing centers of trade and commerce. Amongst the pottery finds are often amphorae, for example from Rhodes containing the popular wine from the Greek island, as well as the famous Hellenistic black glaze pottery, most commonly the Campanian A and B wares in large quantities. This fine tableware was mainly imported from central and southern Italy, but also examples made in Greece and Carthage were found. An interesting feature of the occurrence of the black glaze ware is that here the actual vessels were imported, contrary to the case of the amphorae, which are simply containers for the transportation of other actually sought-after goods. The presence of black glaze tableware not only attests further commercial contacts within the Mediterranean world, but may also indicate that the Hellenistic dining etiquette customary in Greece, Rome, and Carthage had found its way to Numidia. Black glaze wares first appeared in Numidian graves between the very end of the third and the first quarter of the second century, which seems to coincide with the victory of Rome over Carthage and the changes which Masinissa's rise to hegemony over the Numidian tribes brought for the Numidian people.¹¹

A further indication of the assimilation between the Numidian and Punic cultures can be seen in the style used to decorate gravestones from Numidian necropoleis. They are one of the few examples of surviving decorated stones, as most Numidian architecture was built over during Roman times and still remains mostly undiscovered under the Roman ruins. Recurring depictions on these gravestones are symbols well known from the Punic world, such as the sun, the half-moon, and the Tanit sign; and they often mention Baal Hammon and Tanit in their inscriptions. Of course one possibility is that these were made for Punic people living in the Numidian cities, but the sheer

number of stones found decorated in this way points toward another assumption. Also the fact that a fair number of gravestones show Numidian names, or Numidian names transcribed in Punic letters, indicates that the indigenous population too used Punic-style gravestones.¹²

Another find-group showing how tied in the Numidians were with the Punic and Hellenistic world are coins. The earliest Numidian coins appear toward the end of the Second Punic War. Syphax, his son Vermina and a few years later also Masinissa were the first to issue their own coins. An interesting fact is that none of the Numidian coins bear the Numidian script on them: instead Punic letters are used. Furthermore, coins of Masinissa depict the king with a laurel crown, the typical symbol used by Hellenistic rulers all over the Mediterranean world. Apart from the iconography and inscriptions on the coins themselves, the very existence of Numidian money testifies to a flourishing trade between Numidia and the rest of the world that made the introduction of its own currency necessary. In fact, Numidian coins have been found all around the Mediterranean, as far away as Delos, Rhodes, and other places in the eastern regions where they are a common occurrence, as they are in coin hoards from the Balkans.¹³ Considering this, the use of Punic letters might also have been for the very practical reason that the Punic language was spoken and understood more prevalently than the Numidian; although this is a proposition which would need further investigation by more detailed research. An extensive trade throughout the Mediterranean, combined with the ability to move troops from Africa to Iberia and other places, gives reason to assume that the Numidians were also in possession of, or at least had access to, a fleet of some sort, although no traces of it have survived.

The importance and intensity of the commercial relations that the Numidian rulers had in the second century becomes even clearer through our last example.

So far we have mainly been looking at only one side of these relations — the influence that contact with Punic, Roman, and Greek people had on the Numidians. I now turn my attention to the other side to see if we can trace the Numidians in other cultures and shed light on the whole spectrum of Numidian-Carthaginian relationships. Of course, the already discussed coins are a sign of Numidian presence in other cultures. However, an exceptional example for the evidence of Numidians abroad was found on the Greek island of Delos. In the sanctuary of Apollo two dedicatory inscriptions survive, one of which mentions Masinissa's son, while the other one bears Masinissa's name itself. They were placed on statue bases, although the actual statues did not survive. They were donated by merchants from Athens and Rhodes and are a good indication of how far-flung Numidian contacts were.

The intensity of these trade relations must have been remarkable and increasing towards the end of the second century. During this century Delos,

for example, imported most of the grain it needed from Africa. Toward the end of this period the majority of the foreign coins found on the island were Numidian, no longer Carthaginian, suggesting a shift in trade partners. Moreover, Greek-Numidian relations went beyond a purely commercial type. We hear that Mastanabal, one of Masinissa's sons, could read and write in Greek and kept horses that won at the Panathenian Games. He is said to have employed a trainer who was knowledgeable in the art of Hellenistic horse racing. We also hear that Masinissa liked to invite Greek musicians and dancers to his court to provide entertainment for him and his guests. All together these different pieces of information give a good impression of the status the Numidian rulers — and most of all, probably, Masinissa and his family — had in the second century. They were well established within the nobility of what is often described as the “globalized” Hellenistic world.¹⁴

Numidian–Carthaginian Relations

After this little excursus, I shall now look at the more specific topic of Numidian–Carthaginian relations. It was, nevertheless, necessary to look at the Numidians from a wider angle first as the lack of literary sources and the biased view presented in the few texts easily lead to a distorted picture. We mostly hear that the primordially nomadic tribes had only just began to settle and that Masinissa was one of the strongest driving forces behind this change to a new way of life. Polybius praises him as being a civilized man whose mission it was to cultivate and advance his country. Masinissa is said to have improved agriculture and trade and to have furthered the building and development of cities and towns. Nevertheless, apart from the glorified and celebrated figure of Masinissa, the literary sources present us with a rather uncivilized picture of the Numidian tribes before and outside Masinissa's sphere of influence. Mostly they report about Numidians at war, fighting either amongst themselves or as mercenaries for others. We do not learn much about Numidian daily life or social and economic affairs. The lack of Numidian literature itself deprives us of their own point of view and makes them appear rather primitive people, not even capable of producing their own written records. Therefore, it is easy to be trapped in the mistaken belief that Carthage looked down on an inferior, barbaric neighbor.¹⁵

After looking at the impact that the Punic and other cultures had on the Numidian territories, the question now is whether it is also possible to find traces of Numidians in Carthage. Again we mainly have to rely on archaeological sources in default of a comprehensive corpus of Carthaginian literature. Nevertheless, Carthage moved into the focus of archaeologists even in the early days of the discipline. Unlike the situation in many Numidian towns,

where the earlier settlements stayed buried and untouched under the extensive Roman ruins, in Carthage Punic layers were excavated in different places within the city. Of course here also the knowledge remains fragmented and far from complete, but it was still possible to retrieve a fairly good picture of what Carthage was like in the era of the Punic Wars and earlier periods.

There are probably two reasons for this enthusiasm to expand beyond the Roman structures. One is that it is actually possible to excavate beneath Roman layers. Many of Carthage's Roman remains are in a shattered or dispersed condition, which allows the levels below to be investigated. Exceptions such as the Antonine Baths still make a great visual impact on everyone visiting today, but the fact that Carthage has been continuously populated from antiquity to the present day has had a disastrous impact on the survival of buildings. Not only were existing structures destroyed by the foundations of new buildings, for a long time old buildings were also used as quarries for the new ones, as good building material was and is scarce in the area; a habit that started already in antiquity. This same fate also met many Punic structures, but in some places remains survived and the curiosity of archaeologists has found ways of uncovering parts of what is left from the Punic city.

This brings us to the second reason for the advanced level of research into the pre-Roman era in Carthage. Although not many of the Punic texts survived, Carthage is nevertheless mentioned in numerous Greek and Roman texts, covering many different facets of life in the Mediterranean metropolis. The famous and horrifying reports of how the Carthaginians sacrificed their own children to the god Baal Hammon, for example, fueled the inquiring minds of early excavators, eager to find traces of what they could read about in the books of Cleitarchus, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, and was picked up also by the writer Flaubert in his book *Salammbô*. The site of such cruelty was finally discovered in 1921, although modern archaeological research shows that the reported child sacrifices are fantastic fairy tales rather than historical events. Excavations in other Punic necropoleis started as early as in the second half of the nineteenth century.

In Douïmès, Dermech, Ste Monique, and other areas thousands of Punic graves were excavated within a few decades. Around the same time the extensive and detailed literary sources highlighting the Punic Wars sparked a search for the traces of this. The destruction layer of 146 BC was first uncovered in 1859 and successively detected on several other sites in Carthage. Furthermore also, the famous harbors were found as described, with the peculiar circular harbor for the legendary Carthaginian navy as well as the rectangular commercial harbor. While the two actual basins are still easily recognizable in today's landscape, archaeological research brought to light interesting details about the harbor buildings, showing all the skillful knowledge the Carthaginians had in nautical matters.

More recently archaeologists have also turned their attention to the everyday life of the Punic city and began to look for opportunities to unearth parts of the actual settlement. They were particularly successful in four sites, the so-called Quartier Magon, the excavation at the Rue Ibn Chabâat, the Bir Messaouda site and adjacent excavation by the University of Hamburg, and on the slopes of the Byrsa hill. At the Quartier Magon and the Rue Ibn Chabâat sites, the poor state of preservation of younger remains allowed archaeologists to advance as far down as the archaic levels. They uncovered a series of houses from the earliest settlement phase up to the time of the end of the Punic city, also including places of worship. The excavation by the University of Hamburg made use of the Roman crossroads of the *Decumanus Maximus* and *Cardo X*, which was not built over by modern houses. The site allowed the archaeologists to uncover the levels of Punic Carthage, as only a few remaining pavement slab stones of the Roman road had to be removed and there were no other Roman structures covering the earlier remains. Also here it was possible to dig down to the earliest occupation layers and as a result to establish a continuous narrative from the eighth century down to the destruction in 146.

The excavations by the Universities of Amsterdam and Ghent followed *Cardo X* to the south, uncovering more structures from the Punic period, while the situation on the slopes of the Byrsa hill was different again. Here, as part of the Roman rehabilitation of the city, a new forum was laid out on the top of Byrsa, for which a levelled area bigger than the previous space was required. The hilltop was levelled off and thousands upon thousands of tons of debris were simply pushed down the slopes, burying the earlier structures of the Punic occupation. Excavations of the Punic layers so far have focused on the south slope of the hill, where houses and workshops have been unearthed, again from the earliest to the latest phase of the Punic city.

Although research still leaves many questions unanswered, the excavations in Punic Carthage give a much better picture of the city during the period of the Punic Wars than we have from any of the Numidian towns. The destruction layer of 146, detectable in most trenches in Carthage, provides a solid reference point in the stratigraphy of the Late Punic period. There is archaeological and epigraphical evidence that, despite Carthage having to accept defeats, building activity was nevertheless flourishing during the period of the Punic Wars. In addition, numerous finds of imported pottery from all over the Hellenistic world confirm a prospering economy and show that trade, one of Carthage's pillars of wealth and success, was still thriving.¹⁶

However, what exactly this meant for Numidian-Carthaginian relationships is still difficult to say. We know from literary sources that Masinissa spent at least part of his youth living in Carthage and was educated here. There is no reason to assume that he was the only Numidian spending time in the city.

During his early days Masinissa was nothing more than one of many sons of Numidian chieftains, and it is very possible that other offspring of noble Numidian families did the same. Furthermore it was arranged for Sophoniba, daughter of Hasdrubal son of Gisco, to marry to Syphax, a liaison obviously good enough for a Carthaginian noblewoman. It is further to be assumed that, at least due to the numerous engagements of Numidian soldiers in the Carthaginian army, people of other social ranks also mixed. However, the evidence for this is thin on the ground, as it can be neither backed up by the literary nor the archaeological sources.

Although finds dating to the period in question have been excavated, it is very difficult to detect any traces of Numidian culture amongst them. This could of course be partly due to the fact that the acculturation between the Numidians and the Carthaginians was far-ranging by the second century and made a distinction between the two cultures hard. Yet the dearth of uncovered objects from Numidian sites probably bears a greater responsibility for this, besides making it difficult to grasp the material culture of these people. Pottery, for example — usually one of the most common indicators of foreign influence — is very little known, and it is the same with other find types. Only recent projects, such as the excavations at Dougga, have focused on the recording and studying of indigenous wares. When more of this research is published, we might well be able to recognize fragments of those wares amongst the pottery found in Carthaginian contexts. Although finer table wares are more customary export goods than the simpler household wares, finds from Carthage show that imports of plain and coarse wares, including handmade wares are common.

Currently the most reliable source on this issue is probably the finds of Numidian coins in Carthage. Although it remains uncertain how these coins reached the Punic metropolis, it seems a likely assumption that they were brought to Carthage in exchange for goods by Numidian people or other traders. A different matter is a Numidian coin of Syphax found in a grave in the necropolis of Ste Monique in Carthage. In this area, where excavations started as early as in the nineteenth century, graves mainly of the Hellenistic period have been uncovered. In the course of early excavations, Père Delattre, a member of the White Fathers, the missionaries who came to Christianize the area around Carthage, recorded a Numidian coin found in one of the tombs.¹⁷ Also in this case we are left in the dark about the circumstances under which this coin got into the grave. One could go as far as to speculate that a Numidian fellow countryman was buried here, although this speculation would need further backup.

The conclusion is that currently only a few indications point to Numidians living in Carthage, but that the little evidence there is so far seems to confirm speculations that the nature of Carthaginian-Numidian relations were rather

of bilateral interactions between two countries on a par, not of a superpower dominating a much inferior state.

Against the background that this assumption provides, I now want to look at the political actions that Numidia, Carthage, and also Rome took in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, which would lead up to the Third Punic War followed by the fall of Carthage. Again we are reasonably well informed about the historical and military development by the ancient sources.

Events Leading to the Third Punic War

When the peace treaty between Carthage and Rome prohibited the Carthaginians to take up arms without Roman approval, even if it was for their own defence, Masinissa decided to capitalize on the chance of an easy increase of his territory. Not only did he get back land that had been Numidian before the Punic Wars, he also, cautiously at first and then increasingly boldly, encroached onto land that Carthage still possessed after the treaty and annexed it for his kingdom. While doing so he was always relying on Rome's loyalty to an ally who had contributed decisively to its victory by the end of the Second Punic War.

To start with Carthage abided by the treaty and refrained from striking back or defending her territories. Instead numerous delegations were sent to the Roman Senate to appeal for intervention on Carthage's behalf to stop Masinissa's raids. Their legal attempts were not met with success as Rome always decided in Masinissa's favour. Finally, another one of Masinissa's assaults in the late 150s was the last straw, and Carthage took up arms again to defend what even after the draconian peace treaty was rightfully hers. At the city of Oroscopa the two armies met, as Appian describes, and there were many deaths on both sides. In the end the Numidians lay siege to the Carthaginian army who subsequently suffered badly from famine and diseases and finally had to admit defeat.

Although Carthage's first military attempt since the end of the Second Punic War was a complete disaster, the decision to go to battle had even more serious impact on the future of the city. A Roman delegation arrived, including Scipio Aemilianus (also called Scipio Africanus the younger), an adopted grandson of the Scipio Africanus who had defeated Carthage about 50 years earlier. They were initially sent to Carthage to investigate the city's demands for support against Masinissa. However, what Scipio and his fellow countrymen witnessed was enough to let the Roman senators vote in favor of war against Carthage. The result of this decision is common knowledge. Antique texts as well as archaeological sources leave no doubt that Carthage was indeed more or less completely destroyed at the end of this war. The real reason,

however, that stood behind Rome's decision to finally eliminate the city that they had already twice defeated remains subject to discussion.

The official declaration, as it has come down to us through ancient literature, is that Carthage violated the peace treaty by taking up arms to fight back against Masinissa and had to be punished for that.¹⁸ However, it is more or less uniformly assumed that this was just an ostensible reason and a welcome justification for an attack. Some say that Rome could not forget the fear and distress Carthage had once imposed on the city, and that some senators were increasingly worried about Carthage's fast recovery despite the sanctions provided for in the peace treaty. Although this is a possibility, a closer look at Carthage's economic and military situation near the time of the Third Punic War suggests that the city, despite a recent economic upswing, was not in a position to pose any serious military threat to Rome. Others argue that Rome was jealous of a city that was situated in such an excellent position, that seemed to make survival and recovery possible no matter how hard circumstances were. Although this sounds like a reasonable argument, one needs to ask the question, why, if jealousy was the reason, the Romans did not simply take over the city and start using the existing infrastructure right away. Instead, about 100 years passed by before the city was officially reinstated under Caesar, even though it remains doubtful whether the city was actually as deserted as is commonly believed.

Another theory is that Rome suspected that the city offered a welcoming environment for insurgents and was looking to destroy their hideout, as they did with Corinth about the same time. This explanation cannot be excluded, but lacks substantive proof.¹⁹ Another explanation for Rome's decision finally to erase the Punic city might lie in the evidence discussed above. Numidia under Masinissa had become stronger than any of the Numidian kingdoms had ever been before. Masinissa kept on taking more and more of Carthage's land, a path that could have led to the conquest of the city itself by the Numidians at some point. This possibility certainly would have provided enough reason for concern and was a vision that the Romans probably would not have wanted to come true. This theory too needs further proof, but a clue for it could possibly be found in Plutarch's text.

According to his account, Cato finished speech after speech in the senate with his still world-famous demand that Carthage be destroyed. More important for our argument is that Plutarch reports how Cato shook a few fresh Libyan figs out of the folds of his toga to illustrate how near the threat was and to underline his demand. Normally it is assumed that he had picked these figs up during his last visit in Carthage to bring them straight to the senate. However, the fact that Plutarch calls them Libyan figs leaves room for another interpretation. Libya is a name that is broadly used in early Egyptian and also Greek texts and can cover a wide range of people. Herodotus calls all aboriginal

people living in the Maghreb region “Libyans,” as opposed to the southern African Ethiopians and the later settlers from Phoenicia and Greece. Later the term “Libyans” is mainly applied to the tribes living in the immediate hinterland of Carthage, which by the time of Cato’s speech probably already belonged to Masinissa’s kingdom, at least in part. Undoubtedly there were figs growing outside Carthage itself, as they grow in most places around the Mediterranean, so it would have been perfectly possible for Cato to pick up those figs anywhere in North Africa and use them to refer to a danger coming from Numidia, which was just as close to Rome as Carthage was.

If we assume the figs metaphor stood for Numidia, not Carthage, his demand would get a whole new perspective. On the other hand, however, Pliny’s account of the same episode clearly states that Cato picked up the figs in Carthage itself. So it remains unsure, where these figs exactly came from and it is an even greater question, whether the whole episode with the figs in the senate is authentic or figurative language used to emphasize the argument.

Official relations between Carthage and Numidia naturally ended with the conquest of Carthage in 146. The aftereffects of a long and far-reaching cultural exchange and assimilation had consequences. After Carthage’s defeat many of its citizens fled to Numidian cities and legend has it that the libraries of Carthage were handed over to the Numidian kings. The Punic language survived in Numidian territories till Late Antique times, although Numidians or any surviving parts of the Punic population are hard to trace after the Punic Wars in much detail.²⁰

NOTES

1. Pol. 1.67, 71; 6.52; 7.9.1; 15.9; Livy 21.5.5; 28.44.5; 30.33.5–11, 34.7, 35.7; Diod. 5.29.6, 38.2–3; 20.17.1; Plut. *Tim.* 28.11. See García y Bellido 1969–70; Ameling 1993a, 183–213; Lazenby 1996; Rochette 1997; Stephenson 2008; P.C. Naylor, *North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present* (Austin TX, 2009), 39.
2. Appian, *Lib.* 7.43–8.48; Pol. 15.12–14; Livy 30.33.14–35.11.
3. Pol. 15.3–5; Livy 30.36.7–8.
4. *FGrH* II B, 234 (Ptolemaeus Euergetes II) F7; Walsh 1965, 149; F. Bertrand, “La communauté gréco-latine de Cirta (Constantine), capitale du royaume de Numidie, pendant le II^e siècle et la première moitié du I^{er} siècle avant J.-C.”, *Latomus* 44 (1985), 494; Storm 2001, 30–36.
5. For a collection of literary sources about the Ligurians during the Second Punic War see Daly 2002, 106; Ameling 1993a, 213. Masinissa’s repute: Appian, *Mac.* fragments.
6. Fage and Oliver 1978, 173, 181–182; Scullard 1930, 254–261, with a summary of the peace treaty.
7. See below in this chapter, discussion about the reasons for the Third Punic War.

8. Sophoniba's marriage to Syphax: Livy 29.23. He was not the first Numidian chieftain married to a Carthaginian noblewoman. Naravas who stood beside Carthage during the Mercenary Revolt was rewarded for this by being married to a daughter of Hamilcar Barca (cf. Chapter 12): see Fage and Oliver 1978, 179. Similarly first Oezalces and, after his death, Mazaetullus who married his widow, a niece of Hannibal: see Livy 29.29.12. Numidian ambitions: Livy 28.42.7.
9. M. von Strocka, *Thougga I. Grundlagen und Berichte* (2002); Hiesel 2004, 62–64; M. Khanoussi, S. Ritter, and P. von Rummel, "The German-Tunisian Project at Dougga. First results of the excavations south of the Maison du Trifolium," *AntAfr* 40–41 (2004–5), 43–66.
10. F. Rakob, "Numidische Königsarchitektur in Nordafrika," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 145–171.
11. V. Bridoux, "A propos de la pénétration des produits italiques sur trois sites numido-maurétaniens", in C. Briand-Ponsart (ed.), *Identités et culture dans l'Algérie antique* (Mont-Saint-Aignan, 2005) 45–58; and "Les imitations de céramique à vernis noir en Numidie et en Maurétanie (IIIe–Ier siècles av. J.-C.). Etat des recherches," in Akerraz *et al.* 2008, 609–636; M.R. Alföldi, "Die Geschichte des numidischen Königreiches und seiner Nachfolger," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 56; Camps 1960, 201; C.B. Rügér, "Die Keramik des Grabes von Es Soumâa bei El Khroub," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 340–344; P. Cadenat, "Un établissement pré-romain dans la région de Tiaret (Oranie)," *AntAfr* 6 (1972), 29–58; Hiesel 2004, 68–69.
12. Bertrandy (n. 4 above), 489; A. M'charek, "Maghrawa, lieu de provenance des stèles punico-numides dites de la Ghorfa," *MEFRA* 100 (1988), 731–760; F. Bertrandy, "Motifs architecturaux sur les stèles votives à Baal Hammon au sanctuaire d'El Hofra à Cirta (Constantine). IIIe–Ier siècles," in *Actas del IV Congreso internacional de estudios fenicios y púnicos* (2000), 1153–70; Fage and Oliver 1978, 184; H.P. Roschinski, "Die punischen Inschriften," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 103–110, plates 90–103.
13. H.R. Baldus, "Die Münzprägung der numidischen Königreiche," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 187–208; P. Visonà, "Finds of Numidian coins (c. 204–148 BC) in North Africa," *Trésors Monétaires* 11 (1989), 18–23; H.R. Baldus, "Die Münzen der Numiderkönige Syphax und Vermina. Prägungen vom Ende des zweiten punischen Krieges, 218–201 v. Chr.," in *Die Münze. Bild, Botschaft, Bedeutung. Festschrift für Maria R. Alföldi* (1991), 26–34; C. Perassi, "Il 'Numidian hoard' del Malta National Archaeological Museum," in Akerraz *et al.* 2008, 1375–1401; M.C. Nicolau Kormikiari, "Numidian royal portrait," in *XIII Congreso internacional de numismática* (Madrid, 2005), 349–56; Alexandropoulos 2000; M.R. Alföldi, "Die Geschichte des numidischen Königreiches und seiner Nachfolger," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 56.
14. F. Durrbach, *Choix d'inscriptions de Délos avec traduction et commentaire* (1921), 158 no. 93; M.-F. Baslez, "Un monument de la famille royale de Numidie à Delos," *REG* 94 (1981), 160–165; F. Rakob, "Numidische Königsarchitektur in Nordafrika," in Horn and Rügér 1979, 132; G. Manganaro, "Fenici, Cartaginesi, Numidi tra i Greci (IV–I secolo a.C.)," *Numismatica e Antichità*

- Classiche* 29 (2000), 263; M. Aoulad Taher, "L'hellénisme dans le royaume numide au IIe siècle av. J.-C.," *AntAfr* 40–41 (2004–5), 29–41.
15. For an overview see Daly 2002, 92–94.
 16. Here is a selection of excavation reports from Carthage; mainly the latest or key publications are listed in which references to older publications can be found: Lancel 1979, 1982; S. Lancel, *Carthage* (Éditions Cérès: Tunis 1999), 313–353; S. Ribichini, "Tophet und das punische Kinderopfer," in Peters 2004, 247–261; R.F. Docter, E. Smits, T. Hakbijl *et al.*, "Interdisciplinary research on urns from the Carthaginian tophet and their contents," *Palaeohistoria* 43–44 (2001–2), 417–33; H. Benichou-Safar, "Carte des nécropoles puniques de Carthage," *Karthago* 17 (1975), 5–35, and "Les fouilles du tophet de Salammbô à Carthage, 1," *AntAfr* 31 (1995), 81–199; H. Benichou-Safar, *Les tombes puniques de Carthage. Topographie, structures, inscriptions et rites funéraires* (Paris, 1981); C.-É. Beulé, *Fouilles à Carthage* (1861), 55; Rakob 1991; Holst *et al.* 1991; Ennabli 1992; Hurst 1994; Laidlaw *et al.* 1997; R.F. Docter, F. Chelbi, B.M. Telmini *et al.*, "Carthage Bir Massouda. Preliminary report on the first bilateral excavations of Ghent University and the Institut National du Patrimoine, 2002–2003," *Babesch* 78 (2003), 43–70; and "Carthage Bir Massouda. Second preliminary report (2003–2004)," *Babesch* 81 (2006), 37–89; Niemeyer *et al.*, 2007.
 17. Imports of wares: Hiesel 2004, 65. Numidian coin: Visonà (n. 13 above), 21–23.
 18. Appian, *Lib.* 10.70–73 (Carthage's war with Numidia). On the outbreak of the Third Punic War: Pol. 36.3; Livy, *Per.* 49.4–5, 8; Diod. 32.6; Appian, *Lib.* 11.74.
 19. Walsh 1965; Günther 2006, 152; Scullard 1980, 310–311; Ridley 1986; *Cambridge History of Africa*, 185; B. El Kadiri Boutchich, "Les relations politiques de Rome avec le royaume de Numidie pendant la IIIe guerre punique," in *L'Africa romana. Ai confini dell'impero. Contatti, scambi, conflitti. Atti del XV convegno di studio* (Roma, 2004), 1579–1591.
 20. "Libyans": Hdt. 4.197.2; Zimmermann 2001, 235–237. Survival of Punic: Augustine, *Epist.* 17; W. Röllig, "Was sprach und wie schrieb man in Karthago?," in Peters 2004, 314–315; Bridoux 2005 (n. 11 above), 53; Martín Ruiz 2007.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Italy: Economy and Demography after Hannibal's War

Nathan Rosenstein

Rome's struggle against Hannibal required it to mobilize manpower on a scale unprecedented in the ancient world. Nearly 70% of draft-aged Romans were conscripted, a level that would not be equalled in the West until the southern states' bid for independence in the American Civil War. No evidence informs us of the extent of Italian efforts during the war, but they must have been of a similar magnitude. Once Carthage had been defeated, the Republic embarked on a series of conquests that within 50 years brought the entire Mediterranean under its sway by the end of the Third Punic War. This period, too, saw very high levels of conscription — not much less than those during the Hannibalic War. The economic and demographic consequences of this effort were profound, but for too long they have been misunderstood.

The Traditional Interpretation

The men who fought these wars were farmers. Military service in this period, as in Greek *poleis* during the archaic and classical ages, was predicated on the possession of at least a minimum amount of wealth. The Romans (and presumably their Italian allies, although evidence is lacking) assumed that those who fought best were those who had something to defend. The quinquennial census at Rome required citizens to declare among other things what they owned, and the censors used these declarations to determine their liability to conscription (along with their voting privileges). Those who met the

minimum threshold were the *assidui*. And since agriculture was the basis of almost all wealth, the property requirement in effect meant that the *assidui* were almost all owners of small and medium-sized farms. They grew most of the food they and their families ate, and perhaps sold or bartered a small surplus for what they could not produce themselves.

Scholars have long assumed that prior to Hannibal's invasion of Italy, conscripting farmers to fight Rome's wars had not seriously impeded their ability to work their land. The Mediterranean agricultural cycle is determined by the fact that summers are hot and dry and winters relatively mild and wet. Planting is therefore done in the fall, ideally just before the rains begin, which furnish the moisture that enables wheat or barley (which provided the bulk of the calories ordinary Romans and Italians consumed) to germinate and grow. As temperatures drop and the days grow short, the plants become dormant while the rains continue intermittently. When the weather warms, and with (ideally) plenty of water in the ground, the grain resumes growing in the spring and is ready to harvest by early summer. Consequently, fall, the late spring, and early summer are critical times for Mediterranean farmers. For, in addition to planting and harvesting their grain crops, they harvest grapes and olives in the fall while vegetables and other crops are planted in the spring. During the hot, dry summers, by contrast, little agricultural work is done once the grain harvest is in, until it is time to prepare for planting in the fall.

The way Rome fought its wars prior to Hannibal's invasion blended seamlessly with this agricultural cycle — or so scholars have long assumed. Campaigns supposedly were brief and conducted close to home during the summer months. Armies attacked or defended the ripening grain at its most vulnerable stage — when it was dry enough to be burned. It could also be harvested by invading forces to supplement their own food supplies. The threat to the coming year's food supply forced defenders to leave the safety of their fortifications and confront the attackers in the open field. A short, bloody set-piece battle decided who would control the grain lands and, once combat ceased, soldiers were able return to their homes to take up their plows when autumn came and ready their fields for the next year's crop. And the number of Roman and Italians farmers affected by the Republic's wars was small. No more than four legions were levied in ordinary years — about 18,000 Romans and an equal or somewhat greater number of Italian allies.

The Second Punic War supposedly changed all that. The strategy of attrition that the Republic's early defeats compelled it to adopt entailed the deployment of multiple armies in a variety of theaters, necessitating the conscription of tens of thousands of Romans and allies. More crucially, Hannibal's soldiers were under arms year-round, poised to launch attacks at any time. Rome had to respond in kind. It kept its soldiers with their legions throughout the year and for years on end. Consequently, their farms began to suffer in their absence.

Matters only got worse once the war was over. Rome began the conquest of Spain in earnest. During the same period armies were repeatedly sent east to fight in Greece and Asia Minor. And the Gauls and Ligurians of Northern Italy were subjected to a brutal program of "pacification." All these wars placed heavy demands on the *assidui* and Rome's Italian allies for military service. Soldiers in Spain and Greece could not be dismissed to return to their farms when the annual campaigning season ended. Logistical and strategic imperatives required keeping them away from Italy for years at a stretch. Back home, fields lay untilled, women and children went hungry, and debts mounted. When at last the soldiers returned to their farms, many discovered the situation was hopeless (e.g. Val. Max. 4.4.6). They sold their land or just abandoned it.

At the same time, it is thought, changes elsewhere in Italy's rural economy exacerbated the situation. Rome's victories during the years between the Second and Third Punic Wars were often rich ones. Spoils came from captured cities and looted temples; prisoners of war could be even more lucrative, both enemy soldiers and civilians were seized when cities fell. These captives found ready purchasers on the slave markets of the Mediterranean, transactions facilitated by Roman and Italian businessmen who followed the armies and profited by arranging the disposal of booty. Those who profited most, however, were members of the Roman aristocracy who commanded and officered the Republic's armies. Generals had wide discretion over the handling of the spoils of victory (or so it is often held), and they used that discretion primarily to enrich themselves and their lieutenants. Even in peaceful provinces, an unscrupulous governor and his staff could profit from his tenure in many ways. As a result, members of the senatorial class who went to war or administered one of the Republic's overseas possessions often came back flush with cash.

Both they and the Roman and Italian businessmen who had done well abroad sought investments for their newly acquired wealth. However, there was little industry in Italy that required capital during the middle Republic and no institution comparable to a modern stock market to facilitate investment. Profits could be had from commerce, but cultural prejudice held small-scale trade undignified while large-scale, long-distance trade usually involved maritime ventures, with all of the risks that these entailed. That left agriculture. Land was safe, its ownership conferred prestige, and its possessors associated themselves with the moral foundations of Roman greatness. And purchase at this time was attractive. Plenty of land was on the market at attractive prices, because, allegedly, many of the soldiers whose efforts had won the victories that enriched the Roman and Italian elite were selling out, having gone broke as a consequence of their military service. These same years also saw the introduction of new methods of exploiting the land through slave labor. The same wars that had ruined Italy's small farmers had also brought thousands of slaves onto the auction blocks, where their numbers made prices low. Aristocrats and

businessmen bought them up in droves and established them on vast plantations amalgamated out of the farms they were purchasing in Italy. From around a half a million in the late third century, slave numbers mushroomed throughout the second until by middle of the first century there were two or even three million in Italy out of a total population of around six or seven and a half million.

Of course, to make money in commercial agriculture, plantation owners needed someplace to sell what they grew to customers who had to buy their products. Happily for them, just such a market was also developing at this time. Many of the farmers bankrupted by their military service as well as others pushed off their land by wealthy neighbors eager to enlarge their estates at their expense are supposed to have migrated to the cities, and above all to Rome, in search of a livelihood. Life in the capital was attractive because Roman generals did not invest all of their spoils in land. Equally pressing was the need to lay the groundwork for future political success and influence for themselves and their progeny. So they used much of their newly acquired wealth to advertise their conquests, giving games and other entertainments or constructing temples in fulfillment of vows made to the gods for victory. And many simply lavished it on luxurious living and ostentatious display. All of this spending helped induce rural dwellers to migrate to Rome, where they could make a living working on the construction of monuments or in other types of manual labor and enjoy the pleasures of city life. Their numbers swelled the urban *plebs*, more than doubling Rome's population in the half century following the close of the Second Punic War. They all needed to buy food and so provided an ample market for the crops grown on the slave estates springing up throughout Italy.

In the traditional interpretation, not all ruined farmers fled to Rome, however. Many remained in the countryside, eking out a bare subsistence as best they could through casual work and cultivating whatever bits of land they had been able to hang on to. Too poor to marry, they remained childless, and so the numbers of freeborn Romans and Italians declined. The number of *assidui* also steadily fell as the economic hardships that conscription imposed caused many of them to fall into poverty and so below the threshold that qualified them for military service. However, the requirements of the Republic's foreign policy, coupled with the fact that aristocrats made money when they led Roman armies to victory, caused the senate to embark on war after war, necessitating continuing high levels of mobilization of citizens and allies. As a result, the military burden grew progressively heavier on those *assidui* who remained, forcing even more of them to sell or abandon their land, which at least made them exempt from the draft.

For a time, those whom military service is held to have ruined could gain a fresh start in one of the colonies that the senate from time to time ordered to

be founded in Italy. But strategic considerations dictated when and where such colonies were established, not any interest on the senators' part to alleviate the plight of the poor. And after 181 the Republic's hold on the peninsula was secure, and so no more colonies were required or founded for the next half century. In Rome, too, the dream of an easy life proved illusory for many. Construction work was intermittent, dependent on victories and generals' thirst for immortalizing them, while the need to eat and pay rent were constant. The urban *plebs* could rarely afford to start families; to grow Rome depended on a constant influx of migrants from the countryside. All this misery finally came to a head with the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, who sought to limit the size of the vast estates the rich had accumulated and distribute some of the public land that they had usurped to landless Romans. Aristocratic intransigence and greed however thwarted his endeavor and led to his death, and similar fates awaited others who also sought to ameliorate the lot of the landless. But once Marius did away with the property requirement for military service and began to conscript them into the legions, impoverished soldiers became the instrument of ambitious generals who promised them land in exchange for their support. They were the means that enabled warlords like Sulla and Caesar to fight their enemies and eventually bring down the Republic itself.

A Critique

Or at least so many have long believed. Until about a generation ago, the foregoing would have been a fairly standard account of economic and demographic developments between the Second and Third Punic Wars. It offers a simple and compelling narrative that traces the fall of the Republic to the collateral damage caused by the Hannibalic War and Roman imperialism and holds senatorial intransigence squarely to blame for the demise of the aristocracy's collective rule and the establishment of the monarchy that took its place.

However, cracks in the edifice have recently begun to appear. Although the conflict with Hannibal and Rome's wars in the second century are supposed to have led to the widespread abandonment of their farms by smallholders and the establishment of large, slave-run plantations in their place, the archaeological record in the countryside for this period conspicuously fails to support such claims. Certainly in some areas the number of small sites seems to decline, but elsewhere their numbers remain robust — not the result one would expect if a general phenomenon like conscription was affecting farmers in all parts of central and southern Italy. Local pressures and advantages seem better to account for the variety of the evidence observed on the ground. As for large slave-staffed plantations producing commercial crops for sale in urban and overseas markets, these do not appear in significant numbers until the last

years of the second century at the earliest, that is well over half a century *after* the supposed displacement of the small farmers whose sold or abandoned land allegedly made possible their creation.

Further, the extent of plantation agriculture appears to have been much less widespread than earlier scholars imagined. The limitation of transport technology made it uneconomical to produce bulky crops for market anywhere other than near the sea, a large river, or at worst one of the major all-weather roads that the Republic constructed across Italy. That limited large, commercial agricultural enterprises to a very few regions of the peninsula. Elsewhere, the small farms of ordinary Romans and Italians would have held little attraction for those interested in investing their capital in slave-based estates. And even though the population of Rome undoubtedly swelled during the early and middle of the second century, the size of the urban market was still limited. Calculations for the mid first century BC put the population of Rome at close to a million, and estimates of the number of nonagricultural, urban residents elsewhere in Italy are almost as large. Yet to feed them required the produce of no more than 1% of the peninsula's farmland to produce all the wine they consumed annually and the same amount to grow the olive oil they needed. Hypothetically, about 20% of Italy's arable land would have been needed to grow the wheat city dwellers ate, but the vast majority of the grain that fed Rome, at least, came from abroad, so that the area required would have been significantly smaller.

In the mid second century, when the population of Rome and Italy's other cities was no more than half as large as it would become 100 years later, the proportion of land that plantation agriculture would have occupied was far smaller, less than 10%. These findings in turn have forced a radical revision downwards of estimates of the numbers of slaves imported into Italy to labor on these estates. And prospects for handsome returns from commercial agriculture are likely to have been far from rosy. While Italy might have contained a million urban, nonagricultural consumers who had to buy their food, the number of potential growers of that food was scarcely limited to a few hundred senators and wealthy businessmen. Many others were rich enough to own slaves and produce crops for Italy's urban markets. Competition to sell wine, oil, and wheat to city dwellers would have been keen, and few producers can have secured a big enough share of the market to guarantee a large, steady income. Plantation agriculture in other words may not have seemed such an attractive investment in second-century Italy after all.

As for the dramatic drop in the numbers of Roman citizens qualified for military service, long taken as proof of the deleterious effects that these wars had on Italy's small farms, this, too, proves to be illusory. The evidence adduced in support consists of three different figures in three different ancient authors for the amount of money needed to qualify for assiduate status

(Pol. 6.19.3; Cic. *Rep.* 2.40; Livy 1.43.7). Nothing, however, requires us to arrange these figures in descending order except the *a priori* assumption that *assidui* were becoming fewer, so that the Senate periodically had to reduce the qualification to increase the pool of potential draftees. The reasoning is patently circular.

Finally, there is what in many ways constitutes the foundation on which the conventional interpretation of economic and demographic developments in the interwar period has been erected: the shift in the rhythms of Roman warfare from short, summer campaigns in Italy prior to Hannibal's invasion to year-round military service abroad thereafter and the resulting conflict in the demands that war and agriculture now placed upon Roman and Italian farmers. Yet accounts of fighting in the third century and in the first third of the second belie the notion that soldiers serving in Italy campaigned only in the summer and were dismissed in the fall to see to their farms. The ancient sources depict them under arms well into the fall and winter, far past the time they should have been plowing and sowing their crops. The *Fasti Triumphales* provide decisive confirmation. The *Fasti* record the triumphs celebrated in Rome by victorious Roman generals, which were offerings of thanks to Jupiter Greatest and Best for his help in battle. Eventually, these records were inscribed on stone in the reign of the emperor Augustus, and those for the years 298–222 BC survive. They record the name of the general, the people he conquered, and most importantly the date of the celebration. The overwhelming majority of triumphs, about two-thirds, occurred in the winter between January and the end of March, and everything we know about warfare in third century Italy indicates that in such cases soldiers remained with their standards until they paraded through the streets of Rome.

In short, Roman strategy in the Hannibalic War and then as the city pursued its imperial ambitions in the second century did not fundamentally alter the relationship between war and agriculture and bring the two into conflict. They had been at odds for at least a century before the Carthaginians set foot in Italy, yet there is little to indicate the existence of widespread landlessness and poverty in the third century like that we see manifested in the outpouring of support for Tiberius Gracchus' land reform proposals in 133 BC.

The key to Rome's ability to solve the conflict between war and agriculture lay not in when it fought its wars but in who fought them. The critical factor that facilitated the Republic's mobilization of its vast potential manpower, without detriment to the farms from which it drew its troops, was not the crop cycle but the family life cycle. Small farms in Italy were family farms. They not only enabled the families that occupied them to support themselves but reproduce themselves as the families had children, raised them, and eventually saw them marry and begin families of their own while the parents eventually grew old and died. Consequently families' need for food and thus

for the labor necessary to grow it varied significantly over the course of this trajectory as did the amount of labor available to them. A family with sons in their late teens and both parents living, for example, had an abundance of potential workers, far more than would have been required to grow the food necessary to feed its members. Conscribing those sons therefore did not necessarily imperil a family's survival; indeed, rather the reverse.

Roman and Italian farms were typically small, a few hectares at most, and the amount of food that could be grown on them was finite. Intensification of effort could boost yields somewhat, but in doing so small farmers quickly ran up against the law of diminishing returns, where the additional amount of food produced increased far more slowly than the extra effort expended to grow it. So drafting young men (the minimum age of conscription was 17) not only did not deprive their families of essential labor; it could be a positive boon in that it removed the need to feed a hungry adolescent male and so brought the productive capacity of the farm into closer balance with the number of people it needed to support. The burden of feeding the conscript was shifted to others. Roman soldiers were paid, and from these stipends they purchased the food they ate on campaign, while the Republic furnished grain to allied troops free. Indeed, sending a son off to war in such circumstances can be thought of as a form of risk management. This was critical to the survival of small farms in the Mediterranean, where lack of enough rain or any of a number of other potential developments could spell disaster if survival depended on the success of a single crop. Diversification of resources was essential, so farmers grew a variety of crops just in case. Military service was just one more source of potential income for the farm, whether this took the form of a soldier's savings from his pay or what he gained from looting.

The situation for a young family, one with small children, would have been very different. Few wives in that position would have been able to work a farm in the event that her husband was called to war. However, in evaluating the extent to which cases like this one would have contributed to the demise of families on Italy's small farms, it is critical to know how often the Republic would have conscripted the fathers of young families. Evidence from the Imperial era has shown that Italian men typically married later in life, around the age of 30, and there is little reason to suspect that circumstances were much different during the middle Republic. A late age for men's first marriage is part of a widespread pattern that persisted for centuries in western Europe before the modern era. The marriage age of Roman and Italian men is of the utmost importance, for although Roman men (and presumably Italians also) were liable for military service from the age of 17 until they were 46, in actuality the Romans rarely required men over thirty to serve. In 105 BC, for example, following the destruction of two Roman armies at Arausio at the

hands of the Cimbri and Teutones, and with the imminent prospect that these enemies would sweep across the Alps into Italy, the consul Rutilius Rufus issued an edict that forbade any man under the age of 35 from leaving Italy (Granius Licinianus 14F). That is, even in the dire emergency that the Republic then faced, there was no expectation that men over 35 would be called up to defend Italy against the invaders.

Equally important here was the age structure of the legions themselves. Legionaries in second-century legions fell into one of four age categories: the *velites* were the youngest and poorest; the *hastati* were somewhat older; the *principes* were men in their prime; while the *triarii* were the oldest recruits. While the first three categories in a legion each comprised 1,200 men, the *triarii* numbered only half as many. In other words, the military burden the Republic placed on men around the age of 30 was significantly lighter than that imposed upon younger men. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Republic deliberately reduced its demand for older conscripts at precisely the age when men were beginning to wed in significant numbers and take on the responsibilities of supporting a young family.

These optimistic scenarios, however, must be set against the grim realities of life expectancy in the Roman world and its effects on family structure. Although statistical evidence is lacking to prove it, average life expectancy is generally assumed to have been around 30 in this period. This means that after a heavy infant mortality, thought to reach 50% by the age of 5, members of each age cohort died off in small but significant numbers fairly steadily thereafter. Coupled with a late age of male first marriage, a low life expectancy resulted in many fathers dying before their children reached adulthood. On a very large number of farms, then, teenage sons would have represented the primary male workforce. Yet it is not obvious that the Republic would have had to draft many of these men in order to meet its needs for manpower.

In the years following the end of the Second Punic War, Rome kept roughly nine legions in the field annually. Each contained (on paper, at least) 5,200 infantry. Over the course of the 13 years when a Roman citizen was between the ages of 17 and 30, keeping those nine legions at full strength would have required a total of 608,000 man-years (i.e., 13 years $\times$ 5,200 men). The Republic's citizen population (i.e., men aged 17 and over) varied somewhat during the interwar period, but a reasonable estimate of the average is 280,000. If we assume that Coale-Demeny's Model Life Table Level 3 West offers an approximate reflection of the age distribution among all Roman males from birth onwards (as ancient demographers commonly do), a total of 280,000 men aged 17 and over implies a total male population of 444,360. Men between the ages of 17 and 30 might have constituted about 23% of that figure, or 102,000 men. If each legionary served an average of 10 years, then to keep 9 legions at full strength Rome would have needed to conscript about

60% of men in this age group. If the average term of service was as long as 12 years, then about 50% will have had to serve:

$$608,000 \text{ man years} \div 10 \text{ years of service} = 60,800 \text{ conscripts} \div 102,000 \text{ men aged 17-30} = 59.6\%$$

$$608,000 \div 12 = 50,666 \div 102,000 = 49.6\%.$$

So it is quite possible that many men who were the sole support of their mothers and younger siblings could have been exempted from the draft without imperilling the Republic's ability to man its legions. We have no comparable figures for the size of the populations of Rome's Italian allies between the wars, but in light of the situation at Rome, it is reasonable to assume that demands upon their young men were not dissimilar.

Still, there will have been situations in which exemptions were not forthcoming or where a father died during his son's service. What would have happened then? Would the survivors have found themselves in precisely the predicament that earlier theories about the impact of Roman wars in the second century on small farms had postulated? Yet to foresee such a dire fate implicitly assumes that women cannot do farm work, a presumption that would be greeted with disbelief if not derision throughout much of the contemporary underdeveloped world, where women constitute a significant proportion of the agricultural workforce. Certainly, in the normal course of things, Roman and Italian men worked in the fields. But when things were not normal, Italian women were quite capable of driving a plow or harvesting grain. The American Confederacy during the Civil War furnishes a striking parallel. As noted above, around 75% of draft-aged men were conscripted by the southern states over the course of that conflict, which left only women and children on many farms. While the hardships they endured were often serious, mass starvation is not in evidence. Those who remained behind when the men went to war managed to feed themselves, and much the same would have been true for many of the Roman and Italian families whom the Republic's military demands left without an adult male to support them.

Demographic and Economic Developments, 201-149: A New Paradigm

If the foregoing account is correct of how Rome resolved the conflict between the demands for military service it placed upon its citizens (and by implication its allies) and the needs of their farms for labor, we are still left with a critical problem, and that is how to account for the landlessness and poverty that the

reforms of Tiberius Gracchus and others sought to alleviate. To solve it requires examining a little noticed but crucial demographic development of the interwar period, military mortality.

Estimating the number of Roman and Italian deaths that resulted from the Republic's war making between 201 and 146 is not easy. Figures of any sort are scarce in antiquity, and their reliability is always suspect. Still, the ancient sources preserve a few records of the numbers of legionaries and *socii* killed in battles in the years from 200 to 167, which are given in Table 23.1, and they should not be dismissed out of hand. Roman war making was highly organized; the financial and logistical requirements for keeping large numbers of soldiers in the field far from Rome for extended periods of time demanded nothing less. Accounts were kept of an army's disbursements and income, and consuls or quaestors could be required to present these for inspection back in Rome (Pol. 23.14.7–8; Plut. *Ti. Gr.* 6.1–3).

Keeping track of an army's pay and food consumption requires that those doing so have an accurate count of how many men they are paying and feeding. It should not have been difficult, therefore, for generals to reckon up their casualties after a battle, particularly since (after a victory, at least) the dead were collected for cremation. Generals apparently regularly specified the number of men they had lost as well as how many of the enemy their soldiers had slain, to judge by a law of 63 BC that sought to ensure that both numbers had been reported truthfully (Val. Max. 2.8.1). The number of enemies slain regularly figured in the justification of a general's request for a triumph, and it naturally raised the question of the price at which the victory had been won. Too many Roman losses more than once became an argument against awarding a triumph. A commander might try to conceal their extent, but letters from his officers could convey this information to the senate (Livy 33.25.9; 35.6.9–10). Even when no triumph was at issue, the senate at the beginning of every year considered the question of replacements for the legions, and such discussions would have been pointless without an accurate count of each army's troop strength, which would have allowed the *patres* to gauge its losses over the preceding year. Casualties were a critical factor in the senate's management of Roman manpower, and as such they were matters of debate and discussion in the *curia*, whence they will have entered the historical record through the works of contemporary historians like Cato the Censor, Polybius, and L. Piso. There is no *a priori* reason therefore to reject the figures in Table 23.1 as pure invention.

However, once such figures had become the subject of history the possibility of distortion arose. Patriotic annalistic historians, it has been held, inflated Roman deaths to glorify the victories Rome won. And to be sure, Table 23.1 contains some very high casualty numbers from fighting in Spain and Gaul. But while they may invite suspicion, the Table also lists some very low figures

Table 23.1 Military mortality 200–168 BC as reported by the ancient sources

<i>Date</i>	<i>Size of Army</i>	<i>Number Killed</i>	<i>% Killed</i>	<i>Result</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Sources</i>
200	26,500	c.2,000	7.5	Victory	Gaul	Livy 31.22.2
199	26,500	>6,700	25.3	Defeat	Gaul	Livy 32.7.5
197	26,500	c.700	2.6	Victory	Greece	Pol. 18.27.6; Livy 33.10.8
196	26,500	c.3,000	11.2	Defeat	Gaul	Livy 33.36.4
194	26,500	5,000	18.8	Draw	Gaul	Livy 34.47.8
194	13,400	(?)6,700	50	Defeat	Spain	Livy 35.1.2
193	26,500	>5,000	18.8	Victory	Gaul	Livy 35.5.14
193	13,400	73	0.5	Victory	Spain	Livy 35.1.10
191	26,800	200	0.7	Victory	Greece	Livy 36.19.12; App. <i>Syr.</i> 20.90
191	26,600	<300	1.1	Victory	Liguria	Livy 36.38.4
191	26,600	1,484	5.5	Victory	Gaul	Livy 36.38.4
190	13,400	6,000	44.7	Defeat	Spain	Livy 37.46.7
190	26,700	<324	1.1	Victory	Asia Minor	Livy 37.44.2; App. <i>Syr.</i> 36.188
186	26,600	4,000	15	Defeat	Liguria	Livy 39.20.7
185	47,200	c.5,000	10.6	Defeat	Spain	Livy 39.30.6
185	42,200	>600	1.4	Victory	Spain	Livy 39.31.15
181	23,600	>1,030	4.4	Victory	Spain	Livy 40.32.7
180	23,600	1,491	6.3	Victory	Spain	Livy 40.40.13
179	23,600	109	0.5	Victory	Spain	Livy 40.48.7
178	26,800	237	0.8	Defeat	Histria	Livy 41.4.8
176	27,900	52	0.2	Victory	Liguria	Livy 42.18.13
173	21,600	>3,000	13.8	Victory	Liguria	Livy 42.7.10
171	29,400	>2,200	7.5	Defeat	Greece	Livy 42.60.1; Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 9.2
168	29,400	80 or <100	0.3	Victory	Greece	Livy 44.42.8; Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 21.3

for casualties from fighting in Spain, Liguria, and elsewhere. The latter certainly come from annalistic historians and rebut the notion that these authors systematically exaggerated Roman losses. Nor should any particularly high number of casualties surprise. The Gauls, for example, had a reputation as ferocious warriors, as did the Spaniards in view of Roman recruits' reluctance to serve against them in the 150s (e.g. Pol. 35.4.1–7; Appian, *Iber.* 49.209; Livy, *Per.* 48). One may compare Hannibal's losses in his victory at Cannae: 5,700 men, more than 11% of his total force (Pol. 3.117.6). Here there can

be no question of annalistic inflation, for Polybius found these figures in the pro-Carthaginian Greek historian he consulted, not Roman authors. And the Roman figures are not incommensurate with the numbers preserved for Greek casualties in fifth- and fourth-century hoplite battles: about 5% dead on average for the victors, 14% among the vanquished (Krentz 1985). The average Roman losses in the victories and defeats recorded in Table 23.1 are 4.2% and 16% respectively.

There is no reason therefore to presume therefore that the figures in Table 23.1 are seriously distorted. Yet one cannot simply deduce from the average losses that Romans sustained in these battles, 8.8%, an overall military mortality rate. As already noted, mortality rates for victories and defeats are significantly different and curiously all but two of the defeats Rome suffered in this period appear in Table 23.1 while of the 38 battles that Livy terms victories only 15 or 16 are listed there. One might therefore assume that the number of deaths in the victories for which no figures are preserved averaged 4.2%, but that is probably too high. The losses tallied in Table 23.1 range from 50% to 0.3%; thus the average of these figures, 4.2%, differs significantly from their median, 1.1%. A typical mortality rate is likely to have been well below the average, therefore, although probably not as low as the median. A diplomatic solution is to assume that the mortality rate in those victories for which no figure is reported would have fallen midway between the median and the mean of the battles listed in Table 23.1, that is about 2.65% or about 323 killed in a legion comprising 5,200 Roman infantry and 300 Roman cavalry and 6,700 Italian allies (infantry and cavalry). In those 63 legions that won victories not represented in Table 23.1, that loss rate translates into 20,368 dead. Added to the losses in Table 23.1, the number killed comes to 75,648. Allowing for soldiers killed in minor engagements or who died of wounds might raise this total to around 110,000.

Still, this figure cannot yield an overall rate of military mortality because it does not take into account noncombat deaths. Most legions did not see battle every year between 200 and 167. However, the soldiers serving in them as well as those that did fight were exposed to an epidemiological regime that increased the risk of death above that of ordinary civilian life. Disease could take far more lives than actual combat. The number of Union soldiers who perished from sickness during the American Civil War was more than double the number of those killed in battle. Although the sources preserve occasional references to outbreaks of disease in Roman armies, such as the one that affected the soldiers conducting the siege of Carthage during the Third Punic War (Appian, *Lib.* 99.466), their frequency and severity are impossible to determine. Because of the hardships that soldiers were exposed to on campaign and the increased possibility of contagion among a large number of men from different regions living in close quarters who had not developed natural

immunities to diseases prevalent elsewhere, rates of infection ought to have been higher than among a dispersed rural civilian population. However, many of the diseases that ravaged early modern and modern armies prior to the discovery of antibiotics and vaccines, such as typhus, plague, and cholera, do not seem to have been present in the ancient world. And because Roman armies frequently shifted their encampments, particularly in response to outbreaks of sickness (as the general did in response to the outbreak during the siege of Carthage noted above), one might suppose that diseases such as dysentery or typhoid fever, which arise from poor sanitation and contaminated water, were less prevalent than they might have been.

Ultimately, all we can do is make an educated guess, and both what little evidence we have and what we can reasonably surmise on the basis of Rome's long experience at making war suggest that we should guess low rather than high. While the rate of death from disease among soldiers was probably higher than that for civilians, it ought not to have been dramatically so — perhaps between 25% and 75% higher. As noted above, ancient demographers commonly use Coale-Demeny's Model West Level 3 Life Table to approximate the age structure of Italy's civilian population in this period, which estimates the rate of civilian mortality among men between 17 and 30 at about 1.5% per year. Increasing the rate of death among soldiers by 25–75% above that produces a mortality rate between 1.9% and 2.6% per year. To put this into concrete terms, between approximately 73,000 and 100,000 soldiers would have died of disease from 200 through 168 BC at these rates, if on average 116,580 Romans and Italians served every year. Adding those killed in battle or who died later of wounds brings the total to between 183,000 and 210,000 deaths for an overall mortality rate of between 4.75% and 5.45%. However, 1.5% of these men would have died anyway of natural or other causes had they remained civilians. Therefore, the net or “excess” mortality due to warfare would have been lower: about 130,000 to 157,000 deaths or 3.25% to 3.95% annually.

After 168 the pace of Roman warfare slackened somewhat. If military mortality declined accordingly, it might have been only 75% of the rate during the previous 33 years. If so, the total number of deaths between 167 and 133 would have been between 96,000 and 110,000 and the “excess” between 66,000 and 80,000, bringing the total number of deaths due to warfare over the 76 years from 200 down to 133 to between 279,000 and 320,000, and the “excess” deaths to 196,000–237,000. Or, put in other terms, if 12 years was the average term of service for all recruits during this period, between 34% and 40% of all Romans and Italians who went to war in these years might never have returned.

Such figures of course cannot pretend to represent an accurate count of how many men died as a consequence of the Republic's warfare. Their purpose

Table 23.2 Census Returns, 204–124

<i>Date</i>	<i>Number of Citizens</i>
204/3	214,000
194/3	143,704 (perhaps 243,704?)
189/8	258,318
179/8	258,794
174/3	269,015
169/8	312,805
164/3	337,022
159/8	328,316
154/3	324,000
147/6	322,000
142/1	327,442
136/5	317,933
131/0	318,823
125/4	394,736

instead is simply to provide a sense of how to think about the scale of military mortality. But if they are anywhere close to the right order of magnitude, they reveal that the demographic effects of Rome's acquisition of an empire in the second century were profound.

Death on such a scale offers a dramatically new way to understand the other major demographic phenomenon during the middle Republic, population growth. As noted above, every five years the Romans elected a pair of censors to carry out a census of the citizenry (that is, free, adult males). These figures have been preserved for most of the second century, and, although they are not without their problems, scholars generally hold that they are reliable. Census totals between 203 and 125/124 are set out in Table 23.2. They show an increase to 168, a decline thereafter until a sudden and dramatic rise in the final count. That decline is probably illusory, however, attributable to a reluctance among the citizens to serve in Spain (Pol. 35.4.1–4) that led many to avoid presenting themselves for the census and so enrollment among the *assidui*. Once the wars there were over, there was no reason for them to remain off the census rolls. The rates of increase are equally striking. Once groups of citizens that the censors are likely to have missed, mainly men serving overseas in the legions when the census took place, are added to these totals, the citizen population grew by about 106,000, or 1.1% per year, between 203 and 168; and by 87,500, or 0.5% annually, between 168 and 124. (These figures are derived from Brunt 1971: 72, which takes account of soldiers and others not counted in the census returns listed in Table 23.2.) Overall, the increase was about 0.75% per year. These are very robust rates of growth by historical

standards, particularly that between 203 and 168, and one must assume that among Rome's Italian allies growth rates were similar, although in the absence of any sort of data on their populations this cannot be proved. Viewed in conjunction with the rate of military mortality, such growth rates present something of a paradox: high population growth coexisting with high mortality due to war. And yet, as odd as it may seem, the two phenomena are linked.

Populations in the preindustrial era tended in various ways to achieve a rough balance between births and deaths that kept their numbers more or less in line with the economic resources available to them. This stability was maintained through what Malthus termed either the preventive checks — late marriage (which limited the number of children a woman would bear over her lifetime), long intervals between births, celibacy, etc. — or positive checks like disease or famine. Such arrangements can vary considerably, depending on the environmental and cultural contexts in which specific populations exist, but a dramatic increase in the death rate has the potential to alter such arrangements significantly, and this seems to have been what happened at Rome during the second century. Although the loss of a son was a terrible personal tragedy for his family, for other young men who survived Rome's wars the demise of so many of their peers opened up extraordinary opportunities. Many may have found themselves in a position to marry because they had unexpectedly inherited land on which to support a family. They may have been in a position to make a highly advantageous match owing to the fact that the deaths of so many men before their marriages created a surplus of potential brides over eligible bachelors. Hence the dowries brides' families were willing to pay ought to have gone up. Remarriage will have been easier for widowers.

Equally important, the quantity and quality of land men expected to farm will have increased. As the number of people competing for land declines, marginal land tends to be left fallow. Farmers focus their efforts on the best land because this offers the best return for their labor in the form of larger harvests of better quality. More land can be devoted to crops other than those that afford basic subsistence, so diet becomes better and more varied. Whatever market existed for casual labor in the countryside will have become much more favorable to potential workers simply because of the scarcity of those in a position to supply it. At the same time, the city of Rome was growing rapidly. This growth was due primarily to immigration from the countryside, since preindustrial cities tended to have a surplus of deaths over births owing to poor sanitation and the prevalence of endemic diseases. As men moved off the farms and into Rome in search of work there, their departure further eased competition for land. The Senate's dispatch of colonies to the north and south of the peninsula will have had the same effect in many of the regions from which the colonists were drawn.

All in all, therefore, times are likely to have been good for ordinary Roman and Italian farmers, and prosperity tends to raise the birth rate. With more food available couples are willing to have more children — to the extent that they can control their fertility. Certainly infanticide (again, to the extent it was practiced in Italy at this time) will have declined. And Rome and many areas of Italy may already have had in place a demographic regime that encouraged a relatively high rate of growth. As Malthus long ago suggested (Malthus 1986, 243), Rome's constant warfare during the fourth and third centuries, before Hannibal's arrival, may already have kept the usual preventive checks on population growth from operating to their full effect. Instead, military mortality, even though it was not as severe as during and following the Hannibalic War, worked to limit families by steadily and permanently preventing a certain percentage of unwed young men from ever marrying. Consequently, others sorts of limits on the birth rate, like a fairly late age among women for first marriage, did not come into play: Roman women, as best we can ascertain, married around the age of 18, significantly earlier than European women in subsequent eras. Colonization similarly will have enabled Rome and its allies to support a higher birth rate than the land could support by exporting surplus population to recently conquered areas, thereby easing population pressure on those areas the colonists left. Thus the catastrophic disasters of the early Hannibalic War followed by the heavy mortality among soldiers that attended Rome's acquisition of a Mediterranean empire may have caused a population that was already primed to shift from a high to a very high rate of birth to do so.

Strong, steady population growth characterized the period between the Second and Third Punic Wars, therefore. By 168 BC the number of Roman citizens had surpassed the level reached on the eve of Hannibal's invasion, and if that growth continued, as seems all but certain, then by 149 the Roman and (one must presume) Italian populations are likely to have begun to outstrip the economic resources available to them, especially land. It is here, not in the creation of vast, slave-run plantations out of lands abandoned by farmers that Rome's second-century wars had ruined, that the roots of the poverty and landlessness that would trouble the Republic's final century lie.

FURTHER READING

This chapter summarizes an argument presented in Rosenstein 2004, where the reader can find a full citation of the ancient sources and discussions of the relevant modern scholarship. See also Rosenstein 2008. The traditional interpretation is most fully presented in Toynbee 1965, vol. 2, Brunt 1971, and Hopkins 1978. On the archaeological evidence for small farms and large villas in this period, see especially Frederiksen

1970–71 (the first to note the discrepancy between this and the traditional interpretation) and, recently, Morley 1996, 95–103, 129–135, 146–158. On the land required to feed the nonagricultural, urban population of Italy see Jongman 2003, 111–116; on the number of agricultural slaves this implies, see De Ligt 2004 and compare Scheidel 2005, 67–71. On the supposed shortage of *assidui* see Rich 1983. On Roman and Italian farming, see White 1970. On ancient demography and the use of model life tables, see Parkin 1992, and in general Scheidel 2001.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

The “Third Punic War”: The Siege of Carthage (149–146 BC)

Yann Le Bohec

The conflict known under the name of the “Third Punic War” does not enter the category of wars in the general sense of this word: it amounted, in fact, to one single military operation, the siege of one city, in this case Carthage. The author who wishes to describe it will have no order of march to report, no great battle in open country to describe, neither armistice nor peace treaty to mention. But the expression “Third Punic War” has been adopted by tradition, and that is why we are allowed to keep it. In reality, the title “Siege of Carthage” would be more appropriate.¹

Sources and Bibliography

In spite of the simplicity of its development — relative simplicity, as we shall see — this siege is difficult to study and it has given material for few publications. That is because it poses numerous source problems. Modern authors regret that Polybius has not left us much information and that they must rely especially on Appian. All the same, I would object that the reputation of Polybius is totally undeserved, for this Greek showed no objectivity when he spoke of the Carthaginians and the Romans. A former general of the Greeks, completely beaten by the Romans, he regarded his vanquishers with a boundless admiration that allowed him to justify his failure and explain his captivity. All things considered, Appian, a provincial living under the High Empire and who had nothing to hide, shows more distance in relation to the events he describes; he thus seems, to me at least, as reliable as the other.

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And that is not all. Researchers come up against not only the sources but also the bibliography. Assuredly, moderns have been more attracted by the extraordinary figure of Hannibal than by this conflict. They have also, perhaps, been discouraged by the shortcomings of Polybius. Finally, it is equally possible that they find little interest in an event seemingly so simple. In any case, and whatever their motives, they have never been interested in this subject; there exists no proper synthesis dedicated to the "Third Punic War" among recent works of quality. The curious reader of these events will therefore have to make do with reading the last chapter of each of the works dedicated to the three Punic wars.

In order to treat this subject, I shall deal with military history, a discipline that has its rules and its requirements, and shall abide by them. It will be necessary to research the cause (or causes) of the conflict, what was the pretext that triggered it, and what was the size of the forces involved; an episode of negotiations will come next, before an account of the events that will respect their chronology. To conclude, I shall try to assess the consequences of this affair.

The Causes of and Pretext for the Conflict

Apprentice Latinists in times past well knew the obsession of Cato the Elder, who ended all his speeches to the Senate with the same warning: *Delenda (est) Carthago*, "Carthage must be destroyed." Why this determination? Several reasons must be examined ... and criticized. Three series of explanations have been advanced.²

1: The political thesis, firstly, is founded on two series of very different arguments (Appian, *Lib.* 69.310–315).

First, certain historians have claimed that the Roman state had changed its practice in the middle of the second century BC, had given up resorting to a more or less distant protectorate in favor of an imperialism founded on direct control of the defeated. This change would thus concern rather the field of public law, of administration. In fact, a movement of this type can be observed, but it developed progressively and stretched over a very long time, perhaps up till the annexation of Arabia by Trajan. There exists no proof that the Senate of Rome suddenly and simply wanted to change Rome's attitude to Carthage.

A second part of this thesis is due to Gilbert Charles-Picard, and his idea appears attractive.³ But it relies on no text and it is based only on an analysis of the context. This scholar had noted that the environment of the second century BC had seen born and flourish, in the Mediterranean world, and particularly in Africa, in Greece, and in Spain, movements that were democratic,

and also, in his opinion, patriotic, in other words above all revolutionary.⁴ The Roman senators, aristocrats by nature, could have feared that these political ideas would spread to all the neighboring states and even to the interior of the empire, and that they would end up flooding Rome itself like a wave. This shock, which occurred anyway in 134–133 with the birth of the *Populares* movement at the instigation of Tiberius Gracchus, was perhaps already perceptible in 149. It is true that the *Populares* were not seeking to establish a democratic regime; they would have been content merely to have had an agrarian law passed. Whatever the case, the senators would have wanted to arrest a development that affected Roman citizens as well as subject and neighboring peoples. Their fear would explain the harshness and cruelty of the treatment inflicted in the same year 146 on Corinth and Carthage, and in 133 on Numantia. This explanation, all the same, possesses only the merit of likelihood.

2: The economic thesis, in second place, is founded on the complementary character of two types of sources, texts and archaeology. Its supporters explain that the Romans feared the commercial competition of the Carthaginians; they believe in a renaissance of Carthage in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, a renaissance that would have frightened Cato the Elder and his compatriots.

One will notice, before any explanation, that it is hardly likely that rich Romans started a war in order to provide slaves for their great domains; no text makes the least reference to the *latifundia* owners, who in 149 were able to find slave labor without difficulty and who were not in a position to provoke a conflict on their own. Besides, in the process of war declarations, one can see that ordinary citizens, the poor, were no less bellicose because they hoped to gain booty, which was their way of gaining riches; to understand this one only has to reread what the sources say regarding the attitude of the *comitia* in these kinds of circumstances. As for the rich, victory would bring them the possibility of brilliant and perhaps enriching political careers, which was their motive; the case of the *imperatores* in the following century well illustrates this point of view. In fact, rich and poor had reasons to push for war, but those reasons, whilst being complementary, differed profoundly.

So there remain two types of usable documents, the highest-ranking of which are texts. Historians base themselves firstly on a play, the *Poenulus* of Plautus, *The Little Carthaginian*, written around 190 BC. It presents a *gugga*, one of those African merchants who spread through all the towns of Italy and even to Rome. They see in this fiction the proof that Punic trade had regained dynamism. They recall then that Cato the Elder had gone to Carthage in 153 (Appian, *Lib.* 69.310–15) and that, filled with admiration and without doubt also with fear at the agriculture developed in the hinterland of the African

metropolis, he had brought back from his voyage an agronomy treatise written by a certain Mago, with the intention of having it translated into Latin and perhaps of applying its formulae within Latium (one has to say "perhaps," because it is not certain that the ancients had thought that it was possible to apply in Italy formulae tested in Africa; a motive of simple intellectual curiosity must not be dismissed in this regard). Finally, an anecdote with strong historical content has been introduced into the debate. Around 149, the same Cato the Elder went to the Senate with a basket filled with fresh figs. He distributed the fruit to his colleagues; then, when there were none left, he informed them that they had made the trip from Carthage in three days. He had without doubt cheated and brought figs produced in Italy to support his argumentation for, in summer, the time when this episode takes place, six days were needed to link the two capitals and the freshness of the fruit could not have been preserved for such a long time. In that case, the "Third Punic War" would have been a fig war, similar to the oil wars that our world has experienced rather more recently.

As if to back up this interpretation, archaeologists, in relatively recent times, have found other marks of the dynamism of the Carthaginians between 201 and 148, this time in the area of town planning. Henry Hurst and his British team, working in the context of an excavation program launched by UNESCO and entitled "Pour sauver Carthage," studied two lagoons well known for having been the ports, civilian and military, of Carthage.⁵ What is of exceptional interest is that they have been able to show that the work, that is the excavation of the ground areas and the installation of stone structures, was carried out between 201 and 148. Acting under the same program, the French scholar Serge Lancel noted that a residential area quite contemporary with this enterprise had been built on one of the slopes of the hill of Byrsa.⁶

The economic thesis, in my opinion at least, does not stand up to critical examination. Careful reading of the *Poenulus* of Plautus shows clearly that no-one felt fear about the arrival of Carthaginian merchants. Quite the reverse, among the dominant feelings one finds, not without surprise, a certain sympathy and also amusement in the face of these smooth talkers, all mixed with slight contempt. So much for the *guggas*. As for the fig anecdote, it can be interpreted in a very different sense: if a ship laden with fruit makes the trip in so little time, one might think that a warship would scarcely take more, a fact which was indeed more worrying. The military explanation substitutes for the economic explanation, which does not go against what we otherwise know of the collective mentalities of the ancients. Besides, one must not commit an anachronism: the decision-makers of the time interpreted the ideas of competition, feasibility, and competitiveness in their own way, very differently from our modern businesses, and with conceptions that were not forged for capitalism in business schools.

However, it does not seem that one should totally dismiss the economic thesis, but it is advisable to adapt it to the time we are studying. In antiquity, indeed, two very strong motives pushed men to make war: booty and tribute. All the same, in the middle of the second century BC, these driving forces should not have worked very strongly because there was not much to hope for. Certainly, an economic renaissance is attested at Carthage, but it is difficult to measure and several arguments prompt us to limit its size. If no-one considers contesting the monumental aspect of the ports, one must indeed note that the dwellings excavated by Serge Lancel were not built for very rich people. But there is more. The necropoleis that date from the first half of the second century BC are characterized by mediocre funeral stelae, and coin finds reveal a currency of weak quality. And above all Carthage had lost control of her empire. So we must look elsewhere.

3: The psychological thesis — referring to collective psychology — comes in third place, and it too presents several aspects. One author evoked the hypothesis of a “gratuitous crime.” Why not? All the same, one will note that the leaders of a great power are not the habit of indulging collectively in this kind of act.

There is a more serious aspect. That is, that one should especially not, at least in my opinion, neglect the *metus Punicus*, “the fear of the Carthaginian.” First, because the humans of antiquity knew one another badly and ignorance engenders fear of the other. Next, because the trauma of Hannibal’s war remained painful. After the Gaul, the Carthaginian had become “the hereditary enemy,” and he became all the more fearsome because the hostages had been sent home. The need for security seems to have been quite widespread among humans and, combined with ignorance, it has triggered many wars in the past.

Finally, and remaining within the area of collective psychology, one should broach the issue of imperialism, which in times past Paul Veyne did in question form, not without humor: “was there a Roman imperialism?”⁷ Apparently, the reply can only be affirmative. And yet this author noted that the Romans were not always the aggressors, a point of view with which it is difficult not to agree when one inspects the dossier with accuracy. But sometimes they were, and above all they considered every conquest a normal and everyday act. Their expansion, begun several decades earlier, could and had to continue. There were no reasons for it to stop, all the more so since Masinissa, king of Numidia,⁸ had ventured to nibble at Punic territory, in 193 and 162–161, and it could be feared that he and his sons would swallow it all. So, ally though he was, it was preferable to get ahead of him. In any case, after its victory over Carthage at Zama Rome had become the greatest power in the world, the policeman of the Mediterranean. A famous speech, which has been attributed to the senator Manlius Vulso and which he would have delivered before his colleagues,

explained and summarized this new conception of the world, the fruit of an imperialism that had got out of control. Its style is a bit pompous: today, he had said in effect, all peoples obey the Romans (Livy 38.48.2–5). It is true that Cato the Elder had nullified all its impact with a stroke of humor suited to his compatriots, adding to this overflamboyant conclusion "and all the Romans obey their wives" (Plut. *Cato* 8.2).

All things considered, it seems that the political cause perhaps worked, but only perhaps: the aristocrats present in the Senate of Rome would have wanted to warn the democrats of the Mediterranean countries that they were exposing themselves to grave dangers. The economic cause was not, it seems, a determining factor in the starting of the conflict, and it came down to the hope for modest booty and a small tribute. So there remains collective psychology, which would have operated on several levels. Since Hannibal, the Carthaginian had become the hereditary enemy. Since their victory over that general, the imperialism of the Romans had got out of control. In spite of their success and their military might, they felt the need to reinforce their security, all the more threatened by the other since the latter was not well known: ignorance was without doubt at the base of the *metus Punicus*.

So that a war can be a "just war," a *bellum iustum*, so that it is in keeping with law, religion, and moral standards, notions that obviously do not correspond to ours, a good pretext was needed. It was found. The treaty concluded between Rome and Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War forbade the African metropolis from maintaining an army, a clause that was obviously untenable. Indeed in 153 the king of Numidia, Masinissa, knew how to profit from this situation of weakness, and at Oroscofa he crushed the weak forces that his enemies had been able to assemble to oppose his aggression. This easy success enabled him nevertheless to take possession of the *Campi Magni* and of the land of Thusca, a region which corresponds to the west of present-day Tunisia. The Senate of Rome did not want to hear any argument likely to justify Carthage setting up some purely defensive units. It kept its pretext and, officially, considered that this gesture constituted a rupture of the treaty, a rupture initiated by Carthage. So it declared war (Appian, *Lib.* 74.340–4). The responsibility of Rome is full and total in triggering this conflict. One single question remains: to what extent was Masinissa in collusion with his allies?

The Opposing Armies

For good or ill, the Romans therefore had reasons to engage in conflict with Carthage. As one must do in every sensibly led State, they probably wondered, before launching the hostilities, what the relationship of the opposing armies

was and whether it stood in their favor. To tell the truth, it is hardly likely that they wondered about this for long, the imbalance was patently obvious. Certainly, we have only a few figures, but the available information allows no hesitation.

In 149 Rome was at the head of a considerable land empire that comprised the Italian peninsula, the large islands of the western Mediterranean (which had become a Roman lake), Cisalpina (the plain of the Po and the Alpine arc), the eastern part of the Iberian peninsula, and the Balkans. This domain enabled the alignment of considerable forces and provided practically unlimited means. Rome and Italy — no small area in itself — could provide a great number of legionaries, heavy infantrymen. In 154–153, the censors had counted 324,000 Roman citizens there. The rest of the empire, populated by Rome's allies, the *socii*, enabled sailors, cavalrymen, and light troops to be gathered, as many as needed. Rome, therefore, did not experience a problem of numbers. The logistics, in the same way, caused no concern. The provinces supplied money and wheat on demand, all the supplies and all the matériel an army could need. This army, to be precise, had become the best in the world. It is pointless to describe it here: this *Companion* supplies all the necessary descriptions and explanations elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is advisable, in order for the progress of this “Third Punic War” to be comprehensible, to recall the four key points about the Roman armed forces that affected the situation.

In a battle in open country, the heavy infantry of the legions was unbeatable, except for a stupid error by its commander. In a siege, it was formidable, since it knew how to surround the enemy town in such a way as to prevent anyone from entering or exiting. In all other cases, battles in a town setting, guerilla warfare, it showed an astonishing capacity to adapt. Finally, at sea Rome had possessed absolute mastery since the First Punic War, a point which historians often forget. At the beginning of the war, Marcius Censorinus and Manilius, the two consuls in 149, received from the Senate four legions (around 20,000 men), 4,000 horsemen and an unknown number of *socii*. One can estimate the Romans' total forces at some 50,000 men.

Carthage possessed only a small area of land, compared with the territories that belonged to Rome: it was limited to the northwest quarter of present day Tunisia. Still worse, from the beginning of the conflict several Punic cities went over to the enemy (Appian, *Lib.* 94.446). The number of men that the African city had at its disposal is unknown, but we know it was protected by a reinforced wall that could offer quartering in barracks for 24,000 men and stables for 2,400 horses and 300 elephants; it is possible that other facilities had been planned, and the urban area offered other accommodation. But, because of its impoverishment, Carthage could no longer pay mercenaries (Appian, *Lib.* 76.353). “No money, no Swiss.” In any case, the treaty concluded with Rome at the end of the Second Punic War did not facilitate the recruitment of soldiers

of this kind and, on battlefields, a Hannibal would have been needed to prevail, to organize an army that was still, in spite of everything, very heterogeneous. Carthage could only count on some Numidian allies led by a certain Phameas. Its ports could harbor 500 ships (in case of necessity, the places meant for the merchant navy could be reserved for warships). All the same, at sea Carthage had been surpassed for a good century.

The Siege of Carthage: The Time of the Consuls

It is easy to distinguish two major stages in the conflict. At first, the business was managed by the two consuls, with success as long as they limited themselves to conducting negotiations, with difficulty when they had to pass to the stage of military operations.

After the Senate had made the decision to enter into conflict, the two consuls gathered together their army in Sicily, the region best situated for a transfer to Africa. In accordance with the traditions and temperament of the Romans, the two magistrates strove to weaken the enemy as much as possible before beginning operations. In this scheme, they had recourse to negotiations that showed their cleverness no less than their duplicity. Before they had left the great island, they received a first embassy from the Carthaginians (Pol. 36.1.4; Appian, *Lib.* 76.354); their Senate, which appointed them, was dominated by the peace party and it was prepared to make any concessions to avoid war. No doubt well informed of this attitude, the consuls said to the envoys that they had to give proof of their goodwill, of their pacific attitude. And, to feel reassured, they said, they asked for the handover of 300 hostages taken from among the sons of the great families (*ibid.*). In so doing, they restored one of the clauses of the treaty of 201, which had lapsed over time. In Carthage, the mothers of these young people wept greatly and put all their efforts into making this project fail. In vain. Their fathers and their husbands, perhaps more credulous than they, imposed this sacrifice. It was nonetheless in vain.

In fact, although they had taken possession of the captives, the consuls made their army cross the sea and disembarked at Castra Cornelia, a camp constructed in times past by Scipio, the first Africanus, near Utica some 35 kilometers north of Carthage (Pol. 36.1.6; Appian, *Lib.* 78.360–79.370). This Punic city, created earlier but less prosperous than the other, envied it and sided with the Romans (Pol. 36.1.3; Appian, *Lib.* 75.347). On arriving there, the consuls received a second mission. As if the delivery of the hostages had not been sufficient to calm their fear, they formulated a new demand. If the Carthaginians really wanted peace, they said, they did not need to possess arms. To prove the truth of their sentiments, they should strip their ports and

their arsenals of the ships, arms, and equipment that were there. In spite of the fears of the democrats and the people, who formed the party for war, the Senate, composed of aristocrats in favor of peace, agreed to give in to this new demand. A long ribbon of chariots filled with armaments linked Carthage to Utica. The Romans therefore took possession of 200,000 suits of armor and 2,000 catapults (Appian, *Lib.* 80.375). At the same time, all the warships were assembled in Utica harbor and were burnt there.

The senators of Carthage might have thought that they had finally obtained peace. It was pure illusion. The consuls called for a third embassy to which they addressed a speech of perfidy more than Punic (Appian, *Lib.* 81.378). Repeating the moral themes propagated in Greek philosophy (Plato, *Laws* 705a) and among their compatriots, they informed their interlocutors that, in their own interest, the latter had to be aware of good and evil. The profession of merchant and that of sailor, which was linked to it, pushed those who practiced them into every vice, and especially into love of money and theft. These were traits associated with men without a true homeland, without attachment to the land. The only honorable profession, in accordance with good morals, was that of farmer. They therefore asked the inhabitants of Carthage to abandon their city, which was definitely too closely linked to its ports, and to settle far from the coast, in the countryside. In Carthage, anger had slowly risen. This last demand — the drop of water that makes the glass spill over — provoked an explosion of fury and indignation. The party for peace was swept away by the wave and the Punic Senate declared war on Rome (Appian, *Lib.* 93.439).

It is easy to see the double aim that the consuls were pursuing. On one hand, they sought to wrap themselves up in a gown of virtue and to cast onto their adversaries the responsibility for starting a conflict which, under these conditions, would become legally if not morally a just war, a *bellum iustum*. This situation would appease not only the fear of men but the possible anger of the gods. That is because for the Romans, contrary to what one might expect of a people so often engaged in military operations, peace remained a value. It was even deified, and, in that case, it was called Pax; besides, the divine order, *pax deorum*, must not be upset. On the other hand, the consuls wanted to engage in conflict on conditions as advantageous for them as possible. They aimed at least to obtain a prior weakening of the enemy. By disarming them they could even, they thought, obtain a surrender without combat, which would have saved Roman blood. One must admit that they did obtain the appearance of virtue and the disarmament of the Carthaginians. On the other hand, they failed in their quest for an unconditional capitulation.

The decision for war was accompanied in Carthage by an extraordinary burst, an excess of energy (Appian, *Lib.* 92.432–93.441). On the political level, power changed hands and this transfer was accompanied by violence whose victims were the members of the peace party. On a military level,

feverish activity occurred in two directions, armament and strategy. For equipment, all artisans were requisitioned and they had to make new panoplies; the other inhabitants were conscripted similarly. Each day 140 shields, 300 swords, 500 lances and 1,000 catapult missiles came out of their workshops. As for strategy, there was not much choice. Attacked, disarmed, the Carthaginians could not go on the offensive. They therefore began on the defensive, not without skill. They divided their forces into two corps. One army remained inside the city to sustain the siege that was from then on inevitable. Another army was established outside, at Nepheris some 25 kilometers south of Carthage. It was hoped that the Punic cities of Africa would bring help and assistance. This might at least harass the Romans, or at best catch their forces in a pincer.

The consuls thus began the siege before Carthage (Appian, *Lib.* 94.442–47, 97.456–98.465). The city was well protected by a very solid rampart to the west,⁹ and on that side it dominated a tract of ground that extended to a lagoon. To the east, it was washed by the sea. The wall was flanked by towers and reinforced on the inside by various buildings, barracks, stables, and storehouses. To make access more difficult, the Punic architects had installed a palisade in front preceded by a deep ditch. The eastern flank of the city was without doubt worse protected. It offered especially one weak point, the entrance to the ports, which had been excavated on open ground.¹⁰ The dispositions of the Romans are not well known; the ancient authors have left little information on this subject, doubtless because nothing exceptional had been put in place. At sea, the fleet kept watch, without too much difficulty because it possessed absolute maritime supremacy. On land, the legionaries had constructed camps to shelter themselves and the rest of the army, and without doubt they encircled the city hermetically with what we have called "the elementary fortification." They dug a deep ditch in a V-shape, called a *fossa*; the earth thrown out formed an embankment, the *agger*; on this bank they installed a wooden stockade, the *vallum*.

Without doubt for reasons both of personal ambition and of strategy, the two consuls encamped separately. Marcius Censorinus installed himself first on the south side, toward the present urban area of Kheredine, then transferred eastwards, at the edge of the sea. Manilius, for his part, chose a site towards the northwest, beyond the modern village of Sidi Daoud. Quite logically he very quickly sought to loosen the vice in which he found himself caught, and he led a raid against the Punic army of Nepheris. Misfortune overtook him. He suffered a defeat and only the intervention of a young officer, Scipio Aemilianus, avoided a disaster (Appian, *Lib.* 102.472–103.490). Subsequently, one of the two new consuls, Calpurnius Piso, attempted two interventions, one to the east against Kelibia, the other to the north against Bizerte, without the least success (Appian, *Lib.* 110.519–22). These defeats aroused hope and

renewed optimism among the besieged (Appian 111.522–26). Thereupon word came of the death of the king of Numidia, Masinissa, an old ally. The opening of his will had a surprise in store: it appointed as executor of his last wishes Scipio Aemilianus, who thus came decidedly to the fore.

The Siege of Carthage: The Time of Scipio Aemilianus

The second stage in the siege of Carthage began in the spring of 147 and this was, after the siege of the consuls, the siege of Scipio Aemilianus, a battle in an urban setting. Scipio,¹¹ who had succeeded in being elected to the consulate at the age of 38 years (Appian, *Lib.* 112.530), possessed all the qualities, notably a charm that he exercised with success among the soldiers (Appian 105.495). His beginnings were all the same marked by two defeats, the unfortunate landing of Mancinus towards La Marsa, to the northwest (113.535–114.542), and another landing just as unfortunate, of 4,000 men, towards Djebel Khaoui, more to the north (117.554–59). To reinforce his plan and to keep better control of his troops, the Roman general made them carry out works. To the west, the isthmus was barred by a double fortification that complemented the first; one was turned towards the interior to prevent the Carthaginians from going out, the other towards the exterior to prevent reinforcements, supplies, and news from reaching the besieged city. To the east, he installed a mole to prevent entry into the ports (119.563–120.568).

The reaction of the Carthaginians was not without vigor. They led out onto the rampart, in view of the legions, the few prisoners they had taken and they tortured them to death in an atrocious manner (Appian, *Lib.* 118.560). This act was presented by the Romans as obvious proof of Punic cruelty. In reality it must be interpreted differently, as a decision at the same time political and military. By these murders, the war party, which had acquired uncontested authority in the city, imposed on its compatriots as on the enemy one alternative, no other choice being possible: henceforth, it would be victory or death. This is what also explains the extreme rigor that the Romans demonstrated subsequently and until the end of the conflict, behavior that had become inevitable because of the collective mentalities of the time. And that is not all. The Carthaginians had succeeded in constructing warships. Exit from the ports having been barred, they dug a new channel due east. In summer 147, they twice tried their luck at sea. They lost these two naval battles (Appian 121.574–123.586).

Scipio Aemilianus then undertook the conquest of the city. This operation constituted a battle in an urban setting that took place in stages, began in the lower city, and finished in the upper (Livy, *Per.* 51; Appian, *Lib.*

127.605–131.627). The taking of the lower city was itself done in three stages. At the entry to the ports, the weak point in the defense system, was a *terre-plein* platform known by the name of "Falbe's quadrilateral." Roman soldiers managed to gain a foothold there and install equipment: first success. A Carthaginian commando force tried to throw them into the sea. It succeeded in setting fire to the machines, but the men had to withdraw and, what was worse, they could not prevent a widening of this bridgehead (Appian 124.587–125.595). At the same time, while the army of Nepheris was annihilated (126.596–602) and while Phameas was changing sides with 2,200 Numidians, the Carthaginian general, known by the name of Hasdrubal the Boetharch, entered into secret negotiations with his enemies, which failed.

A second success allowed the legionaries to conquer the central square of Carthage or *agora*. This space was dominated by a temple where each rich Carthaginian put his seal: some 3,000 objects of this type have recently been found by German archaeologists; the latter have been able to measure the size of the fire that destroyed the African city.

A third stage could then commence: it involved taking control of the residential districts of the lower city. Three avenues, bordered by buildings of six floors, linked the agora to the upper city. The Roman soldiers moved forward almost in one line, foot soldiers on the roofs, others going from apartment to apartment, piercing holes in the walls. They struck down all the people they met, then threw them, dead or alive, onto the roadway where they were crushed by the horses' hooves. To be sure that the massacre was indeed complete, they set fire to the buildings they had just left. This episode is particularly important for the history of the Roman army. It shows, in fact, how it carried out combat in an urban setting, a subject rarely broached by critics. In this case, then, the action is characterized by three features. The soldiers advance in one line to avoid being isolated. They kill civilians and soldiers. To be sure that they have indeed "cleansed" the abandoned sector, they set fire to it.

It is at that moment that one can best see what "the face of the battle" was for the two parties involved. The psychological tension, born of hatred and fear, had then reached a peak among the Carthaginians, a feeling worsened by hunger and fatigue. The Romans, for their part, did not feel the least doubt as to the justness of their cause, nor as to the normal nature of their feeling toward their enemies, who were guilty of the torture of their comrades. It was then that Scipio Aemilianus revived an old rite, the *evocatio*, perhaps to increase their ardor, doubtless to accelerate the course of history through the aid of religion (Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.9.7–8; cf. Servius on *Aeneid* 12. 841). He addressed a solemn prayer to the gods of the besieged city, asking them to abandon the Carthaginians to their fate, to leave them, and to settle in Rome, where temples, altars, and sacrifices awaited them — he promised this to them. And the gods of Carthage heard the Roman: they departed.

Reaching the last stage of the battle led by Scipio Aemilianus, the legionaries found themselves at the foot of the upper city, the hill of Byrsa, dominated by the temple of Eshmoun. To tell the truth it is only of modest height, but its slopes are quite steep and a rampart protected them. The last Carthaginian soldiers and some deserters from the Roman army had found a last fallback position there. But the former knew that the time for clemency had passed and the latter knew their fate if they were taken: the deserting legionaries would be beaten with rods until they fainted, woken with buckets of water, then decapitated with an axe: the noncitizens would suffer a worse torture, left to the inventive mind of the general-in-chief. It was then that the boetharch carried out a treachery well prepared by long negotiations (Pol. 38.20.2–5). He had been promised that he would receive a small estate in Italy, where he would end his days peacefully, if he abandoned his family. So he went over to the enemy. His wife went up onto the rampart and uttered a brief speech (Appian, *Lib.* 131.626–27). She wished every possible happiness to Scipio Aemilianus, because he had in every way respected the laws of war, however cruel they had been. She cursed her husband, who had abandoned his fatherland and his family. Then she headed with her children towards a gigantic funeral pyre where a collective suicide was being prepared. The family of the boetharch disappeared in company with Carthaginian soldiers and Roman deserters. The burning of the city, one of the most famous in the history of humanity, lasted without doubt for many days (cf. Florus 1.31.18). The boetharch ended his days in Italy, free and perhaps happy (Zon. 9.30).

After the end of the hostilities, the victorious general practiced a rare ritual. He “consecrated” the soil of the city to the gods of the Underworld, that is, he made them a gift of it (Macrobius, 3.9.9–13). This gift implied the absolute prohibition for any mortal to settle there, under penalty of terrible punishments inflicted by the divinities who owned the place.

Carthage was taken. The “Third Punic War” was ended. Scipio Aemilianus was able to begin a fine political career (Appian, *Lib.* 98.465; *ILS* 67). On returning to Rome, he was showered with honors and he resumed the name of Africanus, which in times past his adoptive grandfather had borne. Moderns, therefore, in order to distinguish them specify him as the “second Africanus.” It is said that, considering the extent of his victory, he felt sorrow when thinking about the fragility of the empires of this world (Pol. 38.21–22; Appian, *Lib.* 132.628–30).

The Consequences of the Taking of Carthage

Before seeing what were the true consequences of the taking of Carthage, one must remember three false consequences of this event, three myths to which it gave rise.

Textbooks, in times past, said that the city had been destroyed to the point where there was not one stone left standing, that Scipio Aemilianus had its soil plowed and that he had salt spread over it.¹² About 20 years ago, diggings were made, notably on the *agora* of the lower city and on the temple that went with it, on the hill of Byrsa, and in the port quarter. They showed indisputably that the city had been abandoned, but that the buildings had been left in place, more or less destroyed, more or less burnt, and that they had not been dismantled. Besides the soldiers had other preoccupations, other tasks to accomplish. In these conditions, it was not possible to plow soil littered with pieces of walls, monuments, and debris. In any case, it was not a rite practiced by the Romans with the significance that has been attached to it. As for the salt, it was not used in this context either, and a recent study has showed that this was an invention of a Byzantine writer and taken up by a Renaissance Pope.¹³

Behind these myths, the true and great consequences of this conflict have been revealed. I shall be forgiven for not insisting on the sharing of booty – too banal (Diodorus 32.25; Appian, *Lib.* 133.631–32). For there was something better: first and foremost, the creation of the province of Africa. The Senate of Rome sent to Utica a commission of ten members charged with drawing up the charter of the province, the *lex provinciae* (Appian, *Lib.* 135.639–41). Seven Punic cities, which had betrayed their people and gone over just in time to the victor's camp, were rewarded. Utica, promoted to the rank of capital of the new province, served as the governor's residence. The seven communities received the status of "free cities," in fact only autonomous, especially in the areas of justice and finance, and they formed as many enclaves in the interior of the territory of the conquerors. The former area of Carthage, called *chora* by the Greeks and *pertica* by the Romans, became the collective property of the Roman people, in Latin *ager publicus populi Romani*, or province if you like, and Bizerte, for too long faithful to Carthage, was destroyed.

The consequences of the fall of Carthage were important in another way in the area of civilization; recent works have shown that.¹⁴ The great historian Theodor Mommsen wrote that, from 146 to 31 BC, Rome had been content to keep the corpse (of Carthage) and that, with the exception of Caesar, the victors had shown only little interest in the vanquished. Jean-Martin Lassère showed on the contrary that, during this period, Italians came in great numbers to settle in Africa. They brought Roman law, the Latin language, their way of life, and their gods, impregnating Africa with Roman civilization (Lassère 1977).

For all that, Punic culture did not disappear. It survived while transforming itself, and present-day historians call it "Neo-Punic civilization." It was indeed alive, and the Roman state never forbade it. It has been confirmed in at least four areas. First of all, the language of the Carthaginians endured, and it is

known that it was still spoken in the countryside at the time of St Augustine. Next, Punic onomastics survived the disaster in the same way. In the second century AD there was even a Hannibal in the Roman army; he had certainly received this name at his birth for religious reasons, and the Romans responsible for recruitment enrolled him in spite of the memories linked to the victor of Cannae. Besides, some institutions were maintained: in the second century AD, Africa still counted numerous cities administered by *sufetes*. Finally — last but not the least — the Punic pantheon was preserved in its totality. But through the phenomenon of the *interpretatio Romana* the Romanized Africans adopted the habit of giving Latin names to the local gods. It is thus that, during the whole period that saw polytheism dominate, Ba'al Hammon remained the principal divinity of this province where he is well known under the name of Saturn. (See also Chapter 26.)

And that is not all. Very soon some Romans wanted to revive Carthage. Gaius Gracchus, the tribune of the *plebs* from 123 to 122, settled colonists on this site, by virtue of an agrarian law. But the gods, who had become proprietors of the site thanks to Scipio Aemilianus, showed their displeasure through miracles that proved to the conservative Senate that the reforming tribune of the *plebs* had made an error. It was finally the dictator Caesar who succeeded where Gracchus the tribune of the *plebs* had failed. It is true that he exercised the functions of Supreme Pontiff, *pontifex maximus*. This status allowed him more easily to have the ear of the gods, and he was able to establish at Carthage a colony that was reinforced by Augustus and became in time one of the four or five greatest cities of the Roman empire.

Assessment

Historians of the art of war, if they speak sometimes of a “decisive battle,” have not yet invented the expression a “decisive siege.” However, the siege of Carthage and the street fighting that accompanied it fit well into this category. They marked clearly the end of a conflict which had lasted more than a century, since 264.

The causes of the “Third Punic War” were without doubt multiple. It has seemed to me that it was necessary to stress the political element and especially the collective mentalities, hatred and fear of an enemy considered hereditary and perceived, wrongly at the time, as the incarnation of a terrible threat.

The pseudo-war was reduced in reality to a siege. It was marked by terrible street battles, by equal acts of cruelty on both sides, and by the courage of the Carthaginians who behaved as good combatants, as much as their enemies. It is a woman who emerges from their ranks, the wife of Hasdrubal the Boetharch, who showed more manliness than her husband.

From the ruins of the city was born a new Africa, Roman Africa, which never denied the cultural heritage of Carthage, but which finally stressed the Italian contribution, *Romanitas*.

NOTES

1. Sources: Livy and Polybius, cited in the text; Diodorus, Book 32, Livy, *Periochae* 49–51; Florus 1.31; Appian, *Libyca* and (on Caesar) *Bella Civilia* 4; Orosius 4.22–23; Eutropius 4.5 and 10–12; Zonaras 9.26–30.
2. Zancan 1936; Maróti 1983.
3. Picard 1975, 280.
4. Idea already present in Diod. 32.4.4.
5. Hurst 1983; Fulford and Peacock 1994.
6. Lancel 1989.
7. Veyne 1975.
8. Polybius 36.16–17; Livy, *Per.* 50; Diod. 32.16; Appian, *Lib.* 106.499–500.
9. For the rampart: Diod. 32.14; Appian, *Lib.* 95.449–50, 97.458; Lapeyre 1934; Lancel 1989.
10. On the ports: Diod. 32.13; Appian, *Lib.* 96.452–55, Hurst 1983; Fulford and Peacock 1994.
11. On Scipio Aemilianus, we will see Pol. 31.23–30 and 35.4–5; Diod. 31.26; Appian, *Lib.* 104.491, 105.495. Most recently: Zahrnt 2000.
12. Idea (without salt) already present among the ancients: Appian, *Lib.* 81.378; Florus 1.31; Oros. 4.22.1, 23.6.
13. Ridley 1986; cf. Visoná 1988.
14. These works are synthesized in Le Bohec (2005), and are included in the Bibliography to this volume.

PART V

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Death and Transfiguration: Punic Culture after 146 BC

M'hamed Hassine Fantar

To narrate the death of Carthage as an African city that could be born, develop, blossom, not without taking part in the spread of its culture and beliefs in diverse Mediterranean regions, to the north and to the south, such as eastern Sicily, Sardinia, the Iberian peninsula, and the Balearic Islands, the sources are relatively meager and their accounts would appear unilateral and repetitive. Amongst those who took part in the destruction of the prestigious city of Elissa, ancient historiography gives us the name of Fannius, who appears to have participated in the assault on Carthage. But of his report nothing remains. Stéphane Gsell and other scholars have been able to recognize the feeble echoes of certain chronicles relating to the death of Carthage. It was a rather a question of assassination. One only has to read Polybius, Livy and their compilers to gain an idea of it. Appian did not take offense at recognizing his debts to Polybius whose surviving extracts relating to the Third Punic War scarcely allow us to verify the accounts of his successors and debtors appropriately.

But before talking about the death of Carthage, perhaps it is necessary, if not to present the victim, at least to recognize its main contributions to Mediterranean civilization. The offspring of Tyre, the fatherland of Europa and Cadmus who introduced the alphabet to Greek soil, Carthage, or *Qart Hadash*, can pride itself on rich contributions to Mediterranean civilization and the promotion of a heritage in which all people of the Mediterranean, whatever their ethnic groups, languages, and beliefs, meet and acknowledge one another. One could not speak of Carthage without evoking its Constitution with a Senate and an Assembly of the people to legislate, the suzerainty to direct, and judicial structures to assure justice and control of good governance. Carthage generated illustrious figures whose memory is preserved for us by

ancient authors like Herodotus, Polybius, Diodorus of Sicily, Livy, and many others, whether writing in the Latin language or belonging to the Greek world. For seas and oceans, Hanno and Himilk, for land and agriculture, Mago, author of an encyclopedia in 28 volumes that deals with everything relating to good exploitation of the land, as much with regard to cultural factors as to management: "If you buy land," said Mago, "sell your town house."

In the portrait gallery or in the *de Viris Illustribus* of Carthage, a choice place is to be kept for the Magoids mentioned by the authors of Greco-Latin antiquity. To the breadth of their policies we owe the construction of the state and the exploration of the seas and oceans, whose protagonists we have mentioned. There are many other figures to consider here, notably Hamilcar Barca and his son Hannibal, whom one could rightly present as the founder of the politics of participation and good neighborliness in a Mediterranean that, in the perception of this Barcid chief, should have been tripartite, shared by Carthage, Rome, and Macedonia, whose crown belonged then to King Philip V. Hannibal wanted to be able to convince these three protagonists to sit around a negotiating table. The draft agreement proposed by Hannibal to the king of Macedonia in 215 BC is witness to this: it speaks of friendship toward Rome which, in spite of its defeats at Trasimene and Cannae, rejected it. Be that as it may, the contributions of Carthage to North Africa and to the western Mediterranean were numerous. The historian cannot register the death of the Carthaginian state without presenting its balance sheet, however succinctly.

Inaugurated without doubt at the end of the second millennium BC and crowned by the birth of Carthage in 814, the Phoenician presence in the Mediterranean proved to be prodigiously fertile and had numerous and varied consequences. One had to wait for the Phoenicians for a bridge to be built between the two basins of the Mediterranean and for the light from the East to reach the unknown lands of the West. Landing there, they established trading posts and founded colonies. The Phoenicians therefore are credited with having opened the way, explored unknown lands, shown that the individual could take responsibility for himself, live and prosper far from his native land or from his tribe in new climates with considerable wealth. The concept of the individual can be considered as a Phoenician invention, which could be behind the genesis of the Citizen.

The Phoenicians succeeded in putting in place a system of multiple and regular exchanges. The foundation of Carthage establishes a turning point in the history of the Phoenicians and of the whole Mediterranean. The founders of Utica and of Carthage can be considered, rightly, as the inventors and explorers of the North Africa that appeared out of the prehistoric mists to occupy a place in the Mediterranean. From then, it benefited from a presence, aroused interest, and provoked rivalries. In founding cities there, the Phoenicians opened the gates of North Africa to the world; but they retained

control of it and privileges from it. All the experiences of the prestigious East, whether the Semitic universe or Pharaonic Egypt, influenced the Libyan world, Sardinia, Sicily, the Iberian peninsula, the Balearic Islands, and other places.

Among these experiences was writing: the language and alphabet of the Phoenicians were adopted. In the field of beliefs and religious thought, Carthage was a center of dissemination for Semitic cults: sacred areas, cults, liturgies, and so on. Among other political experiments, the Carthaginians seem to have introduced into their zone of influence the concepts of, among other things, the city, state, and institutions. Cities adopted municipal structures based on the Carthaginian model. The process of sedentarization and urbanization accelerated, involving order, progress, and the tax revenue so necessary for any useful fulfillment of the individual and for the community. Numidian cities like Mactaris, Bulla, Mididi, Thignica, Vaga, Dougga, Bellali near Beja, Siga, Cirta, bear the imprints of Punic civilization; likewise Mauretanian cities like Tingis, Volubilis, and Tamuda; the stamp of Punic town planning and architecture can be found there. The builders of the Medracen were also trained in the school of Carthage without forgetting the legacy of their ancestors. (Medracen is the name the local population gives to a grand Numidian-Punic mausoleum still visible and preserved in Algeria near the town of Batna. The date would lie between the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century BC.)

Where architecture is concerned, whether we are dealing with materials or architectural techniques, the contributions are undeniable. According to G. Vuillemot, "the use of the unbaked brick was brought by the Tyrian conquerors." Columella and Vitruvius mention the *lutum Punicum*, a coating of loamy soil on wicker. It is the same for baked brick in variable shapes and sizes. Among architectural techniques introduced or invented by the Carthaginians, there are earth walls shaped and made with a mold. They are constructed with wadding, in a mold made of planks arranged in parallel, at a distance from one another determined by the thickness of the curtain. Rubblework masonry and concrete, very widespread in the Roman era, notably for vaults, may stem from this Carthaginian adobe technique, which the Romans seem to have borrowed. Other procedures were introduced into North Africa by the Phoenicians and spread by Carthage: the ashlar, the column, the arch, the vault, the use of toothed stones. Thanks to the Phoenicians, the western Mediterranean, notably North Africa knew the house with a central courtyard, the high-ceilinged chamber, the water room, sanctuaries like that of Salammbô and temples like those of Carthage, Kerkouane, Thinissut, and el-Kenissia.

The countryside profited in the same way from the Carthaginian contribution: the agronomical treatise of Mago is proof of this. Techniques, cultivating methods, tools like the swing plough and the thresher, that famous *plostellum Poenicum* of which Varro speaks, nutritional and culinary needs and tastes

were introduced into all the countries of the Punic world, on both sides of the Mediterranean. The art of the orchard, of new cultivations, wine, and oils certainly had an impact on the economy of town and country and on the way of life of the individual and the group.

With the arrival of the Phoenicians and the foundation of Carthage, North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, southern Spain, and the Balearic Islands experienced profound changes that affected society, attitudes, political organization, religion, the city and its municipal displays, and so on. There was a new lifestyle, a new sociopolitical grammar. The work of Carthage was so profound that peasants of incontestably Libyan origin were absolutely convinced that they belonged to the Canaanite world; they were still saying it at the time of St Augustine.

Although harmoniously adapted to the conditions of the western Mediterranean and to the specificities of local populations and cultures, Punic civilization remained faithful to the west Semitic world: language, writing, religion, ideals referred to the East, without escaping native specificities. Carthage, a metropolis in Africa, never forgot that she was the daughter of Tyre; without hiding her origins, she opened herself broadly to the cultures of the host lands in order to profit from them. According to Quintus Curtius, each year an embassy laden with precious gifts left the port of Carthage to travel to Tyre in order to celebrate a sacrifice at the temple of Melqart. It was a veritable pilgrimage. Going by what Diodorus of Sicily says, these offerings placed on the altar of the god of Tyre represented the tithe that the daughter owed to her parent. This loyalty in regard to the city of Europa, Cadmus, and Elissa was payable in other economic and cultural sectors.

At the time of the treaty with Rome, the Carthaginians included the Tyrians in it. Beyond sentiment and attitude, the *Poeni* seem to have consistently recognized in their ancestors a genuine cultural supremacy. It was in the Phoenician and Syro-Palestinian east that they sought references; they appreciated what was being done over there and especially at Tyre. Regarding Ashtarni, a theonym that seems to derive from the Greek form Astronoe, Henri Seyrig recognized a borrowing by Tyre from Greek usage. Then there are influences that came to Carthage after passing through the metropolis. Achaemenid borrowings were received thus, because they came from the East; this was the case of the cylindrical headgear visible on the stele named "from the priest to the child," which is found in the Musée du Bardo, and on the head of the "marine horseman of Kerkouane." In Phoenicia, one can see it on the stele of Yehawmilk, king of Byblos; Melqart wears the same headgear on Tyrian coins; it is to be found on the steles of Oumm el-'Amed, exhibited at the Louvre and at the Ny Carlsberg Glyptothek in Copenhagen. Among other iconographic borrowings, there is good reason to remember the theme of the marine horseman, who appears in the fourth and third centuries on Tyrian coins and on terracotta plaques found in Libyco-Punic sites in North Africa.

Here then is an African metropolis whose role in the Mediterranean and whose contributions to world civilization were considerable. It supplied rich materials for the construction of the Mediterranean, as much on the material side as on the spiritual, a shared work whose greatest protagonists in antiquity were incontestably Carthage, Athens, and Rome. But because it had been a formidable rival, the Romans decided on the death of this Punic metropolis: it was, as we have already said, a genuine assassination. To do this, Rome chose to use a blunted sword. What must we understand from this: hatred or cynicism? Perhaps both, to which were added a good dose of dishonesty and underhand procedures, characteristics of every imperialist and exclusionist policy. But this attitude, which shocks us, is far from being the prerogative of Rome: *mutatis mutandis*, the past and the present provide plenty of evidence of it.

Rome wanted its rival from Africa drained of blood before proceeding to its execution. Although belonging to a clan steeped in humanistic culture, Scipio Aemilianus had to accomplish his duty as a citizen respectful of the law and of the will of the people; he dirtied his hands not without silencing the protests of his conscience. Today, there are objectors and those who believe in the rights of peoples and in the rights of man.

In order to avoid war, the Carthaginians showed themselves prepared to accept everything; they made many, sometimes humiliating, approaches to the Roman senate. They proposed putting themselves at the disposal of Rome, pronouncing the formula of *deditio*. Nothing did any good. Rome was determined to do away with its former rival; but before dealing it the death blow, it wanted to weaken it by using a vagueness of the type to wound body and soul, which G. Ch. Picard called the frightful *suspense* that prevented the Carthaginians from experiencing rest. From 149 to 147 BC their agony passed from despair to violence. Day after day and night after night one could see the suffering of the men and the women.

All the same the taking of the City proved to be a very difficult task. The Romans came up against a patriotism equal to no other. After handing over the elite of their youth and surrendering their arms, they were still able to redouble their efforts to resist a siege, which condemned them to famine and therefore to death. The entire population put a lot of effort into the resistance. Carthage proved to be capable of remaking its equipment and supplying itself with offensive and defensive weapons; its workshops were able to manufacture swords, lances, javelins, catapults. Piles of terracotta slingshot balls have been recognized in Carthage by archaeologists on the lines of defense. The arsenals supplied the needs of the navy, certain light units of which caused the enemy very heavy losses. To contribute to the defense of their homeland, women offered their jewels to increase the financial resources of the state. It is said that they offered their hair for the rigging of the fleet.

In the spring of the year 146, under the leadership of Scipio Aemilianus, the Roman army pierced the walls, took over the port and undertook systematic pillage, carnage, and destruction by fire and sword. Greco-Latin historiography describes the diabolical drunkenness that seized the Roman legionaries; during street combat, they had the task of mowing down lives, unarmed, enfeebled, and incapable of defense. The most moving was surely the martyrdom of those who found death in their own homes, pierced by two-edged swords or crushed under burning rubble. Others could be seen dragged by hooks and hurled into ditches to be buried alive. Possessed by veritable furies, the soldiery was not at all troubled to hear the cries and groans of their victims nor to see their limbs quivering in the ditches before they breathed their last. This apocalypse lasted 17 days under the watchful but grieving eye of Publius Scipio who, sitting on a rock, seems to have been so moved by the horror of the spectacle that he wept and recited out loud a verse of the *Iliad* where Homer said: "The day will come when Ilion, the holy city, Priam and the people of spear-skilled Priam will perish."

In desperation, those who found refuge on Byrsa hill, in the sacred area of the temple of Eshmoun, surrendered, hoping their lives would be spared. Hasdrubal, the Boetharch, appeared with a suppliant's branch and embraced the knees of Scipio, who "made him sit at his feet." As for the deserters, they set fire to the temple and perished in the flames. Recalling the heroism and the nobility of the wife of the Carthaginian general S. Gsell wrote: "Prepared as for a feast day, the wife of Hasdrubal stood with her sons in front of Publius and in front of her husband; she called to the wretch. As he was silent, his eyes staring at the ground, she called upon the gods, thanked Scipio for having promised to spare the lives of her and her children, then, after a short silence, she addressed Hasdrubal, and reproached him for his cowardice and his betrayal. When she had finished speaking, she threw the two children into the pyre and leaped in herself."¹

Thus it has come full circle: the pyre of Elissa constitutes the prelude to the Carthaginian saga and the pyre of Hasdrubal's wife is its conclusion. Here then is a story whose beginning and end are marked by femininity combined with the heat of the fire: two women and two pyres constitute the setting for a stirring epic which one could call *Elissade* on the *Iliad*-paradigm.

But Punic civilization did not disappear with the destruction of Carthage and the elimination of the Carthaginian state in 146 BC. It found refuge in hearts, *mores*, streets, temples, and everywhere. It is curious to note in Roman Africa the compliance of Latin onomastics with the rules of Punic phonetics and writing: Rogatus, Valerius, Felix, and many other names are found on so-called neo-Punic inscriptions. Conventions seem to have governed the transcription and the reading of these names, with recourse very often to *matres lectionis* [consonants used as vowels]. For these Latin onomastics, transcribed

in Punic cursive characters, termed neo-Punic, there is rich documentation. Let us quote one of these texts engraved on a lintel of the temple of Hoter-Miskar found at Maktar in Tunisia. Already in the nineteenth century Victor Guérin noticed this phenomenon on a bilingual Latin-Punic inscription where the *cognomen* Celadus was transcribed in neo-Punic characters with use of *matres lectionis* for the transcription of the vowels.

But it must be stressed that the Africans, although sometimes very Romanized, had a tendency to keep their Punic names; they had them written in Latin characters. The onomastic lists, established on the basis of Latin inscriptions collected in North Africa, allow us to recognize this; it is a question of literal transcriptions, more or less altered, as for Idnibal, Ammicar, Namphano, Mathun, Mitinus. In Corseul, in Brittany, a funeral stele was dedicated to the memory of a woman born in Africa; she was called Namgidde, an anthroponym of whose Punic origin there is not a shadow of doubt. It involves a Latin text which dates back to the dynasty of the Severi.

In favor of the persistence of these pre-Roman onomastics, one can refer to the stele called “of the *iuvēnes*” discovered in Maktar, where we find names like Baric, Muthum, Aris, Arisim, Muthumbaal, Baliathon, Balsamon, Adarbal, and more. In the time of St Augustine, Numidians of the region of Hippo were called Abalonii, a name very certainly of Punic origin.

In other cases, people had recourse to the translation of Punic anthroponyms like Donatus and Concessus, which would be a Latin interpretation of Yhatbon or of Mathan, both formed on the Punic stem *ytñ* which conveys notions of gift, duty, and concession.

In destroying Carthage and taking possession of its territories, the Roman authorities do not seem to have succeeded in stifling Punic civilization. Besides, Rome knew how to profit from it. In this regard, one must stress the homage she had, indirectly or perhaps without wanting to, paid to the work of Mago by depositing it in the temple of Apollo with the famous books of the Sibyls. According to Pliny the Elder, the Roman Senate ordered its translation into the Latin language.

With the exception of those that were destroyed because they supported Carthage until the end of her days, the cities were able to continue and to preserve their institutions, their *mores*, and their language. The capital of Africa, Utica kept its identity as a Punic city, quite distinct from the community of merchants who came to settle there on business. Far from seeking to integrate the Africans, the Roman authorities seem rather to have been keen to encourage them to remain themselves.

Thus the Punic and Libyco-Punic cities preserved their old administrative structures from the time of Carthage, and notably the sufetship. The presence of this institution has been noted at the height of the Roman era in a crowd of African cities: Thugga, Maktar, Althiburos, Curubis, Themetra,

Capsa, Limisa, Thibica, Calama. A Latin inscription, discovered in Dougga, mentions a *sufes maior*, which would translate the Punic expression *rab shophetim*, which could be read on a stele of Maktar. The sufetship is confirmed in Capsa, the present-day town of Gafsa, under the reign of Trajan. In Themetra, in the region of Sousse in Byzacena, Rogatus the sufete dedicated a statue to Antoninus Pius. As in the time of Carthage, the sufete was often the eponymous magistrate. The city of Biracsaccar, the present-day Sidi Medien, dedicated the Capitoline triad for the health of Antoninus Pius and his children, a text dated by the words *anno sufetum*, followed by the names of two people. Thus the survival of certain Punic institutions in the Roman African city is a matter of established fact. Historians have tried to make them the *corpus*; others have been interested in their evolution and in their impact on the new organization introduced by the Romans. In fact, many centuries after the death of Carthage, Punic institutions were still present in this Africa, though they were, however, subject to the Roman molds of politics and administration; in the writings of ancient authors and in Latin inscriptions of Africa, there are legal terms like the *portae*, *princeps*, *principes*, *gens*, *principes civitatis*, and *curia*, which are not a product of Roman law; a Punic heritage has been recognized in them.²

In recent years, the Punic origin of African *curiae* has been contested. But there is every reason to recognize the particular favor that this institution had found among Africans. One must in the same way note its presence in Sardinia and Spain. But perhaps one should remember that Sardinia and Spain had been largely irrigated by Phoenician-Punic culture. It does not seem strange then that a Punic institution could survive there. Behind these African *curiae*, it has been suggested that we find traces either from the *mizrah* or again from the *betaeriae* and *syssitia* that Aristotle speaks of in regard to the constitution of Carthage (*Politics* 2.11.1–16).

The members of the Roman-African *curia* would recall those who, in the neo-Punic inscriptions of Dougga, of Maktar, of Mididi and others, would bear the title of *baalim*, that is, the masters or rather the noteworthy ones. In Dougga, they financed the construction of a temple to the memory of Masinissa. In Maktar and in Mididi, they offered sacrifices at the sanctuary of Baal Hammon. Those are socio-religious activities whose political dimension is very evident. We have suggested elsewhere the establishment of a link between the institution of the *portae*, such as it appears in Dougga under the reign of Claudius, in AD 48, on one hand, and the *baalim* on the other hand. Elsewhere, the hypothesis of an equivalence between the *baalim* of the neo-Punic inscriptions and the *principes civitatis* of the Latin texts ought not to be excluded.

There may be other institutions that would refer to the Punic or rather pre-Roman heritage, like the *decemprimi* and the *undecimprimi* (principal notables of the city). One can, there too, register those who bore the title of *baalim*. It

is the same for Punic religion; it did not disappear with the end of Carthage; the Romanization of Africa did not exclude it at all. Sanctuaries reserved for the Punic gods and goddesses were recognized everywhere in North Africa. The cult of Baal Hammon, under the name of Saturn, remained present in Africa, in spite of the very large spread of Christianity. Going by what Tertullian and St Augustine say, the Africans continued to offer human sacrifices at the height of the Roman era and in spite of the prohibition. Here is the testimony of Tertullian (*Apologeticus* 9): “Babies were publicly immolated to Saturn until the proconsulate of Tiberius who exposed the priests themselves on the same trees which shaded their crimes, as votive crosses; the witness, the militia of our fatherland which executed this order. But, still today, this accursed crime persists in secret.”

Perhaps one should remember here that the term “immolate” in the text of Tertullian must not be taken literally, *stricto sensu*. We now know that the Carthaginians did not immolate their children as a sacrifice. They were babies who died of natural causes or abortions, returned to Baal in accordance with a mysterious ritual about which we only know the practice of incineration, then unusual among the Greeks and forbidden among Jews and Christians. This is what would be likely to favor excesses of imagination and false interpretations.³ The sanctuaries to Saturn that were constructed in the Roman era in Africa often stood in the sacred area of a former *tophet*. The example of Salammbô is very significant: on the site of the old sanctuary, dedicated to Lady Tanit and to Lord Baal Hammon, excavations have revealed the remains of a temple of the Roman era, dedicated to Saturn; a great number of others have been discovered: for example, those of Thignica, Dougga, TébourSouk, Bulla Regia, Mididi, and Maktar.

But, if Baal Hammon was henceforth invoked under the name of Saturn and Tanit bore the name of Caelestis, certain divinities were able to preserve their former theonyms. The citizens of Maktar, at the height of the Roman era, practiced the cult of Hoter-Miskar. The remains of its temple have been identified, in the course of the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Numerous other religious cults and practices attested in Roman Africa are a product of the Punic heritage, no doubt enriched by Libyan antecedents. This is the case of Venus at Sicca Veneria and the practice of sacred prostitution. Perhaps one should add to this file a story that we owe to the Arab geographer and historian el-Bekri who lived in the eleventh century. He writes:

During the Byzantine domination, there was in the church of *Chikka Benaria* a very curious object, a mirror in which a man who suspected the fidelity of his wife had only to look to see the face of the seducer. In that era, the Berbers professed Christianity and a man of that race, having shown a lot of zeal for the religion, had become a deacon. A Latin, jealous of his wife, went to consult the

mirror, and indeed he distinguished the features of the Berber deacon. The king sent for the Berber and condemned him to have his nose cut off and to be paraded across the town; then he hunted him out of the Church. The parents of this man went during the night to shatter the mirror; to punish them, the king had their camp destroyed.

This story is a product of the imagination; it is obviously intended to ridicule Christianity. But the fact that it relates to Sicca and involves a priest cannot be pure coincidence. Might we have in this an echo of the famous temple of Venus and sacred prostitution? It is possible. But it would then be a distorted memory.

Returning to the cult of Baal-Saturn in Roman Africa, it seems that Christianity was able to profit from it. "If, during the first centuries of our era," wrote J.G. Février, "Christianity, heir of Judaism, had such success in North Africa, it is perhaps because to the *molchomor*, the sacrifice of the lamb, successor of the *molek*, which had been maintained in this region with such tenacity, it victoriously opposed another substitute sacrifice, infinitely more spiritualized, that of the paschal lamb."⁴

It seems, moreover, that, for the Africans, the Punic religion was so meaningful that it opened Africa's door to Christianity:

By adopting the Punic religion, the Africans imbued their minds with its spirit. They placed the divine infinitely above men. They became accustomed to a sentiment which was scarcely known to the Greeks and the Romans, but which they found in the Gospel: humble submission to the Lord's will. In cities and towns, everyone or almost everyone adored Baal who bore henceforth the name of Saturn and they placed him in the first rank of the gods, even before Caelestis. It was a move towards monotheism. To explain the welcome that Christianity received in Africa and its development there, one must, perhaps, go back to the Carthaginian beliefs. (Gsell, *HAAN* 4.498)

For Giovanni Garbini, certain aspects of African Christianity risked escaping understanding if one did not take into account "the cultural humus of Phoenician traditions in which they are manifested." St Augustine seems to have been very aware of the links that bound Africa and the Africans to the land of the Gospel and, "as the guide to men that he is, he wants to draw support from this powerful sentiment."

Semitic in origin, Phoenician and Punic beliefs thus contributed to the success of Christianity in Africa, where Tertullian declared: "We are an immense multitude, almost the majority of each city." In the 7th century AD Christian basilicas were everywhere, notably in the cities, towns, and hamlets of Proconsular Africa. In Africa, the religion of the Lord Jesus grew in a land enriched by the Lord Baal Hammon who was succeeded by Dominus Saturnus Augustus.

Without disappearing, Tanit, whom the Carthaginians called “Our Lady,” hid behind Caelestis; she was enriched by this and was able to adapt to the new structures and new mentalities of the time. She resisted Christianity. Her feast days pleased Augustine. In the fourth and fifth centuries, imperial Edicts did not succeed in uprooting the cult; in 421, *manu militari*, they proceeded to destroy edifices that were sacred to it; there were then in Africa pagans who still dared to denounce recourse to violence.

In spite of the fervor of Christianity and of African Islam, certain old Libyco-Punic beliefs continued to be current. In the Maghreb, one can encounter today certain magical-religious practices whose origins go back to the distant past of Carthage and perhaps beyond: the presence of pebbles and ostrich eggs in certain *zaouias* or *mzarat*, the breaking of the vase, the offerings, amulets, funeral meals, and many other practices.

At the time of the Arab conquest, there was living in the mountains of the Aurès a queen priestess, the *Kahena* of Arab historiography. Behind this name, one can detect, it is thought, the Punic term *kohenat*, which designated the priestess. But what was the divinity whose cult she assured? Al-Maliki, an Arab historian of the twelfth century AD, reported that, when she traveled at the head of her army, she had a wooden idol transported on a camel’s back. Was it the image of the divinity of which she was the priestess? The context would whisper the hypothesis of a warrior divinity or one that protected soldiers. One could then hesitate between Ashtart and the Libyan goddess whom Herodotus had identified with Athena. How was this idol presented? The information handed down remains vague: the Arab historian was content to say *sanem*, a term that, in the Arabic language, refers to the image of a divinity, an idol, whether it was a question of a statue or of a simple baetyl.

Certain iconographical representations shown in the Carthaginian world, seem to have been preserved in Roman Africa. The theme of the divinity seated on a throne was surely introduced by the Phoenicians. From the sixth century BC, it was found on gold rings, gathered in Carthage, Utica, and elsewhere. Baal on a throne flanked by sphynx figures on a stele discovered in the *tophet* of Sousse. It may be from the sixth or fifth century BC. This motif was likewise found on other steles. This theme endures, resists time and new structures; we find it again at Thinissut well after the Roman conquest. On a mosaic of Oudna, we see Neptune seated on the back of a sea-horse; he bears the trident. Striking to the eyes of the historian of the mosaic and of Neptune, this image recalls in reality the marine horseman of the Phoenician coins of Tyre and of terracotta medallions found in Kerkouane in Tunisia, and in Tamuda, a city of ancient Morocco. To the repertory of Punic and Libyco-Punic iconography there is reason to attribute the hand, the eye, the fish, the palm tree, the sign called that of Tanit, etc. The list would be long.

All this imagery with magical-religious value is encountered everywhere in the Maghreb. In the tradition of today, the hand still holds an important place. It is present within the bosom of the family. In the home, the room of the mistress of the house displays this image, painted or sculpted, to those who might be likely to enter it. To make it, one sometimes has recourse to clay or to a fabric padded and enhanced with bright colors combined with the brilliance of gold and silver spangles.

Among the jewels of the Maghrebian woman, there is the hand in precious metal; the town appreciates gold whilst the country has a preference for silver. Copper and bronze are not excluded. This hand, at the same time jewel, phylactery, and talisman, is sometimes seen associated with the numerous and diverse components of a necklace; it can have exclusive rights to the neck of the woman who wears it as a pendant with the aid of a gold or silver chain, according to taste, tradition, or fortune. The woman can attach this precious and effective jewel to her drapery, her gown, or her hair, as a fastener or a pin respectively; she can likewise hang it from one of her brooches. A silver or gold hand is very often given as a gift on the occasion of a birth: boy or girl, the baby might then wear this little hand attached to its bonnet. Whatever the shape, dissemination, and value of this amulet, the Maghreb is far from having exclusive rights to it: the image of the hand is present in prehistoric or proto-historic grottoes on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Among the motifs that Roman Africa knew well, there is good reason to single out the theme of the tree flanked by two animals confronting each other. It is proper to recall its frequency in oriental imagery from very distant Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, and Assyrian antiquity. Likewise it was present in Syria, in Palestine, and in Phoenicia. Oriental sailors introduced it into the western Mediterranean. In North Africa, the land proved to be propitious. The motif seems to have retained the value afforded to it in the East, where it represented the tree of life whose protection was confided to the two animals flanking it. Their effectiveness derives from their physical strength or their magic power, especially if wild beasts or fish are involved. For Roman Africa, one can point out a mosaic of Carthage, datable from the fourth Century AD; one can see in it two lions facing each other on either side of an umbrella pine. In Tunisia, and more precisely at Gafsa, the young woman who even today, with colored threads, weaves or embroiders this motif of the sacred tree, no longer knows that she is reproducing an image whose broad outline had been established in Mesopotamia thousands of years ago.

Similarly, Roman Africa owes to Punic culture the sign called Tanit's. Known in Carthage from the fifth century BC, it spread to be adopted everywhere in the Punic world. In the Libyco-Punic world it appeared on stelae, the walls of funerary chambers, ivories, terracotta figurines, lamps, coins, and a multitude of other objects. On amphora handles it served as the mark of the potter. In

the East, it has been found on tesserae and on terracotta figurines dating back to the fifth century BC. One can also add the mosaics of Kerkouane and Sardinia. Later, in the Roman epoch, it is found on lamps and stelae that often bear Latin inscriptions.

Nowadays, in the Mahgreb, this famous symbol continues to be in current use, retaining its apotropaic and propitiative value on Berber rugs and pottery. It belongs to those motifs that people still like to wear on the forehead or on the chin in the form of a tattoo, notably in the countryside. Among the Touaregs of today, people make amulet-jewelry whose form faithfully reproduces the so-called sign of Tanit. It owes its persistence to its magical-religious value whose effectiveness is still recognized by its users.

Besides these images, certain sacred precincts of Roman Africa seem to have favored keeping the Punic language for their liturgy; a very large number of stelae have been discovered with inscriptions termed neo-Punic, some votive, addressed to Baal Hammon or to some other divinity, others funerary. This epigraphical evidence proves incontestably that the Punic language disappeared neither from Africa nor from the other regions of the Carthaginian world in spite of a process of Romanization or Latinization. According to certain contemporary historians, Rome sought to eliminate neither the language nor the *mores* of the *Poeni*. The Punic language was recognized in wills and before the courts.

In the time of Apuleius, in the towns and countrysides of Tripolitania, Punic was the language of the Africans who had not had the chance to go to the municipal school; such was the case of the stepson of Apuleius. "He only speaks Punic apart from some words of Greek which come to him from his mother. As for Latin, he neither knows nor wants to speak it" (*Apology* 98). Pudens, however, lived in Oea, the present-day city of Tripoli; it was under the reign of Antoninus Pius (AD 138–161), i.e. more than three centuries after the fall of Carthage. For later periods, one may invoke texts termed Latin-Punic; they were originally described as Latin-Libyan. They are in fact Punic texts written in Latin characters whose publication is due to the British scholars J.M. Reynolds and J.B. Ward-Perkins, as well as to the eminent scholar, one of the best experts in the Punic language, G. Levi della Vida. More recently still, Robert Martin Kerr has presented a doctoral thesis at the University of Leiden entitled *Latin-Punic and its Linguistic Environment*. That was in February 2007.

The Punicization of vast regions of North Africa thus proves the persistence and survival of the Punic language several centuries after the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC. Speaking of Septimius Severus (193–211), Spartianus reports: "One day, his sister arrived from Leptis. She barely knew any words of Latin, which caused much shame to the emperor. So he invited her to return to her homeland."⁵ In the preceding century, in the time of the Antonines, to be precise during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161–180), the

Punic language was well known in Sardinia, notably in priestly circles; we owe this information to a neo-Punic inscription from Bithia that is now in the Cagliari Museum.

But let us return to North Africa, where the bishops charged with the spread and protection of Christianity had, in certain cases, to have recourse to speaking Punic to be sure of transmitting the message and of properly understanding the preoccupations of the faithful. Arnobius the Younger affirms that in the fifth century AD, the language of Carthage was still spoken south of Sabratha, in Tripolitania. Valerius, the predecessor of Augustine in the bishopric of Hippo, noted the use of the Punic language in the countryside. One day he heard the word *salus*; he asked the meaning of it; he was told that it meant three. This report we owe to St Augustine, an expert in Punic language and civilization. One day, quoting a Punic proverb, he made a point of adding: "I will say it to you in Latin because you do not all understand Punic. Here is this proverb: If a nuisance asks you for a coin, give him two to go away" (*Sermon* 157.4). On the other hand, here is a Donatist bishop who, in order to harangue Circumcellions, had to use an interpreter, according to Saint Augustine, as his audience did not understand the Latin language. The Donatists had, it seems, claimed for Punic a place equal if not superior to that of Latin.

On the occasion of a controversy, St Augustine addressed Crispinus, a Donatist bishop of Guelma in Numidia who claimed to have converted the inhabitants of Mappalia: "You claim that the Mappalians... have gone over to your side of their own free will. Well! Let's go and see them together; we shall both speak to them; our questions will be written down and a Punic interpreter will translate the questions for them" (*Epistulae* 66.2). In a letter addressed to Macrobius, a Donatist bishop of Hippo, Saint Augustine thanked his colleague and rival for having reproached the Circumcellions for their crimes with the aid of a Punic interpreter: *per Punicum interpretem*. In a letter addressed to Pope Celestine (422–432), he recommended the nomination of Antonius to the head of the bishopric of Fussala, a city located 60 km. from Hippo, for in this region the people understood no language other than Punic; Antonius knew how to use it.

Examining the problem of the survival of Punic in North Africa, Chr. Courtois believed he had perceived a certain confusion in the writings of St Augustine. According to him, Augustine would have considered as a Punic language an old Libyan patois doubtless indebted to some borrowings from the language of Carthage.

But it has been demonstrated that the bishop of Hippo knew very well what he was talking about; numerous arguments have been wisely invoked in favor of the Punic language. One must face the facts: to be understood by a Greek, one needs a Greek word, by a Latin, a Latin word, by a Punic, a Punic word.

There is not the least reason to contest the bishop of Hippo's ability to recognize the Punic language, especially when he reports that the African peasants call themselves "Canaanites" and that they say it in the Punic language: "Unde interrogati rustici nostri quid sint, Punice respondentes Chanani" (*Epistula ad Romanos incohata*, 13).

For the sixth century, we have the evidence of Procopius: "The peasants still speak Punic today." That the Punic language was still spoken in the North African countryside on the eve of the Arab conquest, must have been a factor benefiting the spread of the language of the new conqueror. Numerous contemporary historians have already emphasized that. Even today, in Maghrebian speech can be found traces of the old language of Carthage: let us cite the adjective *baaly* (dry) used for dry cultivation. There are other terms too that seem to derive from the Carthaginian legacy.⁶

In the countryside, people did not permanently abandon the use of the swing plough. On close examination of this tool, one notes that it is, so to speak, identical to that the type used by the Carthaginian peasant. Its image is confirmed on Punic stelae found at Carthage. Between the past of this prestigious metropolis and the present day Maghreb, one notes the same procedures and without doubt the same tools. We have the evidence of stelae and mosaics like those of Oudna in Tunisia and Cherchell in Algeria; we see in them the African peasant laboring to work his field with the aid of a swing plough pulled by oxen. Apuleius of Madauros described a peasant who possessed a minute field. To work it, he had at his disposal only the modest strength of his donkey. But let us listen to the African orator: "Nevertheless, avoid in future reminding people of their poverty. Not long ago, that little field at Zarath that your father had left you as your only asset, in the rainy season, you alone with a small donkey worked it in three days" (*Apology* 23).

The agriculture of Roman Africa owes, in fact, a lot to the Punic heritage. The African peasants kept the techniques and the methods of cultivation that had proved themselves well before the conquest; it was the same with the treatment of certain agricultural products. In this area the Africa of the Caesars had not broken with the Carthaginian past. It remained faithful to its achievements all the more because the Romans of the Italian peninsula had recognized the superiority of Punic knowledge and know-how. One only has to recall the prestige of Mago and his agronomical encyclopedia.

It retained many other things from its Punic past. To the Phoenicians and to Carthage, it owes construction materials, architectural techniques, structures, forms, volumes, decorative elements, and so on. We may mention the unbaked brick, the ovenbaked brick, the adobe supported by a wooden frame, the use of toothed stones for the reinforcement of walls built of rubblestone, the dwelling with a central courtyard, and more. These achievements resisted Romanization; we can recognize in them the African contribution to the

building of Roman civilization. To designate tothing-stone construction, the expression *opus Africanum* is often used. This technique is present everywhere in Roman Africa, from civil and religious monuments to simple dwellings. Let us stop in front of the beautiful Capitulum of Dougga to note in it the use of the *opus Africanum*: this technique survived beyond antiquity in Arab-Islamic cities like Tunis, Sousse, Monastir, Sfax, Bizerte, and Lemta. The builders of walls, *ribats*, and mosques, in the ninth century of the Christian era, continued to believe in the efficiency of the use of frames for rubblestone walls. The imprints of Punic civilization have been found in certain typically Roman buildings, like the amphitheater of El-Jem (ancient Thysdrus) where the builder, certainly of African origin, preferred the Punic cubit to the Roman foot.

For the construction of their temples and their dwellings, the Romans of Africa remained faithful to the old designs inherited from the Punic past, so much so that, in contemporary historiography, one speaks "of Roman African temples," when discussing sacred buildings such as the temples reserved for the worship of Saturn and Caelestis. One can observe there the memory of Carthage and of Punic religion, whose impact is perceptible in other sacred spaces in the Maghreb, like those of Apollo at Bulla Regia, Mercury at Gigthis, and Sardus Pater, heir to the Punic god Sid whose traces have been recognized at Antas in Sardinia. To their Carthaginian heritage these buildings owe one or other of their components: the courtyard, the contiguous *cellae*, the crypt, the outbuildings, or the tabernacle chapel installed in the middle of the courtyard.

As for domestic architecture, the Roman-African dwelling is related to the Punic house such as appears at Carthage and Kerkouane, with its access to the street, the corridor, or bent vestibule, the courtyard well shielded from the insolent curiosity of passers-by and its different rooms that take air and light from the patio. The Africans remained faithful, therefore, to these achievements whose advantages their ancestors had appreciated. The so-called Arab house in the Maghreb continues to reproduce the forms and volumes of the Carthaginian dwelling, whose plan had been developed in the Semitic East thousands of years before the Christian era.

To penetrate even further into the obscurity of Maghrebian daily life today, one may recall certain facts and gestures whose origins go back to very ancient times. In the countryside of the Maghreb one can still admire the entrancing movement of the distaff spinner. The most ancient image that we have of her is visible on a bronze hatchet-razor found in a tomb of the Punic necropolis of Sainte-Monique at Carthage; we again find the distaff spinner on a Tabarka mosaic, today exhibited in the Sousse Room in the Musée du Bardo.

Among other activities of the mistress of the house, there is the preparation of bread cooked in the oven which in Tunisia as in Lebanon is called *taboun* or *tabouna*. In other countries of the East like Syria where this bread-oven exists, it is called *tennour*, a name confirmed in Arabic, Hebrew, and numerous

Semitic languages; it appears as a section of a large terracotta cylinder, around 60 cm. in diameter and 80 cm. in height, provided with a side opening for ventilation. It is often fixed to the ground; the flatbreads for cooking must be stuck to its internal walls, appropriately heated beforehand. This type of oven was certainly introduced into North Africa by the Phoenicians. It has been found at Sarepta in Lebanon. Its use is likewise attested in Spain from the eighth century BC.

For Carthage, the excavations at the necropolis of Borj Jedid, carried out in 1957, allowed a terracotta group showing popular craftsmanship to be removed from a tomb, attributable to the fifth century BC. It is a scene of domestic life: the cooking of bread in the oven; we see the housewife busy sticking in or taking out a bread. Just beside her, her child seems to wait with curiosity and impatience for the exquisite round loaf that his mummy must not be slow to offer him. By putting side by side this group from Carthage, which may go back to the fifth century BC, and an image that represents the cooking of bread in the countryside of today's Tunisia, one notices a perfect equivalence: the same oven and the same action.

Evoking the survival of Punic culture after the destruction of Carthage and the end of the Carthaginian state, Jérôme Carcopino wrote:

All those Carthaginians who had survived the famine of a three-year siege, then escaped the massacre of the crowning assault, and whom the quinquiremes of Aemilianus had not carried as slaves to Italy, took refuge among the Numidians and the Mauri and reinforced in their midst the beneficent action which their rulers had carried out for so long there. As the light of a cooled star continues to shine for centuries after its extinction, Carthage, reduced to ashes, pursued from Tunisia to the Ocean its civilizing mission. (Carcopino 1953, 38)

These are but samples brought together by arbitrary selection or from personal taste, but they underline the persistence of Punic civilization, vigorous enough on its own to defy the millennia and their alluvium. For the Maghreb, the foundation of Kairouan in 670 of the Christian era, that is, fifteen centuries after the birth of Carthage, can be considered as a return to the cradle or a renewal of the link with the universe of Semites. The Arabic language seems to have found in this soil an old humus that reinforced its chances of establishing itself there and prospering.

NOTES

1. Gsell, *HAAN* 3 (Paris, 1920).
2. The expression, the *portae*, would doubtless refer to the popular meetings near the city gates where the people expressed their support or their adherence through

acclamation. Without doubt the people had to gather near the gates to make certain decisions or to express their adherence. It was an old tradition attested in the Ancient East; one finds traces of it in the Old Testament (Seston 1967).

3. Fantar 1999.
4. J.G. Février, *Journal Asiatique* (1960), 185.
5. [Spartianus], *Historia Augusta: Septimius Severus* 15.7; Monceaux, P., *Les Africains: Étude sur la littérature latine d'Afrique: les Païens* (Paris, 1894), 354.
6. Saumagne 1953, 171 sqq.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

Spain, Africa, and Rome after Carthage

John Richardson

To begin at the beginning, the Roman provinces in Spain and Africa were the product of the wars against Carthage. They are often referred to as the “spoils of war”: Spain after the Hannibalic war, and Africa, the Roman name for the territory that still remained to Carthage, roughly equivalent to modern Tunisia and the eastern part of Algeria, following the destruction of the city in 146 BC. In a sense this is obviously correct: the territory of Carthage in North Africa was taken over by the Romans and administered as a *provincia*, mostly (so far as we can tell) by praetors and propraetors for the rest of the Republican period; while the two Spanish *provinciae* of Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior were allotted to praetors, additionally elected for the purpose and probably sent out with consular *imperium*, from 197 onwards (Livy 32.27.6–28.11).

However, to regard these areas (and especially Spain) as being taken over by Rome from Carthage, in the way in which Tanganyika was ceded by Germany to the British Empire at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, is both more and less than the truth. In geographical terms, what the Romans controlled in the Iberian peninsula after the defeat of Hannibal was very much less than the whole, and the final conquest of the northeastern section was not completed until the reign of Augustus. On the other hand, it was the process of establishing their control there, along with similar but distinctively different experiences in Corsica and Sardinia and above all in Sicily (also products of the Carthaginian wars), which led the Romans to develop the structures of imperialism that marked the Roman Empire. The evidence of the two-way set of influences, of Rome on the areas she came to control and of the results of that control on Rome, is more abundant from the Spanish *provinciae* than for Africa as well as beginning earlier, but both show the effects of the defeat of Carthage on the

extent and the nature of Rome's growing power in the Mediterranean world, and the different results that this could have in different circumstances.

The Romans in Spain, 218–44 BC

The first time that Spain (Hispania) appeared as the name of a *provincia* in the allocations made annually by the Senate in Rome was in 218 BC, at the outbreak of the war with Hannibal, when it was assigned to the consul P. Cornelius Scipio (Pol. 3.40.2; Livy 21.17.1). It is clear from the accounts of both Polybius and Livy that the reason for the Senate's decision was the threat posed by Hannibal, especially given his capture of the town of Saguntum, perched on a high rock overlooking the main route from the Carthaginian base at Carthago Nova (Cartagena) up the Mediterranean coastline toward the Pyrenees. The other consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, was at the same time assigned Sicily and Africa. The intention was clearly to cut off any advance that Hannibal might be making towards the route into southern Gaul and at the same time to strike at the heartland of Carthage itself. In the event, the strategy failed, thwarted, not for the last time, by Hannibal's speed. Scipio discovered, on reaching the crossing of the Rhône River, north of Massilia (Marseilles), that Hannibal had already crossed further upstream, and decided to return to northern Italy to face the invader, while sending his brother, Cn. Scipio, on into Spain with the army. The events that followed over the next 25 years showed this last to have been a crucial decision, not only for the conduct of the war but for the continuance of a Roman presence in Spain.

For the moment, however, it is worth noticing what this allocation of *provinciae* reveals about what a *provincia* was. The two consuls were given military commands as part of the incipient war. The Senate was not, by naming Spain and Africa as *provinciae*, making a territorial claim on these areas, much less annexing them to a Roman Empire. It was assigning to the two magistrates tasks that they were to carry out, using the power (*imperium*) that they held in virtue of their election as military leaders to the consulship. The history of the *provincia* of Africa shows this clearly: after 218, it ceased to be named as a *provincia* until P. Scipio, the future Africanus and son of the consul of 218, was sent to the “new” *provincia Africa* in 205 (Livy 28.40.1); then, after 201 and the end of the Hannibalic war, it does not seem to be a *provincia* again until it is assigned to both consuls in 149 (Livy, *Per.* 49). The Senate was not showing any vacillation in its policy towards “annexation” by making these allocations, but rather was assigning commands to deal with its perception of the military need.

In the case of the Iberian peninsula, the same motives produced a different result. From 218 to 211, the *provincia* Hispania was allotted to P. Scipio, to

whom it had been assigned. His tenure of the *provincia* was renewed annually, and he led the Roman forces there with assistance from Cn. Scipio, whom he rejoined in 217 after failing to stop Hannibal's advance into Italy at the Ticinus River. They seem to have succeeded in preventing reinforcements reaching Hannibal from Spain by controlling the coastal strip from the Pyrenees down to Saguntum, which they recaptured from the Carthaginians thus confining the Carthaginian forces to the south of the peninsula. In 212 and 211 they apparently operated separately, which led to their being defeated with the loss of most of their armies.

The complete collapse of Roman aims in Spain was prevented by short-term measures, followed by the appointment of P. Scipio's son, also called P. Scipio, who was to gain fame as the eventual defeater of Hannibal. The younger Scipio was only 25 years old and had not held any office higher than that of aedile, so he had to be voted *imperium pro consule* by one of the assemblies of the Roman people to enable him to take up the command. Probably because of this anomalous appointment, the Senate provided him with a more senior colleague, M. Iunius Silanus, and their *imperium* seems to have been limited when it was renewed in 209 by an unusual condition that they should hold it until such time as the Senate should recall them (Livy 27.7.17). In the event, this appointment proved a brilliant success, leading to a series of victories against the Carthaginians in 209, 208, and 207, the only failure being the escape of Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, in 208, which allowed him to reach Italy in an attempt to bring fresh troops to aid his brother's campaign. By the time Scipio returned to Rome in 206 to be elected to the consulship, the threat to Rome from the Carthaginian presence in Spain was effectively over (Richardson 1986, 31–61).

The war, however, was not over. Hannibal was still in Italy, and if the strip of the Mediterranean coastline and the valley of the Baetis River (Guadalquivir) that had been secured by 206 were to remain under Roman control, a continuing military presence would be necessary. This was made more evident by the problems that Scipio had faced from tribal leaders who had been persuaded into alliance with the Romans but were unwilling to replace a Carthaginian presence with a Roman one. The Senate met this problem by appointing, in the years from 206 to 198, a series of men who, two at a time, held *provinciae* called Hispania, none of whom held the consulship or praetorship at the moment of their appointment but who were given, as the younger Scipio had been, the *imperium pro consule*, power equivalent to that of a consul. In effect this was the continuation of the anomaly of Scipio's own appointment, and it shows signs of having been intended as a stop-gap measure. In 201, when the first pair had been in post for five years, the Senate ordered that they return to Rome and be replaced by only one holder of *imperium pro consule* with about half the forces that his predecessors had had

(Livy 30.41.4–5). It is no coincidence that this happened in the year after the final defeat of Hannibal in Africa. This looks like the first part of a phased withdrawal from Spain, but, if so, it did not happen. Only one of the original pair returned in 201, bringing at least some of his troops with him, and there continued to be two Roman commanders and Roman forces there.

Thus far it is clear that the Roman *provincia* (or after 206 *provinciae*, one for each commander) was a military command within a battle zone, initially for the fighting of the war with the Carthaginians and subsequently to ensure stability in an area that was of strategic importance to the Senate in Rome. The strongest evidence for this is the *ad hoc* nature of provincial allocations, especially after 211. This changed in 198, when for the first time two additional praetors were elected for the following year, increasing the total number to six, a development explicitly attributed by Livy to the growth in the *provinciae* and the spreading further afield of the *imperium* (32.27.6). He is referring to Spain, as is shown by the fact that in 197 two praetors were given *provinciae* in Spain, and moreover these two men were instructed by the Senate to fix the boundaries of those *provinciae* (32.28.11).

This certainly marks a shift in policy in that it indicates that the Senate intended an ongoing presence in the peninsula. The two praetors sent out in 197 were, in fact, the first Roman commanders to be present there in their year of office, since P. Scipio, who was allocated Hispania in his consulship in 218, did not reach his *provincia* until 217. Now there were to be two *provinciae*, called Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior (Nearer and Further Spain), with annually elected magistrates available to hold them, though usually those sent were in their *provinciae* for a two-year period. In other ways, however, less had changed than might appear. The boundary between the two *provinciae*, assuming that it was fixed in accordance with the Senate's instruction, was probably a means of ensuring that the two holders of *imperium* (and the praetors in Spain continued to hold *imperium pro consule*, as their predecessors had done) did not conflict with one another. Moreover the area continued to be a war zone: of the 23 praetors and one consul who were sent to the two *provinciae* between 197 and 179, all but four are explicitly mentioned as having been involved in warfare, and indeed in almost nothing else; moreover, half of those who returned to Rome at the end of their tenure were awarded a triumph or the lesser celebration of an *ovatio* for victories gained in their *provincia* (Richardson 1986, 104–105). The fighting, reported mostly by Livy, seems to have been both continuous and sporadic, in that there is no sign of a coherent pattern of conquest, and on occasions to have borne no observable relationship to the alleged boundary between the two *provinciae*. For nearly two decades, the Spanish *provinciae* were places to which praetors and armies were sent to fight and win victories, but were scarcely settled “provinces” of a territorial empire.

The situation changed as a result of the tenure between 180 and 178 of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in Citerior and L. Postumius Albinus in Ulterior (Livy 40.47.3–10, 49.4–7; Appian, *Iber.* 43.179–44.183). The two combined to mount a more systematic campaign, particularly against the Celtiberian inhabitants of the northeastern *meseta* but perhaps also further afield, and Gracchus is credited with making “precise treaties” with the Celtiberians, that they should not form new cities, should pay defined amounts of taxation, and should serve with the Roman army. This looks like a form of agreement aimed at bringing an end to the endless warfare, and in the period between the end of Gracchus’ and Albinus’ tenure down to the end of the period covered by Livy’s surviving books in 166, only two military celebrations in Rome (one triumph and one *ovatio*) were awarded to the 12 commanders who returned from Spain. Although we lose Livy’s account after 166, the inscribed *Fasti Triumphales* from Rome show that between then and 155 not one triumph or *ovatio* was celebrated from the Spanish *provinciae*.

In the mid century, war broke out again. In the west, the seminomadic Lusitanians went into revolt in 155 and fought until tricked into surrender by the praetor of 151, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, who proceeded to massacre them. From 145, led by the remarkable and successful Viriathus, they defeated a series of praetors and consuls sent against them, until in 139 Viriathus was assassinated by three treacherous Lusitanians at the instance of Q. Servilius Caepio, the consul of 140 (Appian, *Iber.* 44.180–55.233). In Hispania Citerior, disagreements between the Roman Senate and the Celtiberian town of Segeda over the treaty arranged by Gracchus over two decades earlier led to warfare, with two consuls being sent out in 153 and 152. Though this phase of the conflict was ended early in 151, trouble broke out again in 143 when the Celtiberians, encouraged by the campaigns of Viriathus and centering their resistance on the town of Numantia in the upper Duero valley, fought successfully against a whole series of Roman consuls. It was not until P. Scipio Aemilianus, who had already destroyed the city of Carthage in 146, was elected consul in 134 and went out to command in Citerior that Rome’s fortunes improved. After a lengthy and ruthless siege, Scipio reduced the desperate Numantines and in 133 destroyed the town (Appian, *Iber.* 44.180–55.233, 76.323–99.428; Simon 1962; Richardson 1986, 126–155).

The historian Appian, writing in the second century AD, states that after the fall of Numantia the Senate sent a commission of ten to arrange a settlement of the area, and also of that fought in by D. Iunius Brutus, consul in 138, who had held Ulterior after the end of the war with Viriathus and had ventured further than any previous Roman commander into the northwest of the peninsula (Appian, *Iber.* 99.428). What this commission did is quite uncertain, but the sending of them suggests that by now, if not before, the Romans intended to remain on a permanent basis.

So far as can be told from Appian's brief account, Roman praetors, and occasionally consuls, resumed a pattern of sporadic warfare over the next half-century. T. Didius, consul in 98, held Hispania Citerior from his consulship until his return to Rome in 93 to triumph over the Celtiberians; and the consul of 97, P. Licinius Crassus, was in Ulterior until the same year, when he triumphed over the Lusitanians just three days after Didius' celebration. These were surprisingly long periods in a province, but they are relatively short compared to Didius' successor, C. Valerius Flaccus, consul in 93, who did not return to Rome until his triumph in 81. In this last case, the reason for his long tenure, and the fact that for part of it he was also responsible for the adjacent *provincia* of Transalpine Gaul, is that Rome was otherwise engaged with the Social War in Italy from 91 to 87, and by the struggle of Marius and Cinna against Sulla that followed. Although, as we shall see, this was a period in which the presence of the Romans in Spain developed notably, the main preoccupation of those who held the *provinciae* remained essentially warfare against the inhabitants of the area.

This was to change in the 80s BC. The return of Sulla from the east in 83, following his truce with Mithridates of Pontus at the Dardanus River, coincided with the departure for Hispania Citerior of Q. Sertorius, praetor in that year and a supporter of Sulla's opponent, C. Marius, who had died three years earlier. Indeed, Sertorius remained in Italy for long enough to see the beginnings of the collapse of the Marian resistance to Sulla before departing for Spain. Despite the opposition of the Sullan regime in Rome, Sertorius (with the help of some of the Roman and Italian settlers in Spain and of native inhabitants, whom he won over by treating them early in his time in the area on a par with the Romans) succeeded after initial reverses in defeating the commanders sent against him. In 79 the consul of the previous year, Q. Metellus Pius, was sent by the Senate to deal with what was by then the only remaining outpost of Marian resistance, but he was unable to get to grips with what proved to be an elusive enemy. Two years later the Senate decided to dispatch Cn. Pompeius with *imperium pro consule* to assist Metellus. Although he had been militarily successful in supporting Sulla and was already using the cognomen "Magnus" ("the Great"), Pompeius was only 28 years old and not only had not held either praetorship or consulship but was too young to have stood for election. His selection was a sign of the desperation of the Senate. Even Pompeius, however, could not defeat Sertorius, and was himself worsted in battle at Lauro, just south of Saguntum. Eventually Sertorius was brought to battle against the combined forces of the two Roman generals and defeated, after which he seems to have adopted low-level guerrilla tactics, which persisted until in 72 he was assassinated by his second-in-command, M. Perperna, at a banquet at his headquarters at Osca (modern Huesca, in the province of Aragon: Plutarch, *Sertorius*; Appian, *BC* 1.108.505–115.538).

As Appian himself notes (*Iber.* 10.438), the significance of Sertorius was not just that he was a remarkable leader who mobilized support from both local and Roman inhabitants, but that this war was a watershed in the history of the Romans in the peninsula. For the first time Roman forces were not deployed simply against Spaniards (though, as the second-century historian Florus observed ruefully, it was they who suffered from the war of attrition in the latter stages (Florus 2.10.8)). Now, and for the decades that followed to the end of the Republic, Romans were fighting other Romans there. It is true that there were other military operations. When Pompeius received his immense command in 67 against the pirates throughout the Mediterranean, two of the fifteen *legati pro praetore* who were his subordinates were based in Spanish territory, one at Gades (Cadiz) and one in the Balearic Islands (Appian, *Mith.* 95.434; Florus 1.41.9); and when Julius Caesar was sent to Hispania Ulterior after his praetorship in 62, he had to deal with Lusitanian raids into the Baetis valley, from which he hoped to gain a triumph (Livy, *Per.* 103; Plutarch, *Caesar* 12; Dio 37.52–53); and Q. Metellus Nepos, consul in 57, faced a rising of the Vaccaei in the central *meseta* when in Hispania Citerior in 56 and 55 (Dio 39.54.1–2).

These last two sound like the sort of military activity that praetors and consuls had been involved with in the Spanish provinces for the past century and a half. In 55, however, Pompeius, consul for the second time in that year, was given command over the whole of Spain for five years by a special law (the *lex Trebonia*), which also assigned Syria to his fellow consul, M. Licinius Crassus, for the same period. Pompeius was to control the area not in person, but through *legati*, as he had done in his command against the pirates in 67. In this case, however, there was no great task to undertake. The need that was met by the *lex Trebonia* was the provision for Pompeius and Crassus of forces comparable to those that Julius Caesar had in Gaul, Caesar's command being extended for five years by a law passed by the two consuls in the same year.

The death of Crassus at Carrhae in 53, fighting ineffectively against the Parthians, removed one third of this arrangement, and as relations between Caesar and Pompeius deteriorated over the next years the armies commanded by the three *legati* that Pompeius had sent to Spain were obviously crucial. Indeed when, after Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon River in January of 49, Pompeius left for Greece, Caesar proceeded to Hispania Citerior, where he succeeded in forcing two of the Pompeian *legati* to surrender to him after isolating them and their forces in a waterless area south of Ilerda (modern Lleida) in the mountains of Catalunya. Caesar believed that the major threat from the Iberian peninsula lay in Citerior, since he reckoned that Pompeius' influence was much stronger there, as that had been the center of the latter's campaign against Sertorius 25 years before; but he also moved in force against the third *legatus*, M. Terentius Varro in Ulterior, exacting allegiance from the

local communities. Varro also capitulated, and Caesar returned to Rome to prepare to pursue Pompeius across the Adriatic the following year.

It was, however, in Ulterior that trouble broke out again. After some crass misgovernment by Q. Cassius Longinus, the man left in charge of the province by Caesar, and the arrival there in 48 of two sons of the now dead Pompeius, Hispania Ulterior became the center of resistance by the Pompeians. Late in 46 Caesar decided to return to Spain, and by March of 45 had brought the Pompeian forces to battle at Munda. His victory there effectively ended the struggle (Richardson 1996, 104–116).

It will be clear from this brief account that the basic function of those sent with *imperium* to the Spanish provinces was to fight, though the warfare involved varied in intensity and in its objects. From 218 to 206, the enemy was the Carthaginians and the fighting continuous; from then for some 30 years military activity continued without pause, but the enemy consisted of a series of indigenous communities. After the mid 170s such fighting became more occasional, with a notable intensification in the Celtiberian and Lusitanian wars from 155 to 133, but lasted almost to the end of the Republic. By that time more serious warfare was taking place on Spanish soil between Romans, the Sertorian war and those between Caesarians and Pompeians being parts of the civil strife that racked the Roman Republic in the last century BC. These changes mark the development of the Roman presence in Spain from its origins in the war against Hannibal, through the sporadic but inevitable extension of Roman control over those in the peninsula who opposed their power, to an at least partial incorporation into the life (and internal struggles) of the Roman people. It was against this background that the structures and methods of what was to become the Roman Empire were first worked out.

The responsibilities of a magistrate or promagistrate sent to an overseas *provincia* in the second and early first centuries BC might be summarized as war, law, and taxes. The first, as we have seen, was fundamental and, in the case of the Spanish *provinciae*, present from the beginning and remained so. The continuous fighting led gradually to the extension of Roman control from the Mediterranean coastline and the Baetis valley, which were the result of the Hannibalic war, to an area that included in Ulterior the land north to the Anas River (Guadiana) and in Citerior the valley of the Ebro River and much of the central *meseta* by the fall of Numantia in 133, and the whole of the peninsula except the northwestern corner by the end of the Republic.

It is important to note too the extent to which the military basis of the *imperium*-holders' work shaped the development of taxation. The first expedition, under the command of the Scipio brothers, seems to have been funded mainly from Rome, but even then a letter from the Scipios to the Senate in 215 stated (if Livy is to be believed) that, although desperate for supplies, they could find money to pay the soldiers' wages from the Spaniards if necessary

(Livy 23.48.5). The younger Scipio is recorded as levying from unwilling allies a *stipendium* to pay his troops at the end of his time in Spain (Livy 28.25.9–10, 29.12, 34.11). The word *stipendium* is significant in that, although it came to be used for taxation in the provinces generally, it originally meant the pay given to soldiers.

Thereafter, although the consul M. Porcius Cato, who was in Spain in 195, is said to have extracted income from the iron and silver mines in his province (Livy 34.29.7), there is no sign of organized taxation until the agreements made by Ti. Gracchus in 178 (Appian, *Iber.* 44.182; Richardson 1986, 116–118). Taxes seem not only to have depended on Rome's control of the region but in origin at least to have been raised to pay for it. By the mid second century, however, the inhabitants of the two provinces seem not only to have paid a 5% tax on grain, perhaps the result of Gracchus' settlement (Livy 43.2.12), but also to have provided a huge amount (Polybius says 25,000 *drachmae* per day) to the Roman treasury from the silver mines near Carthago Nova (Polybius 34.9.8). The minting by some indigenous communities of a silver coinage with inscriptions in the Iberian alphabet on the Roman *denarius* weight-standard, probably about the middle of the second century, also indicates the institution of organized taxation by the Romans (Crawford 1985, 84–102).

The development of jurisdiction by those sent to the Spanish *provinciae* also depended on the military character of their role. An inscription, set up by L. Aemilius Paullus, who had been sent as praetor to Hispania Ulterior in 191, records his edict that the slaves of the people of Hasta who lived at Turrus Lascutana (modern Alcalá de los Gazules) should be free and should hold and possess the land they had previously possessed for such time as the people and Senate of Rome should agree (*ILLRP* 514). This document uses Roman legal terms in a non-Roman context to record Paullus' decision; the historical context is unknown, but almost certainly is connected to the aftermath of a military action, or at least to an appeal to Paullus as the representative of the Romans as the power in the land.

By the end of the second Century and the beginning of the first there is evidence that more formal juridical processes were in place. An anecdote that Cicero tells of the praetor in Hispania Ulterior in about 113, L. Capurnius Piso Frugi, suggests that he was accustomed to dispense justice in the forum at Corduba (Cicero, 2 *Verr.* 4.56). Corduba was the administrative center of the *provincia* and, if Piso did hold regular hearings there, they are likely to have involved Roman citizens; but the story does suggest that already by this time such jurisdiction was a normal part of the *imperium*-holder's function. Another inscription, dated to 87 BC, shows another side of this work (Fatás 1980; Birks, Rodger, and Richardson 1985). The proconsul, C. Valerius Flaccus, issued a formulaic basis for judgment between two local communities in the Ebro valley on the matter of rights over a water-course, which was decided by the "senate"

of another community, acting as judges. The structure of the formula is purely Roman (and Flaccus had been *praetor urbanus* in or before 96) but the substantive law on which it was based is local, not the civil law of the Roman courts. Moreover Flaccus was not only a lawyer; he also (according to Appian) killed twenty thousand Celtiberians and burnt down the council house of the neighboring city of Belgeda with all the councillors in it when they hesitated to support the Romans (Appian, *Iber.* 100.436–7). His varied career in Spain shows both the way in which Roman legal practice spread within the *provinciae* and the military force on which the recognition of Roman law was based. In the late Republic, several magistrates and promagistrates in Hispania Ulterior are mentioned as having spent time on juridical duties (Caesar as *quaestor* in 68 (Suetonius, *Div. Iul.* 7); Varro in 49 (Caesar, *BCiv.* 2.18.5); Q. Cassius in 48 (*BAlex.* 49); and, by the reign of Tiberius, the governor (*legatus Augusti*) of Citerior spent much of his year in this way (Strabo 3.4.20).

The commanders sent to Spain were also in part responsible for the spread of urbanism in the last two centuries BC and thereafter (Cunliffe and Keay 1995). There were already cities in those areas that had been colonized by the Greeks and the Carthaginians before the Romans arrived, and some of these (especially Carthaginian cities such as Gades and Carthago Nova (Cartagena)) were important to the Romans, as were some settlements built by indigenous peoples. Tarraco (modern Tarragona) was fortified as a base by the Scipio brothers in the third century, and their walls can still be seen, with some pre-Roman work in the foundations (Keay 1988. 27–8).

Throughout the period we have been describing, Roman commanders founded towns in the two provinces, beginning with the younger P. Scipio, who (according to Appian) set up in 206 a settlement of wounded soldiers at Italica (modern Santiponce, north of Seville), which was, some two and a half centuries later, to be the place of origin of two Roman emperors, Trajan and Hadrian (Appian, *Iber.* 38.153). In 171 the Senate at Rome responded to a petition from the offspring of Roman soldiers and local women by setting up a colony at Carteia, just west of Gibraltar (Livy 43.3.1–4). Most of the settlements mentioned in the ancient sources were intended, however, for local peoples rather than Romans or Italians, such as Gracchuris (modern Alfaro, in the upper Ebro Valley), established by Ti. Gracchus in the early 170s (Livy, *Per.* 41) and Pompaelo (Pamplona), set up by Pompeius Magnus in the course of the Sertorian war (Strabo 3.4.10). At Valentia (modern Valencia), D. Iunius Brutus is even said to have settled Lusitanian soldiers who had fought under Viriathus, probably alongside retired soldiers of his own (Livy, *Per.* 55). With the exception of Carteia and perhaps Valentia (which seems to have been a *colonia* of some kind before 60 (*ILLRP* 385)), few if any of the towns and cities in Spain seem to have had any formal recognition before Julius Caesar granted the titles of *colonia* and *municipium* to a considerable number at the

end of the war against the Pompeians (for a brief summary, see Richardson 1996, 120–126), and even Corduba (perhaps founded by M. Claudius Marcellus in 152: Polybius 35.2.2; Strabo 3.2.1) was not a Roman *colonia* at the end of the Republic.

However, by the first century BC many towns, though they had no formal status in Roman terms, were already adopting Roman-style buildings: Contrebia and Azaila in the Ebro valley each had classical Greco-Roman buildings by the time they were destroyed, probably during Caesar's campaigns in 49, the latter possessing baths and a temple of this type; and there is mention in the literary sources of a forum and porticoes at Hispalis (modern Seville: Caesar, *BCiv.* 2.20.4) and a basilica at Corduba (*BAlex.* 52) in the 40s. Even by the late second century BC sanctuaries near Albacete on the southern edge of the *meseta* and in the mountains of the province of Murcia had buildings that reflected the Roman and Italian styles, including in the latter case terracotta decorations that had been imported from Italy (Richardson 1996, 92–93).

This appropriation of the trappings of a Roman lifestyle was no doubt the result not only of an inevitable tendency to adopt the patterns of the military power that controlled the area but also of the presence of Romans and Italians in the peninsula in increasing numbers. Roman troops were there, of course, and, as we have seen, some were settled there at the end of campaigns, but we hear also of civilian settlements at Palma and Pollentia on Majorca in 123, when the consul Q. Metellus is said to have placed there 3,000 Romans, drawn from Spain for the purpose (Livy, *Per.* 60); and perhaps the most striking evidence comes from the Greek colony of Emporiae (modern Empúries, in Catalunya), where by the end of the second century a Roman military base was replaced by a town in the Roman style, with a forum, a large temple, and porticoes. Just south of Emporiae, on the Catalan coast around Badalona and Barcelona, there are the remains of a considerable number of rural villas, large farms dating from the late second and early first centuries (Richardson 1996, 90–91).

By the time that the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 marked the end (or the beginning of the end) of the Roman Republic, the presence of Romans in the peninsula and the part they played in the life of the region had increased observably from the position in the second century. Despite the damage done to towns and to the countryside by the ravages of the Sertorian war and by the campaigns of Caesar and his adversaries in the previous half-century, both Romans and Romanized Spaniards are found in greater numbers than before. Some are indigenous people to whom Roman citizenship has been granted, such as the squadron of cavalry from Hispania Citerior in 89 whom Cn. Pompeius Strabo made citizens for service with him during the Social War in Italy (*ILLRP* 515), or L. Cornelius Balbus from Gades (Cadiz), who acquired citizenship from Strabo's son, Cn. Pompeius Magnus, during the Sertorian war (Cicero, *pro Balbo*; Velleius 2.51).

Others are Romans and Italians who were born in Spain: the Pompeian army in Hispania Ulterior in 49 included a legion made up of such men, and another whose loyalty was to the province in which they had lived for so long (*BAlex.* 53.5). There are other stories that reflect a level of Roman culture in the two *provinciae*: Cicero recounts Q. Metellus Pius in Corduba during the war with Sertorius listening to local poets singing his praises in rich and foreign tones (Cicero, *pro Archia* 26). The Roman *coloniae*, which Caesar, partly as a reward and partly as a means of control, instituted in cities in both Citerior and Ulterior were placed in areas which were already beginning to become “Roman” in a sense very different from that of the battle zones of the early second century.

The Romans in Africa, 146–44 BC

Theodor Mommsen wrote that under the Republic the province of Africa had no history (Mommsen 1885, 632). While that may be too severe a judgment, it is true that less is known of Roman activity in the territory of their former adversary, Carthage, than in the Iberian peninsula. This is not because the area was not important to Rome: as a source of grain to the ever-expanding population of the city, Africa is listed alongside Sicily and Sardinia by Cicero, speaking in 66 BC (Cicero, *Leg. Man.* 34) and again with Sardinia by Varro, writing in the 30s (Varro, *Rust. 2 praef.* 3); and Caesar mentions some 200 merchant ships in the harbor of Utica in 49 (*BCiv.* 2.25.6). It was, however, as an area of fertile land and as the former site of her greatest enemy that Africa mattered most to the Romans in the century between the final defeat of Carthage and the death of Julius Caesar, and this resulted in a very different pattern of development from that we have seen in the Spanish *provinciae*.

The historian Velleius Paterculus, whose work was completed in AD 30, wrote that, although Regulus had first invaded Africa in the ninth year of the first Punic War, it was 109 years later that Scipio Aemilianus, after the overthrow of Carthage, brought it into the *formula* of a province (Velleius 2.38.2). It is clear from this remark that for Velleius *provincia* meant not an area of military responsibility, as it had in the third and second centuries BC, but an area subjected to Roman control and norms of organization. The little that we know of the settlement made by Scipio Aemilianus after the capture of Carthage in 146 indicates that the board of ten commissioners, chosen by the Senate and perhaps appointed by a *lex Livia*, mentioned in an agrarian law of 111 BC which includes a section on land in Africa (Crawford (1996) no. 2, lines 77–8), oversaw the destruction of the city of Carthage and of those cities that had been closely allied to it, declared that those cities that had supported the Romans should be free, and imposed taxes on the land and persons of all

those (both male and female) who were not within the free cities (Appian, *Lib.* 135.639–41). This sounds more like a punishment of Carthage than the establishment of a provincial administration of the type Velleius was familiar with, and this is confirmed by the granting of the territories of the cities that were destroyed to those which had aided Rome, most notably Utica. From this time on, Appian adds, a praetor was sent every year to Africa, and we know from other evidence that he was based in Utica.

It was also because Africa was seen as source of available land that C. Gracchus, the tribune of the plebs in 123 and 122, arranged for one of the colonies that he proposed for the settling of the Roman poor to be on the site of Carthage, which was to be called Junonia (Plutarch, *C. Gracchus* 10–11; Appian, *Lib.* 136.644–5). The colony, which was to have (so Appian tells us) 6,000 participants, was never established, following reports of dire omens when Gracchus went out as one of the commissioners to set it up and the *lex Rubria* (proposed in the name of one of Gracchus' colleagues as tribune) was repealed amidst street-fighting in 121, in the course of which Gracchus himself was killed. Epigraphic evidence shows, however, that the work of land commissioners continued after the repeal of the law (*ILLRP* 475) and allocations under it were confirmed by the agrarian law of 111 (Crawford 1996, no. 2, lines 58–62). A large area of centuriated land in what is now eastern Tunisia was probably associated with the land allotted by the commissioners and perhaps even before the *lex Rubria*. Unlike Spain, however, Africa shows no sign of increased urbanization in the late second and early first centuries, and it is likely that the owners of these allotted sections lived in the remaining “free” cities.

By the time the agrarian law of 111 was passed, Rome was again becoming involved in warfare in north Africa, not with Carthaginians but with Jugurtha, who had usurped the kingdom of Numidia that bordered the province to the west, overthrowing and killing his two cousins in 116 and 112. Political maneuverings in Rome and a prolonged war in Numidia led to Jugurtha's defeat by C. Marius in 105 and his capture by L. Cornelius Sulla, the future dictator, who was serving on Marius' staff. Marius is said by a late source (*de Vir. Ill.* 73) to have settled veterans in Africa under a law proposed by the tribune of the plebs, L. Appuleius Saturninus, but the only one for which there is any clear evidence is on the island of Cercina (*Inscr. It.* 13.3 no. 7; see Brunt 1971, 577–580). He did, however, settle some local Gaetulian cavalry in Numidia, the descendants of whom (by then mostly Roman citizens) provided welcome support to Julius Caesar during his African campaign in 46 (*BAfr.* 35.4, 56.3). There were also Italian traders in Numidia before the war with Jugurtha. Sallust mentions their presence in Cirta in 112, when they attempted to defend the city against Jugurtha on behalf of his half-brother, Adherbal (Sallust, *BJ* 21.2, 26.1–3); and Jugurtha's slaughter of these men

when he captured Cirta was one of the reasons for the Senate's decision to declare war against him.

During the civil wars that saw the establishment of Sulla as dictator in Rome, we hear of a Marian governor, C. Fabius Hadrianus, who was burned to death in his own house in Utica by Roman citizens in 82 on account of his greed (Cicero, *2 Verr.* 1.70; Diod. Sic. 38/39.11; Livy, *Per.* 86; Val. Max. 9.10.2). The following year, Pompeius, aged only 24, routed the Marian general, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, in a lightning campaign of 40 days (Plutarch, *Pompeius* 12–13). After this, apart from reports that L. Sergius Catilina, Cicero's adversary in 63, was accused of extortion by an embassy from Africa during his time as *propraetor* there from 67 to 66 (Asconius, *in Toga Candida* 85C), little is known of the province until Caesar set out from Rome in December 47 to fight against the Pompeians who had, with the assistance of King Juba of Numidia, assembled a large army there. After a difficult campaign, Caesar defeated the Pompeian forces at the battle of Thapsus in February 46 and proceeded to take the city of Utica, though he failed to prevent the suicide of M. Porcius Cato, who became as a result the ideological hero of Republican resistance. The war in Africa, however, was over, though the escape of Pompeius' two sons to Spain meant that the Pompeians were not yet defeated.

As with the Spanish provinces, the accounts of Caesar's campaigns in Africa shed light on the situation there at the time. In comparison to Spain, Africa seems less Roman in many ways. Although Cato had a council of 300 Romans whom he consulted in Utica, these are described as businessmen, trading and dealing in loans in Africa, who were heavily fined by Caesar after the capture of the city (Plutarch, *Cato Minor* 59.3; *BAfr.* 90); and there were also communities (*conventus*) of Romans in some coastal cities, such as Thapsus and Hadrumetum (*BAfr.* 97.2). The Romans in Utica are reported as favoring Caesar over Cato because they had benefited from the *lex Iulia*, probably the law *de repetundis* which controlled the actions of provincial governors (*BAfr.* 87.3). There is, however, much less evidence of the Roman presence than in the Iberian peninsula, and of the adoption of Roman ways by the local inhabitants. Although there was a large number of urban settlements, both towns and villages, which had their origins in the period of Carthaginian power and continued to flourish through the second century BC, there is little sign of the adoption of Roman styles, of the sort that can be seen in Spain, until the end of the first century AD (Mattingly and Hitchner 1995, 183–187).

As in Spain, Caesar made significant changes, though again of a different type. He seems to have set up colonies for veteran soldiers, which also included some civilians who may have been drawn from the urban poor: at Curubis on the coast a freedman held a local magistracy before Caesar's death (*CIL* 1².788). There are not many such colonies, however, and, apart from a plan to found a large new city on the site of Carthage (paralleled by a similar plan for Corinth,

also destroyed and abandoned in 146 BC), which was probably only completed in the reign of Augustus (Appian, *Lib.* 136.645–647; Brunt 1971, 593), none appears to be on a large scale. At the end of the war with the Pompeians, Caesar imposed fines on coastal cities that had supported his enemies, including an annual tax of a million liters of oil on Lepcis on the east coast of the province. He also seized the kingdom of Numidia, whose king Juba had supported the Pompeians, and turned it into an additional province, called *Africa Nova* (New Africa), of which the historian Sallust was the first proconsular governor; the province of Africa became known as *Africa Vetus* (Old Africa; *BAfr.* 97.1; Pliny, *HN* 5.25; Dio 43.9.4–5). A substantial portion of land round the city of Cirta was given to a Roman adventurer named P. Sittius, who had raised forces to aid Caesar in Numidia; on this he settled the soldiers he had led. He was killed in 44 in the chaos which followed the murder of Caesar, but the colony founded at Cirta was called *Cirta Sittianorum* by Pomponius Mela and by Pliny in the 1st Century AD (Appian, *BC* 4.7.54; Mela 1.30; Pliny, *HN* 5.22).

The four *provinciae* of Hispania Citerior, Hispania Ulterior, Africa Vetus, and Africa Nova were all the results of the long series of wars with Carthage and of Rome's victory. The differences between them in their development through the second Century and down to the death of Caesar in 44 are as striking as this initial similarity. The Spanish provinces began as commands against the Carthaginians, became a battleground against indigenous inhabitants to secure Roman control in the peninsula, and developed into increasingly Roman areas of the empire. Africa, by contrast, while also being an area that the Romans felt they needed to control, was by its very existence a punishment to a former enemy and its supporters, and a source of grain and of land for the *populus Romanus*; and this continued with the establishment of Africa Nova by Julius Caesar at the very end of our period. These differences illustrate the variation of outcomes that might result from the sending of magistrates and promagistrates to overseas *provinciae*: in both the Spanish provinces and in *provincia Africa*, the mechanisms for the appointment of such men and their responsibilities for military control, taxation and (where applicable) jurisdiction were the same, but the patterns of development were quite distinct. Those differences originated in the Carthaginian wars, and shaped the two areas down to the end of the Republic.

FURTHER READING

For the history of the Roman presence in Spain, there are several general accounts, notably Richardson 1996 and L.A. Curchin, *Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation* (London and New York, 1991). For a more detailed analysis of the earlier period,

see Richardson 1986. A good survey of the archaeology may be found in S.J. Keay, *Roman Spain* (London, 1988). The volume of essays edited by L. Abad Casal, S. Keay, and S. Ramallo Asensio, *Early Roman Towns in Hispania Tarraconensis* (*Journal of Roman Archaeology*, Supplementary Series no. 62, 2006) provides a useful collection of articles on urbanism in Hispania Citerior.

For Africa there are fewer general surveys than for Spain. Susan Raven, *Rome in Africa* (3rd edn., London and New York, 1993) covers the history of the area in a brisk and readable fashion from the Carthaginian period down to the late Roman Empire. Peter Garnsey, in an important article, surveys the motivations and methods of Roman imperial control under the early imperial period (“Rome’s African empire under the Principate”, in P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1978)). A useful survey article by David J. Mattingly and R. Bruce Hitchner, “Roman Africa: an archaeological review” *JRS* 85 (1995), 165–213, brings together the important work, particularly in archaeology, in the quarter century after 1970.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Carthage and Hannibal in Roman and Greek Memory

Giovanni Brizzi

I feel it necessary from the very beginning to limit the scope of this exposition. Accordingly, I will exclude the earliest period — that of the contacts, often conflicts, between Carthage and the Greek world and that of a long friendship with Rome — as well as the more recent phase that precedes the final war between the two cities. In addition, I will limit myself to the Barcid period, that is the period between 241 and 183 BC, and discuss only Hannibal, Carthage, and the image that the city and its general left in the memory of the Greeks and above all of the Romans. Without these limits the subject, already wide, would be unmanageable.

In order to define it even more clearly, it would perhaps be opportune to start with the most famous description of the Punic warrior left to us from antiquity, by Livy at the start of Book 21 (4.9; cf. 23.9.5) in the list of famous *vitia* that the author identifies in Hannibal: “inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullum deum metus, nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio.”

Crudelitas and *perfidia* are the first two *crimina*, the first two accusations that motivate the rest of the description and that, in the last part of the text, justify Livy’s reproach contained in the claim of the total *impietas* of the Carthaginian. According to a famous passage in Cicero (*Off.* 1.41), for a Roman there are two ways of committing *iniuria*, where right is violated: *aut vi aut fraude*, either with violence or with fraud. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the *inhumana crudelitas* and the *perfidia plus quam Punica* attributed by Livy to his character conform perfectly and in the extreme with these two forms of behavior and essentially overlie them. It is, therefore, the moral choices of Hannibal that make him an irreligious person beyond redemption.

One must admit it: from their point of view, the Romans were not completely wrong. As far as *crudelitas* was concerned, the evidence that all historiography presents is explicit and is absolutely uniform. Therefore, unless one completely dismisses all the accounts, it is difficult to refute an accusation that appears not only to be objective, but also substantially legitimate as it stands. Naturally, numerous sources — Silius Italicus and Valerius Maximus (e.g. 9.2 *ext.* 2; 6 *ext.* 6), Cicero (*Amic.* 28; *Senect.* 75), Horace (*Od.* 2.12.2; 3.6.36; 4.4.42), Pliny the Elder (*HN* 8.18) as well as Livy himself (among the many passages: 21.57.13–14; 22.3.4 and 9; 23.5.11–12; 24.35.14; 24.45; 26.9; 27.1.3; 30.20.5–6 etc.) — are late and influenced by a solid annalistic tradition or are obviously too pro-Roman, and tend to exaggerate, even grotesquely at times, the crimes of Hannibal and the Carthaginians in general.

However, the range of witnesses is enormous. So, as far as Hannibal is concerned, we have no reason to reject, for example, the statements made by Diodorus Siculus (26.14.2; 27.18.2) or Strabo (5.1, C256), and quite credible too are voices such as Appian (*Lib.* 33.140–3; 39.164; 63.278–81; *Hann.* 4.14; 28.121–2; 31.130–2; 12.49; 14.59–60; *Syr.* 10.38–42) whose ties to the world of Italy are well known, above all those such as Dio Cassius (15.30; cf. Zon. 8.25, 26; 9.2, 3, 6 and 7). Having lived under the African dynasty of the Severi (the founder of which, we should not forget, built the monumental tomb to Hannibal in Asia) and as the author of the best portrait of the Barcid to reach us (fr. 54, 1–11), it is difficult to accuse this Bithynian historian of partiality. Despite the fact that the atrocities committed by Hannibal were never gratuitous, despite the fact that many of the episodes described should be attributed to the “barbaric” nature of his troops and the excesses of his officers and seem almost justifiable by the necessities of war, there would appear to be no doubt that, in the course of the Italian campaign, Hannibal tolerated, confirmed, ordered, or even committed in person numerous atrocities.

The conclusions we can draw regarding his *perfidia* and the alleged refusal to recognize any rules on his part, are a different matter. In this case the accusations made express only one point of view, the Roman one, and derive in reality from two contrasting interpretations of *ius belli*. As has been mentioned, the theme of Phoenician (and therefore also Carthaginian) treachery is a very old one, and is one that is deeply rooted in the Greek world, where it even became a proverb.¹ Yet I believe that, in Rome, the *topos* of *perfidia Punica* had its basis in their experience with Hannibal and only later was it extended to include the entire people of Carthage. I also believe that the accusation drew its inspiration from one of the most characteristic motivations of Hellenic culture, that of *metis*.

In fact, Greek culture was deeply implanted in Hannibal. He was a pupil of Sosylus, a Greek or more precisely a Spartan. In Sparta at the end of the fifth century, Lysander, the conqueror of Athens, gave an ironic reply — Plutarch

(*Lys.* 7) reports it — to the right-minded people who openly condemned his victories because they resulted from trickery and lying, in a word, from the unscrupulous use of stratagems wholly unworthy of Lacedaemonians, descendants of Heracles: that the skin of the Nemean lion, the obvious symbol of *arete*, valor in battle, did not protect the entire body of the hero, and therefore was not enough in war. What the lionskin left uncovered had to be patched with the skin of a fox — clearly the emblem of *metis*, cunning of every kind, which had in Odysseus its earthly hero and in Athene its divine symbol.

If, again according to Plutarch, during the Peloponnesian War Spartan practice showed itself ready to accept as part of military intelligence not only *peitho*, persuasion, but also *apate*, cunning, during the Hellenistic period any scruples in this regard had been decisively banished. There is a famous saying of Antigonus Gonatas who, when asked how should one behave in war, replied, combining two distinct lines from Homer, by using any means that could be useful, that is, that one could use trickery as well as force, that the enemy could be attacked openly or in an underhand way (Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 4.13.46, ed. Wachsmuth). It is possible that Hannibal knew of Gonatas' phrase; that his teacher Sosylus of Sparta would have told him of the aphorism of his fellow citizen Lysander is extremely probable. One should look therefore in the teachings of Sosylus for the presuppositions of his insidious malice.

For the Romans this represented *perfidia* — or rather *Punica fraus* — but for the Carthaginian, as for the contemporary Greek world, it was no more than a convenient and at times praiseworthy use of *metis*. Roman ethics, however, were different even at the time of the second war against Carthage. It was not by chance that the metaphor chosen by Cicero in the passage cited above (*Off.* 1.41) should stress images and values used by Lysander in Plutarch's aphorism, negatively and spectacularly reversing them: if it is true that “*fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur*” and that “*utrumque*,” each of these forms of behavior, is “*homine alienissimum*,” nevertheless — remarks Cicero — *fraus* is “*odio digna maiore*.” Similarly opposed, for a long time, was the Romans' attitude. Used to define the constant and unscrupulous recourse to fraud, to deceit, to expediency, in other words to *strategema* in any form, military or political, the term *perfidia* underlined the very negation of *fides*: the denial, that is, of an unrenounceable value dear to every Roman worthy of the name at the end of the third century BC, in peace as in war; and conduct that involved any such moral shortcut could only appear to the *res publica* as an unpardonable sin. Only at that time, after the ambush at Trasimene, did the Romans introduce the cult of Mens (which we should remember has the same root as *mentiri* and of *mendacium*), a deified abstraction that is a kind of diminished Roman principle of *Metis*. As has been stated, in my opinion it undoubtedly represents “the antidote to be applied to *fides* to resist the wiles of Hannibal.”

The *crimina* of which the Carthaginian is accused represent, therefore, on one side the basis of the accusation made immediately after by Livy of his *impietas*; and on the other, together with this, they fuel the legend that surrounds Hannibal, which can only be a “leggenda nera” or black legend. As far as the inner religiosity, so to speak, of Hannibal is concerned, if it is true that the already mentioned condemnation by Livy at the start of Book 21 — “nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio” — necessarily represents a purely Roman point of view and is vitiated therefore by undeniable malevolence, no less distorting all the same seems the claim put forward by some modern scholars who see the Carthaginian, at all costs, as a *homo religiosus* who respected all things sacred, regardless of where they came from. During his campaign in Italy, in fact, in every formal act Hannibal constantly conformed his own conduct to the precepts of his native religion alone. Accordingly, the violations and the acts of impiety attributed to him by the sources — I am thinking here in particular of the devastation of sanctuaries such as Pietrabbondante or of Lucus Feroniae, confirmed by archaeological data — cannot always be considered to be simply malicious inventions by the Roman historians.

As far as his personal attitude is concerned, it seems to me that one can add a few considerations. Despite the fact that, as Jérôme Carcopino once said, Hannibal as a child breathed in deeply the atmosphere of Carthage and so must have been influenced by the strong fervor that in his time still defined many elements of the city, as far as his attitude towards his own religion is concerned, I believe that Hannibal, although initiated into many priestly secrets, particularly divinatory ones, was a man who, as has been said, made use without too many scruples of “religious means for secular ends.”³

To show how deep and intimate his bond with his religion was, the events of his entire life, which are invariably invoked every time and are necessarily always the same, are in my view not sufficient; nor is the tie that long bound him to Heracles-Melqart.

Naturally, it is necessary to explain first of all the consistency and nature of several particular gestures, such as the aforementioned violence wrought at Lucus Feroniae, or the sacrifice made before the clash at the Ticinus (Livy 21.45.8). I have dealt extensively elsewhere with the reasons for the first of these; and I will not go into them again here. As far as the second is concerned, although some consider it genuine, it has been viewed — and rightly so — with deep suspicion by others, because it closely recalls the impeccably Roman ceremony of Iuppiter Lapis. The Punic components are contaminated in it and virtually buried beneath the numerous elements specific to the fetial rite. It seems correct to consider the antiques hybrid ceremony described by Livy as “an invention of Coelius Antipater or a blend of second-rate annalists.”⁴ This casts grave doubts also on the origins of the speech made by

Hannibal on the same occasion, which is an integral part of it. In fact, to credit the *perfidus par excellence* with celebration of a rite that directly recalls the genetic value of *fides*, seems to be a parody on Livy's part, perhaps involuntary but certainly grotesque.

That said, all the other cases mentioned — the pilgrimage to Gades (Livy 21.21.9; Sil. *Pun.* 3.14–16); the *horkos*, the oath sworn on the occasion of the treaty with Philip V (Pol. 7.9); the prayers for the army made on numerous occasions (e.g. Livy 21.21.6, 45.8; Pol. 3.44.13, 111.10; 15.19.8) or the rites performed at the temple of Hera Lacinia (Pol. 3.56.4; Livy 27.46.16; Cic. *Div.* 1.24.48) — obeyed, in my view, the necessity of respecting diplomatic forms or of matching the requirements of propaganda, of imposing charisma and willingness on heterogeneous armies that were not always easy to control, or of paying a formal homage to the beliefs of his men. They do not imply in any way a personal involvement on his part.

To those who speak of Hannibal as having “une religion personnelle distincte de celle de sa patrie”⁵ and imbued with Hellenistic elements, the answer often has been that Hannibal's religion was, in reality, the religion of Carthage, which, however, was at times prepared to accept Hellenistic ideas. This could well be true, at least partially, but a similar process led, as an inevitable consequence, to a creeping secularization similar to that which took place in the Hellenic world. However, this secularization, while still keeping intact the forms of the national religion, tended among certain Carthaginians (and in particular, I believe, Hannibal's family) to empty them of any real content.

Apart from a few particular instances, such as the keeping of the promise made to his father before he left for Spain (Pol. 3.11.5ff.; Livy 35.19.3; Nep., *Hann.* 1.3; cf. *Hann.* 2.3–5; *Hamil.* 4.3; Sil., *Pun.* 1.81ff.; Val. Max. 1.3 ext. 3), we know virtually nothing of his inner reactions. But when in Hannibal's case one wishes to speak of any religious sense, it had necessarily to be completely different in him than in the Greeks, but above all, than in the Romans, made up as it was of personal values rather than of exterior formalities. Above all, because of the very nature of Semitic spirituality, it would have been unaware of the naturalistic projections so dear to the myths of the classical world he confronted.

In my opinion, the fact remains that Hannibal made absolutely practical use of religious formalities. In his sometimes open rationality (remember the scorn he showed for the auspices that Prusias intended to draw from a sacrificial victim: Val. Max. 3.7 ext. 6; cf Dio, frg. 52.5; Plutarch, *de Exilio* 5) with which he seems to have constantly filtered traditional notions whatever form they took, it would appear that he followed more the furrow of his Greek schooling than of his Punic character.

To conclude the first part of this exposition, this image is in agreement also with the function performed by Heracles-Melqart (cf. Chapters 15, 20).

Designated for his characteristics as protector of the Barcids and already chosen as his personal *alter ego* by his father Hamilcar, who made the god patron of his political designs, the figure of Heracles-Melqart accompanied Hannibal for the whole of the initial phase of his life and ended up by assuming, at least in Hannibal's eyes, further implications that were even more complex and not only propagandistic and political. That is, it came to be filled with philosophical, even more than religious, content, as reference points in Hannibal's approach to the Pythagoreanism still very active in southern Italy and, perhaps still more, to the then badly understood doctrine of Euhemerus, which, according to the Barcid's understanding, must allow him to project his image into eternity (as can be inferred from the dedication of his *res gestae*, the inscription that commemorated his enterprises in the sanctuary of Hera Lacinia: Livy 28.46.6; cf. Pol. 3.33.18; App. *Hann.* 57.242).

If this actually did happen, his attention to this latter doctrine ideally would have taken Hannibal toward that eastern (and perhaps especially Phoenician) world that was the basis of Carthage's roots and culture also. But, by inducing him to rationalize the oldest forms of deification of power that this doctrine propounded, it must also have offered him his first true secular conception of power itself. Moving from the rationalization of remote concepts, the Carthaginian found in Euhemerus' philosophy the most authentic and efficient logical link between the completely oriental concept of sovereignty in divine form and the western concept of a power based on and justified exclusively by *arete*. In it he discovered a lucidly secular theory, which went as far as to justify the accusation of *impietas* that had already been leveled at its founder in his lifetime. For Hannibal, who was probably among the first in the West to realize its implicit potentialities, the figure of Heracles was able to maintain, even in this environment, the exclusive function of a symbol both ethical and political, but not religious.

As far as the legend created by the sources (and not only the poetical ones) is concerned, the figure of Hannibal is decidedly imbued with religious elements. But for the Carthaginian, who was credited with a superhuman nature and supernatural powers even more dangerous than his *crudelitas* and of his *perfidia*, we are dealing — as stated before — with a “leggenda nera,” the content and lines of which are, obviously, the negative version of the Punic version that portrayed him as the earthly projection of Heracles-Melqart. A study,⁶ dated but still valid, identifies in the Hannibal prefigured in Book IV of the *Aeneid* (lines 625–627) the characteristics of a Fury in human form, hurled against Rome by an ancient curse. Virgil's contribution, nevertheless, although perhaps the most important, is not the only one in the creation of this image.

Let us look briefly, for example, at one of the Carthaginian's most famous deeds, the crossing of the Alps. For all antiquity the connection, constant and

inseparable, between the sacred and the mountain⁷ designated this environment as a kind of privileged seat of the divine, which shows itself in every place and in every shape — the massifs, the mountain chains, and even single peaks, considered the preferred dwelling place of the *numen*; the woods and the caves, often cult places even in remotest ages; the waters, endowed with health-giving properties — and which, precisely in this environment, through the grandeur of these places, seems to express a kind of epiphany of power. The mountains, this space of the gods by definition, therefore demand absolutely particular respect, caution, and devotion from all who wish to cross them. This is particularly the case when one is dealing with the Alps, the mountain chain that more than any other, because of its very size, embodies all these characteristics. For this reason the crossing of the Alps was considered in antiquity as a deed worthy of a god; so much so that the one who had done so in the remotest past of mythical time had been none other than Heracles, the heroic civilizer *par excellence*, who had opened the fabled *hodos Herakleia* between Spain and Italy.

Naturally, it was also because of this memory that Hannibal desired to be identified with Heracles. And yet there were certain traits that, at least in the eyes of Roman authors, clearly distinguished him from the Greco-Punic demigod and turned him into an antithetical reflection of the model: in particular his lack of consideration for the naturalistic aspect of religion, which was so very important in the classic world. The description by Silius Italicus is significant. In the *Punica* (3.497–9) the celestial gods themselves, awestruck, watch the crossing of the Alps, “saxa impellentia caelum,” which up to then had been “uni calcata deo” (11.217–18). Likened by Silius himself to Tartarus and to the peaks celebrated in myth (3.483–6, 494–5), the Alps represent an inviolable space because they were considered “secreta deum” denied to “gressibus humanis” (17.500–2), and Hannibal, despite being surrounded by an aura of superhuman greatness like his mythical precursor, pressed into them not from a desire to promote civilization, but from hate and hostility, intent on bearing “impia... sacros in fines arma per orbem, / natura prohibente” (3.512–513).

Further on, he even dares to abandon the path taken by Heracles; this causes him, during the crossing, to use force against Nature, shattering the rock (with fire and vinegar, according to Livy 21.37.2) to open his path (Sil. *Pun.* 3.497). However, by doing this, the Carthaginian stains his reputation with a further sacrilege, violating one of the ideal boundaries of Roman culture: that which obliges man to respect nature and to abstain wherever possible both from desecrating the bowels of the earth and from shattering mountains (Pliny, *HN* 33.70, 73; Sen. *Ep.* 94.57, Hor. *Od.* 3.3.49–52). Already in Livy Hannibal appears, in the eyes of his enemies, as a despiser of *religio* by affirming secularly the predominance of man over Nature (Livy 21.30.7) and Publius Scipio

answers Hannibal's logic in his *adlocutio* to the troops before the battle of Ticinus, reminding them of the strength of the elements that were the first to defeat the Carthaginian's *hybris* (21.40.9–10) and predicting the enemy's ineluctable final punishment notwithstanding his ensuing victories. Silius, who uses Livy as his source, takes the assertion up again, characterizing in his turn the Carthaginian's statement as an act of impious pride.

A further crossing, of the Apennines, must also have implicitly contributed to fascinating the Romans and convincing them of the Carthaginian's superhuman faculties. For a long time identified as the border of authentically Roman Italy, the boundary of the Apennines had been magically protected by recourse to a cruel and alien rite, repeated twice in those years, of the sacrifice of two couples, one of Gauls and one of Greeks (Livy 22.57.4, 6), and the fact that Hannibal had still managed to violate this boundary could only be explained by believing him to have powerful support in the supernatural world. It is no coincidence that his Titanism was quickly recognized at the popular level. Traces of this are found from antiquity in later culture, in an inappropriate, but evocative etymology, that has the place names *Poeninae* (scil. Alps) and *Apenninus* deriving from *Poenus* (e.g. Isidore, *Origines* 14.8.13; Paul the Deacon, *Historia Langobardorum* 2.18).

But where did Hannibal draw his powers from? There is one last episode that could suggest an answer and that, as far as I know, has passed unnoticed. It too, probably not by chance, is connected with a rite of passage. The Latin sources recount how sometimes the Carthaginian would cross rivers *de cadaveribus ponte facto* (Flor. 2.22.18; cf. Livy 23.5.12; Val. Max. 9.2 ext. 2). Although definitely incredible, the anecdote attributes to the Barcid the violation of a very old taboo, which, current since the days of Homer and Hesiod, probably took on new life and strength in the Roman age. The construction of a bridge, however made, represents an event of incredible religious significance, because it obliges one in some way to infringe Nature, and any transformation is always felt to be a sacrilege, only to be dealt with by a protective ritual of extreme importance in order to be effective. The Carthaginian, by contrast, carried out this same act by resorting to forces completely opposite. Whatever the etymology of the word, the Romans believed with Varro (*LL* 5.83) that the word *pontifex* derived from *pons*, and they had long entrusted the construction of these crossings to the competence, ritualistic even more than technical, of the highest of their priests — the *pontifex maximus*. Until the end of the third century the *Pons Sublicius* was the only construction of this type in Rome; and, built completely of wood to respect the sacredness of the waters, it was considered to be a supernatural work to the extent that it was deemed illegal and even sacrilegious to demolish it (Plutarch, *Numa* 9.2). The suggestion is immediate and instinctive. Capable of carrying out this ritually delicate act by piling impiety upon impiety, to the extent of

profaning the waters with decomposing bodies piled up to dam the current (and perhaps also with the metal of their armour), Hannibal appears to define himself as a kind of priestly figure with inverted and completely negative values: one who, in place of the religious precautions that are the natural inheritance of the *pontifex*, uses the forbidden knowledge of black magic in order to achieve his goals.

Even though they considered Hannibal's violence in Italy to be extreme and intolerable, the Romans were relatively accustomed to the atrocities of war. On the other hand — as Cicero reminds us (*Off.* 1.41) — between *vis* and *fraus* they considered the latter “odio digna maiore,” and therefore, despite everything, they considered *perfidia* as the most odious characteristic of the Barcid. But for at least part of contemporary morality, it was the repeated acts of cruelty occurring in Italy that appeared to be more reprehensible. In particular, in the Greek world which, by contrast, considered it perfectly legitimate to use *metis*, less numerous and cruel acts of violence than those committed by Hannibal in Italy were enough to incur severe moral condemnation. Quite apart from its assessment of him as an excellent commander, the judgment of Hellenic culture on him as a man was based on quite different criteria from those of the Romans.

I have dealt with these parameters in a previous work.⁸ In order to consider them, I began with the portrait that Polybius paints of Hannibal in Book IX of his *Histories* (9.22–26). As the Greek historian states, while he was considered cruel by the Romans, he was condemned by his fellow countrymen for his greed, an accusation for which, in my opinion, there was little basis (even though it was later taken up by the Romans themselves). But what struck me most was the parallel figure of the Hannibal called Monomachos. This remarkable personage comes to the fore in one of the councils of war that were held immediately before the departure for Italy. The greatest difficulty to be overcome during the endless journey through wild, arid landscape, populated by barbarous peoples, seemed to be provisioning the army. Hannibal Monomachus took the floor to declare that he had found the only possible solution. All it required, he said, was to train the army to eat human flesh. Although he could not object to the boldness and practicality of the suggestion, Hannibal turned it down on the ground that, when the time came, he would not have known how to impose such a rule either on himself or on his friends (9.24.4–8).

The genesis of this only seemingly grotesque figure, who according to Polybius was responsible for all the atrocities committed by the Carthaginian army in Italy — a conclusion less remarkable given that it involves a *hapax* that reappears nowhere else in all ancient literature — can in my opinion be traced back to Sosylus, Hannibal's Greek teacher. Using this sinister character, Sosylus may have created the Barcid's black twin, a quasi-literary figure basically similar to William Wilson in the story of the same name by Edgar Allan

Poe or to George Stark in Stephen King's novel *The Dark Half*, a "double" intended to assume all the dark, un-Hellenic aspects that Sosylus saw in the pupil he loved, and to absolve him from the blame that risked being considered more serious in Greek eyes, attributing at least some of the Punic atrocities committed in Italy to this scapegoat specifically created for it.

The other document that should be taken into consideration is the so-called "Hannibal papyrus" (*PHamb.* 129), that, for him, represents a sort of arrival point within the contemporary Greek world. While it is impossible to examine this document in detail — it contains a false letter from Hannibal to the Athenians after one of his great victories, possibly Cannae — it can be connected to numerous anti-Roman prophecies that circulated in the Hellenistic environment from the beginning of the second century. Certain suggestions — either explicit or to be inferred from the text — lead one to consider it as having been written in Antigonid circles just after 184 BC, when, following a brief period of entente, tension reopened between Rome and Macedon under Philip V. Hannibal, we must remember, killed himself in 183 in order not to fall into the hands of the *res publica*. It is at least a stimulating hypothesis that this document, perhaps in the form of a literary pamphlet, may have been circulated very shortly after the Barcid's death in order to exploit the emotion that the news must have awakened in the whole Greek world. In such circumstances, the message it contained would have taken on the importance of a veritable spiritual testament. In the forged letter Hannibal, who was rapidly becoming the symbol of opposition to Rome, addresses Athens, definitely the most attractive recipient because of the moral prestige it had always enjoyed in Greece; and between the lines, by alluding to the "weak lance" that the protagonist had broken several times, he hinted that the military might of the *res publica* was essentially far from invincible.

And Carthage? Here too I shall exclude the earliest period and will limit myself to calling to mind how, in Hellenic culture, the African city had been considered a *polis* in every way similar to those of Greece. Proof of this can be found in Aristotle, who assigns to Carthage a privileged ranking in his hierarchy of constitutions (*Pol.* 2.8; see in particular 1272b 24–26). Eratosthenes puts the Romans and the Carthaginians on the same level, defining them as more civilized (*asteioi*) than even many Greeks and marvellously governed (*thaumastôs polituomenoi*: Strabo 1.4.9, C66). Rome was therefore considered very close to Carthage.

But what were the perceptions of Rome herself, and, in particular, what position did she take during the period under examination in the confrontations with the African city? We must first of all define what had been the real attitude of the Punic state at the beginning of the second conflict with Rome and what political weight the *factio Barcina*, the "party" of Barca, had had in their own country. Fabius Pictor (cited by Polybius: frg. 25P = *FRH* Fabius

Pictor 1, fr. 31 = Pol. 3.8.1–5, cf. 3.9.1–5) attributed the blame for the war to Hannibal who “undertook the war completely on his own spontaneous initiative and against Punic opinion,” while he justified the notables of Carthage, “none of whom was prepared to approve his conduct in the clash with the city of Saguntum.”

That at that time this was a kind of *communis opinio* among the Roman aristocracy — and remained so even later, during the war and after — is a fact that seems to emerge from numerous other sources also. In the famous speech to the citizens of Capua soon after the defeat at Cannae, Terentius Varro depicts the army that defeated him as some kind of alien host that had come from “ab ultimis terrarum oris, freto Oceani Herculisque columnis,” and “expertem omnis iuris et condicionis et linguae prope humanae” (Livy 23.5.11): an image that returns, at least partially, in other protagonists too in Livy’s epic, for example in M. Minucius Rufus (22.14.3). But, if the preferred reading *indigena* (at 23.5.11) is correct, found as it is in the better codices and usually accepted by editors, Hannibal cannot even be considered to be a Carthaginian. He is, in fact, the “Poenus hostis, ne Africae quidam indigena,” not even African.

It is easy to say that this is just propaganda from an obviously pro-Roman source, but Livy himself (25.1.6–12, 12.1–11) recounts yet another episode. Among the measures that the Senate in Rome adopted in 212 was the reading of two prophecies attributed to a certain *vates* Marcius, a seer, the so-called *carmina Marciana*. The first of these contained a prophecy *ex eventu*, warning the Romans to stay away from Cannae and from the *campus Diomedis* if they wished to avoid a massacre, the second suggested sacral remedies to guarantee the safety of the Republic. In the definition given in the first of these texts, the enemy is described as “vomica gentium,” an abscess which “venit longe,” reaching Italy from far away to bring destruction, while the second speaks of a “hostis alienigena.” This last term seems to be most significant. As has been already said, the term “alienigena” carries with it “a semantic nuance” that distinguishes it “from other terms only apparently synonymous, in more frequent use” — such as “barbarian” — and it expresses “the idea of a radical difference, of a clear distinction,” of total extraneousness.⁹ Whether they go back, as some think, to none other than Livius Andronicus or can in any case be dated to just before the second century, these *carmina* are quite significant. With their alien characteristics, Hannibal and his army cannot under any circumstances be considered a representation of Carthage and its people.

A trace of the existence of this idea seems to underlie the text by Polybius referred to above. In referring to Fabius Pictor, the Greek historian (3.8.1–8, 9.1–5) states that he is unable to give weight to Pictor’s assertion, despite the fact that he repeats it himself, but he hints that a rather different reality can be

discerned in his description. Still according to Polybius (3.20.9–10, 33.1–4), the envoys sent by the *res publica* under the leadership of one of the Fabii, who had come to demand an explanation for why Saguntum had been destroyed, on reaching Carthage presented the Punic authorities with a choice: either hand over Hannibal and his general staff or face war. Faced with this choice, the most able of the Carthaginian elders stood up in the middle of the Senate to justify his city's actions. He did this by passing over the Ebro accord in silence, as if it had never existed or at any rate as if it had no value, since it had been concluded without Carthage's agreement. He stated that relations between Rome and the African city could only be according to the treaty of 241, which ended the war in Sicily, since this was the only valid document that could determine the relations between the two powers. Iberia was not mentioned at all in that document and despite the fact that, when the treaty was drawn up, the safety of the respective allies of both was guaranteed, naturally the citizens of Saguntum were not included (Pol. 3.21.1–5).

In order to be able to present a reasonably logical reading of the episode, one must reverse the sequence of events put forward by Polybius: to the statement of the *gerontion*, through the mouth of one of its spokesmen, dissociating itself from the Iberian policies of the Barcids, the Roman envoys replied by demanding that the senate of Carthage hand over those who had committed the act for which it refused responsibility. On one hand, this perspective reveals the fact that conduct of the Punic oligarchy was not unanimous, and that within it there was an element that was opposed to the *factio Barcina*, not only on foreign policy. On the other hand it offers a surprising hypothesis: that, in effect, the Roman ambassadors themselves had foreseen the arguments put forward by the Carthaginian senator, considered them at least partly plausible, and were therefore prepared to verify them by the facts. So, it is my opinion that their reply was intended to offer their Punic counterparts one last possibility of avoiding war. Furthermore, with all respect to Polybius (3.8.9–11, cf. 9.1–5), the annalistic accounts coeval with the event took the same position, obviously indeed with the support of some of the African notables and at least partly shared within the Roman Senate itself. To what other conclusion could these passages set out here have led, if not to an observation — that of Fabius Pictor — that seems exactly parallel on the Roman side to the Punic arguments?

Nevertheless, one cannot in my view speak only of groups who opposed the war. The ties between the two aristocracies were much deeper than that. In both cities there existed conservative factions that had been linked over time by important ties of friendship and hospitality, so that there was even informal dialogue between them and they often maneuvered at cross purposes to official relations between the two states, to their own reciprocal advantage. It is probable that, with the support of the friends they had in Rome, large and

even majority factions in the Carthaginian Senate may have opposed the Barcids. Hanno, who became the symbol of a resistance to their power that counted on the support of the Italian *res publica*, was certainly not the only “Romanum senatorem in Carthaginiensi curia” (according to the later accusation by Himilco: Livy 23.12.5).

The Roman Senate too was divided, and beside groups of families — the Cornelii Scipiones, the Livii, the Appii Claudii and Aemilii — who were openly hostile to Carthage, there existed a part of the Roman aristocracy that maintained excellent relationships with Punic nobles and was able to count on the strong connivance of an oligarchic faction within the *gerontion* to whom they intended to restore power. The leaders of this group were probably the *gens* of the Fabii, the only one for whom the ties of hospitality with the Punic oligarchy is specifically attested in the sources (Carthalo, commander of the garrison at Tarentum, was mistakenly killed by a soldier when, disarmed, he attempted to approach Q. Fabius Maximus counting on “commemorazione paterni hospitii”: Livy 27.16.5). Equally, M. Fabius Buteo was possibly the leader of the last embassy before the outbreak of hostilities; after the death of Fabius Gurgus and before the advent of the Cunctator he was one of the leaders of the *gens* and probably had the task of curbing the warlike impulses of the younger members in the embassy. It is not impossible that even those suspicions of connivance with the enemy that subsequently fell upon Fabius Maximus (e.g. Pol. 3.89.3, 94.8, 103.2ff.; Livy 22.15.1, 23.3; Plut. *Fab.* 5.3, 5.5, 5.7; 8.4) might have been fed by the memory of the pro-Punic attitude of the Fabii before hostilities began. The suspicion that, to paraphrase Himilco’s sarcasm, there existed *Carthaginienses senatores...in Romana curia*, must have sometimes flashed through the minds of the *patres* of the Republic.

It can hardly be a coincidence that Fabius Pictor, also a *gentilis* of the same clan, should be the one to set out this position. Refusing to admit that Hannibal was the true representative of the Punic state, this aristocratic annalist did not correctly represent things as they actually were, but as he would have liked them to be. That is to say, he identified government by the *boni* as the only possible political form, and, as a *nobilis*, he turned to them ideally even when the oligarchic *factio* was not in power. Following a typically aristocratic point of view, he concluded by identifying the true Carthage with the most traditionalist of its oligarchs, that is those with whom part of the Roman Senate — and in particular his own *gens* — had established very close relations over time; in turn he refused to recognize the “democratic” government that supported the family of Hannibal.

Apart from this, important sectors of the Roman *nobilitas* vehemently opposed the decision to go to war against Carthage, not only in 218, but even before that in 264 at the outbreak of the war for Sicily and then again

later in 205, when the planned landing in Africa of Scipio encountered the opposition — once again — of Fabius and his *pars*. After the victory of Zama, in Rome there were discussions on how to deal with the defeated state. Several of the *patres*, among them the consul for the year, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, insisted on the necessity of continuing the war until Carthage was completely destroyed, but they were definitely in the minority. For one thing, in fact, the ties that had existed for years between the aristocracies continued to exist, and they were so strong that they proved still decisive in 195, when there were “*adversae Hannibalis factionis homines*” to write “*principibus Romanis, hospitibus quisque suis*,” resulting in the sending of the embassy that forced Hannibal onto the road of exile (Livy 33.45.6; on the responsibility of the Punic oligarchs cf. also 33.47.3ff.; Nep. *Hann.* 7.6; Appian, *Hann.* 4). On the other, it was Scipio himself who, after the victory, took the path of moderation. Despite the fact that one of Livy’s sources (30.36.10–11, 44.3) affirms that he decided to make peace only because he feared the arrival of a successor (otherwise he would have continued his operations against the city, at least according to Appian, *Lib.* 56.245, and Zonaras 9.14.2), Polybius records that Africanus promised the envoys from Carthage that he would behave with moderation; and even later he always followed the criterion of dealing with defeated enemies with clemency (first in 190 he expressed this view in a letter to Prusias of Bithynia (Pol. 21.11) and later put it into practice in the negotiations with Antiochus III of Syria: 21.17.1–2).

On the other hand this choice was not only in the interests of Carthage, but also in those of Rome herself (Pol. 15.17.3; cf. Appian, loc. cit.). There are considerable traces of the debate in the historiography that have left us with the basic outlines of the orations in 201 in favor of Carthage. Many of the characteristic clichés of oratory are certainly to be found in these: such as, for example, the reminder of the advantage for Rome of allowing a strong enemy to survive as an incentive to her (App. *Lib.* 65.290–1; Val. Max. 7.2.3); or the mention of the weight of Tyche/Fortuna, whose volatility was an invitation to moderation (Diod. 27.14–15, cf. 17.4; Appian, *Lib.* 57.250; 59.260; cf. Livy 30.42.14). Some of these motives seem, however, very plausible. Not only was there still an awareness, during this period, of the appropriateness of respecting foreign public opinion, which would not have approved of an extreme act such as the destruction of the African city (Diod. 27.14, cf. 15.3, 16.2, 17.1; Appian, *Lib.* 57.248–50); but the need for leniency in victory was also considered a requirement typical of the Roman people (Diod. 27.14; Appian, *Lib.* 57.250, 58.253–7; an ambassador from Carthage mentions it in Livy 30.42.17) and magnanimity was considered to be a useful tool in the exercise and maintenance of hegemony (Diod. 27.15–16; cf. Appian, *Lib.* 57.248). Apart from the excerpts from Diodorus and others above, see Diod. 27.13–18; Livy 30.43.1–4; Appian, *Lib.* 57.246–65.291; Dio, frgs. 57.4; 59; cf. Zonaras 1.14.12).

In literature too, the accusations against Carthage seem to have started somewhat later. The verses that survive of Cn. Naevius on the First Punic War (although composed during the second conflict), do not show any particular aversion to the enemy. This continued in the period immediately following: both in the refined output of Q. Ennius and also in those more obviously aimed at a popular audience of T. Maccius Plautus seem to lack any hostile prejudice against the Punic people. An occasional polemical allusion against Carthage can be found now and again in the fragments of Ennius (e.g. the sacrifice of children: 221 V³), which involve chiefly, however, anti-Hannibalic barbs. Apart from cruelty to the wounded (286 V³) and bad faith (274–5 V³), explicit traces of Elissa-Dido's "Punic curse" have been identified in his fragments, the curse which, repeated in Virgil, unleashed the terrible *ultor* against the *res publica*. As for Plautus, there is no bitterness in the depiction of Hanno in the *Poenulus*. The *patruos multiphagonides* (line 54), the polenta-eating uncle who wears the characteristic Punic ankle-length tunic (ll. 975–6; cf. 1121) and looks like a "puer cauponis," a serving boy in a tavern (1298), is a good-natured, not spiteful, caricature; and like him the other Carthaginian characters in the play are positive.

By contrast, the legend of Atilius Regulus is undoubtedly full of poisonous rancor, but, as far as we know, the first to speak of the tortures inflicted upon him was C. Sempronius Tuditanus (fr. 5 P² = *FRH* 8, fr. 5), annalist and consul for the year 129. The absence of older sources could just be due to chance: but it seems probable, in fact, that this motif developed during his youth, around the middle of the second century, while preparations were being made for the decisive intervention in Africa. At this time, it was against the Punic people in general that Cato hurled his arrows. In his fiery oratory they were depicted, not only as the most implacable enemies of the Roman state (*ORF*⁴, fr. 195), but also as the people who had always been capable of every atrocity (*ORF*⁴, frgs. 187, 191, 193, 195b) and every treachery (fr. 195b; cf. *Orig.*, fr. 84 P²).

There can only be one conclusion and that is that, for a long time, the Romans distinguished Carthage from Hannibal. When *perfidia Hannibalis* came to be definitely identified with *fides Punica*, came that is to be felt as the characteristic of an entire people, Carthage at last reaped, unfortunately for her, the bitter harvest of Cato's figs. When in 146 BC the African city was destroyed, only one work from the entire Punic literary production was taken back to Italy, and that was Mago's treatise on agronomy. The translation of this work was entrusted to the *periti linguae Punicae*, who were still numerous in Rome despite all that had happened (Pliny, *HN* 18.22–3). Their presence and their influence could not save Carthage. But the rest of the city's library was offered by Scipio Aemilianus to the *reguli Africae*, that is the heirs of Masinissa who, the Roman victor well knew, had a Hellenistic education. In this way, the culture of the city was saved, at least for the time being. Almost

two centuries after the destruction, these precious scrolls were still kept in the bookshelves of Juba II, king of Mauretania, who was historian, geographer and, in general, a great scholar.

NOTES

1. Prandi 1979.
2. Montanari 1976, 201.
3. Càssola 1962, 94.
4. De Sanctis 1968, 3.2.176.
5. G.-C. Picard 1976, "La religion d'Hannibal" (résumé), *Renaissance, Humanisme et Réforme* 163, 124.
6. A.-M. Tupet, "Didon magicienne," *Revue des Études Latines* 48 (1970), 29–58.
7. For all of these: A. Bernardi, "L'evoluzione storica nel sentimento della montagna. Concezioni divinizzanti e sacrali, finalità religiose e morali, diletto estetico e mondano," in *Pietas loci. Riflessioni sulla religiosità antica e altri saggi di storia romana* (Como 1991), 15–21; and "Il divino e il sacro nella montagna dell'Italia antica," Bernardi 1991, 23–32; S. Giorcelli Bersani, "Il sacro e il sacrilego nella montagna antica: aspetti del divino nelle testimonianze letterarie e nelle fonti epigrafiche," in *Gli antichi e la montagna. Ecologia, religione, economia e politica del territorio (Atti del Convegno—Aosta, 21–24 settembre 1999)*, ed. Silvia Giorcelli Bersani (Torino 2001), 27–44.
8. Brizzi 1984b, 7–32.
9. G.P. Urso, "Il concetto di 'alienigena' nella guerra annibalica," in M. Sordi (ed.), *Emigrazione e immigrazione nel mondo antico*, (CISA 20, Milano, 1994), 223–36, on p. 226.

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NB (1) Very frequent names and terms, e.g. Africa, Carthage, Hannibal (the famous general), Italy, legion, Livy, Polybius, Rome, Spain, are not indexed. (2) A few names or technical terms are spelled in different ways in various chapters, e.g. *adsidui* and *assidui*, Heracles and Hercules, Vergil and Virgil; these are reflected in the index.

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